

# UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS IN EARLY EUROPE

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# UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS IN EARLY EUROPE

Edited by  
Michael Champion  
and Andrew Lynch



BREPOLS

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|      |                                                                                                                                                         |
|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AQDG | Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters<br>(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1955–)                                 |
| BIA  | Borthwick Institute for Archives                                                                                                                        |
| BT   | Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana                                                                                               |
| CCSL | Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (Turnhout: Brepols, 1951–)                                                                                           |
| CSEL | Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum<br>(Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1866–)                                            |
| MGH  | <i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica</i>                                                                                                                    |
| AA   | <i>Auctores antiquissimi</i> , 15 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877–1919)                                                                                    |
| SRG  | <i>Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum</i> , 78 vols<br>(Hannover, Leipzig, and Berlin: Hahn, 1846–)                                        |
| SRM  | <i>Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum</i> , 7 vols<br>(Hannover and Leipzig: Hahn, 1884–1920)                                                              |
| SS   | <i>Scriptores</i> , 39 vols (Hannover and Leipzig: Hahn, 1826–)                                                                                         |
| PG   | <i>Patrologiae cursus completus: series graeca</i> , ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne, 161 vols (Paris: Migne, 1857–66)                                        |
| PL   | <i>Patrologiae cursus completus: series latina</i> , ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne, 221 vols (Paris: Migne, 1844–64)                                        |
| SC   | Sources chrétiennes (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1943–)                                                                                                    |
| TGF  | <i>Tragicorum graecorum fragmenta</i> , ed. by Bruno Snell, Stefan Radt, and Richard Kannicht, 5 vols<br>(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971–2004) |
| YML  | York Minster Library                                                                                                                                    |





## UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS: 'THE THINGS THEY LEFT BEHIND'

Michael Champion and Andrew Lynch

In the self-narrative of oral confession, a practice which gave a vital role to later medieval understandings of personal emotions, the penitent was required to tell the priest 'those circumstances and details that identify a sin for what it is'.<sup>1</sup> When modern scholars consider the nature of emotions in premodern history, they might imagine themselves in a position somewhat like the priest's; that is, although aware of formulaic discourses and schemes of classification, their first task is to attend carefully to testimonies that are inherently subjective, circumstantial, and situational. Joanna Bourke has written that the 'primary problem' in understanding historical emotions 'has been to define what emotions actually "are"'.<sup>2</sup> Using a metaphor of sight rather than hearing, she quickly adds that whatever emotions are, 'they have to be "made visible" if historians are to examine them',<sup>3</sup> and that they are made visible in the record of human experience, not as abstractions. So, for example, 'There is no such thing

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<sup>1</sup> Allen, 'Waxing Red', p. 193.

<sup>2</sup> Bourke, 'Fear and Anxiety', p. 111.

<sup>3</sup> Bourke, 'Fear and Anxiety', p. 113.

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as “fear”: there are only “fearful people”, and ‘the only access historians have to these fearful people in the past is through the things they left behind’.<sup>4</sup>

Bourke’s views on the study of emotion are more complex than this selective picture gives, and we do not mention them here in any attempt at definition. Rather, it is to draw attention to the capaciousness and variety of the human emotional remains ‘left behind’ from the premodern world, and the distinct challenges that confront modern attempts to understand them. The analogy of the scholar of past emotion as qualified listener to a direct self-narrative in a regulated, highly conventional setting quickly breaks down. The modern scholar must also consider the many different evidentiary materials, genres, and modes in which historical emotion may be located, the contested and fluid nature of the cultural conventions which help to give meaning to emotional experiences in any complex human situation, and the multiple methodologies used to produce and analyse the voice, or the vision, in which the investigative process results. And yet an element of likeness in the analogy remains: however biologically instrumental and prelinguistic emotional responses may be considered to be, and however contested they are by contrary definitions, they are manifested in particular places and times, and in particular words, deeds, and things; in that important way, emotion — past and present — is always historical. Equally, although the contemplation of emotions allows a human capacity for sympathy — ‘feeling with’ — as in any other domain of historical inquiry there is no direct access to the sources and thus no timeless or natural understanding of emotions goes unchallenged, and no approach can be treated as unmediated by particular intellectual, emotional, rhetorical, socio-economic, and institutional formations and their effects, especially in relation to emotionally charged historical questions of whose emotions matter, and which, why, how, and when.

To give one instance, universalist aspects of both neuro-scientific and traditional humanist approaches have received strong recent criticism for ignoring the social, political, and moral contexts in which emotional development occurs and is controlled. Daniel Gross reaches back to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* for the view that

anger [...] is constituted not in the biology nor even in the dignity all human beings are supposed to share equally, but rather in relationships of inequity<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Bourke, ‘Fear and Anxiety’, p. 117, citing Harré, ‘An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint’, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Gross, *The Secret History of Emotion*, p. 2.

and to Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* to argue that

far from a symmetrical phenomenon felt equally for everyone by everyone else, for Smith [...] sympathy is precisely about negotiating social difference *from a particular perspective*.<sup>6</sup>

Anger is often defined by theorists as a 'primary' emotion, but while Gross's social point is well taken, attempts to define the fundamental sources and components of 'primary' emotions may make one sceptical about whether 'Ur-emotions' exist. Pushing the problem back to the 'primary' or basic affects which may be said to constitute emotions will not solve the problem either.<sup>7</sup> Further, that definitions of 'anger' and 'sympathy' can be so similar (the one a relationship of inequity, the other a relationship of social difference that may include inequity) points to problems surrounding the utility of defining what is universal in any emotion, along the lines so thoroughly explored from a linguistics standpoint across a variety of languages by Anna Wierzbicka.<sup>8</sup>

Working from a different standpoint, Roger Scruton has utilized Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric* to deny that our response to the emotional content of literature is a biologically-based 'affective appraisal' based on a version of our emotional response to others in real life, which, he argues, would involve a readiness to act which is not possible in the context of fiction.<sup>9</sup> Stoic philosophers, of course, cut this debate off before it started, arguing that what one feels when watching a tragedy unfold on stage is not an emotion at all, since it does not involve beliefs about real wrongs and appropriate actions that should be taken in response to them (e.g. Seneca, *De ira*, 2. 2. 3–6). Literature and history can stimulate the first movements that are the preludes to emotions (*principia proludentia adfectibus*), and these first movements may be necessary constituents of emotions. But literary and historical narratives do not, for Seneca and the other Stoics, elicit the sorts of judgements that constitute emotions.<sup>10</sup> Scruton takes a rather different course, congruent with understanding

<sup>6</sup> Gross, *The Secret History of Emotion*, p. 172.

<sup>7</sup> See Mortillaro, Meuleman, and Scherer, 'Advocating a Componential Appraisal Model to Guide Emotion Recognition'; and the work of the Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences more generally, for modern 'componential appraisal' theories of emotion.

<sup>8</sup> See for example Wierzbicka, 'The "History of Emotions" and the Future of Emotion Research', and Wierzbicka, *Emotions Across Languages and Cultures*.

<sup>9</sup> Scruton, 'Feeling Fictions', pp. 96–97.

<sup>10</sup> For critical discussion of this Stoic position, see Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, pp. 76–81. The Senecan position has been championed recently by Walton, 'Fearing Fictions'.

emotions as experienced in densely-layered narratives or imaginative worlds.<sup>11</sup> Emotions make sense in stories and ‘stories express their structure and teach us their dynamics’.<sup>12</sup> Scruton appeals to Aristotle’s idea that the will is trained in virtue through practice — ‘by “learning what to feel” towards fictional tragedies, we rehearse the emotions that we shall need in life’<sup>13</sup> — and also to Adam Smith: ‘sympathetic responses of whatever kind involve *wanting something for someone else* [...] [which] is, as Smith rightly observes, the root of moral feeling’.<sup>14</sup> Emotions understood as judgements about objects seen, imagined, believed, and valued within complex narratives shaped by culture, social structures, and personal histories from the earliest childhood experiences onwards suggest that literature and history, in their study of textual and non-textual practices and artefacts, have a role to play in shaping moral and emotional experience.<sup>15</sup> The history of emotions therefore always works on at least two levels. It reconstructs past emotions while simultaneously maintaining, changing or expanding possibilities for contemporary emotional life.

These examples show how irresolvable the long debate on the nature of emotions currently seems, to the extent that the final essay in one distinguished collection is entitled ‘Enough Already with “Theories of the Emotions”’.<sup>16</sup> Philosophers, historians, literary scholars, anthropologists, linguists, psychologists, and neuroscientists, using methods which are sometimes incommensurable even with others within their own specialism, are currently working away at different aspects of the study of the emotions, variously defined. In that context, it may be quixotic to hope even for weak methodological coherence or commonly-shared definitions of emotions.

Yet if such coherence of definition and method are desired, it is useful to provide the rich case studies from a variety of fields that are necessary for

Sorabji’s identification of the importance of attention in emotion is a useful corrective to the Stoic position.

<sup>11</sup> For one of several defences of such a claim, see Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*. In her neo-Stoic cognitive account of emotions, Nussbaum speaks of the ‘density’ of narrative emotional experience (p. 65).

<sup>12</sup> Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge*, p. 287.

<sup>13</sup> Scruton, ‘Feeling Fictions’, p. 101.

<sup>14</sup> Scruton, ‘Feeling Fictions’, p. 100.

<sup>15</sup> This case is put in detail in Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, introduced especially at pp. 27–33.

<sup>16</sup> Rorty, ‘Enough Already with “Theories of the Emotions”’.

theory development and to hold open space for conversations about such case studies between disciplines. Disciplines in the humanities may reasonably hope to assist other fields to study emotions. The examples from Aristotle, Adam Smith, and the Stoics above show how the thought of the European past, from ancient Greek philosophy to the Scottish Enlightenment, is to be found in the forefront of contemporary battles, and often valued particularly for its limitations on the reach of all-explaining 'theory', and its emphasis on the effect of local conditions. A recent view from psychology is that 'local context, which in turn is influenced by [...] life history, culture, and temperament' is what develops the distinct phenomenon of an 'emotion' out of the raw potential within a 'brain state'.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, even in a strong defence of the theory of the embodiment of emotions, it is acknowledged that 'culture can exert considerable influence on how elicitation files are modified and created', where an 'elicitation file' is 'a mental file of "body-change elicitors"', that 'may start out with a handful of triggers and expand over the life span'.<sup>18</sup> Childhood development theorists identify ways in which genetically-predisposed emotional expressions are practised as part of the development of many cognitive and physical skills. Emotional development is therefore marked by embodiment and culture as it unfolds in the particular situational context of language acquisition and attachment to the caregiver.<sup>19</sup> Such theories emphasize the ways in which culturally-situated language learning enables the development of increasingly complex and mutually interacting emotions. They help to explain the ways in which we become more or less able to feel a range of emotions, as our capacity to reconfigure experience through linguistically and culturally mediated memory, reflection, and anticipation changes, or is expanded or constrained by circumstance (health, education, chance events, social, political, and economic situations). From a philosophical perspective, Amélie Rorty insists that 'a person's — a society's — characteristic emotional repertoire, its patterns of dominant and recessive emotions and attitudes, is structured by, and in turn reinforces, political and economic arrangements'.<sup>20</sup> In William Reddy's thesis,<sup>21</sup> which incorporates the findings of laboratory science, linguistics, and anthropology, emotional utterances are still historically active: as 'emotives' they are

<sup>17</sup> Kagan, *What is Emotion?*, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Prinz, 'Embodied Emotions', p. 56.

<sup>19</sup> Fischer, Shaver, and Carnochan, 'A Skill Approach to Emotional Development'.

<sup>20</sup> Rorty, 'Enough Already with "Theories of the Emotions"', p. 276.

<sup>21</sup> Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*.

capable of arousing and altering within historical situations the feelings they might seem only to express or refer to; they 'may cause an increase in activation of the emotions named', where 'activation' is 'a state that renders thoughts and other inputs available for processing'.<sup>22</sup>

These and other more-or-less 'cultural-historical' views of emotion are currently influential, and harmonize with narrative accounts of emotions which are especially amenable to literary and historical analysis. The history, literature, art and material culture of the past still provide us with a vast repertoire of practices, images and discourses in a range of languages to illustrate and articulate complex emotional life, complexity that may be missed, for example, in the predominantly English-based surveys often used in psychological studies of emotions. In this regard, historical and philological analysis of the different terms different cultures using different languages have employed to describe broadly emotional phenomena, including passions, appetites, affects, dispositions, feelings, and moods, may enrich contemporary understandings of emotion by providing a more differentiated and subtle emotional vocabulary.<sup>23</sup>

Therefore a 'cultural' approach draws together a wide range of social practices and directs attention to political, ethical, and social questions as well as to individual agents, while incorporating insights about the learned and embodied nature of emotions. Such factors combine in emotions, which depend on how individuals see people or objects, and on how the object of our emotions is imagined within narratives which are in turn shaped by individual experience and social structures.<sup>24</sup> As Reddy and others have urged, this encourages the historian or literary critic to take seriously ways in which social norms, dominant cultural plots, and an individual's experience from childhood onwards constrain emotional and ethical imagination and expression.<sup>25</sup> When what a historical actor finds herself wanting to feel stands in direct opposition to what she knows (or what it may be plausibly inferred) she is socially or politically expected to feel, the historian may find both an often overlooked element of historical, political, psychological, and social change, and (crucially for Reddy) an index of political, social, and psychological suffering. Reddy therefore

<sup>22</sup> Wilce, *Language and Emotion*, pp. 61–62.

<sup>23</sup> For discussion of the utility of reclaiming a richer range of terminology to describe emotional experience than commonly used in contemporary psychology, see Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*.

<sup>24</sup> Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought* again provides a substantial account along these lines.

<sup>25</sup> Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*; and Plamper, 'The History of Emotions', pp. 240, 243.

directs his attention towards 'emotional regimes' — those socially constructed practices that constrain individual emotional expression — as part of a history of emotions usefully understood as a 'way of doing political, social, and cultural history [and, we might add, intellectual history, ethics, and aesthetics], not something to be added to existing fields.'<sup>26</sup> Taken together, these varied current approaches show that the European past is not over and done with in the study of emotions; it is a living, protean presence, even if, like Proteus, always an elusive one.

We have divided *Understanding Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* in roughly equal measure amongst three sets of the historical material concerning emotions 'left behind' from that premodern period: intellectual traditions, literature, and social and material culture. In each set, the separate essays treat different but often overlapping parts of their wider fields. Respectively, they trace concurrent lines of influence that gave post-Classical European intellectuals their terminologies and modes for discussing emotions, through a mixture of philosophical, rhetorical, and theological discourses; they show the effects of theories of aesthetics, of literary and cognitive theory, and of developments in genre on demonstrations and analyses of psychological and embodied emotion in literature; they show the deeply embedded emotive content in rituals, formal documents, daily 'conversation', communal practice, and cultural memory.

The essays collectively offer a conspectus of contemporary investigative and interpretative strategies, and also often show a close inter-relatedness in their concepts and critical practices. This is not surprising. For instance, even if philosophy was primarily about living the good life, discussion of emotions from the Greeks onwards could hardly separate philosophy from literature, which was its enduring communicative form and provided its main source of examples, and from rhetoric, although the latter was sometimes suspected of emotional fakery for narrow persuasive ends. The association between philosophy and literature became pervasive and very long lasting.<sup>27</sup> At the start of the Middle Ages, Boethius instinctively turns to the story of Orpheus's longing backward look to illustrate a reversion to this world after rising to better things: 'Happy is he who can break the heavy chains of earth.'<sup>28</sup> In the 1570s, Philip Sidney takes

<sup>26</sup> Reddy in Plamper, 'The History of Emotions', p. 243.

<sup>27</sup> For modern interactions between philosophy and literature relevant to the field of emotions, see Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge*; and Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*.

<sup>28</sup> Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, book III, poem 12, trans. by Green.



Virgil's *Aeneid* as the complete example of how poetry both models a steady Protestant moral virtue and 'moves' readers emotionally to imitate it.<sup>29</sup>

In work here by David Konstan, Michael Champion, Juanita Feros Ruys, and Daniel Anlezark that bridges these chronological markers, the medieval links between philosophy, theology, literature and rhetoric are traced while the authors deliberately situate the intellectual traditions in the context of wider cultural practices. Anlezark's creative literary readings of the Exeter Book perhaps most clearly demonstrate the connections between the essays grouped under 'Literature' and 'Intellectual Traditions', but each essay includes varying degrees of literary analysis. Thus, the essays in this set are placed first since they foreshadow many of the themes and methods employed in the later sections.

Four inter-related philosophical and theological traditions help to generate the majority of the 'emotional scripts' analysed in the various contributions to this volume.<sup>30</sup> From Classical Antiquity, Platonism, Aristotelian thought, and Stoicism have a long life into the early modern period and beyond, and different Christian thinkers interact with these traditions in different ways and add their own concepts. Perhaps the most creative tension across these traditions is debates over *metriopatheia* (championed in different ways by thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, and Thomas Aquinas) and *apatheia* (promoted by the Stoics and strands of Christian asceticism).<sup>31</sup> That is, should the emotions be expurgated, understood as foreign to the life of the sage, since they are either erroneous judgements or consequent upon giving in to temptation, or may emotions, appropriately displayed, be a significant element of the moral life, necessary, perhaps, for ultimate knowledge of truth or participation in the divine life? Different answers to such questions help to create new understandings of remorse (so Konstan will argue); they set Psellos at odds with his mother and elements of contemporary Byzantine society (as analysed by Champion); they potentially distinguish demons from good angels but associate them with Christ the 'suffering servant' and thus make attributing sadness to Satan theologically risky (as suggested by Ruys); and they colour the poetics of the Exeter Book (as argued by Anlezark in readings of *Resignation*

<sup>29</sup> Philip Sidney, *An Apology for Poetry*, ed. by Shepherd, p. 85.

<sup>30</sup> For 'emotional scripts', see Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint and Community in Ancient Rome*, pp. 8–9 and *passim*.

<sup>31</sup> On these two concepts, see Dillon, 'Metriopatheia and Apatheia'. Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 5–79 has an extended treatment of the relevant ancient traditions.

and *The Wanderer*). Tension between the ideals of *apatheia* and *metriopatheia* thus helps to generate changing conceptions of the emotions from late antiquity through into the early modern period.

If we accept that emotions have a history, then other problems, shared by any intellectual history, arise. For if ideas and emotions have a history, then they change, and accounting for identity within change has caused difficulties since at least Heraclitus. How are we to know that when a Greek says 'polis' he means anything that can meaningfully be related to the modern nation state? Staying within the same language, marked however strongly by loan words, how are we to know that the 'fear' Shoemaker analyses below in eighteenth-century England has anything to do with twenty-first-century phobias? And if translating between eighteenth- and twenty-first-century fear is difficult enough, what about the case where a new emotion comes into existence in a particular culture? David Konstan's essay on regret and remorse may be read as a contribution to such questions, as it traces ways in which these concepts were used and changed from classical Greece into the early medieval period and beyond in a collection of very different cultures.

Konstan also charts ways in which the Christian claim that humans are sinners transforms classical understandings of regret and remorse which were based on the very different assumption that humans are fundamentally decent. His essay, like others in this set, thus provides support for Rorty's claim that theories of emotion 'are comprehensible only within the larger frame of a relatively complete philosophy of mind/philosophical psychology'.<sup>32</sup> Christian claims about personhood make remorse an element of repentance, just as the eclipse of such ideas can lead Spinoza to argue, without reinstating the primarily intellectual account of regret common in classical texts, that 'Repentance is not a virtue, i.e. it does not arise from reason. Rather, he who repents what he did is twice miserable, i.e. impotent' (Spinoza, *Ethica*, pt IV, prop. 54). The roles emotion plays in different Christian and broadly Aristotelian theories of mind are at stake in Ruys's chapter on whether and how demons may be understood to feel emotions. Anlezark argues that Stoic, Aristotelian, and broadly Platonic theories of mind, mediated by thinkers such as Augustine, John Cassian, and biblical commentators, sit behind very different accounts of emotions in early English lyric. Stoic rejection of emotion may resonate with Christian asceticism and elements of poems such as the *Wanderer* and *Resignation*, while philosophical and theological accounts of how emotion may be profitably directed

<sup>32</sup> Rorty, 'Enough Already with "Theories of the Emotions"', p. 278.

and transformed by an eschatological *telos* help to generate the positive evaluation of *caritas* in Thomas of Hales's thirteenth-century *Luue-Ron*. Similarly, Champion suggests that the traces of different evaluations of emotional experience left behind in the speeches of the Byzantine polymath Michael Psellos are partly generated by competing psychologies drawn ultimately from Plato, Aristotle and monasticism influenced by Evagrius of Pontus.

Various levels of philosophical and theological consistency and detail can be expected of different thinkers writing for different purposes, and 'folk psychology' supports, for example, many of the images of a poem like *The Wanderer* or Psellos' *Speech to his Grandson*, despite Psellos' evident philosophical interests.<sup>33</sup> If the essays collected here point to the continuing influence of philosophical psychologies on premodern understandings of the emotions and ways in which those systems filtered down into popular thought as well as into poetry, homiletics, oratory, and technical theological tracts, they also point to wider cultural conventions and practices which are necessary to make theories of emotions comprehensible. Even the most philosophical of the scholastic debates elucidated by Ruys makes sense only if set within cultural practices such as penitence and narratives of salvation. Anlezark's readings of the early English elegies *Resignation* and *The Wanderer* show how literary allusions (to biblical and secular texts and philosophical and cosmological thought) as well as wider cultural narratives of exile, asceticism, and penitence are necessary to frame the poets' understanding of emotion. Similarly, asceticism, court politics, and gender expectations all shape Psellos' orations. Throughout, each of the contributors to this volume insists that intellectual history must be culturally situated and sensitive to literary images and conventions.<sup>34</sup>

Ways in which genre affects how emotions can be expressed and understood (both by contemporaries and modern scholars) are thus central to many chapters. Established rhetorical conventions for constructing *encomia*, for example, mean that Psellos' discussions of emotions are closely related to ethics and can-

<sup>33</sup> For the concept of 'folk psychology', a learned 'system by which people organize their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the social world' see Bruner, *Acts of Meaning*, p. 35.

<sup>34</sup> The companion volume to this collection, *Performing Emotions*, focuses on aspects of the embodiment of emotions and performativity, so those elements of 'understanding emotions', and the related theoretical standpoints, especially those associated with Judith Butler, are not investigated in detail here, although many of the essays in this collection are to some degree influenced by them.

not clearly be separated from virtues, desires, motives, and character traits.<sup>35</sup> The five essays, by Miranda Stanyon, Antonina Harbus, Andrew Lynch, Jennifer Carpenter, and Margarete Rubik, grouped under 'Literature' trace the course of emotional understanding within a variety of developments in generic form — pindaric ode, moral lyric, romance, hagiography, travel writing — and, for example, in the poetics of metaphor, irony, and the sublime. While they engage individually with particular aspects of philosophical and theological discussion — with theories of the passions, or of the relation of affect to cognition and aesthetics, or the status of joy in Christian life — these essays also relate strongly to the social and communal emphases of the third set. Their analyses examine emotion historically *in situ* — amongst participants in an aesthetic debate, in a punitive isolation from community, in a court, in a house of religion, and in a foreign colonial culture — all places where the creation and prescription of emotional life are negotiated within specific parameters. Within that broad similarity their differing approaches seem to reference the debate, discussed earlier, between those, like Jenefer Robinson, who treat encounters with emotions in past literature as like direct encounters with emotional situations in the reader's own experience,<sup>36</sup> and those who insist more on the historical construction of past emotions within culturally specific discourses. Lynch, for instance, suggests that the Guinevere of Chrétien de Troyes is a figure best emotionally understood within a regime where emotion is ideally hierarchical and collectivized, and an individual is treated mainly as a 'personification of social bonds'. Yet, the result, he argues, is not after all only the stasis of 'emotional suffering',<sup>37</sup> because fluctuations and failures within Chrétien's collectives transfer affective potential to the 'social persons' they still define; new chances of emotional agency and character develop in connection with the texts' changing evaluation of community. By contrast, Harbus, in her discussion of the enigmatic Anglo-Saxon *Wulf and Eadwacer*, argues that that poem's communicative success depends on 'the cross-cultural intelligibility of the emotional power of poetry':

That readers today can feel such empathy, and live through the emotions depicted in *Wulf and Eadwacer*, tells against a model of the emotions that relies heavily on their cultural construction.

<sup>35</sup> Rorty, 'Enough Already with "Theories of the Emotions"', pp. 269–70, 278, argues that while emotions may formally be distinguished from such attitudes and states, the best theories of emotions should encompass a wide range of them.

<sup>36</sup> Robinson, 'Emotion and the Understanding of Narrative'.

<sup>37</sup> See Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*, pp. 123 ff.

In an earlier period of literary criticism, such a conclusion might have been grounded on ‘just representations of general nature’ and ‘sentiments to which every bosom returns an echo’.<sup>38</sup> Harbus reaches her conclusion by another route, partly through reference to the theories of Keith Oatley and others about ‘the close interdependence of all cognitive functioning and emotion; and the biological priority of all affective experience’. Faced with the stand-off between biological and social constructionist models, Sarah McNamer has recently appealed to the so-called “weaker thesis of constructionism”, which ‘allows for the possibility that some aspects of emotional response or experience have a basis in biological predispositions, while still granting significant generative and shaping power to cultural influences’.<sup>39</sup> Certainly, most current historians of medieval and early modern Europe would not settle for less.

Harbus’s essay reminds us that, however it is to be explicated, some past emotional forms do seem to communicate powerfully with the present. Whilst we tell ourselves conscientiously to avoid the unthinking imposition of modern categories of feeling onto the past and the illusion of perfect trans-historical access, it is hard to see how the study of past emotions can be quite meaningful (or even quite appropriate) without allowing for some potential emotional connection with them. It can also be argued that trans-historical emotional connections need not have, or only have, a physio-psychological basis. Literary, philosophical, and historical studies of all kinds familiarize us with many different emotional languages and ways of being, so that we can become, as Scruton says, citing Aristotle, ‘trained’ to read and sympathize with a wide variety of emotional languages, experiences, and expressive forms. Many of these forms have persisted or recurred, with variations, over a very long period. Their reception in different societies, and amongst differently-formed readerships in the same societies, will differ — they will not be the same thing for modern readers’ ‘now’ as they have been for past readers’ ‘then’ — but they offer potential routes into the emotional past. It might even be that the often-acknowledged historical and social ‘constructedness’ of modern subjectivity — which has been called ‘an increasingly uninteresting truism’<sup>40</sup> — may make contemporary readers more, not less, sensitive to some aspects of premodern emotional regimes.

<sup>38</sup> Samuel Johnson, *A Preface to Shakespeare*, ed. by Wimsatt, p. 25; Samuel Johnson, *Lives of the English Poets*, ed. by Hill, III, 441–42.

<sup>39</sup> McNamer, *Affective Meditation*, p. 4, n. 7, citing Armor-Jones, ‘The Thesis of Constructionism’.

<sup>40</sup> Pinch, *Strange Fits of Passion*, p. 14.

Socio-economic influence on emotions in cross-cultural encounters is examined closely in Rubik's essay on Aphra Behn and Anna Maria Falconbridge. Applying the theory of the 'textual unconscious' to the 'emotional agenda' of these writers, Rubik invites attention to emotional affects which they do not, or cannot, express directly, but may manifest in other ways. That textual distinction between conscious intention and utterance is sometimes lost in treatments of emotions as 'motivators' of action that 'give us our ends',<sup>41</sup> or as means of recognizing and achieving conscious, or at least half-realized, 'goals' — Rubik also cites the work of Keith Oatley.<sup>42</sup> Whilst suggesting that readers process new emotional phenomena according to received ideological and experiential 'schemas', the essay also points out, and exemplifies in its reading of texts, the strong possibility that those encountering sources of affect in literature, as in life, may well be insensitive to them, or suspicious and distrustful, for many conscious and unconscious reasons. Conversely, overt displays of authorial emotion are seen by Rubik to 'mask' socio-economic self-interest and exploitation, and the authorial power is seen sometimes to monopolize the discourse of feeling, and yet these texts' confused *emotional* picture of cross-cultural relations seems to express the historical complexities of their colonial situations better than either the available conceptual schemas or simple ironic reversals of them.

Miri Rubin has written eloquently of the later medieval cult of Mary that it centred the development of new 'emotional habits, and maybe even emotional communities', and 'endow[ed] Europeans with a sentimental education, and with a repertoire of identities for life'.<sup>43</sup> Jennifer Carpenter's essay here suggests that the 'emotional experience' evidenced by some thirteenth-century Cistercian saints' lives is redolent of that collective atmosphere, one which encourages inter-personal relationships to flourish around an exemplary guide. As in so many premodern treatments of emotion, these *vitae* are models of what *should* be the case, through their depiction of community amongst 'subjects, informants and [...] intended audience'. Accordingly, the 'positive emotions' that suit communal life are encouraged, and others, like anger, required to be restrained. So much for social construction, but much more importantly, positive emotions are highly privileged in themselves within a Bernardine intellectual context that celebrates the inter-subjective joys of mystical experience and of the saved in heaven. Carpenter's point is that in this community a positive

<sup>41</sup> Pickavé and Shapiro, eds, *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> Oatley, *Best Laid Schemes*.

<sup>43</sup> Rubin, *Emotion and Devotion*, p. 70.

emotion, 'joy' for example, is not primarily valued according to the degree of its behavioural control, but according to its spontaneous genuineness, the being what it really is, not a pretence or a mask, nor an objectified item of exchange for something else. She shows her author giving the impression of a community that knows how it wants to be emotionally constructed, so that joy can pour down or flood in. Coincidentally, it is a picture which endorses in another idiom the idea in much contemporary psychology that emotions are necessary and beneficial to bodily and psychic well-being, with the basic difference that here the divinely-sent emotion is the 'goal' as well as the means.

The relation of emotion to the aesthetic seems a comparatively neglected subject in both psychological and historical studies. Categorizations of emotion as 'positive'/'negative' or 'basic'/'secondary' ignore aesthetic influence, as do scientific experiments to establish psychological norms and the critics who fault the experiments on sociopolitical grounds.<sup>44</sup> To Jerome Kagan, 'the affects judged by psychologists as positive or negative are ethical categories [...] no more useful as scientific concepts than the notion "pretty" and "plain"',<sup>45</sup> and yet surely judgments of beauty or ugliness must have important emotional and psychological connections. Outside science, although so much emotional affect is attributed to creative literature, the close effects of aesthetic form within that process are often overlooked in favour of more generalized attention to narrative situations and characters.<sup>46</sup> The valuable ideas of textual utterances as forming potential 'emotional communities', 'emotion scripts', or 'emotives' still tend to privilege the social and political functions of literature for individuals and communities.<sup>47</sup> It is hard to treat either 'scientifically' or 'historically' an emotional attachment to sheer poetic language like that expressed in W. B. Yeats's boyhood memory:

I had seen him described as 'the bright particular star of American athletics', and the wonderful phrase had thrown enchantment over him. Had he been called the particular bright star, I should have cared nothing for him.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>44</sup> See, for example, Gross, *The Secret History of Emotion*, p. 32.

<sup>45</sup> Kagan, *What is Emotion?*, p. 11.

<sup>46</sup> See, for example, Robinson, 'Emotion and the Understanding of Narrative', discussing Dorothea in George Eliot's *Middlemarch*, and the critique by Scruton, 'Feeling Fictions', especially pp. 96–97.

<sup>47</sup> For 'emotional communities' see Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, and for a theoretical investigation and defence of 'emotives' see Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*, pp. 63–111. For 'emotion scripts' see Shweder and others, 'The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions'; Fischer, *Emotion Scripts*.

<sup>48</sup> W. B. Yeats, *Reveries over Childhood and Youth*, Part V. The phrase 'bright particular star'



Yeats is instancing here what Wordsworth wrote:

poetry is passion: it is the history or science of feelings. [...] the interest which the mind attaches to words [...] [is] not only as symbols of the passion, but as *things*, active and efficient, which are themselves part of the passion.<sup>49</sup>

Stanyon's essay on Dryden's *Song for St Cecilia's Day, 1687*, examining a pre-Romantic milieu, finds the relation between words and passions treated in different terms, but the theme of music and poetry concentrates attention on the relation of emotions to aesthetic pleasure, on the simultaneous arousal of different 'passions', and on the question of whether the aesthetic pleasure of music is attached to real passion or to something else, such as an elevation above passion, or a harmonious balance of feeling. For Stanyon, mobilizing theories of the sublime in Dryden's era, the emotional provisions of the *Song* trace a movement from astonishment at music's demonstration of divine power to a final identification with its source. Yet she stresses that early modern 'ambivalence' about lofty music (and poetry) inheres in this text: does this music raise an excess of conflicting passions or 'stimulate an *austere* sublime of absent passion'? The theory of the 'passions', Stanyon suggests, is inadequate to explain the poetic practice fully here, and becomes itself destabilized by the complexities of the sublime. Just as language itself is traditionally seen as inadequate to express emotion — an observation which has often, though problematically, privileged non-verbal somatic states, such as blushing, tears, or trembling, as registers of emotional integrity<sup>50</sup> — so emotion in art is often objectified as something that defeats expression in descriptive or theoretical terms. Wittgenstein wrote that 'Shakespeare [...] has to be objective. Otherwise he would not so much display the dance of human passions — as talk about it'.<sup>51</sup>

The final set of essays, by Lisa Liddy, Penelope Nash, Diane Hall, Robert Shoemaker, and Jane Balme and Sandra Bowdler, relate to emotions in social history and material culture. Many of the topics and methodological concerns seen in this volume's first two sections are revisited by these authors. Barbara

is from Shakespeare, *All's Well that Ends Well*, I, 1.

<sup>49</sup> William Wordsworth, note to 'The Thorn', in *Lyrical Ballads*, ed. by Mason. See also Pinch, *Strange Fits of Passion*, p. 16 and Chapter 3.

<sup>50</sup> For the medieval physiology of blushing and its multiple interpretations, see Allen, 'Waxing Red'. For the unstable signifier of medieval tears, see Blanchfield, 'Prolegomenon', pp. xxi–xxx.

<sup>51</sup> Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, trans. by Winch, pp. 36e–37e. For an extended commentary on the relation of art to affect, see Altieri, *The Particulars of Rapture*, especially pp. 231–54.



Rosenwein's now well-known idea of the 'emotional community', that is, a 'group [...] in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression[,] and value — or devalue — the same or related emotions'<sup>52</sup> has encouraged historical concern with the terminology within which and by which communal understandings of emotion were constructed. Rosenwein's phrase is helpfully flexible, allowing that there may be numerous such communities within the one society, and also that they may change over time. Unsurprisingly, the concept of 'emotional community' has also proved extendable beyond written terminology (and even in writing's absolute or relative absence) to the power of rituals, objects, and cultural practices, as several essays in this section show.

In her study of Otto III's *ira* and *clementia*, Penelope Nash explores territory related to Rosenwein's earlier collection *Anger's Past*<sup>53</sup> and other medieval histories which have stressed the public, formal, and ritual aspects of anger and vengeance, and their calculated manipulation as factors within agendas of power. These historians speak of 'nicely calibrated'<sup>54</sup> 'countenance' 'to formally state that an injury had been committed'<sup>55</sup> and of cold decisions to put opponents in the royal *malevolentia*.<sup>56</sup> Nash shows that audience-oriented emotional display could also have a positive side that allowed for the recognition of real grievances, but 'encouraged a public, unified resolution'. That, at least, is the contemporary historiographical legacy, which she shows is no more a direct record of political motives than the Ottonian ceremonies are a direct record of spontaneous emotions. Nash speaks instead of Otto 'choosing' between the family behavioural models she describes, and the political question is whether he was seen to apply the chosen model correctly and with integrity, in a way that sufficiently satisfied the community of those that mattered, but still with more than a narrow view of political advantage to be taken into account. The private things a novelist would probably want to tell us, for instance whether Otto broke a prior agreement to treat Crescentius's prostration with *clementia*, are unsure. Nash argues, however, that in such cases the slow ritual execution of a policy need not mean it lacked emotional heat; to her Otto's thoroughness suggests the opposite.

<sup>52</sup> Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, p. 3. On change in emotional communities, see Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions in History', pp. 842–43.

<sup>53</sup> Rosenwein, ed., *Anger's Past*.

<sup>54</sup> 'Introduction' to Rosenwein, ed., *Anger's Past*, p. 4, with reference to Hyams, 'What Did Henry III Think in Bed?'

<sup>55</sup> Throop, 'Zeal, Anger and Vengeance', p. 193.

<sup>56</sup> Jolliffe, *Angevin Kingship*, p. 95.

Some writers on the history of emotions have deliberately spurned such elite, formulaic and highly conventional sources, suspicious that such documents would provide only stereotypes, or worse, be too 'insincere' to provide access to 'real' emotional experience. Yet as William Reddy and others have argued, 'sincerity' is itself a cultural production, and highly conventional sources give access to the cultural norms which are used by those in power to manage emotional expression in particular societies.<sup>57</sup> Robert Shoemaker analyses the experience and control of fear in eighteenth-century England, setting accounts of increasing violence from print news against accounts from autobiographies and diaries of the period. In such sources, the problem of sincerity looms large, but as Shoemaker argues, the conventional nature of the sources provides access to shared cultural assumptions and strategies used to manage and manipulate emotional experience. The diarists' 'fears were informed by what they had read' in print sources and helped to perpetuate a new 'climate of fear' in eighteenth-century England which affected how people came to conceptualize criminality and practise punishment. Yet emotional communities are always heterogeneous, and the emotional norms of any society can be challenged by the members of the local cultures which together constitute the society. Shoemaker's diarists have a range of strategies to mitigate the influence of print on creating a culture of fear, including humour and irony.

Contested emotional regimes are also central to Dianne Hall as she concentrates on the ideological evocation of emotion amongst a minority hegemonic group in early modern Ireland, mainly defined by its religious difference. She argues that polemic writings provided 'emotional scripts' that constituted Protestant community membership around a fear of the threat of 'popery'. Hall takes up the potential for change in the phrase 'emotional community' by linking the heightening and prevalence of particular emotions, especially fear, to particular historical moments and to their associated gender demands. The situation seems eerily similar to more recent ethnic and national scenarios: you are not a real member of X unless you fear the threat of Y and act (like a man) to stop it.<sup>58</sup> In the cases Hall describes there was often much to fear urgently, on and from both sides, yet she also shows that the rhetorical marshalling of emotion in crisis drew on a tradition that reached back to the twelfth century.

<sup>57</sup> Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, pp. 108–10, 210.

<sup>58</sup> Since 2001, Australians have seen community fear of refugees arriving by boat strongly encouraged by politicians who compete in 'standing firm' and being 'tough on "illegals"'. The refugees, who arguably show more courage and purpose in having got to Australia at all, rarely if ever benefit from such rhetoric.

One of its key features was to stress the ‘barbarism’ of native Irish opponents, which means that they could be feared for animal-like qualities of strength and endurance, but not credited with an emotional life like that of the opposing community, the ‘us’ that the narratives existed to strengthen. ‘They’ have habits of violence and lust, not bravery. ‘They’ inspire a fear which terrifies helpless Protestant women and calls Protestant men to right action but their own fear (in men) and fearlessness (in women) signifies gender perversion. Whilst the origins of anti-Irish discourse long predate the Reformation, as Hall says, in the documents she examines emotional evaluation seems essentially a matter of religion. Catholics may testify to fears of supernatural vengeance — in stories which might look superstitious coming from Protestants — but as ‘morally inferior’ they cannot feel ‘remorse’. Hall’s essay takes its analysis of emotions beyond the binary positive/negative. It shows, perhaps more than any other in this collection, how the acknowledged possession of a ‘normal’ emotional life — a normality proved in this case by conformity in religion and gender — is a vital political commodity, one which a power in crisis, or seeking advantage, will want to deny to opponents. It seems to illustrate well Daniel Gross’s argument that

the contours of our emotional world have been shaped by institutions [...] that simply afford some people greater emotional range than others, as they are shaped by a publicity that has nothing to do with the inherent value of each human life, and everything to do with technologies of social recognition and blindness.<sup>59</sup>

Peter Brown’s *The Cult of the Saints* showed that for early medieval Christians the cultural institution of veneration of saints’ relics at shrines helped develop a revolutionary communal ‘friendship’ of the dead with the living, as a new version of the kinship and patronage systems of late Roman urban society.<sup>60</sup> Brown cites André Grabar’s statement: ‘The imagery of a martyr’s relics is never in any case an imagery of the *memento mori*; rather, it strives by all means in its power to proclaim the suppression of the fact of death.’<sup>61</sup> For early Christians, writes Brown, the disparity of the size of the relic to its original body only heightened the sense of the size of the martyr,<sup>62</sup> who was now a mighty friend, patron, and

<sup>59</sup> Gross, *The Secret History of Emotion*, p. 4.

<sup>60</sup> Brown, *The Cult of the Saints*, for example, pp. 46–65.

<sup>61</sup> Grabar, *Martyrium*, II, 39, cited in Brown, *The Cult of the Saints*, p. 75.

<sup>62</sup> Brown, *The Cult of the Saints*, p. 78.

'holy protector' to the living.<sup>63</sup> Lisa Liddy's essay on late medieval and early modern English wills shows how in a differently-organized urban society a humbler but not dissimilar process of benign emotional connection between living and dead occurred. Even though the language conventions of wills were restrictive, Liddy argues that testators used personal items 'to create or enhance an affective connection between themselves, their intended recipients [family, friends, and neighbours] and the bequeathed objects'. Where the 'voice' of emotion, especially for women, was strictly controlled and rarely expressed, objects, particularly the personally significant and body items over-specified in wills, seem to have been offered in its place, or by way of supplement, as 'carriers' of affection. These are, in turn, 'carried' (worn or born) by the bodies of legatees. As with the early martyrs' relics, the history and specificity of objects 'left behind' creates a community of the living and the dead, and brings the dead to mind as living presences.

Such a conclusion is congruent with modern psychological studies which have found that mementos are valued partly because they allow one to remember events with particular emotional significance but mostly in the stronger sense that they function as reconstructive symbols, bringing the person with whom the object is associated back into an apparently immediate relationship with the owner of the memento.<sup>64</sup> I see a sketch painted by my grandmother, and I am moved not just because I remember her painting but because she is momentarily brought back, through memory, into my presence. That is, objects have affective power by stimulating memory, and are most affecting when they forge links between people even when the physical relationship has been sundered by death. Liddy's article traces ways in which this process was initiated in medieval York, identifies objects which could carry emotional weight, and reminds us that the affective power of memory extends the temporal boundaries of emotional regimes.

Similar processes are also at work in the earliest clear evidence we have for the burial practices associated with *Homo sapiens sapiens* in Europe and beyond discussed by Sandra Bowdler and Jane Balme. There is evidence that anatomically modern humans (*Homo sapiens sapiens*) were the first hominids to introduce grave goods at burials (the practice is not, so Bowdler and Balme argue, associated with non-human primates or Neanderthals). Tools, spoons, and animal parts are regularly found alongside beads and red ochre at burial sites.

<sup>63</sup> Brown, *The Cult of the Saints*, p. 55.

<sup>64</sup> Sherman, 'Reminiscentia'.

Furthermore, it is with *Homo sapiens sapiens* that we have the earliest evidence of keeping of human relics, a kind of affective object that binds the dead to the living. With care not to treat Australian Indigenous peoples as 'living fossils', Bowdler and Balme argue that the broad continuity of the archaeological record in Australia over the last c. 20,000 years justifies ethnohistorical comparisons based on more recent Indigenous practices, which reveal other means of binding the living to the dead, including the use of amulets and painting the face with the ashes of the dead. By thinking of the emotional power of objects, Bowdler and Balme move beyond discussions of what burial sites and grave goods might imply about, for instance, social status or beliefs about the after-life, and instead begin to conceptualize the range of emotions around death felt by the earliest human societies. This move from social status to social emotions is also possible when comparing the earliest hominid burial practices to intramural burials in churches in England with a focus on London from the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries. In the face of condemnation from ecclesial (Catholic and Protestant) and secular authorities, burial in churchyards within the walls of London continues into the eighteenth century. Bowdler and Balme suggest that a similar matrix of love and fear of or for the dead body, signalling a continuing relationship with the dead person beyond death, and evident in the prehistoric burials, is operating in the premodern European case, albeit mediated through very different belief systems. One conclusion, a fitting one with which to close this volume, is that such cognitive affectivity characterizes *Homo sapiens sapiens* and distinguishes us from our nearest hominid relatives.

We began this introduction by likening historians of emotion to attentive hearers of past narratives, but it is clear that such attention is always a partial process that will have its own emotional content, helping to determine what we listen to. Emotions can motivate us to action, but they can also militate against action, suggesting that they play a much richer role in cognition. Think of Aeneas, driven by duty to found a new Rome yet desiring family, Troy and Dido. His emotions must be suppressed (*curam sub corde premebat*) if he is to act rightly and hold to the commands of Jove (Virgil, *Aeneid*, 4. 331–32).<sup>65</sup> As Martin Pickhavé and Lisa Shapiro have recently argued,

the focus on the motivational role of emotion discounts the many ways in which emotions figure in our cognitive lives. [...] Emotions, or some kind of similar bias,

<sup>65</sup> This aspect of the narrative of the *Aeneid* was explored by Wilson, 'Action and Emotion in Aeneas'.

are unavoidable in our weighting of evidence, and of what we take to be salient. They shape how we see the world.<sup>66</sup>

Emotions thus involve us in the lives, ideas, cultures, and material environments of others. In the words of Robert C. Solomon, 'emotions are subjective engagements in the world' — they involve us in relationships.<sup>67</sup> We love and argue passionately: think of Psellos' delight, joy and grief for family members and for the life of the mind, or the eschatologically transformed desire of the *Luue-Ron*. Music can calm the passions — Pythagoras thought it could even stop berserk youths about to commit murder — even as the aesthetic of the musical sublime destabilizes long-standing affective categories. Emotions incorporate us in particular local cultures and open possibilities for individual agency which can change how emotions are experienced and defined, in cases as diverse as Chrétien de Troyes's Guinevere, the long history of regret, the emotions of demons or religious conflict in early modern Ireland. We delight in and fear cultures and people who are different from us, as for example in travel narratives of colonization, and our fear makes us reframe concepts and social practices, as in the case of crime and punishment in eighteenth-century England.<sup>68</sup> Emotions elicited by cherished objects involve us with others to the extent that they seem to bring the dead to life. Emotions shape and inform our knowledge, bind us to the objects of our understanding, and govern where and how strongly we direct our attention, even as they can also help to decide the degree to which we preserve the inalienable difference between ourselves and the people, ideas and things we try to understand.

It may be, therefore, that cognition should (again) be rethought to include an ineradicable affective element. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* points out that 'we do not hand down judgements in the same way when we are grieving and rejoicing, or loving and hating' (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1. 2, 1356a15–16).<sup>69</sup> In an illu-

<sup>66</sup> Pickhavé and Shapiro, 'Introduction' to *Emotion and Cognitive Life*, p. 1.

<sup>67</sup> Solomon, 'Emotions, Thoughts and Feelings', p. 77. One fiction about emotions, which itself requires further historical investigation to determine how it came to be attractive and what social purposes it serves, is that emotions are *merely* subjective.

<sup>68</sup> The way emotions are used to achieve social change has been a key element of the work of Peter and Carol Stearns. See for example their theoretical reflections in 'Emotionology'. On how emotions functioned in the lead up to the American civil war, see for example Woods, "'The Indignation of Freedom-Loving People'".

<sup>69</sup> See the discussion in Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, pp. 34–35, who also cites Spinoza, *Ethica*, pt III: General Definition of Emotions, where emotions are defined as 'states that make the mind inclined to think one thing rather than another'.

minating essay on Aquinas's Trinitarian theology, Rowan Williams has pointed to the ways in which, for Thomas, knowledge makes the object of knowledge part of the knower.<sup>70</sup> But as Williams notes, for Thomas such knowledge is also a dangerous and deadening colonization of the other unless it is characterized by love, an active response to the other's difference and a deep desire for their good. If knowledge is the knowledge of the perfect lover, it is always actively engaged with its object. Of course, all manner of imperfect, unimaginative and downright dangerous 'knowledge' is bound up with other emotions such as regret, shame, anger, grief, envy, hate or boredom. Cognition that includes such emotions will differ markedly from 'Love's knowledge'. But for our purposes, we draw attention to two points. Firstly, cognition, understood as an affective practice, connects the knower to the object of knowledge in particular relationships; and secondly, as a corollary to this first point, such cognition is a means of social and personal transformation.<sup>71</sup>

Understanding emotions is therefore a necessary part of understanding social change and purposive human action. In a related way, understanding cognition as an affective practice also has implications for scholars of the emotional past. The best sort of literary, philosophical and historical knowledge will be marked by a set of emotions which allow the sources to retain their strangeness while becoming part of, and enriching, contemporary affective experience.

If emotions are necessarily relational, they are also, as Martha Nussbaum puts it, always *about* something. That is, they have an 'intentional object'. In illustrating this statement from personal family experience — the last illness of her mother — Nussbaum identifies as one of Joanna Bourke's 'fearful people' from history, and furthermore identifies her fear as part of a very specific history, whose own identity depended on the way a special object was perceived, involving 'beliefs, often very complex, about the object', and a 'localized' concern with value.<sup>72</sup> Nussbaum's story seems a good place to end our introductory thoughts here, because its approach is 'historical' in two important ways: firstly, its modern treatment of emotions as narratives and judgements is based on an adaptation of ancient Aristotelian and Stoic thought; secondly, it deals with the subject of emotion by drawing attention to a complex set of historical

<sup>70</sup> Williams, 'What Does Love Know?.'

<sup>71</sup> Williams, 'What Does Love Know?', p. 272, points to the irony that Aquinas's most metaphysical reflections can collapse Marx's distinction between those who would understand and those who would change the world.

<sup>72</sup> Nussbaum, 'Emotions as Judgements of Value and Importance', pp. 187–89.



circumstances and ideas. There is certainly a caution for scholars of past emotions in the recognition that no one else could ever be in a position to know just what the narrating observer felt, but there is also encouragement to pay detailed attention to the record, and to leave open the potential for sympathetic communication with the life-experiences and thoughts of other people who have left things behind them.

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Part I

Intellectual Traditions



## FROM REGRET TO REMORSE: THE ORIGINS OF A MORAL EMOTION

David Konstan

In an article entitled, ‘When Did We Start Feeling Guilty?’, Wolfgang Teubert makes the striking claim that ‘guilt feelings were not a discourse topic before 1850’.<sup>1</sup> Among the terms that are semantically related to guilt, Teubert considers ‘bad conscience’ and ‘remorse’. Of the latter, however, in contrast to guilt, Teubert remarks: ‘It seems that *remorse* (in German: *Reue*) has not changed its meaning since early modern times’.<sup>2</sup> Leaving guilt aside — it is a loaded term, and it is often claimed that, in contrast to shame, there was no concept of guilt in classical antiquity<sup>3</sup> — we may ask: is remorse in fact much older? More particularly, did it exist as an idea, or as a subject of discourse, in the classical world, and if not, when and why did the notion arise and become part of the moral and emotional lexicon?

I argue in this chapter that there was in fact a notion of remorse in classical antiquity, although many fine scholars have believed otherwise; I also suggest a reason why this question should be subject to such controversy. But I argue too that the idea of remorse or repentance played less of a role in the Bible than most scholars and translators have supposed, and offer reasons to date the

<sup>1</sup> Teubert, ‘When Did We Start Feeling Guilty?’, p. 122.

<sup>2</sup> Teubert, ‘When Did We Start Feeling Guilty?’, p. 129.

<sup>3</sup> On the contrast between guilt and shame, and its relevance to classical Greek concepts, see Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, pp. 91–93.

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emergence of Christian notions of penitence two or three centuries after the death of Christ, when, under the influence of ascetic tendencies, terms such as contrition and compunction entered the Greek and Latin vocabulary.

Much will depend, of course, on how remorse is defined. The word itself, with its cognates in the romance languages (French *remords*, Spanish *remordimiento*, etc.), is modern, and derives from the Mediaeval Latin *remorsum*, the perfect participle of Latin *remordeo*, meaning 'to bite' or 'keep biting'. The notion of biting or stinging is central, and the word was rendered literally (in what is called a calque) into Middle English as the 'ayenbite of inwit', with 'ayen' (an early form of 'again') corresponding to the prefix 're-' and 'bite', of course, to *morsum* ('inwit' renders 'conscience'). One online definition of remorse gives: 'a gnawing distress arising from a sense of guilt for past wrongs', where 'gnawing' preserves the root sense of the term.<sup>4</sup> Another reads: 'moral and painful regret for wrongdoing, coupled with a desire to make right what is wrong'; here again, the role of injury to another is evident.<sup>5</sup> Teubert for his part cites with approval the definition provided in the *Oxford English Dictionary*: 'a feeling of compunction, or of deep regret or repentance, for a sin or wrong committed.' He goes on to comment:

If someone feels remorse, they want to *repent*, which is defined in the OED as 'to feel contrition, compunction, sorrow or regret for something one has done or left undone; to change one's mind with regard to past action or conduct through dissatisfaction with it or its results'.

Teubert explains: 'For *remorse*, the wish to make amends, to repair the damage, and not to do whatever it was again, is essential',<sup>6</sup> and he draws the contrast between remorse and guilt as follows: 'If we feel *remorse*, we repent [...]. If we feel *guilt*, we leave things as they are. Guilt is a feeling that does not commit us to any action.'<sup>7</sup>

Much of what Teubert takes for granted about the modern conception of remorse will seem problematic to those familiar with medieval thinking on the topic, where compunction, repentance, and remorse (or the Latin terms that

<sup>4</sup> *Online Merriam Webster Dictionary* <<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/remorse>> [accessed 10 September 2014]; as synonyms the entry offers contriteness, contrition, penitence, regret, guilt, remorsefulness, repentance, rue, self-reproach, and shame.

<sup>5</sup> *V2 Vocabulary Building Dictionary* <<http://vocabulary-vocabulary.com/dictionary/remorse.php>> [accessed 10 September 2014].

<sup>6</sup> Teubert, 'When Did We Start Feeling Guilty?', p. 129.

<sup>7</sup> Teubert, 'When Did We Start Feeling Guilty?', p. 130.

correspond most closely to these ideas) are clearly and carefully distinguished. According to *The Catholic Dictionary* online, Thomas Aquinas held that contrition ‘is not merely speculative sorrow for wrong done, remorse of conscience, or a resolve to amend; it is a real pain and bitterness of soul together with a hatred and horror for sin committed’.<sup>8</sup> Nor was there unanimity among the fathers and doctors of the church: in his commentary on the *Sentences* (book 4, distinction 17, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, co.), Thomas quotes the various definitions offered by Isidore, Augustine, Gregory, and others (cf. also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Supplementum 3, q. 1, a. 1).

We shall return to the early Christian tradition concerning remorse, but we may first inquire what relation the nearest equivalents to ‘remorse’ in ancient Greek and Latin bear to the modern notion, that is, whether they too involved ‘a feeling of compunction, or of deep regret or repentance, for a sin or wrong committed’, or on the contrary were only marginally ethical or affective concepts. There are moments when previously recognized emotions seem to drop out of the vocabulary or when emotions that to all appearances had not previously existed, or at least had no common name, come into being: might remorse represent such a case?<sup>9</sup> Indeed it has been affirmed that remorse was

<sup>8</sup> *The Catholic Dictionary*, s.v. ‘contrition’; The online *Catholic Encyclopedia*, s.v. ‘contrition’, defines contrition as a kind of ‘interior repentance’, and cites the Council of Trent (sess. XIV, ch. iv de Contritione) for the definition: ‘a sorrow of soul and a hatred of sin committed, with a firm purpose of not sinning in the future’, <<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04337a.htm>> [accessed 10 September 2014].

<sup>9</sup> One example of such a shift in the emotional lexicon from the classical period to late antiquity is the emergence of the notion of compassion, which in part replaced the classical emotion of pity. The Latin word *compassio*, first attested in Tertullian, is largely specific to Christian writers. *Compassio* would seem to correspond to the classical notion of pity (Latin *misericordia*, Greek *eleos*) as a sentiment elicited by the suffering of another. But the classical terms for pity had come, in early Christian texts, to be conceived of as mercy or even as charitable works (compare, for example, in the Catholic obligation to perform *opera misericordiae* or ‘works of mercy’), and hence to be seen as a character trait or even a virtue, as opposed to an emotion proper (cf. Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, pp. 119–24). It may be that, as the classical words for pity shifted ground, Christians developed a new terminology to replace them (see Pétré, “Misericordia”, esp. pp. 388–89). But there may be another factor at work as well. Pity was commonly understood to be a moral emotion, elicited by undeserved misfortune, not adversity that one has brought upon oneself by crime, willfulness, or negligence. Compassion seems rather to respond to suffering as such, irrespective of desert, and is accordingly instinctive, ascribed even to non-human animals (cf. von Kreisler, *The Compassion of Animals*; Masson and McCarthy, *When Elephants Weep*); it may thus not have counted as an emotion in the classical sense (see Konstan, ‘Not Quite Emotions’, esp. pp. 119–21). But the restriction on the classical



not recognized, or at least not much discussed, in classical antiquity. The classical Latin *morsus* could be used of mental pain (see the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, def. 6b), but no word seems to have had the specificity of ‘remorse’ as opposed to regret in modern English. Thus, David Winston observes that ‘Greek philosophy generally had little interest in the feelings of regret or remorse that may at times lead an individual to a fundamental reassessment of his former life path.’<sup>10</sup> Robert Kaster, in turn, concludes, on the basis of an exhaustive study of the Latin *paenitentia* and related words, that the idea of ‘a change of heart that leads one to seek purgation and forgiveness’ was unknown to pre-Christian Romans.<sup>11</sup> Kaster argues that *paenitentia* corresponds rather to what we call regret. Remorse differs from regret in that it involves sorrow for the damage one has done to others, and not merely the wish that things had turned out differently because of unfortunate consequences to oneself. Thus remorse, as Kaster puts it, ‘is essentially a “moral emotion”, while regret is not.’<sup>12</sup> To take an example, Suetonius, in his life of Julius Caesar,<sup>13</sup> reports that while Caesar was negotiating the surrender of Afranius and Petreius at Ilerda, the two consuls ‘with a sudden change of mind’ (*subita paenitentia*) killed all the partisans of Caesar in their camp; they were hardly stung by a feeling of remorse for not having slain their enemies. As Gabrielle Taylor writes, ‘The person who feels remorse sees himself as a responsible moral agent.’<sup>14</sup> So too, Laurel Fulkerson affirms: ‘true remorse looks beyond the self to the larger world, while regret simply wishes things were different.’<sup>15</sup> I can feel regret if I failed to take an umbrella and was caught in a downpour, but I would hardly say that I experienced remorse.<sup>16</sup>

notion of pity, with the distinction it drew on the basis of responsibility, may itself have seemed inconsistent with the Christian notion of original sin, to which all are heir. Indeed, the Stoic philosopher Seneca had already written, *peccavimus omnes* (‘we have all sinned’, Seneca, *De clementia*, I. 6. 3). An issue of *Emotion Researcher*, the newsletter of the International Society for Research on Emotion, is dedicated to the topic, ‘Lost and Found Emotions’.

<sup>10</sup> Winston, ‘Judaism and Hellenism’, pp. 1–19.

<sup>11</sup> Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome*, p. 80.

<sup>12</sup> Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome*, p. 80.

<sup>13</sup> Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome*, p. 75.

<sup>14</sup> Taylor, ‘Guilt and Remorse’, p. 72.

<sup>15</sup> Fulkerson, ‘*Metameleia* and Friends’, p. 244.

<sup>16</sup> Komiya and Kusumi, ‘Age Differences in the Experience of Regret in Japan’, p. 171, state: ‘Regret is a negative emotion experienced when we imagine that our present situation would have been better if we had made different decisions’, and they offer examples of regret at different stages and conditions of life: ‘During school, regret can center on not studying

The Greek terms in question — the equivalents to the Latin *paenitentia* — are *metameleia* and *metanoia* (for the equivalence, cf. Luke 3. 3, of John the Baptist ‘preaching a baptism of repentance’ (RSV): *metanoia* in the Greek, *paenitentia* in the Latin vulgate). Now, in classical writers these Greek terms commonly indicate a change of judgement — the subsequent recognition that a given action turned out wrong, or that it was wrong to do it; it was thus very often of the nature of an intellectual response, akin to regret (in its non-moral sense), more than an emotional one.<sup>17</sup> Both words have the prefix *meta-*, meaning ‘after’, though the roots differ. *Metanoia* is built on the root *noein*, ‘think’ (cf. *nous* or ‘mind’), whereas *metameleia* has the root verb *melei*, ‘care’ or ‘concern’ (the construction is usually impersonal: ‘it concerns me [...]'). Thus, both bear the sense of ‘afterthought’ or a ‘change of mind’, and do not in themselves carry an additional implication of a painful sentiment. In Latin, *paenitentia*, along with its cognates, has much the same range of meanings (the word seems to be connected with the adverb *paene*, ‘almost’, and not with *poena*, ‘penalty’ or ‘revenge’, at least according to the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*; but the etymology is disputed). Do these terms, then, lack the affective dimension that we typically associate with remorse, and that they seem to bear in Christian literature where they are commonly rendered as ‘repentance’?

A brief survey of occurrences of the terms in classical texts appears to confirm their primarily intellectual, as opposed to emotional, register. One might have expected the Greek words to turn up with some frequency in Greek tragedy, where characters suffer extreme tribulations, but in fact they are uncommon. In part, this may be a matter of diction — the words may have been felt to be too prosaic for the genre — but it is also the case that characters in tragedy rarely are sorry for their voluntary actions; they lament their misfortunes but only occasionally see themselves as being at fault, and when they do, they typically berate themselves, if at all, for their poor judgement rather than for any

enough to get good grades; during marriage, regret can focus on choosing an inappropriate partner; and during illnesses, regret can revolve around not spending enough time with family; none of these examples involves a moral sense of guilt for harm done to another.

<sup>17</sup> Fulkerson argues that remorse, and not just regret, is in fact represented in the classical Greek vocabulary, and is expressed in particular by *metameleia*; as she writes, ‘*metagignosko* simply involves a change of mind, *metanoeo* is a more serious reconsideration (especially where there is some harm done), and *metamelei* is a result of *metanoeo*, specifically the realization, upon reconsideration, that one has made a serious mistake and that it cannot be fixed’ (Fulkerson, ‘*Metameleia* and Friends,’ p. 256); but on her own terms, this latter is an instance of regret, not remorse. But her point is nevertheless sound: see below, pp. 9–10.

moral failure. In Aeschylus's *Eumenides*, Orestes makes a pledge that Argos will never make war on Athens; if any Argives should do so, they will regret the effort (771). A fragment of Euripides (1080 *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*) runs: 'Old age, what hope of pleasure you extend, and every person desires to arrive at you; but once they have you they also have *metameleia* and think there is nothing worse for mortal man.' *Metameleia* here has nothing to do with decisions, moral or otherwise, but simply with a change of view (a fragment of Sophocles (1141) that contains the word is too obscure to interpret). Switching to comedy, in Menander's *Grouch* the misanthrope who gives the play its title is described by Pan, in the prologue, as being so unsociable that he refuses to greet anyone, except perhaps the god himself (that is, his statue) — and even then, he immediately regrets it (*metamelei*, 12); we would hardly describe his sentiment as remorse. So too, the terms are infrequent in forensic speeches, no doubt because admitting regret would be perceived as tantamount to acknowledging culpability, and, as Aristotle remarks, if you are going to concede guilt, why go to court in the first place. Where they occur at all, it is most often in the form of an accusation that one's opponent fails to show signs of having altered his behaviour. Thus, Lysias (3. 7) accuses his rival of being 'so far from feeling regret (*metamelêsai*) for the people he abused' that he compounded the wrong with further acts of *hubris* (cf. 3. 10, where he pretends to imagine that his rival has by now got over his passion and hence regrets his former errors; also 3. 43; similarly, at 14. 29 an opponent is accused of not feeling regret for his behaviour; cf. also 16. 2, 30. 3). Demosthenes (19. 54) speaks of the Athenians' regret (*metameleia*) at having made peace with Philip of Macedon, and elsewhere of their recognition that they were wrong (*metanoêsai*) each time they passed decrees proposed by his opponent.<sup>18</sup>

Where the terms for regret do occur, moreover, they most often are reflective in character. Herodotus uses only *metamelei*, which is far the more common term in most authors, and that just five times in the course of his history. Twice, it refers to the shifting moods of the mad Persian king Cambyses, who is prone to change his mind abruptly (3. 36); the other three uses are all future oriented, indicating that a benefactor will not have occasion to rue his good deed (3. 140; 7. 29; 9. 89). None has an especially emotional colouring. Xenophon speaks of restraining anger so as not to regret one's actions afterwards (*Memorabilia*, 2. 6. 23; cf. *Anabasis*, 2. 6. 9); in his *Symposium*, a charac-

<sup>18</sup> Other examples of *metamelei* in Isocrates, 17. 11, 18; 18. 21, 60, 64; 19. 3, where again a person is accused of being far from feeling regret.

ter declares that whenever he has put his trust in omens he has never regretted it (4. 48). At *Anabasis*, 1. 6. 7, Cyrus reminds Orontas, who is attempting to get back into his good graces, that he — that is, Orontas — has already regretted having turned against him on a previous occasion; elsewhere in Xenophon, a king declares: ‘I am not sorry that I killed your son, but that I did not kill you as well’ (*Cyropedia*, 5. 3. 6): hardly a case of remorse (compare the passage from Suetonius cited above). Polybius affirms that one ought never to destroy the land of one’s enemies root and branch, but always leave some room for *metameleia* (23. 15. 1–2), since anger at a single instance of wrongdoing should not be irreversible; this is not remorse or even, strictly speaking, regret but simply a change of attitude at some future time.<sup>19</sup> In none of these situations is a person begging forgiveness, or manifesting anything like shame for past conduct. What is meant is simply that a past action is seen as a mistake, and the regret that is experienced is not in itself a source of emotional distress.<sup>20</sup>

As I have mentioned, there is no intrinsic reason why changing one’s mind need be accompanied by anguish or grief. Regret does imply the wish that things had turned out otherwise, and reflecting on the actual unfortunate state of affairs may be painful, especially in comparison with hopes that one might have entertained earlier for a better outcome. One may even lament one’s lack of foresight or the failure to have apprehended the circumstances more clearly. None of this, however, carries the moral sense of repentance or remorse as these are understood today, which involve a deep change of heart in regard to one’s character or moral identity; to repeat the remarks of Teubert with respect to remorse, ‘the wish to make amends, to repair the damage, and not to do whatever it was again, is essential’; it is also, we may add, a precondition for gaining the forgiveness of the offended party.

Yet there are passages in which the Greek and Latin terms in question do seem to take on a moral character. Let us return to the passage, cited above, in which Lysias accuses his opponent of being ‘so far from feeling regret (*metamelêsai*) for the people he abused’ that he compounded the wrong with further acts of *hubris* (3. 7); Lysias is evidently suggesting that true regret would result in recognition of his fault and a change of behaviour. John Stobaeus, in his anthology of excerpts from pagan writers, cites a remarkable passage from

<sup>19</sup> The preceding three examples are taken from Fulkerson, *No Regrets*.

<sup>20</sup> *Metameleia* and related forms occur several times in Plato; to take one example, at *Laws*, 866E we read that people who act impulsively or out of anger later regret their actions; cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 114A; Plato, *Phaedrus*, 264A; similarly: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1110b, 18–23; also 1150a, 21–30 on the absence of regret in people who lack self-control.

Plutarch's *On Good Cheer* (*Peri euthumias*, 476F–477A), under the heading, 'On Conscience' (*Peri tou suneidos: Anthologium*, 3. 24. 15, 1–13). Plutarch is here commenting on a famous line in Euripides' *Orestes* (396), in which Orestes explains the madness with which he was afflicted after slaying his mother as his self-awareness (*sunesis*) of the terrible thing he has done; Plutarch says that conscience (*to suneidos*) leaves regret (*metameleia*) in the soul like a bloody and ever-stinging (*nussô*) flesh wound, and the fact that no one but oneself is responsible (*epaitios*) for the wrongdoing makes the pain all the heavier (compare Cicero's speech, *For Roscius Amerinus* 67, where he perhaps has this same tragedy in mind and employs the term *conscientia*).<sup>21</sup> The historian Arrian, who was a disciple of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus and recorded his conversations, concludes his treatise on Alexander the Great by affirming that it is no great surprise if he should have committed wrongs in a fit of anger, but adds that 'Alexander is the only one I know of among old-time kings who repented (*metagnônai*) of his errors by virtue of his nobility' (7. 21. 1). Most, he says, have sought to disguise their wrongdoing; but this is a mistake, since 'the only cure for error (*harmartia*), it seems to me, is to admit that one has erred and to make it clear that one regrets it (*ep' autôî metagignôskonta*)', and this plants the expectation that one will not commit the same fault in the future (7. 29. 2).<sup>22</sup> On the Roman side, Livy reports that the patricians who slew a tribune were so far from regretting the crime that even those innocent of it wanted to appear to have taken part in it (2. 54. 10); the patricians clearly fail to realize that they have done wrong, and Livy regards this as a fault. Again, Quintus Fabius offered peace to the Aequi on condition that they repented of their previous perfidy (3. 2. 4–5); the implication would appear to be that they must recognize their wrongdoing and not repeat such conduct in the future.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> The full passage reads: Τὸ γὰρ συνειδὸς οἷον ἔλκος ἐν σαρκὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν μεταμέλειαν αἰμάσσουσιν αἰεὶ καὶ νύσσουσιν ἐναπολείπει. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλας ἀναιρεῖ λύπας ὁ λόγος, τὴν δὲ μετάνοιαν αὐτὸς ἐνεργάζεται δακνομένη σὺν αἰσχύνῃ καὶ κολαζομένη ὑφ' αὐτῆς. ὥς γὰρ οἱ γιγνόμενοι καὶ πυρετοῖς διακαίμενοι τῶν ταῦτα πασχόντων ἔξωθεν ὑπὸ καύματος ἢ κρύους μᾶλλον ἐνοχλοῦνται καὶ κάκιον ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἐλαφροτέρας ἔχει τὰ τυχερὰ τὰς λύπας ὥσπερ ἔξωθεν ἐπιφερομένας. τὸ δὲ οὐ τις ἐμοὶ τῶν ἄλλος ἐπαίτιος, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἐπιθρηνοῦμενον τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις ἐνδοθεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, βαρύτερον ποιεῖ τῷ αἰσχυρῷ τὸ ἀλγεινόν.

<sup>22</sup> For discussion, see Fulkerson, *No Regrets*.

<sup>23</sup> For a detailed and convincing argument for the moral sense of *metanoia* in pagan texts of the classical, Hellenistic, and early Imperial periods, see Nave, *The Role and Function of Repentance in Luke-Acts*, esp. pp. 39–70; Nave examines mainly instances of *metanoia* rather than *metameleia*, though he acknowledges that the two terms are often interchangeable.

If the terms can carry this sense, what has led scholars like Winston and Kaster to conclude that remorse in the modern sense played only a negligible role in ancient thought? The answer, I believe, lies in the way remorse functions in contemporary moral discourse. Like other emotions, remorse is not simply a feeling but is embedded in a set of narratives or scripts: it has typical causes and effects, and these form an essential part of how we regard the sentiment. Thus, a person who feels remorse is assumed to have committed a wrong, that is, to have treated another person unjustly (I omit the exceptional case of wronging oneself), and to have acknowledged culpability for the action, often in the form of an apology in which one professes a sincere change of heart. On the basis of this new moral awareness, one seeks forgiveness from the injured party.<sup>24</sup> Let me illustrate this scenario of remorse by citing a recent article entitled 'Betrayal, Rejection, Revenge, and Forgiveness: An Interpersonal Script Approach', by Julie Fitness, a professor of Psychology at Macquarie University.<sup>25</sup> Fitness writes:

A truly contrite offender must take full responsibility for the offence [...]; there is a big difference between a friend or lover who simply says, 'I'm sorry you're hurt', and one who says, 'What I did was wrong; you have every right to be hurt and I'm sorry'.

Here, then, we have the first stage: the offense and the remorse, that is, the belated realization that the behaviour was morally reprehensible. 'Sincere apologies', according to Fitness, 'imply that an offender is feeling guilt, an emotion that comprises an essential element of the interpersonal betrayal script'. But there is more: 'the pain of guilt [...] motivates atonement and a desire to make the suffering partner feel better.' We feel an 'empathic distress in response to the pain' that we have caused, and this in turn will 'motivate remorseful behaviors and attempts to restore the relationship'. Remorse is a component of a broader scenario that proceeds ideally from wrongdoing to forgiveness (although forgiveness is not obligatory and may be withheld).

Familiar as this pattern is, it is not necessarily the only script in which a genuinely moral regret may find a place. Acknowledging responsibility for one's acts is surely an essential element in any paradigm for remorse, as well as distress for the suffering one has caused in another, which we may call guilt; but

<sup>24</sup> On the relationship between remorse and forgiveness, see Griswold, *Forgiveness*; Konstan, *Before Forgiveness*. For the idea of emotional scripts, see Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome*.

<sup>25</sup> In Leary, ed., *Interpersonal Rejection*, pp. 73–103.



the consequent desire to make amends may take several forms, such as material compensation or, in the case of insult, a posture of deference and humility. We may question, however, whether one must also profess a sincere change of heart and seek pardon or absolution on this basis. And indeed, it is just within this scenario of inner transformation and forgiveness that Winston and Kaster made their claims about the absence of remorse in the classical era, Winston speaking, as we have seen, of 'the feelings of regret or remorse that may at times lead an individual to a fundamental reassessment of his former life path', and Kaster of 'a change of heart that leads one to seek purgation and forgiveness'. Both observations, when placed in their narrative context, are correct; but they do not in themselves invalidate the supposition that moral regret was known in the classical world.

The Greeks and Romans did not regard remorse or regret as a sign of virtue; after all, they did not conceive of human beings as essentially sinful and in need of repentance. It was natural, accordingly, to ascribe moral regret to one's opponents, and to castigate them, often enough, for failing to display remorse rather than praise them for manifesting it. Good people, it was supposed, behaved consistently from the beginning, and were not in need of the kind of radical transformation of character that is incumbent upon sinners. It is for just this reason that the classical philosophers on the whole tended to ignore *metameleia* and *metanoia*, since they held that regret or a change of mind pertained to ordinary people, and was a sign of a flawed character; sages would have no occasion to have second thoughts about their prior behaviour. In Philo of Alexandria's treatise *On Virtues*, *metanoia* is elevated to the status of a virtue, one of four discussed in the essay. But as Philo points out, regret or a change of mind not only presupposes an earlier state of error, but is active as a virtue only in respect to such a state. Once one has abandoned foolishness, injustice and the rest and, as Philo puts it, 'left vice behind as a treacherous mistress' (181), there is no longer need for *metanoia*. Thus, Philo classifies *metanoia* as a secondary virtue: just as health is the greatest good for the body, and recovery next best, so too the recollection of what has been forgotten, to which a change of mind is most closely related, 'is not ranked in the first and highest class of goods, but as winning second prize in the next class' (176). Philo's discussion is clearly indebted to classical Greek conceptions of virtue, and *metanoia* continues, in this essay, to be treated as an intellectual awareness of prior error.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> For the connection with classical philosophy, see Konstan, 'Philo's *De virtutibus* in the Perspective of Classical Greek Philosophy'.

In several of the passages cited above, remorse has been treated as an emotion, and this is indeed consistent with modern English usage, even if the emotion of remorse is taken to be complex in nature.<sup>27</sup> However, *metanoia* and *metameleia*, the terms most often rendered as ‘regret’ or ‘remorse’, make only a rare appearance in lists of emotions by classical thinkers. The intellectual nature of regret may partially explain this absence. They do not figure, for example, in Aristotle’s discussion of the several emotions in the second book of his *Rhetoric*, though one might imagine that it could be useful for an orator to arouse such a sentiment in the audience. Aristotle’s definition of emotion runs: ‘Let the emotions [that is, *pathê*] be all those things on account of which people change and differ in regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure’, and he cites as examples ‘anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their opposites’ (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2. 1, 1378a, 20–23). If he regarded regret as a primarily intellectual phenomenon, it may have seemed to lack the element of pain that is evident in passions such as anger or fear, and also to be a judgement itself rather than a motive for altering one’s views. So too, *paenitentia* is absent from Cicero’s inventory of emotions in the *Tusculan Disputations*.

Nevertheless, regret did find a place in Stoic registers of the emotions or *pathê*. Thus Arius Didymus, in his summary of Stoic ethics, affirms that, according to the Stoics, a sensible person does everything well whereas a base person (*phaulos*), who has no experience of correct behaviour, does everything badly, and for this reason is changeable and afflicted by regret (*metameleia*) over each of his actions. This much is consistent with classical views of afterthoughts or a change of mind. Arius goes on to explain that ‘regret (*metameleia*) is pain for things that have been done in error by oneself, an unfortunate and conflictual passion (*pathos*) of the soul; for to the extent that one enmeshed in regrets suffers for what has happened, he is irritated with himself for having been responsible for it’.<sup>28</sup> The use of the term *pathos* here, together with the emphasis on pain or distress, points to a classification of *metameleia* as an emotion, and this is confirmed by the inclusion of *metameleia* in a long list of *pathê* in a Stoic treatise entitled *On Emotions*, ascribed to a certain Andronicus, where it is located in the class of ‘pain’ (one of the four broad Stoic categories of emotion, the others being pleasure, fear, and desire), along with pity, envy, emulousness, jeal-

<sup>27</sup> Cf., e.g., Roberts, *Emotions*, pp. 222–24; Lyons, *Emotion*, p. 188; Johnson, *Physical Abusers and Sexual Offenders*, p. 209; Radzik, *Making Amends*, p. 37.

<sup>28</sup> Μεταμέλεια δὲ λύπη ἐπὶ ἁμαρτήμασι πεπραγμένοις ὡς δι’ αὐτοῦ γεγονόσιν, in *Andronici qui fertur libelli Περὶ παθῶν pars prior de affectibus*, ed. by Kreuttner, p. 12 = *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. by von Arnim, III, 414. 1–32.



ousy, and fully eighteen other painful emotions, minutely differentiated. One might suppose that the almost obsessive desire for comprehensiveness on the part of Andronicus is in part responsible for the inclusion of *metameleia* in the list, but it may also indicate a sensitivity to the moral dimension of the term and the extreme discomfort that may accompany a sense of wrongdoing, for this too was a part of the semantic domain of *metameleia* and *metanoia*.

But if *metameleia* was an emotion for the Stoics, it also raised a potential paradox for them that Cicero, for example, seized upon. As a passion, as opposed to a mere judgement, the Stoics could only view regret as something to be eliminated, like anger, pity, and all other *pathê*, which they roundly condemned. Yet regret differs from the other emotions, for one might come to regret or have a change of heart precisely in regard to one's own lack of virtue, and such a sentiment, one might imagine, is worthy of approval. Thus Cicero writes in the *Tusculan Disputations* (3. 77):

Cleanthes [the successor to Zeno as head of the Stoic school] seems to me, nevertheless, not to have taken sufficient notice of this point, that distress (*aegritudo*) can sometimes be felt as a result of the very thing that Cleanthes himself concedes is the greatest evil. For what shall we say about the time when Socrates persuaded Alcibiades, as we have heard, that he was a person of no worth and that there was no difference between Alcibiades, who was born in the highest station, and any load carrier, and Alcibiades berated himself and in tears implored Socrates to grant him virtue and drive out his baseness — what shall we say, Cleanthes?<sup>29</sup>

Cicero makes it clear that the cause of Alcibiades' distress must have been a genuine evil, even on Stoic terms, for they regarded virtue as the only good and vice as the only evil, and that therefore his reaction was appropriate and indeed good.<sup>30</sup> We cannot be sure that the term *metameleia* (as opposed, for example, to the simple *lupê* or 'distress') was employed by Cleanthes, but Cicero's question points to the difficulty they had with valorizing the notion of regret, precisely insofar as it was assimilated to a *pathos*. What we may conclude is that the broad semantic range of *metameleia* and *metanoia*, running from non-moral

<sup>29</sup> 'Et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes ipse fateatur. quid enim dicemus, cum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse nec quicquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis baiolum interesse, cum se Alcibiades adflicaret lacrimansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret — quid dicemus, Cleanthe?'

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, p. 196.

regret or mere change of mind to a feeling of intense sorrow for wrongs that one has done to another and one's own ethical failings, left the way open for various interpretations of regret, whether as an intellectual judgement or alteration of opinion or something like a genuine moral emotion, equivalent to remorse. But *metameleia* and *metanoia* seem never to have become central terms in the classical ethical vocabulary, nor did they excite great interest among ancient Greek and Roman thinkers. While the tendency of ancient philosophy to focus on perfection may explain in part the focus on consistent virtue rather than on regret, the relative absence of regret or remorse in the major genres of literature is perhaps due also to the fact that it did not constitute an essential element in the rhetoric of reconciliation, as came to be the case with the forgiveness scenario.

There is no question, of course, but that *metameleia* and *metanoia* play a much larger role in Jewish and Christian writings than in pagan texts of the classical period, where they come to assume an entirely new dimension of meaning. Margaret Graver puts the matter succinctly:

If one were to consult Philo, or Origen, or any other Jewish or Christian writer of Greco-Roman antiquity, about the proper function of mental distress, an answer would be ready to hand: remorse and repentance bring about a change in one's relationship to god, marked by a fuller awareness of one's responsibilities as a moral agent. This explicitly religious conception of remorse, developed under the influence of the Hebrew *shuv* or 'return' (i.e., a return to god), is not to be found in the secular philosophical tradition,

despite the example of the weeping Alcibiades (for *shuv* rendered as *metanoia*, cf. Jeremiah 4. 28 and 8. 6).<sup>31</sup> In fact, neither term is very frequent in the Septuagint, and where they do occur both can mean simply a change of mind, though *metanoia* is applied also to regret for former vices or errors (*epi kakiais* or *epi hamartêmasin*, Ode of Moses 12. 7. 3, Wisdom of Solomon 12. 19. 4, both texts originally in Greek). What is more, there are many variations on the way *shuv* is rendered in the Septuagint (one important term, in this context, is *epistrephô*). Indeed, Guy Nave Jr, who has examined all the renderings of *shuv* in the Septuagint observes, 'of the twenty-two occurrences of *metanoëô* and the five occurrences of *metanoia* in the Septuagint, there are no instances where either of the words is used to translate an occurrence in the Hebrew Bible of the root *shuv*'; rather, it is rendered by one or another form of *strephô*, 'to turn'. As Nave remarks, 'if *shuv* was the term that best expressed the idea of repentance

<sup>31</sup> Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, p. 206.

within the Hebrew Bible, the Jewish translators were either unaware of it or had a different understanding of repentance.' In fact, 'the translators used *metanoëō* to represent the root *nchm*, 'be sorry, moved to pity, have compassion, have regret, console oneself', for which *metamelomai* is also frequently used.<sup>32</sup>

It is in the New Testament that *metanoia*, and to a lesser extent *metameleia*, are to be found with some frequency and where they clearly play a new role.<sup>33</sup> To go by modern translations of these terms, it would appear to be taken for granted that the sentiment they represent is remorse or repentance, that is, not just regret for a negative outcome but an acknowledgement of moral responsibility for error or sin, accompanied by the intention or commitment to change one's ways. Thus, at Luke 5. 32, Jesus proclaims: 'I have not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance (*metanoia*)', according to the Revised Standard Version, and in its rendering of *metanoia* it is in accord with the New Revised Standard Version, the Authorized King James Version, the Darby Translation, the American Standard Version, and Noah Webster's version (the Latin vulgate, as usual, has *paenitentia*). Two versions, however, offer different readings: the Basic Bible in English, which seeks to use the most elementary and accessible vocabulary, has 'may be turned from their sins' (cf. Hebrews 6. 1), whereas the God's Word Translation, published in 1995, has 'change the way they think and act'.<sup>34</sup> The last rendering has much to be said for it, not least because it brings the sense of *metanoia* in line with the classical usage, reflecting

<sup>32</sup> Nave, *The Role and Function of Repentance in Luke-Acts*, pp. 112, 113.

<sup>33</sup> See Nave, *The Role and Function of Repentance in Luke-Acts*, pp. 119–44; for Luke and Acts in particular, pp. 145–224.

<sup>34</sup> Rendering the Greek *hamartia* as 'sin' is itself problematic in the context of Greek usage of the period; As Roberts in 'Reconsidering *hamartia* as "Sin" in 1 Corinthians', observes, 'In contemporary English usage, the term sin functions as a specifically religious term'; Roberts rightly notes that 'in the case of *hamartia* in New Testament texts (and especially in Paul) the problematic assumption is that it is a technical term that designates a robust and unified theological doctrine of human sin, whose only viable solution is salvation through Jesus Christ' (pp. 343, 345). See Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7*, who notes (p. 3): 'In the West, a tradition running from Augustine to Martin Luther and John Calvin made Romans 7 central to its understanding of sin and in so doing ascribed a condition of total depravity to all humans and moral conflict even to the Christian.' Wasserman argues convincingly that when Paul affirms (7. 20), 'Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me', he is referring to the passions and appetites that constitute, in Platonic and other Greek philosophical traditions (including the works of Philo), a threat to reason and must be held in check. These are what Paul calls 'the passions of our sins' (7. 5), located in the members of our bodies: they are for Paul, as they are for Plato, a function of our incarnation — a harsh doctrine, but not one that condemns mankind to perpetual mourning for our fallen condition.

an alteration of views rather than the pain and self-castigation that we associate with repentance. At the same time, the emphasis on an alteration in one's overall conduct suggests remorse, which involves, according to Teubert, the intention 'not to do whatever it was again', and not just sorrow that a given decision turned out badly. This is not surprising, insofar as *metameleia* and *metanoia* in Jewish and Christian contexts correspond to the recognition that one has sinned in the eyes of God, and typically are part of a petition for God's mercy or forgiveness.<sup>35</sup> As we have seen, John the Baptist appears in the wilderness 'preaching a baptism of *metanoia* for the remission of sins (*metanoia eis aphesin hamartiôn*)'. So too, Luke (24. 47) insists that '*metanoia* for the remission of sins should be preached in his [Jesus's] name to all nations' (cf. Acts 2. 38, 5. 31, 8. 22). There is no doubt that the alteration of ideas and sentiments in these latter contexts involves an act of faith and something of a moral transformation, entailed by belief in Jesus as the son of God. But does this change carry with it the deep emotional resonance that the terms remorse and repentance bear, as do the ostensible synonyms, contrition and compunction, offered by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, or is it more like a change of mind, with the intellectual connotation this phrase suggests?

The question of the nature of *metanoia* goes to the heart of what conversion means. On the one hand, if it signifies a change of mind or of moral attitude, which in a Judaeo-Christian context is tantamount to conversion, then those who manage to 'change the way they think and act', as the God's Word Translation has it, should experience a liberation from the state of sin and the inauguration of a new life — one that, presumably, brings with it contentment and joy rather than a continued state of sorrow and regret. *Metanoia* is the successful alteration of belief, at which point the sense of guilt and remorse is presumably overcome. On the other hand, if penitence is conceived of as the means of overcoming sin and gaining God's forgiveness, and hence the precondition to conversion, then it is naturally accompanied by a sense of guilt: although penitents are aware of their fallen state, they have not yet overcome it — in the end, a true conversion depends entirely on God's grace, not on one's own efforts — and so *metanoia* signifies not a total change of self but rather the initial stage by which one begins to will such a transformation.<sup>36</sup> Acts of peni-

<sup>35</sup> For a review of passages illustrating how *metanoëō* (verb) exhibits a shift from 'change one's mind' to 'feel remorse, repent, be converted' (in religio-ethical sense), see Arndt and Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, s.v.; again, *metanoia* is defined as 'a change of mind', and then 'repentance, turning about, conversion'.

<sup>36</sup> Stroumsa in 'From Repentance to Penance in Early Christianity', p. 176, observes:

tence are a way of reminding and punishing oneself for one's abiding spiritual deficiency. This conception of repentance is consistent with the idea that not even the most holy of men and women are entirely free of guilt, and so they devote their entire lives to weeping and suffering as a means of purification, in the hopes of earning God's mercy, which is the only way one can escape the heritage of original sin. It also goes hand in hand with an increasing hostility to the body, at least among some churchmen, and the belief that true liberation from sin will come only when one has escaped the corporeal shackles and passed to a better world. Among many examples of this attitude, we may cite Prudentius's *Peristephanon Praefatio*, 44–45: 'O may I flash forth, free from the chains of the body' (*vinclis o utinam corporis emicem | liber*), and 2. 581–84: 'Hear kindly the suppliant Prudentius, indicted by Christ, and absolve him, who is in servitude to the body, from the chains of this world' (*audi benignus supplicem | Christi reum Prudentium | et servientem corpori | absolve vinclis saeculi*). So too Basil writes in his letter to the Neocaesarians, 'I pray that you all live amid tears and perpetual repentance'.<sup>37</sup>

It is not always clear which sense of *metanoia* or *paenitentia* is active in a given context. Tertullian affirms (*On Penitence*, 4. 1): 'God has promised his pardon (*venia*) through repentance (*per paenitentiam*), declaring to the people: "repent (*paenitere*) and I shall save you"'. So too Saint Ambrose (fourth century), in his treatise *On Penitence: Against the Novatians* (1. 90–91), insists

'Originally, repentance (*paenitentia*) is identical to baptism, through which one enters into the Church. As such, it is required by God.' There is, however, a *secunda paenitentia*, after baptism, which is more like a 'cathartic practice' (p. 177): 'In contradistinction to baptism, which had been a second birth, penitence is conceived as an act of mourning. As he laments his sins, the penitent covers himself, in biblical fashion, with a sack of ashes [...]. This attitude of the repentant, expressing mourning and sadness (at the remembrance of sins past) is called *penthos*. It will later become typical of the monk in the eastern tradition' (p. 178). It is also part and parcel of the Calvinist tradition; thus Calvin writes in the *Institutes*: 'when we call repentance "a conversion of the life to God", we require a transformation, not only in the external actions, but in the soul itself; which, after having put off the old nature, should produce the fruits of actions corresponding to its renovation [...]. It remains for us [...] to explain our position, that repentance consists of two parts — the mortification of the flesh and the vivification of the spirit [...]. For if we truly partake of his death, our old man is crucified by its power, and the body of sin expires, so that the corruption of our former nature loses all its vigor'; quoted from *A Compend of the Institutes of the Christian Religion by John Calvin*, ed. by Kerr, p. 96 (John Calvin, *Institutes*, III. 3. 7).

<sup>37</sup> ηὐχόμεν γὰρ πάντας ὑμᾶς ἐν δάκρυσι ζῆν καὶ μετανοίᾳ διηγεκεῖ, *Epistulae* 207. 4; cf. *Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam*, p. 6 (if not by Basil, then very likely by a contemporary Cappadocian): 'Ἐὰν οὖν ὀργιζόμενον, ἡ λυπούμενον, ἡ μεταμελόμενον [...], etc.

that a person who has committed sins in secret, if he repents sincerely, will be reintegrated into the congregation of the church:

I wish that the guilty person hope for pardon (*venia*), beg for it with tears, beg for it with groans, beg with the tears of all the people, entreat that he be pardoned (*ignoscatur*) [...] I have people who, during penitence, have made rivulets of tears in their faces, hollowed their cheeks with continual weeping, prostrated their bodies so that they might be trampled by all, and with their faces forever pale with fasting, presented the appearance of death in a breathing body.

These passages suggest that penitence is part of the process of achieving a genuine conversion to God, and not the end point. Remorse, so understood, is a kind of perpetual mourning, and one of the terms commonly employed in this context is *penthos*, which signifies grief or sorrow: thus, 'mourning (*to penthêsai*) wipes away sins' (John Chrysostom, *Homily*, 3. 4 = PG 49, col. 289, l. 36). Hannah Hunt examines the role of grief (*penthos* in Greek) for the state of sin, and how tears manifest this grief: 'repentance and *penthos* [...] describe a continual process in which individuals become aware of their sins, regret them, and know that they cause a division and distance from God.'<sup>38</sup> John Chrysavgis comments in turn:

It is clear that what is at stake here is not particular acts of contrition, but an attitude, a state of mind. 'For this life', states John Chrysostom, 'is in truth wholly devoted to repentance, *penthos* and wailing. This is why it is necessary to repent, not merely for one or two days, but throughout one's whole life.'<sup>39</sup>

The ambiguous nature of *metanoia*, which straddles the notions of penitence as a means to conversion and a change of heart consequent upon, or coincident with, conversion, seems to have led to a new conception and vocabulary of remorse. It is beyond the scope of this essay to examine all the relevant passages in Christian literature; what I offer here is rather a preliminary study, and to

<sup>38</sup> Hunt, *Joy-Bearing Grief*, p. 14.

<sup>39</sup> Chrysavgis, *Repentance and Confession in the Orthodox Church*, citing John Chrysostom, *On Compunction*, 1. 1 and 1. 9 = PG 47, cols 395 and 408); 'Introduction' available online, <<http://ad-orientem.blogspot.com/2007/11/repentance-confession.html>>. See also Murphy, *Punishment and the Moral Emotions*, who distinguishes two kinds of remorse: both involve acceptance of responsibility for one's wrongful acts, 'repudiation of the aspects of one's character that generation the actions', and the determination to atone or make amends (p. 139); but there is an intense form of remorse in which 'a kind of *hopelessness* is essential to the insoluble bite of conscience', and a sense that 'the wrong one has done is so deep [...] that one can in no sense ever make it right again — such a possibility being permanently lost' (p. 140).

this end I have selected two tracts by John Chrysostom, who wrote towards the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth, which exhibit most clearly the shift of terminology under investigation here. The first is his series of nine sermons that are entitled *Peri metanoias* (usually rendered as *On Repentance*), delivered in Antioch during the years 386–87. In describing the punishment of Cain for the murder of Abel, John writes that God

immediately examined and punished him, not so much for the murder as for his impudence (*anaidea*), because God does not hate the one who sins as much as the one who has no shame (*anaiskhounta*). God neglected Cain and did not accept him when he approached repentance (*metameleia*), because he was not the first to tell the sin.<sup>40</sup>

John insists as well that *metanoia* alone is insufficient to win forgiveness, for ‘repentance without almsgiving is a corpse and without wings.’<sup>41</sup> John urges his congregation:

Do not be ashamed (*aiskhynthêis*) to enter the church again: feel shame when you sin, not when you feel *metanoia* (*metanoôn*). Consider what the Devil did to you. They are two things, sin (*hamartia*) and *metanoia*: sin is the wound, *metanoia* is the medicine (*pharmakon*). Just as in the body there are wounds and medicines, so too in the soul there are sins and *metanoia*. But sin bears with it shame, whereas *metanoia* acquires candor (*parrhêsia*).<sup>42</sup>

In other passages too, John insists that sin is the cause of shame, not the frank avowal of sin that accompanies *metanoia* (e.g., *PG* 49, col. 338, ll. 49–47; col. 338, l. 56–col. 339, l. 7; col. 339, ll. 8–9; col. 339, ll. 10–23).

Shame is unquestionably an emotion in ancient classifications, and occurs when a vice is exposed to public view, or alternatively when one becomes conscious of a flaw in one’s own character. Aristotle, for example, defines *aiskhunê* as follows: ‘Let *aiskhunê*, then, be a pain or disturbance concerning those ills, either present, past, or future, that are perceived to lead to disgrace, while shamelessness is a disregard or impassivity concerning these same things’ (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2. 6, 1383b, 12–14). The confession of sin would, one would think, bring on shame, since it reveals one’s vice; this is why John must

<sup>40</sup> John Chrysostom, *On Repentance, Homily* 2. 3 = *PG* 49, col. 285, ll. 45–50; the translation is that of Christo, *The Fathers of the Church*, p. 17.

<sup>41</sup> John Chrysostom, *On Repentance, Homily* 7. 21 = *PG* 49, cols 332–40; trans. by Christo, *The Fathers of the Church*, p. 103.

<sup>42</sup> John Chrysostom, *On Repentance, Homily* 8 = *PG* 49, col. 338, ll. 29–35; my translation.



argue that *metanoia*, that is, regret for the sin committed, permits one to speak forthrightly about one's defects or sin without shame. If the deed is shameful, a change of heart wipes away the stigma, and allows one to speak openly of one's sin in full confidence. Thus, where the emotion shame might have been expected to serve as a motive for concealment, the doctrine of *metanoia* and confession invites you to overcome shame by affirming your new view or perception of your former conduct. But again, is *metanoia* itself an emotion? That is, has it come to mean something like the English 'remorse'? Or is it rather an antidote to the emotion of shame?

The second tract I should like to consider is entitled *To Demetrius, On Compunction*; the word for 'compunction' here is *katanuxis*, deriving from the root *nussô*, that is, 'stab' or 'pierce'.<sup>43</sup> In this address, John writes:

I know, o divine one, that you are thoroughly possessed by the fire of compunction: your sleepless nights bear witness to me of this, and the streams of your tears, and the passion for solitude that continually resides and rages in your soul (PG 47, col. 394, ll. 1–9; my translation).

John speaks of the 'virtue (*aretê*) of compunction' (PG 47, col. 410, l. 41), but his language makes it clear that compunction is marked by sharp pangs of conscience. One is reminded that the Latin origin of the word 'remorse' is 'to bite again' (*remordere*), and in a remarkable passage, the Epicurean poet Lucretius speaks of crimes that bite at one (*praeteritisque male admissis peccata remordent*, 3. 827), and again of the mind that stings or bites itself when conscious of some fault (*consciis ipse animus se forte remordet*, 4. 1135).<sup>44</sup> *Katanuxis* would seem, then, to come close to remorse as an emotion, and the verbal form (*katanusso-mai*) is defined (s.v.) as 'the feeling of pain connected w. anxiety, remorse, etc.' in the standard dictionary of New Testament and early Christian Greek.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Hunt, in *Joy-Bearing Grief*, defines *katanuxis*, or 'compunction', as 'that pricking of the heart, or conscience, which acts as a catalyst to repentant thoughts and deeds' (p. 16). In modern Greek *katanuxis* principally signifies the feeling of deep religious faith and piety (cf. Babiniotis, *Dictionary of the Modern Greek Language*, s.v. *katanuxi*: το αίσθημα βαθιάς θρησκευτικής πίστης και ευλάβειας των πιστών).

<sup>44</sup> The Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, a contemporary of Lucretius, mentions the 'bites' (*dégmoi*) that accompany rational anger (in his treatise *On Anger*) and also the 'natural bite' one feels at the thought of loved ones suffering hardship because of one's death (in his treatise *On Death*); see Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, pp. 44–49.

<sup>45</sup> Arndt and Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, s.v. The term *katanuxis* appears once in the New Testament (Romans



The consciousness of sin that is represented by *metanoia* in the New Testament and other Christian sources suggests not just an intellectual recognition of wrongdoing but the pain associated with the acknowledgement of one's own error and sinfulness; as such, it presumably bears the painful charge that is present in shame, and is the reason why one repents (*metanoëin*) 'in sackcloth and ashes' (Matthew 11. 21; Luke 10. 13). But the term retains, I think, much of its intellectual colour — indeed, the change of heart per se is painful only to the extent that one recalls one's previous state of mind — insofar as it signifies a successful conversion and the liberation from sin and remorse that this entails; perhaps for just this reason the term *metanoia* comes to be supplemented by the idea of compunction or contrition, which carries the negative valence — the sense of pain — that informs the modern notion of repentance and remorse, and endows these latter terms with the character of an emotion. There is, indeed, a parallel development in Latin, with the introduction of the new term *compunctio*, specific to Christian Latin, as well as *contritio* or 'contrition'.<sup>46</sup> These terms and their relation to remorse will receive meticulous analysis in the hands of scholastic theologians such as Thomas, as we have seen.

The history and theological significance of these Christian coinages is again beyond the scope of this study. My contribution here has been to call attention to their role in the evolution of the emotional lexicon in late antiquity. Christianity, with its doctrine of original sin and the need for grace, conferred a new meaning upon terms like *metanoia* and *paenitentia*, associating them not only with regret but with conversion and redemption through faith. But even those who had exhibited the profound change of heart implied in conversion might not adequately have abandoned their former state of sin, and repentance

11. 8. 3), is relatively frequent (along with the verbal form) in the works of Origen, and comes into its own with John Chrysostom and Ephraem Graecus.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Augustine, *Sermon* 175. 4: '*Interfectorum Christi conversio*. Denique loquente sibi Petro, compuncti sunt, et factum est in illis quod Psalmus praedixerat: *Conversus sum in aerumnam, cum configeretur spina* (Psalm 31. 4). Quid est *spina*? Compunctio poenitentiae. Sic habes et verba ipsa Scripturae in Actibus Apostolorum: *Compuncti sunt corde, et dixerunt ad Apostolos, Quid faciemus?* Ambrose, *In psalmum primum enarratio*, 33: 'In veteri Testamento compunctio, in novo laetitia est'; *De interpellatione Job et David*, 1. 5: 'Conteruntur autem qui in iudicium resuscitantur. Est autem bona contritio: "cor enim contritum et humiliatum Deus non spernit" (Psalm 50. 19). Et alibi: Sana contritiones ejus (Psalm 59. 4). Sed et ad Josaphat dictum est: "Contritae sunt naves [nec potuerunt] ire in Tharsis" (II Chronicles 20. 37); eo quod se sacrilego miscuisset. Utrumque igitur contritio significat; quia utrumque est in die iudicii.' The Septuagint equivalent to *contritum* is *suntrimmenon*, that is, 'crushed'; and *contritiones* corresponds to *suntrimmata*, 'crushings'.

came to signify not just a deep moral regret for prior conduct but a lifelong sense of guilt and anguish for one's fallen state. This latter meaning became dominant with the emergence of ascetic practices, when penitence came to signify less a fully-realized inner transformation and the joy that might naturally accompany such a renewal of the self, and more a lifelong discipline of self-punishment motivated by a perpetual consciousness of guilt and sin. What the new uses of the terms *metanoia*, *metameleia*, and *paenitentia*, along with new coinages such as *katanuxis*, *contritio*, and *compunctio*, indicate is a new emotional register in the idea of a change of mind or afterthought. On the Christian model, which has penetrated modern secular thought and made moral transformation the condition even for interpersonal forgiveness, remorse presupposes not just recognition of wrongdoing and a wish to make amends but the further display of sincere inner reform. This script was foreign to classical culture.<sup>47</sup> Greeks and Romans assumed that character was normally constant over time, and that, in the case of basically decent individuals, wrongdoing was a temporary aberration rather than evidence of deep-seated depravity. One might regret the harm done to another, but such behaviour was assumed to be exceptional, and by way of apology one tried to explain it, or explain it away, rather than reassess one's former life path or seek purgation and forgiveness, as Winston and Kaster put it. But classical regret did sometimes take the form of sorrow for wrongdoing, accompanied by shame, pangs of conscience, and a desire to make amends. If we fail to recognize this sentiment as the moral sentiment of remorse, it may be because we expect remorse to take the form of a conversion, according to a paradigm or scenario that would only emerge with a new Christian conception of a fallen self.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> For discussion, see Konstan, *Before Forgiveness*.

<sup>48</sup> This chapter is a much revised version of the talk I gave at the conference on 'Emotions in the Medieval and Early Modern World'; as my friend Jay Reed observed to me, my essay may itself be regarded as an exercise in *metanoia*.

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## REPRESENTING EMOTIONS IN THREE BYZANTINE ORATIONS OF MICHAEL PSELLOS

Michael Champion

In this chapter, I explore how the prolific Byzantine politician, monk, thinker, and orator Michael Psellos (1018–c. 1080) presents, constructs, and implicitly theorizes emotions in his rhetorical works. I focus on three understudied orations: *To His Grandson, Who Was Still an Infant* (*Eis τὸν αὐτοῦ ἐκγονὸν ἔτι νήπιον ὄντα*),<sup>1</sup> a *Funeral Oration for his Daughter Styliane* (*Eis τὴν θυγατέρα Στυλιανὴν πρὸ ὥρας γάμου τελευτήσασαν*),<sup>2</sup> and the *Encomium for his Mother* (*Ἐγκώμιον εἰς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ*).<sup>3</sup> Like any good rhetorician, Psellos knows that emotions do things and can be used instrumentally to gain desired ends. The speeches thus illumine ways in which culture conditions the experience, expression, and understanding of emotions. They allow us to probe ways in which status and gender norms colour acceptable emotions and suggest ways in which emotional display is constrained or generated by expectations surrounding different family roles at different life stages. Psellos' account also clearly points to manifold ways in which emotional experience and understanding is implicated in theories of mind, theological claims, and ethical commitments. Despite recent interpretations, Psellos' generally positive evaluation

<sup>1</sup> *Michaelis Pselli oratoria minora*, ed. by Littlewood, pp. 152–55.

<sup>2</sup> *Pselli Miscellanea*, ed. by Sathas [ΜΙΧΑΗΛ ΨΕΛΛΟΥ. ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ, ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΛΛΑ ΑΝΑΚΔΟΤΑ]. The title in Sathas's edition translates as 'To the daughter Styliane, who died before the hour of her marriage'.

<sup>3</sup> *Michele Psello: Autobiografia*, ed. by Criscuolo.

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of a range of emotions places him within the mainstream Christian tradition, informed by Plato and Aristotle rather more than the Stoics.<sup>4</sup> Within this view, certain manifestations of emotions are viewed as central to a good life. The goal is *metriopatheia* rather than absolute *apatheia*, and desire remains in the good life because God, the object of desire, remains beyond reach. I hope that my analyses of these rhetorical works may lay a foundation for a more complete account of Psellos' philosophical and theological psychology and the role of the emotions — broadly conceptualized — within it. I do not attempt this larger task here, but my analysis may help to situate Psellos' thought on the emotions within a range of largely complementary intellectual traditions, including classical rhetoric, hagiography, and monastic and philosophical literature.

Given the interdisciplinary reach of this volume, a brief introduction to Psellos is in order. Psellos' literary works span several genres, including historiography, philosophy, various species of rhetoric, letters, and theological writings. He claimed to have been able to recite the *Iliad* aged ten, and was formally trained in rhetoric, although he was self-taught in philosophy.<sup>5</sup> His rhetorical abilities and wide-ranging classical knowledge and his political acumen, tenacity, and flexibility saw him rise to positions of power in successive imperial administrations from around 1040 to 1076.<sup>6</sup> As 'Consul of the Philosophers' (ὑπατος τῶν φιλοσόφων) in the Byzantine court, he led a revival of classical learning in general and rhetoric and Neoplatonic philosophy in particular in the middle Byzantine period.

The three speeches I analyse in this chapter all sit within the genre of encomium.<sup>7</sup> Encomium is a useful genre through which to investigate emotions, since it was concerned not just with episodes in a life, but with the whole life,

<sup>4</sup> See Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, pp. 2–4.

<sup>5</sup> Psellos, *Encomium for his Mother* 5b, 6b–c. Cf. Psellos, *Chronographia* 4. 4.

<sup>6</sup> For further biographical details, see *Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters*, ed. and trans. by Kaldellis, pp. 3–16. A useful summary of education and imperial politics in the period is given by Agapitos, 'Teachers, Pupils, and Imperial Power'. Wilson, *Scholars of Byzantium*, pp. 156–66, remains useful. For Psellos' role within Byzantine Humanism, see Criscuolo, 'Tardoantico e umanesimo bizantino', pp. 22–23, noting the importance of classical learning for imperial rhetoric. There were monastic influences on Psellos' 'humanism', especially from Basil and other Capadoccians, but also other late antique Christian and pagan-hellenic authors, and philosophical influences from Neoplatonists such as Proclus and earlier church fathers such as John of Damascus.

<sup>7</sup> English translations are provided in *Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters*, ed. and trans. by Kaldellis. My translations throughout are adapted from his fluent and accurate rendering and his introduction opens up useful lines of inquiry.

and not just with one particularly fine characteristic, but with the whole set of virtues and dispositions which made the subject of the encomium worthy of praise as an instance of what is noble (τὸ καλόν).<sup>8</sup> Aelius Theon, like other writers of rhetorical handbooks, identifies goods of the soul and character (τὰ [ἀγαθὰ] μὲν περὶ ψυχὴν τε καὶ ἥθος) as one of the three subjects of encomium (*Progymnasmata*, 109, 29–30).<sup>9</sup> Emotions, broadly defined, are understood to come under this category, so we should expect a rich account of emotions in Psellos' encomiastic speeches.

A final preliminary, on terminology, is required. It has been claimed of 'emotion' that 'this term has proven utterly refractory to definitional efforts; probably no other term in psychology shares its combination of nondefinability and frequency of use'.<sup>10</sup> I am broadly convinced by Thomas Dixon's argument that the creation of the term 'emotion' in the nineteenth century has given rise to some of these problems of definition, and that a richer psychological vocabulary should be recovered.<sup>11</sup> Psellos, of course, knew nothing of the modernist reduction of emotions to involuntary, non-cognitive epiphenomena of physical stimuli; nor would he have been sympathetic towards a generally amoral emotivism. His account of 'emotions' is often visceral, but it is not reduced to the aggregate of bodily states, pointing to his non-physicalist view of the world. His concept of 'emotion' includes physical urges and instinctive reactions. But he is more interested in cognitive responses, intentional states, and the ways in which 'emotions' — affections and sentiments, passions, and appetites — reflect and form character. His account of emotions, broadly conceived, thus has ethical implications. Since in this chapter I deal mostly with his rhetorical rather than his technically philosophical or theological works, we should not

<sup>8</sup> In the fifth century, Nicolaus the Sophist wrote that 'encomium is performed through an account of all the virtues and all the superior qualities of what is being praised. The purpose of encomium is the noble' (ἐγκώμιον δὲ τὸ διὰ πασῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ διὰ πάντων τῶν τοῦ ἐπαινουμένου πλεονεκτημάτων ἐργασθέν. Τέλος δὲ ἐγκωμίου τὸ καλόν) (Nicolaus the Sophist, *Progymnasmata* XLIX, 5–8). See *Nicolai progymnasmata*, ed. by Joseph Felten. On *encomia*, see the relevant sections collected in *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, ed. and trans. by Kennedy, pp. 50–52, 81–83, 108–11, 154–162, 206–10.

<sup>9</sup> *Rhetores Graeci II*, ed. by Spengel, pp. 59–130.

<sup>10</sup> *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology*, ed. by Reber, Allen, and Reber.

<sup>11</sup> See Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, p. 2: 'The over-inclusivity of our modern-day category of emotions has hampered attempts to argue with any subtlety about the nature and value of the enormous range of passionate, affectionate, sentimental, felt, and committed mental states and stances of which we are capable.' See also pp. 247–49.



expect precision from Psellos in the use of ‘emotion terms’, and for this reason, as much as for convenience, I will at times use the term ‘emotion’ to describe his account of different passions, affects, and feeling states or attitudes. But one conclusion from my analysis will be that Psellos has a rich view of different psychological states and activities which is vastly more differentiated than some modern definitions of ‘emotion’.<sup>12</sup>

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I begin with Psellos’ *Speech to his Grandson*.<sup>13</sup> Psellos frames the speech by acknowledging that he may not live to see the dearest newborn and offspring of his soul as an adult (*Speech to his Grandson*, 152, 2). The whole speech is thus delivered under the expectation of future bereavement. Psellos constructs an emotional attachment between grandfather and grandchild and uses it to bind the boy to him and to influence the child’s life choices. It is, in part, a speech which uses emotions to make the grandchild emulate his grandfather. It thus simultaneously makes a claim for the superiority of Psellos’ own career choices and general way of life. Psellos uses his construction of emotion in this speech as in others to justify his intellectual interests or advance them as useful contributions to society. The final lines of the speech make these points clear:

But you, my living pearl, the ornament of my soul, when you reach your age of wisdom and realize what sort of man your grandfather was, and what the first days of your life were like, take him as your model, steer your disposition toward moderation and honour your parents. Feeling respect towards your teachers and professors, above all adorn your soul with words. For hence I too brought honour upon your mother and the family. May you also obtain what you love, but especially education and good sense, which indeed alone raise the soul to its proper beauty and which constitute understanding of the more profound things. I wrote this for you while holding you in my arms and kissing you insatiably.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For a methodological argument that theories of emotions should aim to include a broad range of such states, see Rorty, ‘Enough Already with “Theories of the Emotions”’, pp. 269–70, 278.

<sup>13</sup> References in what follows will be to page numbers in *Michaelis Pselli oratoria minora*, ed. by Littlewood, followed by a comma and the line number in the speech as a whole.

<sup>14</sup> *Speech to his Grandson*, 155, 99–108. σὺ δέ μοι ὁ ἐμψυχος μαργαρίτης, τὸ τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἐγκαλλώπισμα, ἐπειδὴν τῆς φρονούσης ἄψαιο ἡλικίας καὶ γνοίης οἷος μὲν σοι ὁ πάππος, οἷα δέ σοι τῆς ζωῆς τὰ πρωτόλεια, πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα σαυτὸν ἀπεικονίξει, ῥυθμιζὼν τὸ ἦθος πρὸς σωφροσύνην καὶ τιμῶν μὲν γονέας, αἰδοῦμενος δὲ παιδαγωγούς τε καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ πρὸ πάντων λόγοις τὴν σὴν καλλύνων ψυχὴν ἐντεῦθεν γάρ σοι καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὸ γένος ἐκόσμησα. καὶ τύχοις μὲν ὅσων ἐράξ, μᾶλλον δὲ παιδείας τε καὶ συνέσεως, ἃ δὴ καὶ μόνῃ ἐπὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κάλλος ἀνάγει ψυχὴν

Psellos also uses emotions instrumentally in the *Encomium for his Mother*. In this complex and multifaceted speech, he constructs a portrait of appropriate emotional relationships between mothers and sons partly to justify his choice to enter a monastery, as the emperor is demanding that he return to the more dangerous life of court politics, a return Psellos is anxious to avoid.<sup>15</sup> Thus Psellos secured his political position through drawing on emotional norms. Like all orators in the classical tradition, he knows how to use emotions to form a connection with his audience and persuade them to his position.<sup>16</sup> But to reduce Psellos' presentation of emotion to such instrumental, political, or self-advancing aims — important though they are — is to miss much of what the speeches can reveal about his understanding of emotions and expectations about how they should be displayed and experienced at different life stages in elite society in eleventh-century Byzantium.

Psellos begins his encomium to his grandchild by justifying his choice of subject. The particular problem that he faces is that it may seem strange to direct a truthful and purposefully emotional speech to an infant whose thoughts and perceptions are undeveloped (*Speech to his Grandson*, 152, 6–7). How could the child be expected to understand the words, let alone the emotional force of the speech?<sup>17</sup> Psellos' answer is that he is committing his speech to writing so that it will be available for the child when he is old enough to understand it. But he also makes a claim that, despite the common understanding, the child is perfectly capable of forming fixed and accurate emotional judgement:

You are perfect in these respects [thoughts and perceptions], insofar as you hear my voice and feel my affection, cling to my neck, slip into my embrace, and put up with my annoying kisses.<sup>18</sup>

καὶ σύνεσιν τῶν ἀρρητοτέρων συντίθῃσιν. ἐγὼ δέ σοι ταῦτα γεγράφηκα ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀγκάλαις ἔχων καὶ ἀπλήστως κατασπαζόμενος.

<sup>15</sup> See Agapitos, 'Teachers, Pupils, and Imperial Power', pp. 181–82; *Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters*, ed. and trans. by Kaldellis, pp. 31–32.

<sup>16</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II is the *locus classicus* for all later authors in this tradition. See the discussion in *Aristotle: On Rhetoric*, ed. and trans. Kennedy. See the introduction (especially p. xii) of *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, ed. and trans. by Kennedy, for discussion of the handbooks in use in the Byzantine period.

<sup>17</sup> For wider Byzantine views on children, see Caseau, 'Childhood in Byzantine Saints' Lives'; Kalogeras, 'What Do They Think about Children?'; Moffat, 'The Byzantine Child'.

<sup>18</sup> *Speech to his Grandson*, 152, 7–9: ἔπειτά μοι μόνῳ ταῦτα ἀπακριβοῦντος καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς αἰσθανομένου καὶ φωνῆς καὶ στοργῆς προσφυομένου τε περὶ τὸν τράχηλον καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ὑποδευκότος ἀγκάλην.

We have here a hint of how Psellos understands emotions. Emotions are a form of judgement, connected to perception and thought.<sup>19</sup> They involve the processing of external stimuli (hearing the voice), recognition of and internal change generated by the other's affection (feeling of affection), physical changes and external effects (clinging to the beloved), and correct judgement of the appropriate response to the other's emotion (reciprocal embraces or resignation).

'For most people at the moment of birth', Psellos admits with deadpan humour, 'the soul is disposed as rather irrational' (τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πολλοῖς ἀλογωτέρα ἢ ψυχὴ γενομένοις εὐθὺς διατίθεται). Humour and playfulness colour the speech throughout, constructing in the text a sense of play and loving enjoyment we are supposed to imagine characterizing Psellos' relationship with his grandchild. His serious point is dependent on medical theories of a developmental view of the foetus and the soul, whereby the foetus develops from a plant-like state to an inspirited but still animal-like state near birth, before developing reasoning capacities in childhood.<sup>20</sup> In a developmental view of the soul, stable and intentional emotions would be impossible for children, since the undeveloped reasoning soul would be incapable of judgement (*Speech to his Grandson*, 153, 45–6). Since emotion requires the capability of judgement and the consistent, intentional, and cognitive direction of attention towards an object, it seems children in general would be incapable of stable emotions.

Not so, it seems, for his grandson, who is described in the tradition of the *puer senex*, a *topos* well known in middle-Byzantine hagiographic literature.<sup>21</sup> Psellos describes what look to us like the child's emotional responses in detail. Addressing the child, Psellos claims that his eyes moved 'cheerfully' (ἰλαρῶς) whenever he was about to smile (152, 24–153, 25). The description of the joy experienced by the baby is affecting:

true enough, you moved your lip slightly, blushed, and, behold! You laughed. Nor were your brows uninvolved in the meditation reflected in your eyes, but those too

<sup>19</sup> Both Plato and Aristotle define emotions as forms of judgement: emotion is irreducibly cognitive. See, for example, Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1. 2. 3–6, 2. 1. 1–4, 8. See also the discussion in Cooper, *Reason and Emotion*, pp. 237–52 and 406–26.

<sup>20</sup> For discussion of relevant views on the embryo in the Greek-Christian tradition, see especially Gourinat, 'L'embryon végétatif et la formation de l'âme selon les Stoïciens'; Boudon-Millot, 'La naissance de la vie dans la théorie médicale et philosophique de Galien'; and Hanson, 'The gradualist view of fetal development'. Tiziano Dorandi demonstrates Psellos' extensive use, often through Porphyry, of the Galenic text *ad Gaurum*. See Dorandi, 'Pour une histoire du texte du traité *ad Gaurum* attribué à Galien', esp. pp. 127–31.

<sup>21</sup> See Caseau, 'Childhood in Byzantine Saints' Lives', pp. 151–52.

laid bare some aspect of your inner disposition by gently flexing and contributing their portion of prudence as well.<sup>22</sup>

For Psellos, with his characteristic optimism and generally positive evaluation of embodiment, laughter is a sign of good character, where earlier authors had seen laughter as a potential sign of moral weakness or indolence.<sup>23</sup> In Psellos' view, the eyes which demonstrate the child's cheerfulness are 'not too rapid in motion nor slow and lethargic, which would have signified a dull disposition, but, rather, sometimes they were fixed as though lost in thought' (οὐτε γοργὸν καὶ εὐκίνητον οὔτε ἀργὸν καὶ βλακῶδες, ὅπερ ἀμβλυτέρου ἤθους σημείον καθέστηκεν) (152, 22–23).

With these last descriptions, speech about affections (cheerfulness, joy) has moved quickly across into speech about virtues of character (prudence, intelligence). This is exactly what we should expect at this point in any encomium; the rhetorical handbooks place the description of the subject's virtues at this place in the speech.<sup>24</sup> The laughter of the baby is not so much about his feeling of joy or cheerfulness as about his active intelligence and prudence, which is contrasted with his counter-factual 'dull disposition'. As this section of the speech continues, other terms we normally associate with emotions are tied strongly to virtues. When the wet-nurse 'deprived [him] of his customary drink', the baby displays a strong sense of justice, which recognizes injustice and hubris (ἀδικίας καὶ ὑβρεως) (153, 33 ff). He does not burst forth with cries and convulsive movements (διερρήγνυσο τοῖς κλαυθοῖς καὶ ἀπέσπαιρες) in an unruly, passionate response to a deprivation of a physical appetite (153, 35). Rather, he lets a single tear roll down his cheek to win the attention of the jurors, thus indicting the nurse for injustice (153, 35–37). The baby drinks with the virtue of moderation rather than with a passionate greed. For all its playful humour, built on comic exaggerations and incongruities, in this move from affections and sentiments to virtues, there is the implicit claim that experiencing certain

<sup>22</sup> *Speech to his Grandson*, 153, 28–32: καὶ αὐτίκα βραχύ τι τὸ χεῖλος μετακινήσας ἐρυθήματός τε πεπλήρωσο καὶ παρείχες τὸν γέλωτα. ἐν δὲ ταῖς τῶν ὀμμάτων συννοίαις οὐδὲ ἡ ὀφρὺς ἀσυντελής ἦν, ἀλλὰ κάκεῖνη παρεγύμνου τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἡθῶν ἡρέμα συγκαμπτομένη καὶ συνδιδοῦσά τι καὶ συνέσεως.

<sup>23</sup> For example, John Chrysostom, *PG* 57, cols 69, 71. See the discussion in Kalogeras, 'What Do They Think about Children?', p. 6.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, those of Aelius Theon, 'Hermogenes', Aphthonius, and Nicolaus translated in *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, ed. and trans. by Kennedy, pp. 50, 82, 108, 158.

good emotions is necessary for virtue. Certainly, passions and physical appetites should be controlled or moderated, but the higher, if still passionate and physical, affections and sentiments display virtuous character traits. For Psellos, as for others within the Christian-Platonic-Peripatetic tradition, there are positive and negative emotional responses, and displaying positive sentiments and affections while limiting passions and appetites is essential to the life of virtue.

Psellos spends most time describing the emotions experienced by the baby: when breastfed (happiness signified by kindly glances and laughter (εὐμενὲς ὄμμα καὶ γέλωτα)) (153, 44); when bathed (happiness and grace, delight (χάριτας, ἡδόμενος)) (154, 76–83); when embraced (filled with pleasure (πᾶν σοι θυμηδίας μέτρον ἐπλήρου)) (154, 64); when wrapped in swaddling clothes (upset, cross, robbed of charm (κατηφιῶν ἐσκυθρώπαζες, οὐδέν σε τῶν ἄλλων ἔθελγεν)) (154, 65–69); when freed from constraints (cheerful, delighting (ἰλαρώτερον, γλυκύτερον)) (154, 71). The speech also sets out how the ideal grandfather should respond emotionally to his grandchild. Psellos speaks of ‘deriving enjoyment’ from the behaviour of his grandson, he plays with him, lifting him up into the air until he is full of joy and, as at bathtime, delighting in his enjoyment. In the *Encomium to his Mother*, Psellos has an affecting story of pretending to be asleep as his mother, embracing him and weeping, cries ‘O my dear child, though I love you so, I cannot embrace you often’ (*Encomium for his Mother*, 17, 8b). Psellos has his mother claim that such unmoderated displays of emotional attachment on the part of parents may lead to disobedience (*Encomium for his Mother*, 17, 8b). Yet grandfathers need have no such concern. Psellos kisses the baby ‘without restraint’, crushes his lips with his rough touch and embraces him too firmly (153, 57–58). It is a mark of his advanced graces and prudent disposition that the baby accepts these excessive displays of emotion with love. The speeches thus provide an account of what constitutes an acceptable emotional display for young children and their parents and grandparents, and again point to the strong connection between reflective emotional displays and ethical action.

In Psellos’ *Funeral Speech for his Daughter Styliane*, we find portraits of appropriate emotional experiences of parents in relation to daughters.<sup>25</sup> There is a good deal about the parents’ joy and rejoicing in Styliane’s beauty and their high expectations for her bright future, especially her marriage.<sup>26</sup> There is no

<sup>25</sup> For literature on this speech see Jouanno, ‘Michel Psellos: *Epitaphios logos à sa fille Styliane*’; Leroy-Molinghen, ‘Styliane’.

<sup>26</sup> References to this speech are to page numbers in *Pselli Miscellanea*, ed. by Sathas [ΜΙΧΑΗΛ ΨΕΛΛΟΥ. ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ, ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΑΙ ΚΑΙ ἌΛΛΑ ΑΝΑΚΔΟΤΑ].

anxiety about display of emotion towards the daughter, as there is in the case of the grandson and Psellos as a boy. The view that boys may be morally and intellectually weakened by excessive displays of emotion is not present in Psellos' account of his interactions with Styliane, highlighting gendered differences in the construction of appropriate emotional behaviour and experience. Psellos speaks passionately of his love and affection for her, demonstrated by the daughter rushing for his embrace and by their spending long days together (66–67). Father and daughter lie together on their bed and eat together while the daughter sits on his knees (67). The love and boundless joy Psellos feels is figured in creatively conflicting Platonic imagery. Psellos becomes a prisoner to his desires but his love for his daughter energizes him: it is impossible to be passive and loveless in her presence (68). Styliane reciprocates these affections by sharing 'everything that was offered and set before her on account of the boundless sea of love that she felt for me' (τὸ περὶ πᾶν ὁτιοῦν προσφερομένων καὶ παρατιθεμένων μετέχειν ἐθέλειν διὰ τὸ πρὸς με τῆς ἀγάπης ἀπεριόριστον πέλαγος) (67).

When Styliane dies young, 'shipwrecked' (78) before the age of marriage, Psellos flounders in an ocean of grief, greater than the boundless sea of love he has experienced from his daughter. Like the sea, his grief is boundless (85). Grief is expressed in the 'uncontrollable weeping' (αἰέρρουν τὸ δάκρυον) of the parents and all the other people present at the bedside, 'For they suffered along with us as lovers of their own children and offspring, even measuring our sufferings from their own' (συνέπασχον γὰρ ἡμῖν οἷα κάκεῖνοι φιλότεκνοί τε καὶ φιλόπαιδες, καὶ ἀντιμετροῦντες ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν τὰ ἡμέτερα) (79). Here we glimpse the communal sharing of grief, the prevalence of infant and childhood mortality, and the deep sadness associated with such experiences.<sup>27</sup> Similar accounts are seen in the encomium for his mother. While Psellos' grief at the death of his mother is not as great as that described in the *epitaphios* for his daughter (here he can collect his wits in the midst of his grief), the account displays similar tropes that alert us to the rhetorical expectations of accounts of death, including the death scene itself, where the sick person is surrounded by relatives and friends in an expression of visceral communal mourning, replete with embraces of the dead body.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> On causes of death, statistics and literary and non-literary evidence, see Talbot, 'The Death and Commemoration of Byzantine Children'.

<sup>28</sup> These practices are identified in a study of monastic death rituals: Abrahamse, 'Rituals of Death in the Middle Byzantine Period'. The similarities point to one way in which Psellos' oration approaches hagiography.

For Psellos, attempts at explanations and comfort after his daughter's death are in vain. While he retains belief in divine providence, he cannot remove his grief by relying on the goodness of God's intentions for his creatures (79–80). His grief also drives him to search out medical explanations. He seeks to apply his medical knowledge, but is forced to admit that no medical skill could cure the disease, and while the failure of medicine is beneficial since it makes humans rely on divine aid, such knowledge is really no use in his present situation (77–78). In turning to medical and religious explanations for Styliane's death, Psellos attempts to govern his grief by finding a narrative in which the death could make sense; emotions acquire meaning in stories. The best reason he can come up with is that her death preserves her from defilement 'by human intercourse' and the 'filth of the flesh' (78). Yet in the next sentence he returns to graphic descriptions of the uncountable sores which cover her body as she lies dying, suggesting that this explanation is empty too.

Later in the speech, Psellos compares his grief to biblical narratives, trying to find a fitting perspective by inserting his experiences into the stories of Jacob and Joseph and Jeremiah's lament for Jerusalem. While Psellos is following the advice of the rhetorical handbooks to magnify his subject through well-known comparisons, the use of these stories is partly designed, I suggest, to help him attempt to put appropriate limits on his grief. The comparison with Jeremiah is particularly pointed, since at this point in the speech he claims to experience greater sadness than Jeremiah's lament for the capture of Jerusalem, whereas at the beginning of the speech Jeremiah's grief is accepted as the one unsurpassable sadness.

His own experience of grief continues unabated. In contrast to the joy which animated him earlier, Styliane's death leaves him dejected, almost dead, objectless and lamenting (85–88). His grief is 'of a different kind',

not bounded in time, it will not end at a certain deadline, it will not relent even for a little while, but will last for the rest of eternity and press upon me until we are all resurrected at the very end.<sup>29</sup>

With his grief come darkened sight and sullenness, a striking contrast to the kindly, bright, and moving eyes of the happy and active baby described above (85–86). He is delirious with pain and does not know how to make this suffering end (86):

<sup>29</sup> *Funeral Oration for his Daughter Styliane*, 85: τὸ δ' ἐμόν, οὐ τοιοῦτον, οὐ χρονοῖς διοριζόμενον, οὐ προθεσμίαις παραγραφόμενον, οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγον συγχωρούμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ παντὶ αἰῶνι συμπαρεκτεινόμενον, καὶ μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας καὶ καινῆς ἀναστάσεως συντηρούμενον.



All my comforters are good men, but to the same degree that they seek to comfort me they fuel the fires of my grief.<sup>30</sup>

While external griefs are supportable, the fact that children are our own ‘flesh and bone’ (σάρκες [...] καὶ ὀστέα)<sup>31</sup> means that our grief is internal and unconditional and that we never cease from ‘being wounded by the barbs and red-hot nails of that pain’ (τοῖς ἐκείθεν κέντροις καὶ πεπυρωμένοις ἡλοῖς τὴν ψυχὴν αἰωνίως κατατιτρώσκεσθαι) (86). When I sympathize with you, I physically feel your pain or pleasure as I am physically moved by your emotion. When that movement comes from within, it is both stronger and more involuntary, explaining the strength of our emotions related to situations which pain or please us personally, and consequently the greater difficulty in restraining them by the application of reason. In Psellos’ distinction between internal and external griefs, there is an insistence on the ways in which emotions affect people physically, without reducing emotions to physical stimuli.

All the characteristics of Psellos’ presentation, performance, and implicit theorization of emotions we have traced so far are found in his *Encomium to his Mother Theodote*.<sup>32</sup> A recent edition of the speech calls it an ‘autobiography’; if not finally defensible, this claim at least draws attention to the many ways in which Psellos makes the speech about himself.<sup>33</sup> He speaks repeatedly about the pleasant feelings which attach to learning; lack of study is distressing for him and he is pained when it seems his studies might be brought to an

<sup>30</sup> *Funeral Oration for his Daughter Styliane*, 86: παρακλήτορες δέ μοι πάντες χρηστοί, οἱ ὅσῳ μοι τὰς παρακλήσεις προσάγουσι, τοσούτῳ τῶν ὀδυνῶν τὰς καμίνους ἀνάπτουσι.

<sup>31</sup> Psellos draws attention to his use of scriptural language in this citation, but the reference is a general one: the phrase is found repeatedly in the Septuagint.

<sup>32</sup> For recent literature on the speech, see Walker, ‘These Things I Have Not Betrayed’; Walker, ‘Michael Psellos: The Encomium of His Mother’. Charles Diehl’s account is largely superseded: Diehl, ‘Une famille de bourgeoisie à Byzance au XI<sup>e</sup> siècle’. Kaldellis places the speech at the centre of an excellent overview of Psellos studies; Kaldellis, ‘Thoughts on the Future of Psellos-Studies’.

<sup>33</sup> See the title of Criscuolo’s edition. Cf. Kazhdan’s more careful argument, cited in Angold below, that the insertion of a new personal viewpoint into old genres is characteristic of middle Byzantine literature: Kazhdan, with Franklin, *Studies on Byzantine Literature of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*, pp. 224–55. On autobiography in Byzantium, see Angold, ‘The Autobiographical Impulse in Byzantium’. Angold points out that considerable obstacles to the writing of autobiography remained in the eleventh century, but Psellos persistently ‘inserts himself’ into his narratives with strong claims to autonomy (p. 233): ‘It is not necessary for me to be measured by the hands of others: I am for myself both the measure and the norm.’



end (11, 5b).<sup>34</sup> The final section of the speech ties reason and emotion together as he describes feeling excited, attracted, fascinated, and moved by geometric reasoning, dialectic, and logic (54, 27a–61, 31a). The positive but not excessive emotions which Psellos feels when engaged in intellectual pursuits are evidence that they are reasonable and virtuous; Psellos will describe himself as being consecrated to learning, just as his mother was consecrated to a monastery (61, 31a). Psellos uses emotions within a political project to defend his wide learning when it has come under suspicion.<sup>35</sup>

What is most relevant for our purposes, however, is the emotional portrait of his mother. Psellos begins his portrait by emphasizing the mutuality of her physical and intellectual perfections. She continually draws near to God in acts of piety and advances in material perfection (demonstrated through good household management) (9, 4a). She advances in both physical and intellectual virtues, rather than merely being a mean between them (9, 4a). In this she is like Christ, perfect God and perfect man, rather than some mixture of the two (9, 4a). This Christ-like nature is repeatedly stressed in the encomium. Where some commentators have seen Theodote portrayed in Neoplatonic terms of the ascent of the soul, and such connotations would resonate among Psellos' intellectual circle, the parabolic motion of Philippians 2 may be more apposite. In his hagiographic portrayal of Theodote, Psellos writes her as a Christ-figure, who descends in humility to rise in glory. Psellos shares his mother's ascent and descent, just as all Christians participate in Christ: 'The ascent of your soul towards higher things draws me up; elevated to that point, the depth of your humility draws me down' (ἀνθέλκει με ἢ πρὸς τὰ κρείττω ἀναγωγή τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνήγμαι ἐκεῖσε καὶ καθέλκει με τὸ βάθος τῆς σῆς ταπεινώσεως) (16, 7d).<sup>36</sup>

Yet the death of her daughter pushes Theodote towards a more ascetic evaluation of the emotions. Using her grief as a rhetorical tool, she persuades her husband that they should enter the monastery (32, 16b). From this point on, Theodote begins to purge her bodily and irrational desires. She mortifies her flesh to a point where her carers begin to worry for her health. Psellos is not directly critical on this point, but his generally positive evaluation of the

<sup>34</sup> References are to pages in *Pselli Miscellanea*, ed. by Sathas, and sections in *Michele Psello: Autobiografia*, ed. by Criscuolo, as in *Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters*, ed. and trans. by Kaldellis.

<sup>35</sup> For ways in which Psellos' classical learning could be used against him in the imperial court, see Agapitos, 'Teachers, Pupils, and Imperial', pp. 181–82.

<sup>36</sup> For Neoplatonic readings, see *Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters*, ed. and trans. by Kaldellis, pp. 39–45.

body stands in contrast to his mother's behaviour. She restrains her tears and sighs even when her husband dies (ἀνέστελλε γοῦν καταρρέον τὸ δάκρυον καὶ ἀνασπώμενον κάτωθεν ἐπεῖχε τὸν στεναγμὸν) (39, 19c–40, 19c). Again, we must suspect that Psellos, with his allegiance to *metriopatheia* over *apatheia*, would have found this purgation of passion excessive.

Yet there are signs that even Theodote's rigorous asceticism should not be conceptualized as pure *apatheia*. The picture Psellos paints of his mother is of a person aiming to subject every desire (ἐπιθυμία) to the rational part of her soul, 'enslaving everything irrational within her' (δουλοῖ δὲ ἅπαν τὸ ἄλογον) (34, 17a).<sup>37</sup> Yet passion remains, as every desire and appetite (ἐπιθυμία, ἐφesis) directs her towards God (34, 17a). In this passage, *epithumia* is not in itself a bad thing: it is necessary to effect divine ascent (τὴν θεϊαν ἀναγωγὴν) and must be spurned where it separates the believer from God. Psellos understands these desires and appetites as passions of the soul: 'she was conveyed to God by all the powers of her soul' (ὅλαις πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἐφέρετο ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῆς ψυχῆς) (34, 17a). Theodote directs Psellos to view his grief as desire for God (40, 19c). Each soul, she tells him, has a deficiency which can only be filled in the process of assimilating oneself to God; separation from God is a deficiency of the soul (40, 19c). This separation is overcome in the general resurrection, according to Theodote, who quotes biblical texts to make her point (Matthew 24. 31; 1 Corinthians 15. 52).

Margaret Graver has helpfully pointed to ways in which Stoic thinkers retained a place for some passions.<sup>38</sup> She has emphasized that the Stoic sage may experience the '*eupatheiai*', which include joy, desire for the good and goodwill towards others. On this reading, Theodote's passionate desire for God, joined as it is to a rigorous rationality, may be viewed as broadly equivalent to the Stoic *eupatheia* of desire for good. But where the Stoic sage ceases to feel even the *eupatheiai* when in possession of what is desired, for Theodote, the separation from God which is the rational basis for desire is not overcome on earth, so desire remains integral to the life of even the most rational ascetic.

Given Psellos' wider philosophical and monastic context, and his references to the different powers of the soul, a more plausible philosophical analogue for his account of his mother's increasing asceticism is a broadly-Platonic tripar-

<sup>37</sup> Analysis of this passage, with its mixture of Christian and Neoplatonic imagery, could become the basis of an investigation of Psellos' anthropology and psychology, but full treatment must await further research.

<sup>38</sup> Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, pp. 210–11.

tite psychology. Perhaps the most influential proponent of this psychology for Eastern monasticism was Evagrius of Pontus.<sup>39</sup> Evagrius took over from Plato the idea that the soul is divided into three parts, alike to reason, desire and spirit (*nous*, *epithumia*, and *thumos*) (cf. Plato, *Republic*, 434d–441c) (e.g. *Praktikos*, 89).<sup>40</sup> Each part of the soul is necessary for proper human flourishing. Evagrius acknowledges that humans are emotional or passionate by nature. Humans should be guided by the reasoning part of their soul (*nous*). But they also need the desiring and spirited or appetitive parts of the soul (*epithumia*, *thumos*) to project them towards reason, justice, virtue, other creatures and God. The lower parts of the soul can certainly be dangerous, and the danger associated with them led some of Psellos' contemporaries to recommend purging the passions, appetites, and desires associated with the lower parts of the soul. His mother seems to have inclined towards this harder line, although even in her asceticism, as we have seen, desire remains. But the main line of the Christian tradition recognized that the lower parts of the soul could be put to good use. For example, *thumos* can enable people to counter vice and injustice, while *epithumia* is the faculty of the soul that can make people love God and other people.<sup>41</sup> In living according to nature, the 'desiring part [of the soul] longs for virtue, the spirited part struggles on the behalf of virtue and the rational part perceives the contemplation of beings', as Evagrius put it (*Praktikos*, 86). While Evagrius does use the term *apatheia*, as in Clement of Alexandria, for Evagrius this highlights the moral requirement to purge attachments to bad desires, while allowing a rich range of moderated passions to remain integral to the life of naturally passionate humans.<sup>42</sup> John Cassian took over Evagrius' thinking, and usefully interpreted Evagrius' definition of *apatheia* more broadly than allowed by the specifically Stoic coinage, terming it 'purity of heart'.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup> On Evagrius's partition of the soul, see further Stewart, 'Evagrius Ponticus and the "Eight Generic Logismoi"'.  
<sup>40</sup> He covers his tracks by attributing this idea to Gregory Nazianzus. Dorotheus follows this view in his *Commentary on St Gregory's Hymn*.

<sup>41</sup> For further discussion of Evagrius on the passions, see Stewart, 'Evagrius Ponticus and the Eastern Monastic Tradition on the Intellect and the Passions'.

<sup>42</sup> For the continuing place of the passions in Clement, see Osborn, *Ethical Patterns in Early Christian Thought*, pp. 68, 73–80; Osborn, *Clement of Alexandria*, pp. 236 ff.

<sup>43</sup> See Sheridan, 'The Controversy Over *apatheia*: Cassian's Sources and his Use of Them'. Cassian, of course, had a major influence in Western Monasticism. For recent advances in placing John Cassian's work in a Greek tradition well known to Psellos, see Tzamalikos, *A Newly Discovered Greek Father*, and Tzamalikos, *The Real Cassian Revisited*.

Something similar seems to be operating in Psellos' speeches, as he recognizes potentially damaging consequences of affects but continues to mark out a valued space for passions and emotions. Psellos follows this line of the monastic tradition by insisting that humans are properly emotional animals, where all three parts of the tripartite soul are able to work together for good. Like many other Christian writers, he speaks of ordering, rather than eliminating somatic desires (e.g. *Philosophica minora*, 1. 49. 224–26).<sup>44</sup> Standing within overlapping Christian and Neoplatonic traditions, he rejects the claim that evil arises from the irrational parts of the soul (*thumos* and *epithumia*). These are both irrational, and so their movements, even when they incline to the worse, are not in themselves evil; evil only arises if the irrational parts of the soul do not obey the dictates of the rational part of the soul (*On Evil*, 2. 26, p. 102. 5–12).<sup>45</sup> We can also find him valuing the intellectual part of the soul over the lower components in the psychic hierarchy (*Philosophica minora*, 1. 1. 4–9). But he would have agreed with Dorotheus of Gaza, a sixth-century monk, who understood passions as a natural part of human existence, not merely something humans share with animals and must suppress: 'why should an emotional man find it strange to be disturbed by his emotions?' (*Did.*, 13. 141).<sup>46</sup> So Psellos speaks repeatedly of the value of the impulses and desires of the lower part of the soul, perhaps most strikingly when he claims that the more chaste or moderate people may end up producing sickly offspring, since they are insufficiently passionate in bed (*Philosophica minora*, 1. 16. 165–87).<sup>47</sup> Such a position puts him at odds with many of his more ascetic contemporaries and moves beyond Stoic *eupatheiai*, even as it is congruent with strands of thought from earlier philosophical and theological traditions.

In all this, the parallels with Gregory of Nyssa's *Life of his Sister Macrina* are, I think, instructive, and may be briefly set out, although they deserve full treatment elsewhere. Gregory's *Life of Macrina* is written explicitly as hagiography, whereas Psellos' speech to his mother could be said to be hagiography under the cover of encomium. Both writers set out the early life of their subject,

<sup>44</sup> *Michaelis Pselli philosophica minora*, 1: *Opuscula logica, physica, allegorica, alia*, ed. by Duffy. For further argument about Psellos' conception of the relationship between body and soul and the role of the passions in his thought, see Miles, 'Body vs Soul, Text vs Interpretation in Michael Psellos'.

<sup>45</sup> *Michaelis Pselli philosophica minora*, 11: *Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica*, ed. by O'Meara.

<sup>46</sup> *Dorothee de Gaza*, ed. by de Préville and Regnault.

<sup>47</sup> I owe this point to Miles, 'Body vs Soul, Text vs Interpretation in Michael Psellos'.

speaking of her physical beauty and her range of suitors. Macrina maintains her virginity, where Theodote marries. But then the similarities of their lives begin again as both Macrina and Theodote devote their lives more and more to God. Macrina is rather more successful in this, leading her mother away from worldly possession into the monastery she forms, and building a community of nuns around her, all the while being a spiritual inspiration to her famous brothers as well as offering them theological instruction.

The *Life of Macrina* is a study in grief, as Gregory, like Psellos, intersperses the story of her life with narratives of the deaths of close family members, and finally narrates his grief when he learns of his sister's approaching death, and how he races to her sickbed, mourns for her as she dies, and grieves bitterly at her death.<sup>48</sup> Like Gregory, Psellos' multifaceted exploration of grief in the encomium for his mother, as in the funeral oration (*epitaphios*) for his daughter, takes grief as what Rowan Williams in his discussion of Macrina has called a 'paradigm of desire'.<sup>49</sup> Grief can figure unhealthy fixation on, and inappropriate attachment to, a non-ultimate being. We have seen Psellos' grief for his mother, like Gregory's for his sister, transformed by the 'saint' so that he may see the particularity of his mother as someone distinct from himself, as a woman who is tremendously influential for him even as he is able to take a quite different path in his commitment to the life of the mind. (Such a transformation of grief is not achieved in the *epitaphios* for his daughter, where Psellos explains his grief as coming from a loss of himself: we have seen him claim that children are part of their parents, of the parents' own flesh. In that case, as in Augustine's loss of part of himself with the loss of his friend in *Confessions* Book Four (VI. 11–VII. 12), grief becomes a barrier to seeing the other person in their distinctive otherness).

Yet in the *Encomium for his Mother*, as in the *Life of Macrina*, both Psellos and Gregory are led on, in their grief, to yearning for God, who is an object of their desire and contemplation. Hagiography is an appropriate medium for grief, since it directs attention both to the particularity of the saint and to God, in whom the saint is perfected through participation. Thus for Psellos, as for Gregory before him, the contemplative life is not a state of pure *apatheia*. Psellos represents himself as experiencing deep emotions throughout his life, partly because of the Christian and Platonic/Aristotelian belief that emotions play a role in the virtuous life.

<sup>48</sup> On grief in the *Life of Macrina*, see Smith, 'Macrina, Tamer of Horses and Healer of Souls'; Smith, *Passion and Paradise*. See also Williams, 'Macrina's Deathbed Revisited'.

<sup>49</sup> Williams, 'Macrina's Deathbed Revisited'.

Crucially, the effects of temporality on the human soul are emphasized in both Gregory and Psellos. Gregory famously anticipates Wittgenstein's proposal that the human body is the best picture of the soul in his claim that we can 'read the history of the soul' in the life of the body (*Op hom.*, XXIX. 9).<sup>50</sup> Psellos' *Encomium for his Mother*, like Gregory's *Life of Macrina*, emphasizes the way in which events can alter one's character and spiritual identity, as when grief at her daughter's death changes Theodote's emotional and spiritual trajectory. It forces our attention towards the ways in which temporal experiences are essential for the spiritual life. Even in Theodote's more ascetic world-view, spirituality and temporality are intertwined. For Psellos, the contingency and force of emotional experiences are emphasized. While Theodote's desires and emotions directed towards temporal things are progressively eliminated, she nevertheless continues to move passionately towards God, just as Macrina also transforms her body into a spiritual offering to the God she perpetually desires. Gregory's concept of *epektasis* — the infinite movement of the soul towards ever greater enjoyment of God — is congruent with this picture. Psellos thus stands within a long tradition of Christian thinking about the transformation of emotional and physical desires in the purified soul that continually desires God without experiencing need or lack.<sup>51</sup>

It has been suggested that when Psellos admits that he cannot follow his mother's rejection of particular emotions and desires, he is implicitly criticizing a Christian faith which essentially spurns the body.<sup>52</sup> There is certainly support for interpretations which emphasize Psellos' positive evaluation of embodiment, even if to speak of a 'rehabilitation of the body' somewhat over-dramatizes a putative 'rejection of the body' in much of the rest of the Christian tradition.<sup>53</sup> We have already seen that eleventh-century Byzantine Christians could draw on a number of resources from within Christianity to make a positive case for emotions and the body.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Williams, 'Macrina's Deathbed Revisited'.

<sup>51</sup> For the concept of *epektasis*, see Lucas F. Mateo-Seco's entry '*Epektasis*' in Mateo-Seco and Maspero, *The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa*. See also Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique*, pp. 291–92. Williams in 'Macrina's Deathbed Revisited' has typically illuminating comments along these lines in relation to Macrina.

<sup>52</sup> *Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters*, ed. and trans. by Kaldellis, p. 45. See also Walker, 'These Things I Have Not Betrayed', p. 76.

<sup>53</sup> For the view that Psellos offers a 'rehabilitation of the body', see Kaldellis, *The Argument of Psellos' Chronographia*, pp. 154–66.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters*, ed. and trans. by Kaldellis, pp. 42–45.



So while Psellos rejects the view that emotions should be eliminated and uses a broadly Platonic psychology, congruent with a dominant strand of Eastern monasticism, to offer an alternative to the more extreme forms of contemporary asceticism, a simple contrast of philosophical versus Christian positions on the emotions is ultimately unsatisfactory. Certainly, there are some inappropriately directed passions, excessive appetites or vicious affections, and where *apatheia* is understood as the elimination of such desires, Christian writers unsurprisingly take up the cause. But equally there is the tradition we have seen represented in Evagrius and Gregory of Nyssa, where certain kinds of desires are not even eliminated in paradise, and which takes from Plato and Aristotle the view that enacting passions and appetites is not evil in itself, although there are vicious or foolish expressions of them. Theodote's desires and appetites remain, and direct her to God. Ultimately, Theodote's rejection of the flesh is, for Psellos, a praiseworthy attribute which is a central component of his description of her as a saint, and especially, a central way in which Psellos characterizes his mother as Christ-like. She finds her unique identity, for Psellos, in the particular ways in which she realizes the divine image in her emotional, spiritual, and physical experience. Hagiography is (in part) Christianized encomium, and Psellos makes his mother into a saint by drawing upon one strand in Christian thinking about Christ-like perfections. Yet, as Maximus the Confessor had emphasized, there are as many ways to imitate Christ and thereby realize the divine image as there are humans, since Christ's humanity is perfect and total.<sup>55</sup> It is thus perfectly Christian for Psellos to claim his own sort of imitative Christian life, distinct from his mother. He stands in a long line of Christian theology where personal uniqueness is a function of the unique ways in which that person realizes the divine image. So when Psellos claims that he cannot follow his mother's example, he is not offering us a brief glimpse of heterodoxy, or his real Platonism under the cover of Christianity.<sup>56</sup> Rather, he is elevating his mother in comparison with himself in accordance with the rhetorical expectations of the genre of encomium, and being consistent with significant strands of classical Christianity.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>55</sup> On this view in Maximus, see Williams, 'Macrina's Deathbed Revisited'.

<sup>56</sup> For example, *Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters*, ed. and trans. by Kaldellis, p. 48: 'his allegorical and Neoplatonic treatment [...] hardly establishes the purity of his faith; quite the contrary, one suspects.' Compare Kaldellis's *Hellenism in Byzantium*, p. 191: 'few would go so far as [Psellos] in replacing the Christian component of Byzantine culture with Greek philosophical alternatives.' Kaldellis argues that Psellos tried to 'propagate his ideas [i.e. his real philosophical beliefs] while appeasing those who (rightly) doubted the sincerity of this faith'.

<sup>57</sup> The use of biblical comparisons as most appropriate to make sense of and to demonstrate the magnitude of his grief for Styliane also place him firmly within such a Christian context.

Certainly, the main way in which Psellos himself chooses to imitate Christ is through the wide-ranging intellectual interests he sets out in the last section of the encomium, where he claims his knowledge is God-given and consecrated (60, 30d–61, 31a), an earthly imitation of the ‘spring of the intelligibles’ (τῶν νοουμένων πηγῇ) — a possible reference to the *Chaldean Oracles* 56 — towards which he strives (61, 31a). Such a life of the mind did stretch his contemporaries’ understanding of the ‘mind that was in Christ Jesus’, at times to breaking point.<sup>58</sup> But we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of his Christian commitment on the basis that he was also interested in non-Christian sources of knowledge.

We are still, of course, a good way from reconstructing a general Psellan theory of the emotions, but this analysis suggests places to look for its constituent parts, within Platonic and Aristotelian views of the soul and within Christian mystical and monastic writings about desire in the perfect Christian life. Focusing on only Christian or classical philosophical influences is likely to distort Psellos’ thinking and prove excessively limiting. Nothing less should be expected of a culture in which the normative Christian writings of John Chrysostom, Basil the Great and Gregory Nazianzus, were used to defuse conflict over the Platonism of Psellos’ pupil, John Italos.<sup>59</sup> Further work remains to be done to synthesize Psellos’ various writings on emotions, especially drawing on his philosophical and theological works. Yet the analysis of these three speeches identifies a potentially rich account of emotions based on a broadly Platonic tripartite psychology (*nous*, *epithumia*, and *thumos*) and which includes responses and judgements about external stimuli, internal feeling, physical signs and actions generated by the emotion, the intentionality of willed emotions, and the ways people are physically affected by and moved to share other people’s emotions.

Particular conclusions about the emotional experiences of different groups within Byzantine society may be drawn. Since Psellos thinks that judgement is a part of emotional experience, and children ordinarily have incomplete powers of judgement, it seems that Byzantine children in general were not expected to feel fixed emotions, although Psellos behaves towards both his daughter and his grandchild as though they are capable of intentional emotional attachment and consistent judgements. For Psellos, expected emotional behaviours differ from

<sup>58</sup> On political difficulties relating to Psellos’ use of classical sources, see Agapitos, ‘Teachers, Pupils, and Imperial Power’, pp. 181–82.

<sup>59</sup> Agapitos, ‘Teachers, Pupils, and Imperial Power’, pp. 187–91.



situation to situation and from role to role. Different emotional treatment of boys and girls demonstrates ways in which gender shaped emotional experience in eleventh-century Byzantium. Similarly, Psellos' speeches suggest that different emotional behaviours were expected of parents as opposed to grandparents. His writings thus draw attention to the social and historical construction of emotional experience and caution against excessively reductionist views of emotion.

For Psellos, emotions are an essential part of human life. The activities of the irrational parts of the soul are not good or bad in themselves, although it is possible to direct one's emotions more or less virtuously in accordance with reason. Practising appropriate emotional responses is part of what forms good character traits and is part of the life of faith. The ways in which virtues and emotions are intricately linked make attention to emotion critical to biographical accounts and allow Psellos to present a self-portrait of his emotions as part of his political project to justify his intellectual interests. The connections between virtues and emotions also form part of his emphasis, throughout the orations, on connections between temporal experience and the perfection of the Christian soul. The virtues of character which are practised on earth are, for Psellos, connected to the perfect virtues of the eschaton and so emotional experience remains part of the Christian life and has ethical force within salvation history. As for thinkers like Gregory of Nyssa before him, joy, devotion and contemplation, albeit purified of the concerns of the flesh, remain as the soul desires God eternally.

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# ‘TEARS SUCH AS ANGELS WEEP’: THE EVOLUTION OF SADNESS IN DEMONS

Juanita Feros Ruys

[...] now conscience wakes despair  
That slumbered [...]  
Sometimes towards Eden which now in his view  
Lay pleasant, his grieved look he fixes sad [...]  
Then, much revolving, thus in sighs began [...]  
‘Me miserable! Which way shall I fly  
Infinite wrath and infinite despair? [...]  
For never can true reconciliation grow  
Where wounds of deadly hate have pierced so deep [...]  
So farewell hope, and, with hope farewell fear,  
Farewell remorse’

(*Paradise Lost*, IV, 23–28, 73–74, 98–99, 108–09)<sup>1</sup>

These lines by John Milton, especially when accompanied by the evocative nineteenth-century engravings of Gustave Doré, present a Satan riven by powerful emotions. In just a few lines Milton has evoked diabolic sadness, grief, despair, hatred, fear, hope, and remorse. Yet the Christian tradition from the New Testament and patristic eras into the High Middle Ages did not, on the whole, credit the Devil and demons with this level of emotional

<sup>1</sup> John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, ed. by Fowler, pp. 216–21.

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complexity.<sup>2</sup> Although there are some exceptions in the vernacular, and particularly the Old English poems of the Junius manuscript,<sup>3</sup> until the High Middle Ages, the dominant Latinate tradition depicted fallen angels as acting according to the directives they received (whether from God or the Devil), and not as animated by personal passions or as possessed of interior individual motivations.

As the emotional capacity attributed to demons developed during the Middle Ages, texts such as the miracle tales of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries began to depict in demons a limited range of emotional expressions, as for instance, malicious glee or rage. Demons might erupt in cacophonous laughter whenever a sin was committed or an unrepentant sinner consigned to them for eternal torture, or they might react with fury when a wayward soul was snatched from their clutches by deathbed confession and repentance or a saint's intercession. In the fifteenth century, Jean Gerson characterized demons in his treatise on the passions as blinded by insane spite, unregulated and savage pride, and senseless envy;<sup>4</sup> meanwhile the emerging genre of the *ars moriendi* (Art of Dying) manual was frequently accompanied by prints portraying demons filled with irascible emotions as their deathbed temptations were foiled by saints and guardian angels.<sup>5</sup>

What is different with regard to Milton's portrayal of Satan, and which forms the subject of this chapter, is the attribution to him, and to demons in general, of the associated emotions of sadness, sorrow, grief, and despair. This chapter aims to explore the evolution of sadness in demons from the High Middle Ages, considering key factors that impacted upon this trajectory. Primary among these was the recognition by medieval writers of the theological hazards that could ensue if demons were pictured as capable of sadness and so turned into objects worthy of empathy. The emotion of sadness (*tristitia*) was powerfully aligned throughout the Middle Ages with the nature of humanity and consequently the divine humanity of Jesus. Indeed, the ability of Jesus to feel sadness was considered one of the key features that defined him as more than impassible God simply clothed in human form. Assigning sad-

<sup>2</sup> See my 'Sensitive Spirits.' Neil Forsyth writes of Milton's Satan: 'Whatever he owes to medieval predecessors, then, this interior and troubled dimension of Satan makes him a product of the early modern world'; Forsyth, *The Satanic Epic*, p. 56

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the figure of Satan in *Genesis B* and *Christ and Satan*: see Krapp, *The Junius Manuscript*, and Finnegan, *Christ and Satan*. See also Dendle, *Satan Unbound*.

<sup>4</sup> Jean Gerson, *De passionibus animae*, 15, in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. by Glorieux, ix, 423: 'excoecat enim eos malitia amens, superbia furens sine lege et ordine, livor insaniens.'

<sup>5</sup> See Hind, *An Introduction to a History of Woodcut*, i, 224–30.

ness to demons would mean drawing such creatures closer to the fundamental nature of both humanity and Jesus himself. Moreover, as Milton’s verses cited above recognize, greater danger lay in the fact that sadness was frequently seen as the trigger for remorse and repentance. Since it was a tenet of orthodoxy that demons and the Devil could neither repent nor be absolved of their original apostasy, attributing sadness to demons could have the hazardous effect of creating sentimentalized demons capable of arousing empathy, in place of the hateful and implacable adversaries entirely divorced from all goodness upon which Christian theology insisted.

### *Demons and Sorrow: ‘Dolor’ and ‘Tristitia’*

On the whole, demons were not supposed to have the capacity to experience passions of the soul (*passiones animae*) such as sadness. This viewpoint was most influentially stated by Thomas Aquinas in what is sometimes called his ‘Treatise on the Passions’, *Quaestiones* 22–48 of the First Part of the Second Part (IaIIae) of his *Summa theologiae*.<sup>6</sup> Here Aquinas defined a passion of the soul as a movement of the sensitive appetite of the soul allied with some bodily change. This meant that incorporeal beings — God, angels, and demons — could not, by definition, experience a passion of the soul. Instead, Aquinas argued, the sorts of ‘passions’ attributed to such beings, as for example the love and joy ascribed to God and the angels in the Scriptures, were not passions proper, but rather simple acts of the will, residing in the intellective, not the sensitive, appetite.<sup>7</sup>

Aquinas treats the passion of sorrow under the doubled terms *dolor et tristitia* in IaIIae, Q. 35–39, in twenty-five distinct articles, which renders it the most extensively examined of the passions.<sup>8</sup> In Q. 35, art. 2, Aquinas distin-

<sup>6</sup> For an introduction to and summary of Aquinas’s thought on the passions, see King, ‘Aquinas on the Passions’; and Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*.

<sup>7</sup> See for example Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, Q. 22, a. 3, ad 3: ‘Ad tertium dicendum quod amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuantur Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, absque passione’; see also I, Q. 59. All citations from the works of Aquinas are from <<http://www.corpusthomicum.org/iopera.html>> [accessed 10 September 2014].

<sup>8</sup> Miner notes: ‘Of all the passions, sorrow or sadness (*tristitia*) is “most properly” said to be a passion. Perhaps because the soul is most violently acted upon (*pati*) when it suffers, the phenomena denoted by “sorrow” and “suffering” overlap considerably. The close connection between *pati* and sorrowing/suffering may explain why Aquinas devotes more Questions to



guishes between *dolor* (pain/suffering) and *tristitia* (sadness), categorizing *tristitia* as a species of *dolor*, where *dolor* arises through the exterior senses before being apprehended by the interior sense, while *tristitia* arises through the interior senses.<sup>9</sup> Earlier in the *Summa*, Aquinas had argued that sorrow (*dolor*) could not be experienced by demons as a passion, since they did not have bodies, but could be felt as a simple act of will, insofar as their will either for or against something was frustrated. He particularly noted that for their punishment to be effective, it had to be contrary to their will, and hence a source of intellectual, though not sensitive, *dolor* to them.<sup>10</sup>

However, there had long been theological objections to the idea that demons could not suffer *sensible* grief and torment. A corrective position, dating from Plotinus and Augustine and reiterated in the High Middle Ages by thinkers such as Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard, argued that following their fall, the demons had been deprived of their original angelic empyrean bodies and been cast down instead into denser airy (*caliginosus*, or cloudy) bodies that were susceptible to pain and suffering from the only element that was superior to them: fire.<sup>11</sup> Scholastic debate raged over whether this would need to be a genuine fire (as in the fires of Hell), or whether simply the thought of fire (that is, the apprehension of future punishment) would be sufficient, just as a dreamer experiencing a nightmare perceives the imaginary to be real and suffers accordingly.

*tristitia* than to any other passion. Another explanation of the treatment's comparative length would recall the complexity of the historical conversation'; Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, pp. 188–89.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, Q. 35, a. 2, co: 'ille dolor qui ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, nominatur quidem dolor, non autem tristitia. Sic igitur tristitia est quaedam species doloris'; see also IaIIae, Q. 37, a. 7, co: 'Dolor etiam exterior sequitur apprehensionem sensus, et specialiter tactus, dolor autem interior sequitur apprehensionem interiore, imaginationis scilicet vel etiam rationis.'

<sup>10</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 64, a. 3, co: 'Respondeo dicendum quod timor, dolor, gaudium, et huiusmodi, secundum quod sunt passiones, in Daemonibus esse non possunt, sic enim sunt propriae appetitus sensitivi, qui est virtus in organo corporali. Sed secundum quod nominant simplices actus voluntatis, sic possunt esse in Daemonibus. Et necesse est dicere quod in eis sit dolor. [...] Unde oportet dicere quod in eis sit dolor, et praecipue quia de ratione poenae est, quod voluntati repugnet.'

<sup>11</sup> See for instance Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, III. 10, trans. by Hill, p. 225; Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, Book II: *On Creation*, D. VIII, C. 1, trans. by Silano, II, 34.

### *Demons as Productive of Sadness in Humans*

Although it was not always clear whether demons could suffer sadness themselves, they were certainly attributed with the creation of sadness in humans. In Cassian's Conference Seven, Abba Serenus relates that particular demons are embodiments of individual vicious emotions that they instil or incite in humans, so that some 'are more especially intent on anger and rage. Others, again, feed on sadness ('*alios pasci tristitia*'), and still others are pleased with vainglory and pride'.<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, however, he intimates that demons do not experience these particular emotions themselves: their universal response to the emotional pain they inflict is delight: 'Each one insinuates that vice into human hearts in which he himself rejoices' ('*gaudet*').<sup>13</sup> A similar sense is given in a vision related by the eleventh-century monk Otloh of St Emmeram. Finding himself, in a dream, surrounded by demons laughing maliciously at their evils, Otloh grows increasingly sad ('*tristiores*'). The demons take exception to this emotional response and advise Otloh that if he elects not join them in their joy ('*nobiscum gaudere et ioculari non vis*'), then they will see to it that he experiences sadness instead to its limits.<sup>14</sup> This story eloquently expresses the high medieval understanding of how demons operate to produce sadness in humans, and yet how remote that emotion is considered to be from the demonic constitution itself.

In early desert monasticism, demons were particularly associated with the sin of *acedia* (sloth), which was a specific permutation of sadness, also known after Psalm 90. 6 (91. 6) as 'the noonday demon'.<sup>15</sup> Many centuries later, Caesarius of Heisterbach was still warning monks of the snares of the Devil that lay in sloth, relating the story of a somnolent brother seen asleep in his stall, the Devil as a serpent slithering over his back and feasting on his sleepiness.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> John Cassian, *Conferences*, trans. by Ramsey, p. 259; ed. by Pichery, p. 260: 'Hoc tamen nosse debemus [...] alios irae furorique peculiariter inminere, alios pasci tristitia, alios cenedoxia superbique mulceri.'

<sup>13</sup> John Cassian, *Conferences*, trans. by Ramsey, p. 259; ed. by Pichery, p. 260: '[...] et unumquemque illud uitium humanis cordibus quo ipse gaudet inserere.'

<sup>14</sup> Otloh von St. Emmeram, *Liber visionum*, ed. by Schmidt, p. 56, line 27; p. 57, line 6; 'Quia ergo elegisti tristitiam, satis profecto experieris illam.'

<sup>15</sup> See John Cassian, *Institutes*, X. 1, trans. by Ramsey, p. 219; ed. by Petschenig, p. 174: 'Sextum nobis certamen est, quod Graeci ἀκρηδίαν uocant, quam nos taedium siue anxietatem cordis possumus nuncupare. [...] denique nonnulli senum hunc esse pronuntiant meridianum daemonem, qui in psalmo nonagensimo nuncupatur.' See also Wenzel, *The Sin of Sloth*, pp. 7–8.

<sup>16</sup> Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, D. IV, C. XXXII, ed. by Strange, I, 203: 'Die quadam tempore aestivo, cum laudes decanterentur, vidi in dorso fratris Wilhelmi, qui

It is interesting that this image of diabolic forces ‘feeding off’ (*pasci, pascebatur*) varieties of sadness should remain a potent metaphor across the several centuries between Cassian and Caesarius. Again, however, demons themselves were seen as immune from experiencing this form of sadness. Aquinas considered the question explicitly in his *Summa*, declaring that the incorporeality of demons prohibited them from suffering *acedia* because the condition necessarily included bodily weariness: ‘Sloth is a certain kind of sadness, by which a man turns only reluctantly to his spiritual exercises on account of bodily fatigue; this is not applicable to demons.’<sup>17</sup>

### *Demons as Sufferers of Sorrow*

There are only a few brief instances in the Latin tradition where demons are shown experiencing sadness in Christian thought prior to the early modern era, and in most cases this sadness is more a variety of frustration. That is, it is a reaction against the actions of others and allied with the emotion of anger, rather than inherent, that is, springing from an internal disposition.

An early example occurs in Cassian’s Conference Seven on Evil Spirits.<sup>18</sup> In relating the spiritual combat between the desert monks of early Christianity and their ever-present demonic tempters, Cassian’s speaker, Abba Serenus, notes that this is a true battle, containing winners and losers, with both sides experiencing the highs of success and the lows of defeat. Thus, he says, the demons do not ‘engage in this struggle without any effort of their own. For they themselves also have a certain anxiety and sadness (*‘anxietatem et tristitiam’*) in the conflict, especially when they meet with stronger rivals’. Accordingly, they will suffer ‘grief and distress’ (*‘dolor atque confusio’*) if defeated.<sup>19</sup> Here Cassian’s rhetoric

libenter ibi dormit, clara die serpentem serpere, et statim intellexi quia diabolus esset, qui in eius somnolentia pascebatur.’

<sup>17</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 63, a. 2, ad 2: ‘Acedia vero est quaedam tristitia, qua homo redditur tardus ad spirituales actus propter corporalem laborem; qui Daemonibus non competit.’ Translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

<sup>18</sup> This instance is discussed by Rosenwein in *Emotional Communities*, pp. 182–85. While Rosenwein notes that demons are associated above all with pride and envy, she does not appear to recognize that the attribution of sadness to demons is extremely rare in the medieval period: ‘Envy, anger, grief, fear: Ekman and Friesen’s modern list of “universal emotions” differs little from the Devil’s emotional capacity in the late seventh century’ (p. 185).

<sup>19</sup> John Cassian, *Conferences*, trans. by Ramsey, p. 260; ed. by Pichery, p. 262: ‘Habent namque etiam ipsi in suo conflictu quandam anxietatem atque tristitiam et maxime cum fuerint ualidioribus aemulis’; ‘super deiectione maneat dolor atque confusio’.

is designed to affirm the real nature of the struggle that monks would undergo, preparing them for steadfastness against temptation and giving them the sense of an opponent worthy of being overcome, in whose downfall and subsequent confusion they can rejoice. Yet the result is an emotion attributed to beings who are usually, and especially at this early period, represented as indifferent to the outcome of their machinations. When Cassian has Abba Serenus conclude that in defeat, the demons ‘grieve (‘dolent’) no less than we’,<sup>20</sup> he draws demons into closer contiguity with human nature through their expression and experience of the emotion of sadness. Nevertheless, this is patently a reactive sadness, motivated by the demons’ unsuccessful combat and not something essential in their own nature. It is thus explicable in terms of Aquinas’s understanding of any demonic ‘emotions’ as fundamentally volitional — that is, as springing from either the achievement or frustration (as here) of their will.

In the scholasticism of the High Middle Ages, the question of demonic emotions became the subject of more systematic speculation, although sadness remained one of the least considered of the passions in this regard, with demonic anger, hatred, envy, and lust remaining the focus. William of Auvergne treats demonic sadness briefly in his *De universo*, Pt. II, Pt. III, C. IIII, where he finds it a necessary counterpoint to demonic joy, which constitutes his primary study, arguing that since it is clear that demons are saddened at the good that befalls humans, so it is necessary that they delight in their evils.<sup>21</sup> He posits an irremediable cause for sorrow in demons, suggesting that although the evils committed by humans, in which demons rejoice, might outnumber good works done by humans, nevertheless the *magnitude* of the good works done, which cause demons sorrow, will always exceed that of the evils committed.<sup>22</sup> This will leave demons in an emotional deficit of sadness that cannot be mitigated, no matter how many evils are committed or how long the world should endure.<sup>23</sup> Taking this analogy further, William adds that demons sorrow over

<sup>20</sup> John Cassian, *Conferences*, trans. by Ramsey, p. 261; ed. by Pichery, p. 263: ‘Dolent igitur etiam ipsi non minus.’

<sup>21</sup> William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1021bA: ‘Cum manifestum sit, eos dolere de bonis ipsorum, necesse est gaudere de malis eorum.’

<sup>22</sup> William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1021bC: ‘quapropter magnitudo, & intentio bonorum paucitatem eorum non solum redimunt, & compensant magnitudinem, & multitudinem malorum, sed etiam illam incomparabiliter superant, & excedunt.’

<sup>23</sup> William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1021bC: ‘Quare non est necesse ut gaudium quod est malignis spiritibus de malis hominum, aut de malis aliis, absorbeat dolores, & cruciatus eorum, nec etiam, ut mitiget, aut temperet illos, licet mundus in isto cursu duraturus esset in infinitum.’

the immensity of the glory of the Creator with a grief that is incomparably greater than every joy they could ever take in the evils of humans.<sup>24</sup> This is more than the sadness of a frustrated will; this is an evocation of true internal sadness. Yet William does not allow these demons to remain fundamentally sorrowful figures, which might constitute them as worthy of compassion. Instead, the overwhelming impression of William's demons is of beings who are implacable in their wrath and hatred for humans, the good angels, and God, and divided amongst themselves by currents of pride, envy, and anger 'just like a kind of spiritual tempest'.<sup>25</sup>

Even more explicitly, the Franciscan theologian Peter John Olivi depicts demons as beset, and indeed, impelled by seething tides of emotions. Yet the situation is not unambiguous, for while Olivi does not seem to depict in demons a simple sadness that might render them objects of pity, he does ascribe to them a passion far more powerful and loaded with theological implications. Although Olivi notes that the evil joy demons take in their temptations of humans is not uninterrupted, he does not posit sadness as its opposite. Instead, he pictures the delight of demons as soured by the 'bitter and corrosive dregs of tumultuous wrath, envy, an insatiable and raging lust that is always infinitely more hungering than fulfilled, and the unavoidable apprehension of future punishment'.<sup>26</sup> Olivi does not attribute sadness to demons as a sole and discrete emotion; it only appears allied with more 'typically' demonic emotions such as wrath. Thus when he pictures the emotions that demons might feel when frustrated in their intentions — for instance, when they are thrust into Hell, prohibited from tempting someone, overcome by holy men, or mocked by God and the good angels — he describes them as being both 'saddened and enraged' ('contristantur et irascuntur').<sup>27</sup> Olivi suggests that while demons' awareness

<sup>24</sup> William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1021bD: 'Nec prætermittendum est tibi quantum doleant de immensitate gloriæ creatoris, de qua si dolent similitudinem, & comparisonem, qualis excogitari posset aliorum bonorum, dolent indubitanter dolore omni gaudio, quod habere possunt de malis hominum, incomparabiliter majori.'

<sup>25</sup> William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1044aH: 'Deinde cum ira, velut tempestas quædam spiritualis sit, qualiter inter extremæ iracundiæ substantias pax esse poterit [...]?'

<sup>26</sup> Peter John Olivi, *Quæstiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 748: 'Sciendum tamen quod huiusmodi complacentia non est mera, sed amaris et corrosivis faecibus turbulentæ iræ et invidiæ et insatiabilis et furiosæ concupiscentiæ semper plus in infinitum famelicæ quam satiatae, faecibus etiam indubitabilis expectationis omnimodæ suæ poenæ semper est commixta.'

<sup>27</sup> Peter John Olivi, *Quæstiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen,

of their imminent destruction at the Final Judgement does not prevent them from undertaking evil activities, it does cause them to carry these out with less delight and greater sadness ('indelectabilius et tristius').<sup>28</sup>

Yet despite the rather medieval focus here on demonic wrath and delight in evil deeds, some hints do also emerge of the sort of sorrowing emotions that will render Milton's early modern Satan so memorable. Thus Olivi speaks of the demons' awareness of their forthcoming punishment as a 'despair of God and a despairing remoteness from both him and all his good'.<sup>29</sup> Later he depicts the demons as being at the mercy of their emotions, urged on to evil deeds by their overwhelming despair at their imminent punishment.<sup>30</sup> For his time, Olivi's insistent attribution of despair ('desperatio ... desperativa ... desperat ... desperatum') to demons is unprecedented. So also is the (perhaps unintended) pathos of his depiction of the demons as perennially acted upon by their emotions, now raising themselves to heaven engorged with proud delight and audacity, now falling into the abyss through pining and a desperate loss of hope.<sup>31</sup> Olivi concludes that demons constantly stagger between the two extremes, just like drunks ('continue sicut ebrii perturbantur'). The specific comparison here to alcoholics recalls the language employed by Ambrose in his *De bono mortis* where he speaks of the human soul, at the mercy of its embodied passions, as 'staggering and swaying just like a drunk'.<sup>32</sup> As such, Olivi's language bears

I, 748: 'Unde quando ad horam in infernum detruduntur aut a tentando cohibentur aut a sanctis viriliter et triumphaliter expugnantur aut a Deo et eius sanctis angelis multiformiter deluduntur: utique amplius contristantur et irascuntur.'

<sup>28</sup> Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 749: 'Timore vero poenae ab eorum sensuali aspectu absentis, qualis est novissimi iudicii poena, non retrahuntur a malo, nisi solum pro quanto ex eius expectatione indelectabilius et tristius perficiunt mala sua.'

<sup>29</sup> Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 748: 'est ibi desperatio de Deo et desperativa elongatio ab ipso et ab omni eius bono.'

<sup>30</sup> Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 750: 'poena quae sic sibi imminet quod omnino desperat se eam evasurum potius generat in eo desperatum ad omnia mala praecipitum quam timorem reactivum.'

<sup>31</sup> Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, Q. XLVI, ed. by Jansen, I, 748: 'nunc per superbam complacentiam et praesumptuosam audaciam seu confidentiam ascendunt usque ad caelos, ac deinde per contabescientiam et desperatam diffidentiam praevalendi descendunt usque ad abyssos.'

<sup>32</sup> Ambrose, *De bono mortis*, IX, ed. by Schenkl, p. 737: 'et tamquam ebria perturbationibus eius uacillet et fluitet.'

witness to the movement towards anthropomorphizing demons and their pas-sional states by the end of the thirteenth century.

### *The Impassibility of God and the Angels*

The major consideration that influenced whether, and how, demons could be depicted as emotional beings, and particularly ones subject to sadness, was the understanding of the emotional systems applicable to other key beings in the universe: God, the good angels, and the god-man Christ. Since God and the good angels were conceived throughout the Middle Ages as impassible, having demons that could feel immediately removed them one step further from the celestial hierarchy that oversaw the medieval world. As a perfect, immutable, and incorporeal being, God was unable to be moved towards anything that approached a human affection, including joy and compassion.<sup>33</sup> Theologians struggled with a way to synthesize this idea with the concept of a loving God who cared for his Creation, and in his *Proslogion*, Anselm of Canterbury elegantly articulated the doubled reasoning that was required to hold these two thoughts in equilibrium:

For when you look upon us in our misery it is we who feel the effect of your mercy, but you do not experience the feeling. Therefore you are both merciful because you save the sorrowful and pardon sinners against you; and you are not merciful because you do not experience any feeling of compassion for misery.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, Aquinas argued that the emotion of sadness (sorrow, grief) had to be doubly denied to God, both because God was insensible to passions in general, but also because even if God could feel passions, as a perfect being he could

<sup>33</sup> Early Church Fathers (Origen, Tertullian, and Lactantius in his *De ira Dei*) had considered the passibility of God, but from the time of Augustine, God's impassibility was a doctrine of the Church: see Lieb, 'Reading God', esp. pp. 215–17; and Weinandy, *Does God Suffer?*, esp. ch. 4: 'Bridges to the Patristic Doctrine of God' and ch. 5: 'The Patristic Doctrine of God'.

<sup>34</sup> Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, VIII, trans. by Charlesworth, p. 91; ed. by Schmitt, I, 106: 'Etenim cum tu respicis nos miseros, nos sentimus misericordis effectum; tu non sentis affectum. Et misericors es igitur, quia miseros salvas, et peccatoribus tuis parcis; et misericors non es, quia nulla miseriae compassione afficeris.' Augustine had formulated a similar set of impossible equivalencies to describe God's emotions in the opening chapter of his *De patientia*: 'sicut autem zelat sine aliquo liuore, irascitur sine aliqua perturbatione, miseretur sine aliquo dolore, paenitet eum sine alicuius suae prauitatis correctione: ita est patiens sine ulla passione': Augustine, *De patientia*, ed. by Zycha, I. 1, 663.



never feel 'bad' ones that indicated some kind of lack in him. Aquinas theorized this as the denial to God of passions not only by reason of their genus (as passions) but also by reason of their species.<sup>35</sup> Such a species of passion, he declared, was sorrow or pain (*tristitia vel dolor*), since it arose from an evil already present; as a result, neither sadness nor sorrow could ever be found in God.<sup>36</sup>

Meanwhile, medieval angelology was producing similar theories of impassibility in relation to the good angels who had not rebelled against God and had subsequently been confirmed in grace. Aquinas noted that the good angels were no more capable of grieving or of compassion towards humans than God was.<sup>37</sup> Because sorrow and grief arise only from the obstruction of the will, and angels have a will perfectly aligned with that of God, they cannot suffer.<sup>38</sup> Bonaventure contended that since there was no grief or sadness outside of punishment, and the good angels had no faults for which they could be punished, consequently they must be free from grief and sadness.<sup>39</sup> As David Keck observes, medieval angels 'are Christianized Stoics'.<sup>40</sup>

Moreover, Aquinas pointed out, any references in the Scriptures to angels feeling negative emotions — as for example Isaiah 33. 7: 'the angels of peace

<sup>35</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk I, C. 89, n. 8: 'Quaedam autem passiones remouentur a Deo non solum ratione sui generis, sed etiam ratione speciei.' See also Kretzmann, 'Aquinas on God's Joy, Love, and Liberality', pp. 125–48.

<sup>36</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk I, C. 89, n. 8: 'Talis autem est tristitia vel dolor: nam eius obiectum est malum iam inhaerens [...] Tristitia igitur et dolor ex ipsa sui ratione in Deo esse non possunt.' See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 21, a. 3, co: 'Tristari ergo de miseria alterius non competit Deo.'

<sup>37</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis*, Bk 2, D. 11, Q. 1, a. 5, co: 'ideo nihil potest accidere de quo doleant Angeli, sicut nec de quo doleat Deus'; Bk 2, D. 11, Q. 1, a. 5, ad 2: 'compati non potest qui passibilis non est; et ideo ex impassibilitate Angelorum hoc accidit quod condolare non possunt.'

<sup>38</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 113, a. 7, co: 'Tristitia enim et dolor, secundum Augustinum, non est nisi de his quae contrariantur voluntati. Nihil autem accidit in mundo quod sit contrarium voluntati Angelorum et aliorum beatorum, quia voluntas eorum totaliter inhaeret ordini divinae iustitiae.'

<sup>39</sup> Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Bk 2, D. XI, a. 2, q. 3, sc. 3: 'dolor et tristitia non est sine poena, et poena non est sine culpa praevia; sed in beatis Angelis nunquam fuit culpa: ergo nec fuit nec potest esse tristitia'; all citations from this text are from <<http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/sent.html>> [accessed 10 September 2014].

<sup>40</sup> Keck, *Angels & Angelology in the Middle Ages*, p. 108: 'Seneca's description of the intellectual and emotional qualities of the happy person or the philosopher could also be Bonaventure's description of an angel.'



will weep bitterly' ('angeli pacis amare flebunt') — had to be taken metaphorically.<sup>41</sup> Bonaventure suggested an exegesis of this verse either in terms of the 'angels' standing for the good officers of the Church or in terms of 'weeping' offering a deliberately anthropomorphized representation of an angel's inner state.<sup>42</sup> Therefore the 'Tears such as angels weep' which spring from Milton's Satan as he surveys his fallen comrades and followers in *Paradise Lost* (Bk I, line 620, p. 98), and which provide the title to this paper, mark a distinction between a somatically emotional early modern prince of demons and the impassive angels of medieval theology.

### *Man of Sorrows: The Passibility of Christ's Human Soul*

In this same period, the question of whether the human nature of Jesus was capable of truly suffering passions of the soul was under serious consideration. Theologians were not just concerned with whether the fleshly body adopted by Jesus at his incarnation exhibited natural external bodily reactions to stimuli such as hunger, thirst, and tiredness, but whether his divine soul internally apprehended and experienced passions — and particularly 'bad' passions such as sorrow, fear, and anger — that could only be designated as inherently human (that is, not capable of being experienced by a divine being).

The Bible itself was an important source, with both Old and New Testaments providing texts that could depict a sorrowing Jesus. The description in Isaiah of the suffering servant, which was read in the Christian era as referring prophetically to Jesus, spoke of him as a 'man of sorrows' (Isaiah 53. 3: 'virum dolorum') and related that 'he bore our sufferings' (Isaiah 53. 4: 'dolores nostros ipse portavit'). Jesus as the 'man of sorrows' became a powerful focus for individual piety, especially in the later Middle Ages.<sup>43</sup> More particularly, the representa-

<sup>41</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis*, Bk 2, D. 11, Q. 1, a. 5, ad 1: 'Si autem ad Angelos referatur, intelligendus est dolor non proprie, sed metaphoricè, per modum quo etiam frequenter in Scripturis Deo attribuitur.'

<sup>42</sup> Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Bk 2, D. XI, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2: 'Et per hunc modum verbum Isaiae, quod subsequitur, potest intelligi vel exponi, ut *Angeli pacis* dicantur ibi *boni praelati*. Si tamen quis intelligit de Angelis beatis secundum veritatem, *amaritudo fletus* non indicat veritatem doloris, sed aliquam conformitatem notat in signo vel effectui exteriori; et potest illud intelligi dictum per anthropopathon.'

<sup>43</sup> See for instance, Ross, *The Grief of God*; and Cohen, *The Modulated Scream*, esp. ch. 7: 'Human and Divine Passion'. Cohen argues for a necessary link between the scholastic examination of Christ's suffering and the rise of Passional piety (p. 208).

tions in two of the synoptic Gospels of Christ's behaviour on the night prior to his Passion raised potent questions about the passibility of his soul. When Jesus went to the Garden of Gethsemane to pray with Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, he is reported to have 'begun to sorrow and grow sad' (Matthew 26. 37: 'coepit contristari et maestus esse') and to have confessed to his companions: 'My soul is sorrowful unto death' (Matthew 26. 38: 'tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem'). In the Gospel of Luke, Jesus is said to have been placed at this time 'in great suffering' (Luke 22. 43: 'factus in agonia')<sup>44</sup> and to have prayed so hard that his sweat ran to the ground as drops of blood: 'et factus est sudor eius sicut guttae sanguinis decurrentis in terram' (Luke 22. 44). This was a powerful evocation of a passion in the scholastic sense of the word, involving both an internal emotional state and an associated somatic alteration.

This constituted the accepted reading of Jesus's suffering throughout the Middle Ages. In his *De civitate Dei*, Augustine wrote that as there was in Jesus 'a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion' and that 'when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul'.<sup>45</sup> Ambrose specifically addressed the issue of Christ's sorrow, writing:

He took my sadness [...] as a man, he took on my sadness [...] Mine is the sadness which he took up along with my ability to suffer [...] He takes pity on me; he is sad in me; he grieves in me.<sup>46</sup>

By the same token, Peter Lombard declared that Jesus took on 'a human nature that was capable of suffering: a soul capable of suffering, and flesh that was capable of suffering and mortal'. Indeed, the indication that Christ's soul was

<sup>44</sup> For a discussion of the polysemy of 'agonia', see Pool, *God's Wounds*, p. 282.

<sup>45</sup> Augustine, *The City of God*, XIV. 9, trans. by Dods, p. 409.

<sup>46</sup> Ambrose, *De fide*, II. 7, ed. by Faller: 'suscepit tristitiam meam. Confidenter tristitiam nomino, quia crucem praedico [...] quia ut homo suscepit tristitiam meam, ut homo locutus est et ideo ait: Non sicut ego uolo, sed sicut tu uis. Mea est tristitia, quam meo suscepit adfectu [...] Mihi compatitur, mihi tristis est, mihi dolet. Ergo pro me et in me doluit, qui pro se nihil habuit, quod doleret.' However, Ambrose goes on to suggest that Christ suffers and grieves more for humanity and its trials than for himself. See also Ambrose, *De bono mortis*, VII. 27, ed. Schenkl, p. 727: 'siquidem Iesus ait: tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem, affectum hominis in se exprimens' (And indeed Jesus said: 'My soul is sorrowful unto death', expressing in himself the emotional disposition of humanity).

truly human was that 'he took on the defects of the soul, namely sadness, fear, pain, and suchlike'.<sup>47</sup>

Origen and Jerome had qualified the matter somewhat by suggesting that Jesus had not experienced these emotions as full-blown passions, but rather as the 'first movements' of a passion, or a propassion. These are affects or feelings (stirrings) to which human nature is inherently subject but to which the consent of the will is not ultimately given.<sup>48</sup> Jerome argued this interpretation from the syntax of passage in Matthew which declared that Jesus '*began* to sorrow and be sad' ('coepit [...]'), stating that 'it is one thing to be saddened, another thing to begin to be saddened'.<sup>49</sup> That Jesus suffered only propassions became the orthodox line throughout medieval theology,<sup>50</sup> repeated, for instance, by Peter Lombard: 'For Christ in his human nature had true fear and sadness [...] these defects exist in us according to both propassion and passion; but they are in Christ only according to propassion.'<sup>51</sup> The same thought was maintained by Aquinas: 'sadness was denied to Christ according to the sense of a completed passion, but it was in him in its first inklings, in the sense of a propassion.'<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, this was, Aquinas stresses, a true passion: 'And for that reason, just as there could be true suffering (*dolor*) in Christ so there could be true sadness (*tristitia*) in him, although in a different way than it is in us.'<sup>53</sup> As Paul Gondreau concludes:

<sup>47</sup> Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, Book III: *On the Incarnation of the Word*, D. XV, C. 1. 1, trans. by Silano, III, 57; see also D. XV, C. 1. 7, p. 59.

<sup>48</sup> On the concept of propassions see Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 122–95.

<sup>49</sup> Jerome, *Commentariorum in Matheum*, IV, ed. by Hurst and Adriaen: 'quod dominus, ut ueritatem adsumpti probaret hominis, uere quidem contristatus sit sed, ne passio in animo illius dominaretur, per propassionem coeperit contristari. Aliud est enim contristari et aliud incipere contristari.'

<sup>50</sup> Beyond medieval theology, however, it met with a number of powerful detractors, such as Erasmus of Rotterdam who took it to task in his *Disputatiuncula de taedio, pavore, tristitia Iesu*, trans. by Heath, pp. 56–57. See Tracy, 'Humanists among the Scholastics', pp. 38–39, and Madigan, *The Passion of Christ in High-Medieval Thought*, esp. ch. 6: 'Christus passibilis'.

<sup>51</sup> Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, Book III: *On the Incarnation of the Word*, D. XV, C. 2. 1, trans. by Silano, III, 61.

<sup>52</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, III, Q. 15, a. 6, ad 1: 'tristitia removetur a Christo secundum passionem perfectam, fuit tamen in eo initiata, secundum propassionem.'

<sup>53</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Q. 15, a. 6, co: 'Et ideo, sicut in Christo potuit esse verus dolor, ita in eo potuit esse vera tristitia, alio tamen modo quam in nobis est.'

St. Thomas' account of Christ's passion provides a highly nuanced and resounding defense of what many would consider an inherent impossibility: the coexistence of movements of passion, even intense ones, and moral perfection. Aquinas presents to his readers the image of a sinless man who remains yet fully alive with intense emotion.<sup>54</sup>

The key point here was that Christ's ability to feel an emotion like sadness was recognized as a fundamental marker of his humanity. Insofar as sadness designated the true humanity of Christ, the attribution of sadness to demons trod dangerous ground, bringing them into closer likeness not just with flawed humanity, but also with the sinless human nature of Christ as well.

### *Sorrow as Productive of Remorse and Repentance*

One of the greatest dangers inherent in the attribution of sadness to demons was, however, the potential development of sadness into remorse and repentance. This pathway had a biblical basis in Paul's declaration that he rejoiced in the sadness of the Corinthians insofar as it brought them to repentance ('nunc gaudeo non quia contristati estis sed quia contristati estis ad paenitentiam'), since sadness according to God worked a lasting repentance ('quae enim secundum Deum tristitia est, paenitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur', II Corinthians 7. 9–10). Similarly, Caesarius of Heisterbach described contrition as a state arising from grief over sins ('dolor de peccatis'), with repentance specifically defined as an internal grief ('dolor [...] interior') that alleviates guilt.<sup>55</sup> More significantly, Caesarius made emotion one of the four key steps leading to justification: there is an infusion of grace which, together with free will, arouses an emotion which leads to contrition and thence to the remission of sins.<sup>56</sup>

Clearly, then, the attribution of the emotion of grief to demonic agents had to be handled carefully to avoid the heretical suggestion that a demon might suffer remorse and then repent, since the early and medieval Church held it as

<sup>54</sup> Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ's Soul*, p. 29.

<sup>55</sup> Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, D. II, C. 1, ed. by Strange, I, 56: 'Contritio est cordis poenitudo, scilicet dolor de peccatis. [...] poenitudo dolor est interior, tollens culpam.'

<sup>56</sup> Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, D. II, C. 1, ed. by Strange, I, 57: 'In iustificatione peccatoris dicunt quatuor concurrere, gratiae infusionem, motum surgentem ex gratia et libero arbitrio, contritionem, peccatorum remissionem.'

a tenet of orthodoxy that the Devil would necessarily remain obdurate in his evil will and so could never be redeemed. For this reason, Origen's early assertion that the Devil (along with all beings) would eventually be granted redemption (a theology known as 'apokatastasis', a term read as indicative of universal restoration) was condemned at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553.<sup>57</sup> Instead, in a formulation often quoted throughout the Middle Ages, John Damascene theorized that the fall of the angels was to them what death is to humanity — namely the incontrovertible end of any possibility of repentance.<sup>58</sup> Although this statement was associated with and quoted from John Damascene throughout the Middle Ages, it had in fact been drawn by Damascene from the fourth-century father Nemesios.<sup>59</sup> Nemesios' reasoning was that since humans, as corporeal beings, necessarily suffer from disturbances due to the emotions, they are permitted to change their ways throughout their life, and, returning to reason and sound health after violent emotional disruptions, can then seek forgiveness. The angels, however, being incorporeal and therefore unbothered by emotions, as well as by want or desire, must be held to the consequences of their purely rational choice.<sup>60</sup>

In the era of scholasticism, Aquinas argued for the denial of forgiveness to demons on the grounds of choice alone: he suggested that appetite had to fol-

<sup>57</sup> See Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis*; Satran, 'The Salvation of the Devil'; Forsyth, *The Old Enemy*, ch. 21: 'Origen's Wicked Angel: Universal Fall and Redemption'; and Patrides, 'The Salvation of Satan'. Ramelli makes it clear that Origen's theory of *apokatastasis*, as also Gregory of Nyssa's closely following him, were firmly based in both Old and New Testament texts, plus texts considered by both of them at the time as canonical. She also clarifies that although the concept of *apokatastasis* was in circulation from the end of the second century and into the third in various North African and Near Eastern Christian contexts, it became particularly associated with Origen as he was the first to give it a full and coherent form and make it a part of his theology.

<sup>58</sup> John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, XVIII. 5, ed. by Buytaert, p. 77, lines 38–40: 'Oportet autem scire quoniam quod est hominibus mors, hoc est angelis casus. Post casum enim non est eis paenitentia, quemadmodum neque hominibus post mortem.'

<sup>59</sup> See Louth, *St John Damascene*, p. 124: 'John's presentation of what is essentially Nemesios's teaching was destined to be very influential.'

<sup>60</sup> See Nemesios Emesenus, *De natura hominis, graece et latine*, ed. by von Matthaei, Latin text, pp. 8–9: 'angeli [...] natura omni affectione corporis et inopia et voluptate vacent, merito per poenitentiam ad veniam adspirare non possunt. At homo non modo rationis particeps, sed etiam animal est [...] motusque turbidi persaepe rationem attentant atque labefactant. Quare, cum ad sanitatem redit, et, declinatis turbulentis animi motionibus, virtutem complectitur, justa illi misericordia, id est, venia tribuitur.'

low apprehension, and insofar as angels apprehended things ‘immovably’ (that is, they apperceived an entirety at once, and did not reason from one idea to another the way humans do), their will clung to the object of their free choice immovably. In other words, they had free will before they chose, but once having chosen, their choice was fixed and immovable. So the good angels who stood firm with God were confirmed in justice, and the evil angels who chose to sin necessarily remain in sin.<sup>61</sup> William of Auvergne also noted that the will of demons remained fixed on the pursuit of evil, so that any theoretical impossibility of them attaining redemption (as, for instance, in Aquinas’s reasoning) could not excuse them for their failure to do so since impossibility only excuses what the will would otherwise allow: this is not the case with demons.<sup>62</sup>

Anthropomorphizing demons also rendered them objects of understanding and therefore pity. This is evident with respect to Satan in early modern literature, such as *Paradise Lost*, as the lines extracted at the head of this paper reveal.<sup>63</sup> Gustave Doré’s 1866 engravings for *Paradise Lost* which show Satan looking forlorn and lost, Ricardo Bellver’s evocative sculpture ‘El Ángel Caído’ (‘The Fallen Angel’, Madrid, sculpted in 1877), also inspired by *Paradise Lost*, and Hermann Hesse’s poignant short story ‘*The Field Devil*’ (‘*Der Feldteufel*’, 1908)<sup>64</sup> similarly reveal that a depiction of sadness and despair in others — even demonic others — can invoke a corresponding sense of compassion and pity in observers, as Aquinas indeed noted in his study of the passion of sadness.<sup>65</sup> As ‘sympathy for the devil’ was not one of the aims of medieval theology, which needed rather to reify the Devil constantly as the great Adversary, theo-

<sup>61</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 64, a. 2, co (see also ad 2 and ad 3); see also *De malo*, Q. 16, a. 5.

<sup>62</sup> William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia*, I, 1045bC: ‘Verum hoc non est eis possibile propter radicationem & profundationem malignitatis in ipsis. Scito tamen, quod impossibilitas hæc non excusat eos à malitia, vel culpa, & hoc est, quoniam voluntaria est non solum quoniam per voluntatem suam se induxerunt in illam, sed etiam cum voluntate mali, & mala, in eis est. Impossibilitas autem excusat, ubi contraria est, voluntati, videlicet ubi voluntas est per impossibilitatem prohibita, vel impedita. Verum apud eos, sicut impossibile est eis malitiam deserere, sic & voluntarium est eisdem persistere in eadem.’ See also Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Bk 2, D. 7, Pt. 1, a. 1, q. 1.

<sup>63</sup> For an analysis of remorse and repentance in *Paradise Lost* see Benet, ‘Adam’s Evil Conscience and Satan’s Surrogate Fall’, esp. pp. 5, 8, 11.

<sup>64</sup> Hermann Hesse, ‘*The Field Devil*’, ed. by Ziolkowski and trans. by Manheim, pp. 139–45.

<sup>65</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, Q. 35, a. 8, co: ‘Unde extraneum obiectum tristitiae accipi potest vel secundum alterum tantum, quia scilicet est malum, sed non proprium, et sic est misericordia, quae est tristitia de alieno malo, inquantum tamen aestimatur ut proprium.’

retical and literary formulations that might result in compassion for the Devil and his demons had to be curtailed.

### *Conclusion*

Sadness was a dangerous emotion to attribute to demons in the Middle Ages. There was a strong desire to view demons as capable of suffering for their rebellion against God, and whose suffering would distinguish them from the good angels who were confirmed in grace and impassibility. Yet creating suffering demons constituted them as potential figures of pity and compassion and left open the heretical possibility that they could travel from sorrow to repentance. It also brought them perilously close to the 'suffering servant' Christ whose sadness was both a marker of humanity and essential to the redemption of the world.

The attribution of sadness to demons was a later arrival in medieval Latinate writings, with more typical demonic emotions being anger, hatred, and lust. At first, demonic sadness was depicted as little more than a reactive emotion consequent upon a frustrated will; yet through the investigations of the Scholastics, a picture emerged of sadness as a fundamental component of the demonic constitution, an internal disposition that necessarily affected everything demons did.

By the end of the thirteenth century, medieval demons had begun to exhibit symptoms of sadness, grief, despair, and remorse. It would take until the early modern period, however, to produce a demon that could appear as a fully emotional being, one so completely open to affect that he could be described as imprisoned 'in his own reified emotions'.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Stavely, 'Satan and Arminianism in *Paradise Lost*', p. 135.



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## FROM ELEGY TO LYRIC: CHANGING EMOTION IN EARLY ENGLISH POETRY

Daniel Anlezark

Early English lyric poetry offers the modern reader insights into the experience of emotion, framed in a concise literary form, often focused directly on the problems of emotion itself. The earliest English lyrics are often classified as ‘elegies’, a misleading label for a group of poems which owes no debt to the elegiac form.<sup>1</sup> All of the Old English poems classed as elegies are found in the Exeter Book, a manuscript which was copied by a single scribe some time around 970, and is made up of booklets associated with the divergent form and content of the poems.<sup>2</sup> The first group in the manuscript is made up of narrative poems, overtly religious in subject matter — three poems on the life of Christ, others on various saints, and a poem on the phoenix, allegorically associated with Christ’s resurrection. Another narrative poem, *The Harrowing of Hell*, which relates closely to the subject matter of the three Christ poems, appears much later in the manuscript. The rest of the poems in the manuscript fall roughly into two groups — those which are riddles (ninety-five in total),

<sup>1</sup> Dronke, *The Medieval Lyric*, pp. 30, 36–37. Dronke is reluctant to discuss these and other, shorter Anglo-Saxon poems as ‘vernacular lyrics’, apparently because they do not share the formal characteristics of later poems in Romance languages. However, they are certainly metrical, and there is no reason to assume they were not composed to be sung.

<sup>2</sup> For editions of the text see *The Exeter Book*, ed. by Krapp and Dobbie; *The Exeter Anthology of Old English Poetry*, ed. by Muir. On the copying of the book, see Conner, ‘The Structure of the Exeter Book Codex’. The text of the poems used in this essay are based on *The Exeter Book*, ed. by Krapp and Dobbie, and *The Old English Elegies*, ed. by Klinck.

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and those which are not. Where the boundary lies between the riddles and some of the other poems is not easy to define, as many of these are difficult to understand, and are often enigmatic in style. Many of these other poems are those classified as elegies because of their shared treatment of the theme of loss and suffering. This group includes some of the best-known and most widely studied poems in Old English, including *The Wanderer*, *The Seafarer*, *The Wife's Lament*, *The Husband's Message*, and *Deor*. Other poems are more overtly theological and didactic in tone, such as *The Lord's Prayer* and *Judgement Day I*. Between these didactic poems and the elegies a group can be described which shares a theological interest absent from many of the elegies, but sharing with the elegies their interest in loss and suffering.<sup>3</sup> The approach to suffering and loss differs across these 'non-religious elegies' and 'theological elegies', and in the context of the one manuscript book, the reader is presented with different ways of addressing the experience of human suffering.

The Exeter miscellany dates from a golden age of English monasticism, with many of its texts embodying a cultural tradition with its roots in the ascetical struggles against the passions of monks in the Egyptian deserts of late Antiquity. This unique collection from the Anglo-Saxon period presents parallels with English anthologies of the following centuries, with particular similarities of literary interest noticeable in the so-called 'friars' miscellanies.<sup>4</sup> There are also obvious differences between the Exeter Book and, for example, the thirteenth-century manuscript: Oxford, Jesus College, MS 29, but despite the changed linguistic and cultural context, the continuity of anthological interest across the two is striking. The Exeter Book contains nothing like the remarkable debate poem *The Owl and the Nightingale*, but does include *Soul and Body II*, an early example of the debate poem genre. The cultural obsession with the Last Judgement that *Body and Soul* represents is well attested across later anthologies, where *Body and Soul* poems continue to feature. Jesus College MS 29 also includes a number of lyrics with a strong interest in the role of emotion in directing the spiritual life, among them Franciscan Thomas of Hales's *Luue-Ron*. This is very much a poem of its thirteenth-century context, written for an educated religious lady, and marrying its themes of *Ubi sunt* and *contemptus mundi* to the popular love lyric, concluding that Jesus is the only true 'leofmon'. The emotive love-longing of *The Wife's Lament* and *The Husband's Message* could not have reached such a conclusion in an age before the blossoming of affective piety and

<sup>3</sup> See Greenfield, 'The Old English Elegies'.

<sup>4</sup> See Pearsall, *Old English and Middle English Poetry*, pp. 51–56, 94–102.

the theories of the emotions which underpin it. The Old English lyric poems, however, share the deep interest in the role of emotion in the development of the interior life, but use a different language of emotion, and present different emotional strategies.<sup>5</sup> The first of the two Exeter Book elegies to be discussed closely here, *Resignation*, offers the reader a biblically-based Christian rationale for emotional suffering, and an ascetical approach to living with it. The second poem discussed, *The Wanderer*, presents a radically different approach, echoing the Stoics' philosophical treatment of emotion, though any direct debt to any Stoic philosophical text would be impossible to establish. A new and alternative understanding of the emotions underpins the rhetorical strategy of the lyrics that emerged in the thirteenth century, which will be discussed in relation to Thomas of Hales's *Luue-Ron*.

### *Resignation*

There is no firm agreement on whether *Resignation* should be treated as one poem or two; and if two, whether either poem can be considered complete as first authored.<sup>6</sup> This problem hinges on textual difficulties at line 69, which have suggested to some that a folio is missing from the manuscript at this point. For the purpose of this study the poem will be treated as a unified whole, as the evidence against such an assumption is inconclusive, and *Resignation* appears to have been read as a complete textual unit in the Exeter Book. The poem's apparent uneven progression is not directly attributable to its exploitation of two generally distinct genres — the exile's lament and the penitent's prayer — as this generic blending is characteristic of the poem throughout, though the exile's lament intensifies towards the poem's end.

The poem begins very much in prayer mode, with a gradual shift to narrative. The rhetorical development is important for the poem's treatment of emotion — the suffering described becomes less abstracted, and more personal. This shift is not obviously autobiographical, but rather the poetic treatment of emotional suffering is framed in different ways — the impersonal and the personal — which are juxtaposed in the poem. *Resignation* speaks of a sea voyage (97b–104), aligning its metaphoric development with other elegies in the manuscript: the speaker of *The Wanderer* has crossed waterways, and has spent time

<sup>5</sup> The expression 'emotional strategy' is used here only in a general, rhetorical sense. For a more technical discussion see Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*.

<sup>6</sup> *The Old English Elegies*, ed. by Klinck, p. 55.

contemplating the sea and the 'binding of the waves'; *The Seafarer* is centred on the metaphor of life as a difficult sea journey, elected by the Christian ascetic; the wife of *The Wife's Lament* has followed her husband on a frustrated journey and travelled across the waves; the speaker of *The Husband's Message* has journeyed across the water, and been separated from his wife; the female speaker of *Wulf and Eadwacer* cannot leave her island, and longs for Wulf who is on another. It can be safely assumed that the Anglo-Saxon reader of the Exeter Book understood the metaphor of life as a sea journey, and other aspects of the sea as metaphor, including the commonplace notion that the sea can symbolize separation, the changeability of fortune, or chaos. In *Resignation* it appears that the motif of the sea journey is used in different ways: referring to a real sea journey in the speaker's life (line 89); as a metaphor of isolation (line 72); and as the journey of the Christian soul in death (lines 41–42a: 'Nu ic fundige to þe, fæder moncynnes, of þisse worulde'; 'Now I journey to you, father of humankind, from this world').<sup>7</sup> However, while these distinctions are present, they are not rigidly observed by the poet, who either deliberately or accidentally fuses different ways of understanding a common elegiac motif. The poem is cast in the voice of one contemplating death, though it is clearly meant to apply to those with a life to live ahead. This mortifying approach to daily life is recommended in one of the foundational texts of Western monasticism, Athanasius's *Life of St Antony of Egypt*:

As we rise daily, let us suppose that we shall not survive till evening, and again, as we prepare for sleep, let us consider that we shall not awaken [...] For the larger fear and dread of the torments always destroys pleasure's smooth allure, and rouses the declining soul.<sup>8</sup>

The framing of the character in *Resignation* is religious and moral rather than ethical and philosophical, the focus on sin and redemption rather than the

<sup>7</sup> *The Old English Elegies*, ed. by Klinck, p. 55. Klinck suggests that the journey in *Resignation* is 'the journey of the soul', which in the context of the poem implies the metaphoric journey of death, as the soul leaves this world; see Klinck's '*Resignation*: Exile's Lament or Penitent's Prayer?'. See also *Kleines angelsächsisches Dichterbuch*, ed. by Schücking, p. 22; and followed by *The Exeter Book*, ed. by Krapp and Dobbie, p. lx; Nelson, 'On Resignation', pp. 134–35 characterizes this as 'a voyage to the heavenly patria'. Stanley, 'Old English Poetic Diction', suggested that the journey might be a literal one, an example of the early medieval ascetical *peregrinatio pro amore Dei*. The suggestion by Bliss and Frantzen, 'The Integrity of *Resignation*', is not persuasive.

<sup>8</sup> Athanasius, *The Life of Antony*, XIX, trans. by R. C. Gregg. See Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 138–39.

achievement of happiness, and the poem internalizes the moral value of fear of death and Judgement.

The speaker experiences both poverty (101) and loneliness as a direct result of his exile (102, 106b–8a) across the sea; these could as easily be understood literally or metaphorically. The social exile has no material wealth and is alone; the soul exiled in this world from the heavenly homeland is spiritually impoverished and cut off from God.<sup>9</sup> There are notable differences in tone and emphasis between the two parts of the poem: the first is more emphatically concerned with spiritual suffering, and the need for God's grace (lines 19, 33–34a, 51a, 66b–68) and the speaker's sin (25b–26a, 27b–28a, 34b–36a, 51b–52a, 64b–65a), while the second focuses on the emotional pain caused by material loss (81b–82a, 85b–87, 111b–13).<sup>10</sup> The speaker's admission that his punishment is just (78b–81a) could also be understood with reference to God or human society.<sup>11</sup> Despite the differing emphases across the poem, the attitude to suffering remains consistent: the speaker has sinned against God and man, and his emotional suffering must be endured because of this. The recognition of the justness of the immediate causes of this emotional pain — poverty and loneliness — is presented as the psychological mechanism that makes such endurance possible. In this way *Resignation* (the name of the poem is a modern editorial one) evokes its broad (and at times specific) debt to a Christian ascetical tradition rooted in scripture, most importantly in the Book of Psalms and the Pauline epistles. The psalms and Paul's letters share a subjective authorial voice generally absent from the rest of the Bible, and often reflect on the experience of personal suffering.<sup>12</sup> Paul describes his own experience as an exile for the gospel, beside theological reflections on the suffering caused by sin. The psalms, many of which were believed by medieval readers to be songs composed by King David, describe the experience of one suffering just or unjust persecution, and almost always appealing to God's mercy. The psalms were so much a part of the prayer life not only of the Anglo-Saxon monastic (who sang the full Psalter every week), but of any literate Anglo-Saxon, that some familiarity with their words and sentiments can be assumed on the part of any Christian poet.

<sup>9</sup> See *The Old English Elegies*, ed. by Klinck, p. 56.

<sup>10</sup> See *The Old English Elegies*, ed. by Klinck, p. 56; Bliss and Frantzen, 'The Integrity of *Resignation*', pp. 400–02 see the latter part of the poem as a psychological study in self-pity.

<sup>11</sup> See *The Old English Elegies*, ed. by Klinck, p. 56.

<sup>12</sup> On biblical theme in *Resignation*, see Deskis, 'Jonah and Genre in *Resignation B*'.



*Resignation* opens with a petition straight out of the sentiment of the psalms, as direct address prayer to a familiar, personal God (1–3):

Age mec se ælmihta god,  
 helpe min se halga dryhten!      Ðu gesceope heofon ond eorþan  
 ond wundor eall, min wundorcyning,

Deliver me, almighty God, help me holy Lord! You created heaven and earth and all wonders, my wonder-king.

From the outset, the poem establishes the complete dependence of the human on the Divine, both as creator of the universe, and also as personally in control of the events of the individual's life: God's power to intervene in creation logically flows from his role as creator. The speaker then offers himself as an oblation to God, body and soul (5–9):

Ic þe, mære god,  
 mine sawle bebeode      ond mines sylfes lic,  
 ond min word ond min weorc,      witig dryhten,  
 ond eal min leoþo,      leohtes hyrde,  
 ond þa manigfealdan      mine geþohtas.

I offer you, great God, my soul and my own body, and my words and works, wise Lord, and all my limbs, shepherd of light, and the multitude of my thoughts.

The conventional offering of the self echoes one of the best-known psalms, the *Miserere* (Psalm 50. 19): 'Sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus; cor contritum et humiliatum, Deus, non despicias' ('A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a contrite and humbled heart, O God, you will not despise').<sup>13</sup> The prayer continues in the tone of the penitential psalms, emphasizing the speaker's sin and need for forgiveness (lines 15–21):

Regnþeof ne læt  
 on sceade sceppan,      þeah þe ic scyppendum  
 wuldorcyninge      waccor hyrde,  
 ricum dryhtne,      þonne min ræd wære.  
 Forgif me to lisse,      lifgende god,  
 bitre bealodæde.      Ic þa bote gemon,  
 cyninga wuldor,      cume to, gif ic mot.

<sup>13</sup> The biblical text (and psalm numbering) is taken from the Vulgate: *Biblia sacra vulgata*, ed. by Weber and others, with punctuation added; translations are based on the Douay-Rheims version.

Do not let the great thief harm me in the shadow, though I more weakly obeyed the creating wonder-king, the powerful Lord, than would have been beneficial for me. Forgive me in tenderness, living God, the bitter awful deeds. I remember the remedy, king of glory, let me come to it, if I may.

The conventional language evokes death as the thief in the night (1 Thessalonians 5. 2); the conventional shadow of death is also evoked in the wake of the reference to God as *leohtes hyrde* (shepherd of light, line 8; cf. Psalm 22. 1, 4). In the face of his emotional anguish, the speaker both asks for respite, and accepts his suffering as a spiritual test (22–25):

Forgif þu me, min frea,    fierst ond ondgiæt  
ond geþyld ond gemynd    þinga gehwylces  
þara þu me, soþfast cyning,    sendan wyll  
to cunnunge.

Give me, my Lord, respite and understanding and patience and purpose in each of those things, truth-fast king, that you will send in testing.

His voice is one with the psalmist (Psalm 37. 18–19): ‘Quoniam ego in flagella paratus sum, et dolor meus in conspectu meo semper. Quoniam iniquitatem meam annuntiabo, et cogitabo pro peccato meo.’ (‘For I am ready for scourges: and my sorrow is continually before me. For I will declare my iniquity: and I will think for my sin.’) The speaker’s concern with approaching death does not of course imply that this is imminent — the universality of death, and meditations on it, make this very much a poem about choosing to live life in death’s shadow.

That the language of sin and death is conventional rather than strictly personal, is suggested not just by the dependence on biblical sentiment, but also comments suggesting the speaker is in fact one engaged in the ascetical life (74–75): ‘ond me þæt eal for gode þolian bliþe mode’ (‘and for myself I suffer all that for God with a happy mind’). The speaker goes so far as to refer to his *martirdom* (81), a word that is perhaps not likely to apply to a sinner as great as he suggests he is; the tone of the poem makes it likely such a word is used hyperbolically. The conventional language projects a persona with whom any monastic reader might identify, and suggests that the experience of suffering can, in fact, produce happiness if understood in the Christian ascetical context. In this way, the removal from home and family, and the experience of poverty take on a different aspect, not unlike the sufferings of St Paul himself (82–89):

Ne eom ic dema gleaw,  
wis fore weorude.    Forþon ic þas word spræce,  
fus on ferþe,    swa me on frymðe gelomp

yrmþu ofer eorþan,    þæt ic a þolade  
 geara gehwylce    — gode calles þonc —  
 modearfōþa    ma þonne on oþrum,  
 fyrhto in folce;    forþon ic afysed eom  
 earm of minum eþle.

I am not a man wise in his judgements, wise before the host; therefore, I have spoken these words eagerly in mind, as from the outset poverty proved to be my lot across the earth, so that each year — thanks be to God for it all — I have always suffered more heartfelt hardships and dread than there was in others; for I am driven, impoverished, away from the place of my birth.

A Pauline proclamation of the folly of the cross (1 Corinthians 1. 18–23) might only loosely be discerned here, were it not for Paul's description of the exile he suffered to preach it, which parallels the situation of the speaker in *Resignation* (1 Corinthians 4. 11–13):

Usque in hanc horam et esurimus et sitimus et nudi sumus et colaphis caedimur et instabiles sumus. Et laboramus operantes manibus nostris maledicimur et benedicimus persecutionem patimur et sustinemus. Blasphemamur et obsecramus tamquam purgamenta huius mundi facti sumus omnium peripssima usque adhuc.

Even unto this hour we both hunger and thirst and are naked and are buffeted and have no fixed abode. And we labour, working with our own hands. We are reviled; and we bless. We are persecuted and we suffer it. We are blasphemed and we entreat. We are made as the refuse of this world, the offscouring of all, even until now.<sup>14</sup>

The echoes of the sentiments of voluntary asceticism in *Resignation* sit beside language that resonates closely with that of speakers in other elegies (89–96):

Ne mæg þæs anhoga,  
 leodwynna leas,    leng drohtian,  
 wineleas wræcca.    Is him wrað meotud,  
 gnornað on his geoguþe,  
 ond him ælce mæle    men füllestað,  
 ycað his yrmþu,    ond he þæt eal þolað,  
 sarcwide secga,    ond him bið a sefa geomor,  
 mod morgenseoc.

The solitary one, without joys of the people, cannot long endure a friendless exile. The creator is angry with him, in his youth he grieves, and at every season people condescend to him and increase his poverty, and all this, the painful words of men, he suffers and always his mind is sad, and his heart sick at morning.

<sup>14</sup> See also Romans 8. 35–36 and 11 Corinthians 1. 3–10, 16–18.

Not only do the sentiments compare with those of *The Wanderer*, but the poets employ a similar vocabulary of social pain: the wanderer is also solitary (*anhoga; Wanderer*, lines 1, 40), and friendless (*wineleas; Wanderer*, line 45); both lament their sorrows at dawn, as does the wife of *The Wife's Lament* (*Wanderer*, line 8; *Wife's Lament*, line 35). But even here *Resignation's* Christian penitential framework suggests as much of a debt to the psalms as to the elegiac tradition (Psalm 70. 17, 20):

Deus docuisti me ab adulescentia mea et usque nunc adnuntiabo mirabilia tua. [...] qui ostendisti mihi tribulationes plurimas et adflictiones conversus vivificabis nos et de abyssis terrae rursum educes nos.

You have taught me, O God, from my youth: and till now I will declare your wonderful works. [...] great troubles have you shown me, many and grievous, and turning you have brought me to life, and have brought me back again from the depths of the earth.<sup>15</sup>

Even the conventional dawn setting, shared with *The Wanderer* and *The Wife's Lament*, takes on different connotations in the penitential elegy, and evokes an alternative literary pedigree (Psalm 118. 146–48): 'Invocavi te salvum me fac et custodiam testimonia tua. Surgebam adhuc in tenebris et clamabam verbum tuum expectans. Praeveniebant oculi mei vigilias ut meditarer in sermonibus tuis' (I cried unto you, save me, that I may keep your commandments. I rose up with the dawning of the day, and cried, because in your words I hoped very much. My eyes have foreseen the morning, that I might meditate on your words).<sup>16</sup>

For the speaker of *Resignation* there is no happiness to be had in this world. The remedy sought at line 20 is realized at line 110 (108–11):

Eala dryhten min,  
meahtig mundbora,    þæt ic eom mode seoc,  
bittre abolgen;    is seo bot æt þe gelong æfter life.

Alas, my Lord, mighty protector, that I am sick in mind, bitterly perturbed; the remedy is with you after this life.

<sup>15</sup> See also Psalm 24. 7.

<sup>16</sup> The conventional language of the psalms that permeates *Resignation* may offer an explanation for the speaker's comparison of himself to the tree which is allowed to flourish in season, while he cannot (lines 105–06); in the convention of the psalms, the flourishing tree is the just man, favoured by God. See Psalm 1. 3; 91. 13; 51. 10.

The ultimate pessimism about the possibility of happiness in this life is rooted in the expectation of another, better world, as well as a belief that all suffering is sent by God as a chastisement and cure for sin (compare Hebrews 12. 6–10).<sup>17</sup> The sickness of mind and emotional disturbance that the speaker laments is accepted as part of the human condition, inseparable from the inevitability of sin, and the need to be cured of it (117–18):

Giet biþ þæt selast,   þonne mon him sylf ne mæg  
wyrd onwendan,   þæt he þonne wel þolige.

It is still the best thing, when man may not avert fate himself, that he should suffer it well.

The poem's final appeal to fate carries little or no philosophical weight, coming as it does in the wake of a thoroughly theological exploration of the emotional suffering caused by loss and loneliness. Here *wyrd* can only mean something like 'the unavoidable events of life'.<sup>18</sup> The Christian asceticism of *Resignation* dominates the elegiac motifs and metaphors the poet employs, though it would be an exaggeration to call the poem a pastiche. As a penitential elegy the poem offers a clearly defined rationale for emotional pain, and a remedy for this inspired by the Christian ascetical tradition.

### *The Wanderer*

The spiritual passivity of *Resignation* is a commonplace in Old English religious poetry and prose, but the poem's attitude to loss and suffering is not universal; certainly the Exeter Book elegies present other ways of approaching the problem of emotional pain. *The Wanderer* is a poem very much interested not just in the experience of suffering, but the challenge it presents for the individual who wants to come to terms with external forces, such as fate and divine decree, but still live something like a stable and happy life. The poet develops a discourse on the relationship between emotion and reason, but significantly does not attribute the cause of his emotional pain either to his own sinfulness, or the desire of God to inflict suffering, either as a divine chastisement or for an intrinsic redemptive value. God is mentioned in the poem, but this God is more remote from human experience than the God found in *Resignation*, and the God in *The*

<sup>17</sup> Pulsiano, 'Spiritual Despair in *Resignation B*', does not accept the assurance that the poem provides a remedy to suffering.

<sup>18</sup> See Timmer, 'Wyrd in Anglo-Saxon Prose and Poetry'.

*Wanderer* does not directly inflict pain. The force of a loosely personified 'Fate' (*Wyrd*) appears in the poem as part of the chain of causality in life's events, though the relationship between Fate and God is not explored closely by the poet.<sup>19</sup> What is explored in detail is the speaker's attitude to his emotional suffering, and it is both in this stance and the ideas developed from it, that the poem presents a marked divergence from the ascetical approach to suffering found in *Resignation*. In both poems the events that cause emotional pain (especially grief and loneliness in exile) are treated as an inevitable part of life; but while the asceticism of *Resignation* sees emotional suffering as necessary, *The Wanderer* advances a Stoic view that the emotional turmoil and pain produced by life's events are far from predetermined, even if the events themselves are.

*The Wanderer's* opening, against the background of the understanding of emotional pain derived from Christian biblical tradition and exemplified in *Resignation*, takes on a contrastive, or even argumentative force, especially in the context of the Exeter Book anthology (lines 1–5):

Oft him anhaga    are gebideð,  
metudes miltse,    þeah þe he modcearig  
geond lagulade    longe sceolde  
hieran mid hondum    hrimcealde sæ,  
wadan wræclastas.    Wyrd bið ful aræd.

Often the solitary one waits for favour, the mercy of the Creator, though anxious of mind, across the seaways he must for a long time stir with his hands the frosty sea, walk the exile-way. Fate is full written.

The situation of this solitary one is typical of many speakers of the Old English elegy — the direct attribution of the course of life's events to Fate is not. This short introduction offers a distinct characterization of both the solitary figure who will emerge as the speaker, but also of the Creator. It is far from clear that the Creator here is to be imagined in biblical, rather than more philosophical, terms. The mention of Fate beside the Creator at the opening of the poem implies the latter, and has suggested to some that the poet has been influenced by Boethius's *De consolazione philosophiae*, a work well known in later Anglo-Saxon England, both in the Latin original and in an Old English version.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Lochrie, 'Wyrd and the Limits of Human Understanding', argues for a deliberate pattern in the compilation of the elegies, around the theme of *wyrd*.

<sup>20</sup> See Horgan, 'The Wanderer — A Boethian Poem?'; Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, ed. and trans. by Stewart, Rand, and Tester.

Boethius's work was enormously influential for more than a thousand years after its composition in the early sixth century: it was practically the only book of ethical philosophy known in the early Middle Ages, and even long after Boethius's own classical sources were introduced into the universities from the twelfth century onwards, his own synthesis of Neoplatonic cosmology and Stoic ethics remained popular, influencing writers from Chaucer to Samuel Johnson.<sup>21</sup> The source of much of this popularity lies in Boethius's authorial persona, struggling to come to terms with the loss of social position and material goods. The fact that the wanderer shares this voice may simply be coincidental, and no clear textual link has been established between *De consolazione* and *The Wanderer*; any philosophical debt may be more general than specific. It is noteworthy that *The Wanderer* maintains a philosophically neutral description of God as Creator of the world and of humanity (line 85), and a 'Father' in the heavens (line 115); the Son and Holy Spirit are not mentioned, and, most significantly, neither is any doctrine of sin and redemption. The absence of Christ does not of course present a rejection of Christianity, and does not imply that *The Wanderer* is a pre-Christian Germanic pagan literary relic. The conception of God echoes that presented by the Christian author Boethius, rewriting Antique philosophy into a monotheistic tradition.<sup>22</sup>

The solitary figure in *The Wanderer* is one whose outlook on life is imagined in these terms, common to medieval theology and Late Antique philosophy. His situation is shared with other exiled elegy personas, but the poet frames him in a more philosophical, less penitential world.<sup>23</sup> The full force of the poem's opening word 'often' suggests to the reader not just that the character of this poem has often been in this situation, but that both his literary relatives, and indeed any solitary person, can find themselves in difficulty, and awaiting God's intervention by grace, turning events. But what if events don't turn? What if fate is fully written? Is the experience of emotional pain inevitable, and entirely contingent on the changing world? Fate might be fully written, and favours ultimately do all come from God, but how should the individual react and relate to these forces and the disturbing emotions they cause? The first half

<sup>21</sup> See Hoenen and Nauta, eds, *Boethius in the Middle Ages*.

<sup>22</sup> Compare the Old English Boethian Metre 5 and the following Prose, which elaborate the discussion of the passions found in the original Latin (1. 7. 25–28); *The Old English Boethius*, ed. by Godden and Irvine; I, 394–400, II, 104–08; Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, ed. by Bieler. See Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 232.

<sup>23</sup> On *The Wanderer* in the Christian meditative tradition, see Selzer, 'The Wanderer and the Meditative Tradition'; Savage, 'The Place of Old English Poetry', pp. 94–98.

of the poem, up to line 57 (out of a total of one hundred and fifteen lines), details the experience endured by the wanderer (who previously has enjoyed the life of an noble warrior) since his loss of kinsman and human society — this is much the same fate as has befallen the speaker of *Resignation*. The wanderer's initial reaction, which has lasted for some undefined period, was to look for consolation in his suffering by searching for a replacement for the lost lord and kinsmen. Social happiness was clearly of great importance to the Anglo-Saxons, and the emotional loneliness caused by its absence is a unifying theme across the elegies. The search has been unsuccessful for the wanderer, though the reason for his failure is not explained. The implication is that replacing lost loved ones with strangers is not simple, and that these cannot restore lost happiness. The wanderer's only joy comes with sleep (37–50):

Forþon wat se þe sceal    his winedryhtnes  
 leofes larcwidum    longe forþolian —  
 ðonne sorg ond slæp    somod ætgædre  
 earmne anhogan oft gebindað,  
 þinceð him on mode    þæt he his mondryhten  
 clyppe ond cysse    ond on cneo lecge  
 honda ond heafod,    swa he hwilum ær  
 in geardagum    giefstolas breac.  
 Ðonne onwæcneð eft    wineleas guma,  
 gesihð him biforan    fealwe wegas,  
 bapian brimfugas,    brædan fēþra,  
 hreosan hrim ond snaw,    hagle gemenged.  
 Ðonne beoð þy hefigran    heortan benne,  
 sare æfter swæsne;    sorg bið geniwad.

Therefore he knows he who must for a long time do without his friendly lord's dear utterances — when both sorrow and sleep together often bind the wretched solitary one, it seems to him in his mind that he embraces and kisses his lord, and on knee lays hands and head, as in times before, in the old days, when he enjoyed the bounty of the throne. When the friendless man wakes again, he sees before him fallow waves, sea-birds bathing, spreading wings, frost and snow falling, mingled with hail. Then are the heart's wounds the heavier, pining for the dear one. Sorrow is renewed.

The poem draws into play the complex relationships between the conscious and unconscious mind, the way memory functions in both of these, and emotion. The renewal of anxiety expressed at line 50 ('sorg bið geniwad', 'sorrow is renewed') as the dreamer awakes 'painfully after the sweetness', is reiterated at line 55 ('cearo bið geniwad', 'care is renewed'). However, both the cause of the



emotional pain, and the way in which it is experienced, are explored in much greater complexity than in *Resignation*. In the way the poet presents this loss, it is not the experience of the loss in the objective world that is the cause of the solitary wanderer's pain. The poet carefully introduces a distinction into the wanderer's levels of consciousness and awareness — the sleeping and dreaming, beside the wakeful and remembering — to make this distinction possible. Whether the wanderer is awake or asleep, the objective reality is the same — he has lost his lord and companions. Initially he believes that it is this loss that is the direct cause the emotional pain of grief and loneliness. However, by introducing the experience of two different states of consciousness, the poet detaches the material experience of his character's loss from the different ways in which the mind can imagine and perceive the lost loved ones. The point he makes with this distinction is that it is not the objective experience of loss that causes pain, but the mind's perception of it. When the sleeping man forgets the loss and imagines he is with his loved ones, his pain is replaced by joy. When he wakes and finds birds in their place, his grief is renewed. The difference is not in the objective experience of loss in the material world, but in the experience of it in the interior world of the *mod* (mind).

This focus on emotion itself and its relationship to the mind suggests that the poet was aware to some degree that he was writing in a Christian philosophical tradition which saw an interior hierarchy among emotive and willing parts of the self.<sup>24</sup> One of the most influential writers on this subject was Augustine of Hippo, according to whom 'all philosophical schools taught that the emotions are unconsidered responsive movements of the soul, and that the dominating part of the soul should impose laws on them.'<sup>25</sup> Across his works, Augustine drew freely but not uncritically on the theories of pagan philosophy, especially the Stoics and the Platonists, who all agreed that emotions should be understood as disturbances of the soul.<sup>26</sup> Augustine borrowed Stoic terminology about the passions, classifying emotions into four groups: pleasure (*laetitia*), appetite or desire (*cupiditas*), distress or sadness (*tristitia*), and fear (*metus*, *timor*). He also borrowed both the Platonic idea of a soul with an internal hier-

<sup>24</sup> For an overview of Anglo-Saxon psychological theories inherited from the Patristic period, see Lockett, *Anglo-Saxon Psychologies*, pp. 179–227.

<sup>25</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 153.

<sup>26</sup> Augustine, *De ciuitate Dei*, IX. 4 and XIV. 19 discusses the philosophers on emotion. See Colish, *The Stoic Tradition*, pp. 142–238, for a full discussion of Augustine's 'inconsistent' use of Stoicism.

archy, and its related terminology focused on concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) and anger (*ira*).<sup>27</sup> Augustine accepted the idea that emotions represent movements of the soul, which he believed in their initial states were uncontrollable, but argued that ‘the superior will can react to them either by consenting to emotional suggestions or refusing them.’<sup>28</sup> However, Augustine was particularly critical of the Stoic ideal of *apatheia*, which he suggested was impossible, and rejected their claim to a soul completely undisturbed by the passions as the product of deliberate terminological obscurity.

The ideas of early Christian monastic writers developed along the same lines, though with different emphases. They shared with Augustine an interest in the role of emotions in leading the soul to sin, and the practical question of how to overcome this problem. The most influential writer in this tradition for the West was John Cassian, who had studied and lived the monastic life of the Egyptian desert. Cassian’s *Institutes* and *Conferences* were widely disseminated throughout the Middle Ages, and heavily dependent upon the ideas of Evagrius of Pontus, and ultimately Origen.<sup>29</sup> Origen had no direct interest in emotions, but rather ‘in the possibility of becoming a person who is not led by emotional suggestions and who ignores rather than moderates them.’<sup>30</sup> His Christian *apatheia* compliments the soul’s perfection in true belief and right conduct. When treating these subjects, Origen uses both Platonic ideas of the division of the soul and Stoic terminology. Origen’s concept of sin, which became hugely influential via his followers, employed the Stoic distinction between first movements of emotion, or pre-passions, and assent to them. However, Origen does not reject emotional experience altogether, and indeed the point of attaining a Christian *apatheia* is to receive divine *agape*. Origen’s ideas were taken up and developed more systematically by Evagrius, who expanded the Stoic element of Origen’s thought into stages of spiritual progress.<sup>31</sup> Evagrius’s theory of emotion and sin developed the idea and role of involuntary pre-passions, the first movements of the soul — these pre-passions are not in themselves sinful, but

<sup>27</sup> See Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 156.

<sup>28</sup> See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XII. 12; Augustine, *De ciuitate Dei*, XIV. 19. See Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 168.

<sup>29</sup> John Cassian, *Institutes*, ed. by Petschenig; John Cassian, *Conferences*, ed. by Petschenig. See Chadwick, *John Cassian*, pp. 82–109; Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 136–51.

<sup>30</sup> Origen, *Selecta in Psalmos*, PG 12, col. 1600C; my discussion draws on Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 122.

<sup>31</sup> See Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 142.

sin follows assent to them. However, for the advanced ascetic in this system, the ideal of *apatheia* is not simply found in refusing assent to these tempting movements, but ‘it is a state of having no sinful thoughts either awake or asleep and also involves a deconstruction of one’s emotional memories’.<sup>32</sup> Much of Evagrius’s thought is taken over by Cassian, who described ‘the cognitive aspect of detachment [...] as one’s despising the gratification of transitory things through having fixed the mental gaze on eternal things’.<sup>33</sup>

At the earlier stage of the psychological process of coming to terms with the emotional pain of loss, the wanderer had not been the master of either his mind or his emotions. His old mind is characterized not as an active faculty, but entirely passive in the face of painful memories, which the poet’s metaphor very precisely characterizes as involuntary movements (51–53):

Ponne maga gemynd    mod geondhweorfeð,  
greteð gliwstafum,    georne geondsceawað  
secga geseldan.    Swimmað eft on weg.

Then the memory of kinsmen pervades the mind, greets happily, eagerly surveys  
the companions of men. Later they swim away.

This passivity is not characteristic of the act of memory represented by the poem in its entirety. As a philosophical meditation, the account of the wanderer’s experience is retrospective, seen from the point of view of one who has come to be the master of his mind, memory and emotion. The speaker is one who has achieved this at the end of the poem, now describing his earlier experience of sorrow. The wanderer was first introduced in the poem as a solitary figure who remembered the fall of kinsman, and who knew the noble custom of keeping his sorrowful thoughts to himself (13–14), but also as one whose tired mind would not help him when overwhelmed by fate (or Fate) and events (15–16):

Ne mæg werig mod    wyrde wiðstondan,  
ne se hreo hyge    helpe gefremman.

The weary mind cannot withstand fate, nor the cruel mind provide help.

In the structure of the poem, the logic of the meditation on the reality of emotional pain hinges on a moment of recollection about this weary spirit (55–57):

<sup>32</sup> *Évagre le Pontique*, ed. by Guillaumont and Guillaumont, chs 54–56 and 67. See Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 143.

<sup>33</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 147.

|                     |                   |
|---------------------|-------------------|
|                     | cearo bið geniwad |
| þam þe sendan sceal | swiþe geneahhe    |
| ofer waþema gebind  | werigne sefan.    |

care is renewed for the one who must often send a weary mind over the binding of the waves

This passage has been widely discussed in terms of early medieval psychology, and the poet implies that the mind itself does indeed reach out from the body.<sup>34</sup> But the sudden shift in the language of the poem from representing the mind as passive to its active engagement should not be overlooked, and this original approach merits exploration.

Up to this point the solitary wanderer not only has been a passive sufferer of the events Fate has thrown at him, but he has also been mentally passive. It is not his mind that recalls memories, but the memories and emotions that wander freely within his mind, whether he is awake or asleep. When he is asleep, they produce a passing, illusory sensation of happiness; when awake, grief. This mental passivity, or 'weariness' as the poet characterizes it, is left behind at line 57, a turning point in the wanderer's emotional history (57–64):

Forþon ic geþencan ne mæg geond þas woruld  
 forþwan modsefa min ne gesweorce,  
 þonne ic eorla lif eal geondþence,  
 hu hi færllice flet ofgeafon,  
 modge maguþegnas. Swa þes middangeard  
 ealra dogra gehwam dreoseð ond fealleþ,  
 forþon ne mæg weorþan wis wer ær he age  
 wintra dæl in woruldrice.

Therefore, I cannot think, for all this world, why my mind should not grow dark when I contemplate the life of men, how they suddenly gave up the hall, the courageous nobles. So this middle-region fails and falls each and every day; therefore a man cannot become wise before he has his share of years in the earthly realm.

The poet's emphatic reiteration of *forþon* (therefore) emphasizes the active engagement of the mind in a reasoning process, which has replaced the wanderer's mental passivity.<sup>35</sup> The poem's recollection of the earlier, disordered state of mind is now placed in a structural perspective in the text, as an imagi-

<sup>34</sup> See Clemons, 'Mens absentia cogitans in *The Seafarer* and *The Wanderer*'.

<sup>35</sup> It is notable that an earlier *forþon* at 37a seems illogical.

native exploration of an extreme emotional state, a mind disordered by grief. This is contrasted to the new, present state which characterizes the speaker who has achieved a more ordered mind. He is identifiable as the solitary wise one, actively choosing to sit apart in meditation at the conclusion of the poem (111–15):

Swa cwæð snottor on mode, gesæt him sundor æt rune.  
 Til biþ se þe his treowe gehealdeþ, ne sceal næfre his torn to rycene  
 beorn of his breostum acypan, nemþe he ær þa bote cunne,  
 eorl mid elne gefremman. Wel bið þam þe him are seceð,  
 frofre to fæder on heofonum, þær us eal seo fæstnung stondeð.

So said the one wise in mind, sat himself apart in meditation. Worthy is he who holds his resolution, nor ought a man ever express too readily the raging in his breast, unless he know the remedy beforehand, the warrior with courage. Well is it for him who seeks favour, consolation from the Father in the heavens, where for us all stability stands.

The full significance of what the poet is saying in these closing lines can only be understood in terms of the relationship between the wanderer's psychological development as it progresses in line with the structure of the poem. The poem opened describing a solitary figure, and closes with a solitary figure. The wanderer at the beginning of the poem does not choose to be alone, but has had solitude forced on him by loss, causing grief: he passively waits for God's favour, for changed circumstances, in response to unruly concupiscence. The speaker at the end of the poem, wise in mind, chooses solitude, as the Old English reflexive verb emphasizes: 'gesæt him sundor' (sat himself apart).<sup>36</sup> This elected solitude is purposeful, not accidental, and the paradoxical action of 'actively sitting' draws together the action of the mind and the body, imposing stability in response to wandering emotions.

Throughout the poem the emphasis on the body has associated it alternately with intimacy, as when the dreaming wanderer recalls the tender placing of his head on the knee of his seated lord (42), and with death, as when the speaker evokes the memory of covering the warrior's face with the earth (84). The image of bodies falling and departing (7, 53, 61, 80, 99), or disintegrating in death (80–84), parallels the more famous *ubi sunt* passage in which the wise man laments the transitoriness of human life:

<sup>36</sup> Bjork, 'Sundor æt Rune', argues for a broader reading of this phrase in the wanderer's experience.

Se þonne þisne wealsteal    wise geþohte  
 ond þis deorce lif    deope geondþenced,  
 frod in ferðe,    feor oft gemon  
 wælsleahta worn,    ond þas word acwið:  
 Hwær cwom mearg? Hwær cwom mago?    Hwær cwom maþþumgyfa?  
 Hwær cwom symbla gesetu?    Hwær sindon seledreamas?  
 Eala beorht bune!    Eala byrnwiga!  
 Eala þeodnes þrym!    Hu seo þrag gewat,  
 genap under nihthelm,    swa heo no wære.

He then wisely considers this foundation, and deeply contemplates this dark life, wise in mind, distantly remembers many a massacre, and says these words: Where is the horse gone? Where is the man gone? Where has the place of feasting gone? Where are the hall joys? Alas the bright cup! Alas the byrned warrior! Alas the glory of the prince! How the time went, as if it never were, grew dark under the helm of night.

The wise man detaches himself from these passing material things, and his detachment leads him away from the body, and into the mind. At this point in the philosophical meditation the two demonstrative 'this-es' take on their full contrastive force: *this* foundation, *this* dark life. This wise man is a man who has become wise, this man who thinks clearly has emerged from the man who earlier had been ruled by uncontrolled emotion, precipitated by uncontrollable events. In the metaphoric structure of the poem this wise-man-once-a-warrior no longer pines for the lost material joys of the hall; his memory now serves his thought, not his feeling. In his thought he detaches his mind not from the memory of the joys, but his desire for them. Where they were wanted, now they are lamented. The philosophical shift, and the focus on the slip between perception and reality, intensify, as the wise man identifies the passing material reality with the problem of temporality: once gone, it is indeed as if the lost hall joys, like time, never were. The complex construction of the inner self represented in the poem, constituted of emotion, thought, desire, memory and will, is only just supported by an Old English vocabulary designed for less subtle distinctions between the interior faculties of the mind-soul, beside the philosophical problem of how this self perceives and identifies with an objective universe.<sup>37</sup>

What prevents this mind from disintegrating is its attachment to a transcendent dimension, as signalled in the poem's final line, where we find a (115):

<sup>37</sup> See Godden, 'Anglo-Saxons on the Mind'; Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*.

‘fæder on heofonum, þær us eal seo fæstnung stondeð’ (Father in the heavens, where for us all stability stands). The Father-God of the last line of the poem is not a God who inflicts suffering to redeem sinful human beings — the unfortunate events of the poem are attributed to Fate, not to God, and certainly not to human sinfulness. What God provides is *fæstnung* (stability, fixedness, fastness), a permanence which in medieval cosmology resides with him in the heavens. This last line of the poem recalls the precise cosmological location of instability (61–62): ‘Swa þes middangeard ealra dogra gehwam dreoseð ond fealleþ’ (So this middle-region fails and falls each and every day). The realization of this distinction comes at key moments in the structure of the poem: the instability of the middle-region, the earth between the heavens and hell, is noted at the structural moment when the wanderer moves from emotional instability to active reasoning; the poem then concludes with the confident affirmation that despite this, not all in the universe is changeable and transient, or subject to Fate. The mind fixed not on earthly, material things, but on the unchanging God in the heavens, is freed from turbulent emotions, which naturally shift as the earth itself changes. This is the *bot* (remedy, line 113) to the *torn* (violent emotion, raging, line 113) in his breast. The *bot* suggested in *Resignation* is death itself; while this remedy also offers relief to emotional suffering with an appeal to the transcendent, it is utterly pessimistic about the possibility that emotional suffering can in any way be cured or diminished in this life. The transcendence ultimately offered by the *bot* in *The Wanderer* is philosophical, not eschatological; this poem’s reference to the failing of this world does not turn the reader towards death, but attempts to make life liveable before it, despite the experience of loss and grief. The poem’s treatment of emotion echoes the monastic Stoicism of Cassian, but the poet’s refusal to discuss the wanderer’s emotional problem in terms of sin strikes a jarring note within this tradition, pointing to a more ‘philosophical’ interest.

Another indication of this philosophical tendency is found in the poet’s assertion of the mind’s right attitude to suffering: ‘nor ought a man ever express too readily the raging in his breast’. This concluding remark recalls two earlier passages in the poem. In the first, the wanderer suggests he knows the noble custom of not speaking about his emotional life (13–14); at the end of the poem, we know that this may be done, if the speaker knows the remedy. The second and longer passage recalled offers advice on how to be wise (62–75):

Wita sceal gepyldig,  
ne sceal no to hatheort      ne to hrædwyrde,  
ne to wac wiga,      ne to wanhydig,



ne to forth, ne to fægen,      ne to feohgifre,  
 ne næfre gielpes to georn,      ær he geare cunne.  
 Beorn sceal gebidan,      þonne he beot spricedð,  
 oþþæt collenferð      cunne gearwe  
 hwider hreþra gehygd      hweorfan wille.

The wise one must be patient, not too intemperate, nor too hasty to speak, nor too weak a warrior, nor too foolhardy, neither too timid nor too happy, nor too avaricious, nor too eager to boast, before he fully comprehends. A man must wait, when he makes a vow, until, keen in mind, he readily knows which way the heart's thoughts will turn.

The structure of the poem ties the stability of the mind to the balance of the human character, all of which are derived from self-knowledge. This passage is not about the command of emotions, but rather understanding them from the point of view of some kind of internal objectivity. The conclusion of the poem suggests that in the case of extreme emotional disturbance, the wise person does not give vent to feeling without knowing how to cure emotional distress.

The remedy that is offered is philosophical rather than Christian and ascetical, and suggests the greater influence of Stoicism on the poet's thought than of penitential literature. Indeed, Tom Hill has recently suggested a radical rethink of the way this particular passage has been read by scholars.<sup>38</sup> The usual meaning of *fægen* in Old English is 'happy', though there has been a preference in modern editions to gloss this meaning away. Dunning and Bliss in their edition render it as 'servile', while Bruce Mitchell suggests 'overconfident'. Hill suggests the problem begins with modern understandings of the meaning not of *fægen*, but more fundamentally of the idea of happiness. He argues that the Anglo-Saxon attitude to happiness is closer to the classical Stoic (and also what he characterizes as the 'Germanic') understanding of happiness, or joy, as a perturbation of the soul, one of the four passions that the wise man keeps under control, in favour of the ideal of *apatheia*, the defining feature of the Stoic sage. I would take the argument further than Hill, and suggest that there is little Germanic about the wanderer's decision to rise above emotion, which instead represents the influence classical Stoicism mediated through any of a variety of channels, not least via biblical commentary.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Hill, 'The Unchanging Hero'.

<sup>39</sup> Jerome, *Commentariorum in Hiezechielem*, XIII, 272–74 summarizes them: 'gaudii, aegritudinis, cupidinis et timoris, quorum duo praesentia, duo futura sunt' ('of joy, of grief, of desire and of fear, of which two are of the present, two of the future'); citing Cicero, *Tusculanae*



The poems *Resignation* and *The Wanderer* share a pessimism about emotion. In *Resignation* the only useful human emotions are grief and fear, which the poet harnesses to point the reader away from the empty futility of this life towards life in the world to come. Both the treatment and the theory of the emotions in *The Wanderer* differ from *Resignation*, but *The Wanderer* shares *Resignation*'s despair of the world, only taking this further to abnegate emotion altogether, in favour of a form of *apatheia*. The emotional conclusions of both poems are worlds away from Origen's ideal of *agape* in *apatheia*. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Christian mystics and philosophers, informed directly by Greek philosophy and Islamic commentaries on it, developed different approaches to the mixed inheritance of Stoic and Platonic thought on emotion with the help of Aristotle.<sup>40</sup> Thomas Aquinas suggested that the Stoics misunderstood emotions, identifying them with mistaken choices, because they could not see the distinction between the will and what he defined as the soul's sensitive moving power.<sup>41</sup> For Aquinas, the emotions are acts of these motive powers, which are caused by objects outside the soul acting on the evaluations of an 'estimative power', which bring about emotional movements in the heart. In human beings this 'estimative power' is called 'particular reason'. The intellect can control concupiscence and irascibility by making particular value judgements about objects, relating these to general value judgements.<sup>42</sup> In the century before Aquinas, Bernard of Clairvaux developed a concept of the ascent of the soul rooted in the monastic tradition that looked for the moderation of emotions, not their Stoic extirpation, confident that the soul could ascend through love.<sup>43</sup> The development of theories according to which emotions could be controlled and directed underpins the new emotional strategy of thirteenth-century lyric *Luue-Ron*. The maiden to whom the poem is addressed desires a lover, and Thomas of Hales attempts to redirect this desire rather than

*Disputationes*, 3. 4. On Patristic reception of Stoic ideas on the passions, see Colish, *The Stoic Tradition*, especially pp. 48–91; Canellis, 'Saint Jérôme et les Passions'. Discussion of the passions is included in Boethius glosses known in Anglo-Saxon England, see Godden, 'Alfred, Asser, and Boethius', pp. 330–33.

<sup>40</sup> See Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 177–255.

<sup>41</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. by Caramello, II-1. 24. 3; 59. 2; see Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 254.

<sup>42</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. by Caramello, I. 78. 4 and I. 80–81 discusses sensitive faculties; emotions are discussed in full at II-1. 22–48; see Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 239.

<sup>43</sup> See Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 195, 197.

negate it. The poem echoes *The Wanderer's* rejection of this world and its transience (lines 9–16):<sup>44</sup>

Mayde, her þu myht biholde  
 Ðis worldes luue nys bute o res  
 And is by-set so fele volde,  
 Vikel & frakel & wok and les.  
 Ðeos þeines þat her weren bolde  
 Beoþ aglyden so wyndes bles,  
 Vnder molde hi liggeþ colde,  
 & faleweþ so doþ medewe gres.

Maid, here you can behold this world's love is nothing but a disturbed frenzy, and is beset with complexity, fickle and deceitful, and weak and false. These noblemen that here were bold have glided away like a blast of wind; they lie cold under the ground, and fade like the grass of the meadow.

The focus here is on erotic love, comparable with the homosocial love of the warrior band, while the imagery of the brave warriors drifting away, and the dead cold in the ground, is identical. However, Thomas's attitude to emotion generally is different from the earlier poem, despite his shared assertion of the random movements of human feeling (lines 49–52):

Monnes luue nys buten o stunde:  
 Nv he luveþ, nv he is sad,  
 Nu he cumeþ, nv wile he funde,  
 Nv he is wroþ, nv he is gled

Man's love is but for a moment: now he loves, now he is sad, now he comes, now he wishes to depart, now he is angry, now he is glad.

However, the lyric does not urge the denial of emotion as in *The Wanderer*, or seek to replace the desire with fear as in *Resignation*, but rather suggests the submission of the desire for a lover to the will, and the redirection of the desire towards Christ (lines 87–88):

Mayde, if þu wilnest after leofmon  
 Ich teche þe enne treowe king.

Maid, if you wish for a lover, I recommend to you the one true king.

<sup>44</sup> *English Lyrics of the XIII<sup>th</sup> Century*, ed. by Brown, pp. 43–74.

The poem's blend of desire and asceticism is alien to the Anglo-Saxon elegy, which is suspicious not only of earthly goods, but the emotions which are drawn to them. The fusion of love-longing and asceticism in *Luue-Ron* is possible not only because of the formal development of the love lyric, but also because of developments in the theory of the emotions. The first movements of the concupiscent heart might or might not lead to sin, but are now considered potentially useful rather than necessarily dangerous. This is true only when the chastened will remains in control, aware of the heart's movements, and choosing to direct them towards the Christian *agape* that Origen had long before articulated as the fulfilment of a Christian *apatheia*. Nevertheless, the erotic asceticism *Luue-Ron* is only possible in the light of a tradition which reached this understanding via centuries of emotional and ascetical struggle which began in the sketes of the Egyptian desert and had found literary expression in the Anglo-Saxon elegy.

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Part II

Literature



# ‘WHAT PASSION CANNOT MUSICK RAISE AND QUELL!’ THE PINDARIC ODE AND THE MUSICAL SUBLIME IN THE HISTORY OF EMOTIONS

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Although an important preoccupation of early modern culture from the late seventeenth century, the sublime has been somewhat at the margins of work on the early modern history of emotions.<sup>1</sup> A study of John Dryden’s *A Song for St Cecilia’s Day*, 1687, and the genre of Pindaric music odes in which it stands, illuminates the rich potential of integrating the sublime, and particularly the musical sublime, into this history. This is not (as might be assumed) because the sublime is obviously emotional or music obviously passionate, but, on the contrary, because the musical sublime’s relationship to affective experience is so unstable as to disrupt and test categories like the pas-

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<sup>1</sup> Kahn, Saccamano, and Coli’s collection, *Politics and the Passions*, mentions the sublime fleetingly (pp. 98, 106, 222, 307 note 42); Reddy’s *Navigation of Feeling* uses the word in passing (pp. 41, 184, 208, 234–35, 238, 240, 256, 273, 316). Where the sublime receives more attention, it can seem that its history began with Edmund Burke’s *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757). James, ‘Passion and Striving’, pp. 65–68; Schmitter, ‘17th- and 18th-Century Theories of Emotions’.

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sions.<sup>2</sup> My broader concern is with how the emerging musical sublime and the related development of aesthetics in the eighteenth century helped to formulate the modern regime we know as the emotions.

Given the long heritage of the sublime — that strange experience of rhetorical and psychic height which exceeds standard rhetorical persuasion by astonishing, transporting, and elevating its listeners — this study also has potential implications for earlier emotional regimes. At least six editions of Pseudo-Longinus's foundational first-century treatise *On the Sublime* (*Peri hypsous*) appeared in classical languages through the sixteenth century, to be joined by Italian, English, and French translations in the seventeenth century. Medievalists, early modernists, and classicists are currently exploring the more elusive reception of Longinian and other versions of the sublime well before the renaissance of sublimity in the later seventeenth century.<sup>3</sup>

The period considered in this essay drew Longinus into intensive discussion of the passions and their relation to reason, physical sensation, secure knowledge, and right living. A rethinking of passion in the long eighteenth century flowed partly from a rejection of supposedly over-complicated, dogmatic systems like scholasticism — often showily rejected in constructing new 'enlightened', 'empirical', or 'scientific' modes of thought.<sup>4</sup> Yet older distinctions between higher and lower kinds of feeling, and narratives about the redirection or transformation of the low into the high, in fact continued to inform eighteenth-century discourses like the sublime. Viewed through the lens of the history of emotions, we might say, the sublime is not only an exemplum of 'emotional' transformation — a narrative moving through admiration, transport, and elevation, and typically converting surprise or fear into pride and excitement — but also an exemplum of the transformation of categories of 'emotion'

<sup>2</sup> The sublime is seen as an emotion by Flaherty, 'Transport, Ecstasy, and Enthusiasm'. See also the subtler position of Feldman, 'Music and the Order of the Passions', especially p. 67 n. 85. Feldman, too, sees the sublime as operative only after the mid-eighteenth century. While our accounts differ in many ways, I broadly concur with her argument that the sublime 'exalted pathos' yet weakened 'the hegemony of any single passion' in music, and ultimately the whole category of 'passions' (pp. 37, 53–54). See also Terada's stimulating discussions of the sublime, passion, and music in *Feeling in Theory*.

<sup>3</sup> Till, *Das doppelte Erhabene*; Porter, 'Lucretius and the Sublime'; *Magnificence and the Sublime*, ed. by Jaeger; Norbrook, 'Milton, Lucy Hutchinson'.

<sup>4</sup> For an introduction to discourse on the passions in the period, see, for example, Potkay, 'Passion'. On rejections of tradition and scholasticism, see, for instance, Woolhouse, 'Empiricism', p. 395; Hatfield, 'Epistemology', p. 12; and Roger Emerson, 'Tradition', pp. 177–78.

inherited from early modern, medieval, and ultimately classical thought. This is of course a much larger history than this chapter can survey, but by examining some receptions of Dryden’s *Song* from the eighteenth century to the present, I point towards the power of Dryden’s ode and its musical sublime as touchstones and whetstones in thinking about the passions, their others, and their limits.

Written on the cusp of the vogue for Longinus, Dryden’s odes were frequently hailed as sublime by eighteenth-century commentators. Yet this consensus also made them a site of debate. In 1756, the influential critic Joseph Warton praised *Alexander’s Feast; or, The Power of Musique* (1697), Dryden’s second Pindaric music ode for St Cecilia’s Day, as

alive, sublime and animated to an unparalleled degree[.] [...] No poem [...] affords so much various matter for a composer to work upon; as Dryden has [...] introduced and expressed all the greater passions, and as the transitions from one to the other are sudden and impetuous.<sup>5</sup>

Warton unhesitatingly identifies music and the sublime with expressing and arousing conflicting passions. This widespread view is precisely what William Jackson, a contemporary composer, painter, writer and organist, questions in a 1783 essay which takes its refrain from Dryden’s first music Pindaric, the *Song for St Cecilia’s Day*:

‘What passion cannot music raise or quell?’ says Dryden [...] and the same thought is so often expressed by other poets, and so generally adopted by all authors [...], that it would be [...] bold [...] to contradict it, were there not an immediate appeal to general feeling, which I hope is superior to all authority. Thus supported, then, I ask in my turn — ‘What passion *can* music raise or quell?’ Who ever felt himself affected, otherwise than with pleasure, at those strains which are supposed to inspire grief — rage — joy — or pity? and this, in a degree, equal to the goodness of the composition and performance. We attend — are pleased — delighted — transported — and when the heart can bear no more, ‘glow, tremble, and weep.’ All these are but different degrees of pure pleasure. When the poet or musician has produced this last effect, he has attained the utmost in the power of poetry or music. [...] [T]ears, in fact, are nothing but the mechanical effect of every strong affection of the heart[.]<sup>6</sup>

With a small constellation of somewhat opaquely situated terms — ‘passion’, ‘feeling’, ‘pleasure’, ‘affection’ — Jackson attacks the idea that art works by

<sup>5</sup> Joseph Warton, *An Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope*, pp. 55, 63.

<sup>6</sup> William Jackson, ‘Letter XVII’, in *Thirty Letters on Various Subjects*, I, 114–19 (117–19).

depicting passions which are then awakened in the audience: whatever passions are depicted, art's effect (and value) lies not in arousing corresponding passions in the listener, but in stimulating some faculty for 'pure pleasure'. Jackson supports his argument by paraphrasing a characterization of sublimity by Hugh Blair, a Scottish clergyman and professor of rhetoric whose 'sublime' poet 'make[s] his readers glow, and tremble, and weep'.<sup>7</sup>

Unlike Jackson, Blair did not, in fact, object to the idea that art arouses passions, but he did discuss the sublime as a curious combination of 'delight' and 'grief', or what the earlier critic John Dennis had called 'terrible Joy'.<sup>8</sup> Jackson's stance on music also resonates, in a muted way, with the projects of theorists like Blair's friend, Henry Home, Lord Kames, and their fellow Scot, Archibald Alison. As Thomas Dixon observes in *From Passions to Emotions*, Alison and Kames were 'early users of the category of "emotions"'.<sup>9</sup> When applied to affective states in the eighteenth century, he suggests, this term had generally remained undefined and so a *de facto* synonym for passions. The theorization of emotions as a category distinct from and eventually in competition with passions was gradual and uneven, making its correlation with other discourses difficult. But it seems significant that theorizations of emotion were often involved with explaining the contradictory, mixed feelings associated with the sublime — a combination, we might say, of painful passions like terror with an emotion of 'pure pleasure'.

The following pages explore the sublime in music Pindarics against the background of such debates and changes. After analysing Dryden's *Song for St Cecilia's Day* in some detail, I illustrate the fate of the musical sublime in some later music Pindarics, before concluding with a reflection on the centrality and instability of music and passion in the writings of one of the earliest British theorists of the sublime. Methodologically, I draw particularly on Dixon's study, which traced a gradual transition from a finely differentiated thought-world of passions, appetites, affections, emotions, and sentiments to a world dominated by emotions, reimaged by the mid-nineteenth century 'as a set of morally disengaged, bodily, non-cognitive and involuntary feelings'.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Hugh Blair, *A Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian*, p. 74.

<sup>8</sup> Hugh Blair, *A Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian*, pp. 74, 70. John Dennis, 'Letter Describing his Crossing the Alpes' (1688), in *The Critical Works of John Dennis*, ed. by Hooker, II, 380.

<sup>9</sup> Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, p. 101; Henry Home, Lord Kames, *Elements of Criticism*; Archibald Alison, *Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste*.

<sup>10</sup> Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, p. 3. Attention to the creation and changing understandings of categories like 'emotions' and 'passions' does not imply that 'passions' in any given

While Dixon sees secular, rationalist mental sciences driving this transition, I am concerned with the place of aesthetics in this history. After all, Kames and Alison are best known as theorists of aesthetics, including the sublime, and, as Victoria Kahn and Neil Saccamano have recently underlined, '[a]s the discourse particularly concerned with the sensations of pleasure and pain that accompany perceptual and imaginative acts and elicit passions and interests, aesthetics does not merely stand alongside' other human sciences 'in the eighteenth century: it provides for a universal subject of sentiment to support the discourses of moral and political law'.<sup>11</sup>

It is to just such a 'universal subject of sentiment' (a 'general feeling [...] superior to all authority') that Jackson makes 'an immediate appeal' in attacking 'received opinion' about passions and the sublime in art; and it would have seemed natural that he turn to Dryden's irregular or Pindaric music ode to do so.<sup>12</sup> For one thing, Pindarics had a long-standing association with the sublime. Imitations of the classical poet Pindar's odes were popularized in the sixteenth century by the French court poet Ronsard.<sup>13</sup> In England, Paulus Melissus, a visiting German poet, addressed neo-Latin Pindarics to Elizabeth and Cecil (*Schediasmata poetica*, 1586), and Soowthern, Drayton, and Jonson all imitated aspects of the genre.<sup>14</sup> But English Pindarics flourished especially profusely from the later seventeenth century alongside a growing fascination with Longinus's *On the Sublime*. For Longinus, Pindar's unpredictable, uneven fieriness characterized true sublimity, against the seeming perfection of blandness and regularity.<sup>15</sup> The strain was taken up by Longinus's most influential early commentator, Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, whose 1674 translation of *On the Sublime* helped bring the work to the forefront of English thought. Boileau praised Pindar's 'beautiful disorder' (*beau desordre*) and likened his sublime odes to David's psalms, where 'broken sense' (*sens rompus*) revealed traces of

period are rigidly delimited, or form a language understood univocally.

<sup>11</sup> Archibald Alison, *Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste*; Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, 264–308 and passim; Kahn and Saccamano, 'Introduction', in *Politics and the Passions*, ed. by Kahn, Saccamano, and Coli, p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> William Jackson, 'Letter XVII' in *Thirty Letters on Various Subjects*, 1, 117; on irregular and Pindaric odes more generally, see Koehler, 'The Ode', pp. 388–92.

<sup>13</sup> Schmitz, *Pindar in der französischen Renaissance*.

<sup>14</sup> Revard, *Politics, Poetics, and the Pindaric Ode*, pp. 72–125.

<sup>15</sup> Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 33. 5.

divine inspiration.<sup>16</sup> Yet although Pindar's odes were recognized as songs, it was largely left to writers of music Pindarics to elaborate connections between Pindar's famed sublimity and music.

Music odes proliferated in England from around 1683, when a London music society founded annual St Cecilia's Day celebrations. Shortly after their institution, the society approached Dryden to compose the ode which, set to music by Giovanni Battista Draghi, would form the culmination of festivities in 1687. Literary scholarship has only recently recognized the importance of the sublime to Dryden and his contemporaries, and a specifically musical sublime has rarely been seen in the seventeenth century.<sup>17</sup> Reading Dryden's *Song* as part of an emerging musical sublime cultivated in the Pindaric music ode, I suggest that the genre reveals a puzzle about the passions for late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers. In a nutshell: was the sublime an experience of excessive, extreme, conflicting passion, or was it not passionate at all? The early modern sublime seems to propel subjects towards points of indistinction between excess passion and its absence.<sup>18</sup>

'Passion', a word ubiquitous in the music odes, is something of an umbrella term, but can also be understood more limitedly as a turbulent movement of the soul towards an object deemed good, or away from one deemed hurtful.<sup>19</sup> Passion's apparent absences can, I think, suggest the aporias of excess: as passion's movement becomes extreme, it might exceed any sense of particularity in direction, object, or subject, and any conventional emotional tone — warmth or coolness, joy or grief, pleasure or pain.<sup>20</sup> But absences of passion are also associated in music Pindarics with various alternatives to the passions, some earlier and some later than Dryden: the medieval category of passionless affections,

<sup>16</sup> Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, *Ode, du Sieur D\*\*\* sur la prise de Namur*, pp. 3, 6.

<sup>17</sup> Two recent discussions of Dryden's second music Pindaric connect it with the sublime but are curiously silent about music: Turner, "'Thy Lovers Were All Untrue'"; Scodel, 'The Cowleyan Pindaric Ode', pp. 180–201.

<sup>18</sup> This modifies Scodel's enlightening discussion of the sublime in Pindaric odes. Scodel identifies the sublime only with excess, and hence with an excess of passion. The sublime's 'other' for him is moderation; lack does not receive much attention. Scodel, 'The Cowleyan Pindaric Ode' and Scodel, *Excess and the Mean in Early Modern English Poetry*.

<sup>19</sup> Compare Le Brun's influential Royal Academy lecture on expression (Charles Le Brun, *Expressions des Passions de l'Âme*, p. 1). In its stress on movement towards or away from an object, this understanding of passion resembles that of thinkers as diverse as Augustine, Descartes, and Hobbes.

<sup>20</sup> Compare Terada, *Feeling in Theory*, pp. 1–13, 87.

movements of the higher soul towards God, for instance; and later understandings of emotion.<sup>21</sup>

Passion's connection to the sublime had always been conflicted: Longinus described passion as extremely powerful in effecting the shock, transport, rapture, and elevation of the sublime, but nonetheless insisted that passion was not essential to sublimity.<sup>22</sup> Initially, connections between music and the passions seem clearer. As early modern writers were aware, music's immediate power over the passions had been celebrated and worried over since antiquity.<sup>23</sup> John Calvin echoed Augustine as well as Plato when he warned that music 'pierces the heart' and so holds almost unrivalled 'power to turn or bend, this way and that, the morals of men'.<sup>24</sup> By the late seventeenth century, music was typically naturalized as a language of passion. As Nicholas Brady's Cecilia's Day ode of 1692 put it,

'Tis Nature's voice [...]  
The universal tongue to none [...] unknown!  
From [Nature, music] learn'd the mighty art  
To court the ear and strike the heart:  
At once the passions to express and move;  
We hear, and straight we grieve or hate, rejoice or love.<sup>25</sup>

The genre of music odes would later blend into odes on the passions, like Collins's famous irregular ode, *The Passions: An Ode for Music* (1746). Nonetheless, the connection between music and passion is not so simple. Ancient authorities were ambivalent about whether music simply moved the passions (for good or ill), or could release mortals from passion altogether.<sup>26</sup> This duality was a

<sup>21</sup> On passionless affections and their historiography, see, for instance, Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, pp. 75–77. Discourse about redirection of lower passions into higher, non-carnal feelings was current in seventeenth-century England, for example through the strong reception of works by Nicolas Caussin. Garrod, 'Pathos, Martyrdom and Senecan Catharsis'; Veevers, *Images of Love and Religion*, pp. 177–81.

<sup>22</sup> Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 8. 2–3.

<sup>23</sup> On music and the passions in antiquity, see Shepard, 'Music Therapy in Neoplatonism', p. 148.

<sup>24</sup> John Calvin, Preface to the Genevan Psalter (1565), quoted from Begbie, *Resounding Truth*, p. 109. Compare Augustine, *Confessions*, Book 10, XXXIII. 49–50; Plato, *Republic*, 3. 401d.

<sup>25</sup> Quoted from Husk, *An Account of the Musical Celebrations on St Cecilia's Day*, p. 162. See also Austern, "'Tis Nature's Voice": Compare Thomas Yalden's 1693 ode, verse III, ll. 5–6 (in Husk, *An Account of the Musical Celebrations on St Cecilia's Day*, p. 171).

<sup>26</sup> Shepard, 'Music Therapy in Neoplatonism', pp. 149–51, discusses relevant material from Plato, Proclus, Aristotle, Porphyry, and Iamblichus.

commonplace of early modern *laudes musicae*. A 1520 collection of motets, for example, cites Maximus of Tyre's view that music 'can both alleviate and stimulate the affections of the soul' — and the ultimate source of music's power could suggest both effects.<sup>27</sup> Music's power over the passions was generally ascribed to its affinities with the harmony of the universe and an ideal harmony within man. The harmony of the universe came to be strongly (although not exclusively) linked to non-sensuous, mathematical ratio and reason, which seemingly had little to do with passion. Indeed, *harmony* on this understanding is frequently associated with balancing, stilling, quelling, or purging passions.<sup>28</sup> The sublime and music, then, were coded as sites of both extreme and absent passion.

A tension between music as *passion* or as *harmony* creeps through Brady's ode: praise of music's natural power over the passions is followed by stanzas on the 'sublime celestial lay' of the universe, which harmonized the 'jarring seeds of matter' into an 'agree[ment]' unmarked by passionate turbulence.<sup>29</sup> This celestial music is then likened to that of the organ, for while secular instruments inspire 'Wanton heat and loose desire', and generally 'alarm' the 'passions', the organ 'compose[s] and charm[s]' them.<sup>30</sup> The ode thus narrates a kind of trans-

<sup>27</sup> See *Liber selectarum cantionum*, Preface by Sigmund Grimm and Marcus Wirsing, ed. by Senfl, p. 1: '[musica] animae affectiones moderatur [...] et remissionem atque infractionem subleuat exacuitque.'

<sup>28</sup> The goal of eliminating the motions of passion can be associated especially with a kind of stoical or epicurean view of perfection. It may be true, as Scodel argues, that later seventeenth-century Neoepicureanism differed from classical Epicureanism in its scepticism about the possibility of exchanging passion for tranquillity, and its encouragement instead of various diversions of the passions (Scodel, 'The Cowleyan Pindaric Ode', p. 182). Yet the history of music theory and the music Pindaric complicates the argument that 'the widespread notion that unruly passions should be diverted because they could not be suppressed was a distinctive early modern intellectual phenomenon, a new third way between the long-standing alternatives for handling the passions, which were traditionally thought to be conquerable by either reason or force' (Scodel, 'The Cowleyan Pindaric Ode', p. 181). If diverting passion means redirecting desire from one object to another, then Augustine's account of the potential movement of desire from lower to higher objects, a movement aided or endangered by music, must be remembered. If to divert passion is to redirect, say, anger towards pity, then classical discussions of music already provide an account of how contrasting musical modes divert the passions. See *Strunk's Source Readings in Music History 1: Greek Views of Music*, ed. by Mathiesen.

<sup>29</sup> Brady, quoted from Husk, *An Account of the Musical Celebrations on St Cecilia's Day*, p. 163, verse IV, l. 1; p. 162, verse III, l. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Brady, quoted from Husk, *An Account of the Musical Celebrations on St Cecilia's Day*, p. 164, verse VI, ll. 3, 7–8.



formation of earthly passions into the almost-not-passion of religious 'rapture' and 'heavenly love'.<sup>31</sup>

Such movements are common in music Pindarics, repeatedly marking the climax — but also the complete reframing — of their catalogues of instruments and the passions each evokes. A similar pattern, and a similar tension between harmony and turbulence, is evident in Dryden's *Song*, with its much-cited exclamation: 'what passion cannot music *raise* or *quell*!'<sup>32</sup> Yet Dryden's *Song* is more than simply representative of its genre. Without using the word 'sublime' (which will, by the by, appear in Dryden's *Alexander's Feast*), the *Song* moves beyond Brady's apparently casual use of the term to develop what I describe as an emerging or nascent musical sublime.

Dryden was certainly familiar with Longinus's sublime when he wrote his *Song*. Ten years earlier, he had paraphrased Longinus to defend the fiery, irregular passion of Abraham Cowley's *Pindarique Odes* (1656), the loose translations and imitations which created a vogue for Pindarics in seventeenth-century England.<sup>33</sup> According to Dryden, bold figures, exclamations, and sudden and disordered connections are 'natural' and 'graceful' in the Pindaric, where they serve to imitate a mind possessed by 'passion'.<sup>34</sup> The best part of Cowley's odes are their strong imagery, for

Imaging is [...] the very heighth and life of Poetry. 'Tis, as *Longinus* describes it, a Discourse, which, by a kind of Enthusiasm, or extraordinary emotion [*in the sense of 'movement'*] of the Soul, makes it seem to us, that we behold those things which the Poet paints, so as to be pleas'd with them, and to admire them. [...] If Poetry be

<sup>31</sup> Brady, quoted from Husk, *An Account of the Musical Celebrations on St Cecilia's Day*, p. 164, verse VII, l. 5; verse VI, l. 5.

<sup>32</sup> Mace, 'Musical Humanism, the Doctrine of Rhythmus, and the St Cecilia Day Odes of Dryden', p. 267, observed that Dryden's *Song* 'embodies the two major and opposing seventeenth-century conceptions of [...] music [...] as harmony and [...] as a stimulus of the passions'. Dryden's formulation echoes Tate's 1685 ode (Husk, *An Account of the Musical Celebrations on St Cecilia's Day*, p. 148, verse IV, ll. 1–2). Echoes abound in later odes, like Samuel Wesley's (1691/94?) (Husk, *An Account of the Musical Celebrations on St Cecilia's Day*, p. 158, verse III, l. 2); anon., 'Ode II. To MUSIC', in *Things in Imitation of Poetry*; Thomas Townshend, *Poems*, 'Ode to Music', p. 48, verse XVI, ll. 23–25.

<sup>33</sup> See e.g. Scodel, 'The Cowleyan Pindaric Ode', esp. p. 208; Revard, *Politics, Poetics, and the Pindaric Ode*, pp. 125–97.

<sup>34</sup> John Dryden, 'The Authors Apology for Heroique Poetry', in *The Works of John Dryden*, ed. by Hooker and Swedenberg Jr, XII, 93. Unless otherwise stated, references to Dryden are taken from this edition.



imitation, that part of it must needs be best, which describes most lively our actions and passions[.]<sup>35</sup>

Dryden's *Song*, which loosely adopts the irregular form of Cowley's Pindarics, would equally fit this description. A catalogue of instruments and attending passions at the centre of the ode shifts abruptly between subjects, rhythms, and rhyme schemes. Dryden, as will become evident, also deploys a kind of sublime 'Imaging', or vivid imitation, though of the aural rather than the visual. Finally, the outlines of the emotional narrative which early modern writers saw in the sublime can be traced in the *Song*. This narrative begins with astonishment — a pre-critical passion involving mental and physical arrest — and moves, often through fear, to rapture and transport, and finally to a joyful sense of elevation and inflation, as we move from feeling stunned and threatened by a sublime object, to somehow identifying ourselves with its power.<sup>36</sup>

Dryden's catalogue begins with astonishment, dramatizing humans' wonder at the invention of musical instruments by Jubal. Repetitions of a tiny number of rhymes, and the enclosing of Jubal's narrative by a repeated exclamation, create a sense of stasis and fixation fitting for a notion of wonder as arrest. The pre-critical element of wonder seems present, too, in Jubal's brothers' adoration of the overwhelming power of music:

What Passion cannot MUSICK raise and quell!  
                     When *Jubal* struck the corded Shell,  
                     His list'ning Brethren stood around  
                     And wond'ring, on their Faces fell  
                     To worship that Celestial Sound.  
 Less than a God they thought there cou'd not dwell  
                     Within the hollow of that Shell  
                     That spoke so sweetly and so well.  
 What Passion cannot MUSICK raise and quell!<sup>37</sup>

The same mimetic principle is carried into succeeding stanzas. Stanza three evokes the sound of military instruments through rapid, energetic triple pulses in 'The TRUMPETS loud Clangor | Excites us to Arms', and an abrupt shift to duple rhythms with 'The double double double beat' of the drum (25–26, 29).

<sup>35</sup> John Dryden, 'Apology for Heroique Poetry', p. 94.

<sup>36</sup> For the prevalence of this narrative, see the excerpts in *The Sublime*, ed. by Ashfield and De Bolla. Coltharp, 'Raising Wonder', pp. 6–8, discusses early modern understandings of astonishment as pre-critical.

<sup>37</sup> John Dryden, *Song for St Cecilia's Day*, III, 201, ll. 16–24. Cited hereafter in-text by line number.

This stanza also suggest something of the sublime's mysterious transition from fear and awe to inflation and pride. Traces of fear are evident as the trumpet sounds 'mortal Alarms', and cries 'Charge, Charge, 'tis too late to retreat' (28, 32) — retreating has evidently been on someone's mind. But fear of war is now swallowed up in courage. Somehow, in listening to the instruments' 'shrill [...] Anger' and 'thunder' (27, 30), we are inspired, not with terror, but with an echoing, imitative anger: as in the sublime, the 'Soul' is 'exalt[ed] [...] and [...] conceive[s] a greater Idea of it self'; being filled with 'a certain noble Pride, as if it self had produc'd what it but barely Reads' — or in this case, hears.<sup>38</sup>

A conspicuous moment of elevation also closes Dryden's catalogue. As in Brady's ode, the organ surpasses and undoes the power of secular, humanly created music, and does so by evoking the radically different passion (or perhaps affection) of 'holy Love':

But oh! what Art can teach  
What human Voice can reach  
The sacred ORGANS praise?  
Notes inspiring holy Love,  
Notes that wing their heav'nly ways  
To mend the Choires above. (42–47)

A comparison follows between Orpheus's legendary lyre — which moved not only passions but trees and stones — and Cecilia's organ. Her instrument immediately drew down an 'Angel', 'Mistaking Earth for Heaven' (53–54). Cecilia thereby 'rais'd the wonder' of music 'high'r' than Orpheus (51) and also implicitly raised a higher *kind* of wonder than that of Jubal's brethren, worshipping the first lyre. Their static wonder is transformed in Cecilia's stanzas, where emphatic anaphora and freer rhymes and rhythms evoke the exalting movement of ascent (verses VI–VII). The organ directs love towards heaven, making it entirely unlike the jealous and melancholy love of earlier verses, marked by 'Depth of Pains, and height of Passion' (40). This love is one with the organ's notes, 'that wing their heav'nly ways | To mend the Choires above' (46–47). This ascent recalls Augustinian and Neoplatonist models of the redirection of earthly passion towards a different order of love for God.<sup>39</sup> But it is plausible,

<sup>38</sup> John Dennis, *The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry*, p. 84; compare Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 7. 2. For Dennis's 'read', others give 'heard'. On writing and speech in Longinus, see Russell's commentary in Longinus, *On the Sublime*, trans. by Fyfe and Russell, p. 163 n. b.

<sup>39</sup> See e.g. Augustine, *Confessions*, Books 4. ix–xii and 13. xii, xxxi; Harris, *Transformations of Love*, pp. 81, 158–59.

too, to hear overtones of the early modern sublime, with its insistence on the transformative transmission of power and loftiness from the sublime object to the recipient.<sup>40</sup> Earth is elevated to a state that even an angel could mistake for heaven; the organ does not palely imitate but powerfully *mends* (or improves) the choirs above.<sup>41</sup>

The aural qualities of both language and music are clearly central to this elevation. The organ's ability to mimic voices, as well as its astounding range in register, intensity, and timbre (and perhaps its corresponding ability to imitate the range and harmony of the entire cosmos) allow it to surpass the 'human Voice' as a speaker of 'praise', to join the heavenly 'Choirs', and to span the distance between earth and heaven.<sup>42</sup> And throughout the preceding catalogue, Dryden employs onomatopoeic techniques to communicate the sounds of instruments, and their effects on the passions. Longinus, while fairly dismissive of instrumental music, had discussed the power of aural 'harmony' like this to effect the sublime, devoting considerable space to detailing how words and metres harmonize with their emotional sense in order to forcibly transform readers' responses.<sup>43</sup> Still more directly, the imitative techniques in Dryden's *Song* resemble, on an aural plain, the 'Imaging' which he had praised through Longinus in Cowley's Pindarics.

The *Song's* catalogue of passions, then, suggests a nascent musical sublime. It describes instruments overwhelming auditors, compelling them to take on various passions. The same procedure is performed for (or on) the reader by devices of aural 'Imaging'. The poem lastly implies a narrative of movement from arrest and astonishment through danger to ascent and inflation. This final moment, one of 'holy Love', could be read as the apotheosis of passion or its extinguishing by a passionless affection, a movement of the higher soul which might once have been sharply distinguished from passion — although Dryden and his contemporaries no longer call on this linguistic distinction in their Pindarics.

<sup>40</sup> This facet of Longinus's treatise was particularly emphasized by Boileau. See, for instance, Gilby, 'The Seventeenth-Century Sublime'.

<sup>41</sup> 'Mend' is apparently used in the sense of improvement without reference to prior defect. *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. 'mend', II. 1–11.

<sup>42</sup> Associations between the human voice, organ, and universe are dense. The 'universal frame' (created universe) in Dryden's *Song* is described as if an enormous instrument spanning all notes; in his *Alexander's Feast*, Cecilia invents the 'vocal frame' or organ. Athanasius Kircher, *Musurgia universalis*, II, 366–67, explicitly figured the universe as an organ. Compare Bickwell, 'The Organ Case', pp. 57–59.

<sup>43</sup> Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 39. 1–3.

There is yet another way that the climax of music's power in this ode wavers between extreme passion and its absence. Framing the catalogue of instruments, the ode's first and last stanzas describe, not individual passions or audible instruments, but the 'heavenly Harmony' governing the universe. The opening narrates the cosmos's creation from a chaos of 'jarring Atomes' (4). A 'tuneful Voice' from 'high' calls the elements 'to their stations' and moves through all the stages of creation — 'all the compass of the Notes' — to close at the top of the scale, in 'Man' (6, 9, 14). There are no evident 'emotion words' here, and the mimetic aural qualities so effective in moving the passions, and so striking in later verses, are largely absent.<sup>44</sup> Instead, Dryden employs perhaps the most intricate rhythmic and metrical scheme of any English Pindaric. Six different syllables end the first six lines, in a mixture of metres with five, four, and three pulses. Only as we pass into the final nine lines of the stanza do we find a corresponding rhyme for each of the first six endings, and a complex metrical pattern begins to emerge.<sup>45</sup> Most of this patterning is barely if at all audible — especially in the context for which Dryden's ode was designed, a musical setting for St Cecilia's Day.

The stanza performs, then, an *obscure harmony*, like the inaudible music of the spheres. In the later seventeenth century, this harmony was frequently imagined as, in Milton's words, 'intricate, | Eccentric, intervolved, yet regular | Then most, when most irregular [...] [it] seem[s].'<sup>46</sup> This harmony is the supreme expression of music's power, but seemingly exceeds or swallows up passion.

An absence of passion need not, however, imply an absence of sublimity. Longinus had uncoupled *pathos* and sublimity, maintaining that 'some passions [...] are far removed from sublimity and [...] there are many examples of the sublime which are independent of passion'.<sup>47</sup> As Boileau and his successors never tired of pointing out, Longinus himself praised the sublimity of the sparse, direct utterance of the *fiat lux*: 'God said let there be light, and there was light!'<sup>48</sup> For many early modern commentators, the sublime in this phrase consists in the irresistible performative power of God's words, and the astounding grandeur of Genesis's conception of creation, rather than an appeal

<sup>44</sup> On 'emotion words', see Rosenwein in *Emotional Communities*.

<sup>45</sup> On the poem's numerical patterns and symbolism, see John Dryden, *Poems*, ed. by Hammond and Hopkins, pp. 115–37.

<sup>46</sup> John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, ed. by Fowler, 2nd edn, V. 623–24.

<sup>47</sup> Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 8. 2–3.

<sup>48</sup> Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 9. 9.

to pathos through moving rhetoric. The *fiat lux* is the very subject reworked by Dryden's first stanza, with music replacing light; and the *Song*'s last stanza, the *Grand CHORUS*, reiterates the theme of creation before turning from Genesis to Apocalypse — and prophesying the 'last and dreadful hour' when the last 'Trumpet' 'shall untune the Sky' (59–63).

These framing stanzas have puzzled critics. In John Hollander's influential reading, their 'cosmological orthodoxies' are rendered 'trivial' by the central stanzas on 'music itself', that is, for Hollander, 'affective music'.<sup>49</sup> Recognizing that many readers are nonetheless 'moved' by Dryden's cosmic music in the framing stanzas, Duane Coltharp has recently attempted to reinject affect into the *Grand CHORUS*.<sup>50</sup> He rejects the possibility that the stanza elicits 'apocalyptic dread' — for 'surely no one familiar with Handel's [...] setting [...] would want to take such a reading seriously'.<sup>51</sup> Rather, the last stanza suggests to Coltharp the 'dislocating wonder that Dryden's own culture would eventually associate with the [...] sublime'.<sup>52</sup>

This claim is not fleshed out, and does not acknowledge Dryden's and his contemporaries' own complex and vigorous engagements with the sublime. Instead, the claim supports a general argument that the passions in Dryden's *Song* can offer a refuge from rationalism and materialism; the 'sublime' here evokes an autonomous sphere of feeling and spirit, distinct from reason, ethics, religion, and politics — something rather like the Kantian aesthetic sphere. Gesturing towards Dryden's 'modernity', this argument seemingly deploys the sublime as a sort of veiled placeholder for the modern, disinterested sphere of aesthetics.<sup>53</sup> This recent reading of Dryden and the passions thus recalls a problematic teleological tendency in older scholarship on the sublime, which tended to position it as a harbinger of modernity whose early manifestations were essentially 'a kind of dress rehearsal for the full-fledged philosophical aesthetics of Immanuel Kant and his heirs'.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Hollander, *The Untuning of the Sky*, p. 422. Hollander's book closed with the alleged death of *musica speculativa* in Dryden's music odes.

<sup>50</sup> Coltharp, 'Raising Wonder', p. 1.

<sup>51</sup> Coltharp, 'Raising Wonder', p. 14.

<sup>52</sup> Coltharp, 'Raising Wonder', p. 14.

<sup>53</sup> On Dryden and modernity, see Zwicker, 'Dryden and the Problem of Literary Modernity'.

<sup>54</sup> *The Sublime*, ed. by Ashfield and De Bolla, p. 2. For revisions of teleological readings of the sublime and the aesthetic sphere, see e.g. *The Sublime*, ed. by Ashfield and De Bolla, pp. 1–17;

But this reading does draw attention to something valuable. Resisting teleological implications and instead tracing changing discourses of the sublime through the reception of Dryden’s *Song*, we can suggest that, from the later eighteenth century, both music and the sublime do seem important in establishing a distinct aesthetic sphere, one which requires a new and different understanding of affective life, and which might partly drive the emergence of ‘emotions’. Kames’s *Elements of Criticism* separated emotions from passions in order to establish a class or quality of experiences of pleasure and pain which are unrelated to movement, desire, and action — that is, unrelated to the passions — and so apply to our perceptions of beauty and the sublime.<sup>55</sup> Jackson, too, wanted to distinguish absolutely extremities of passions from the qualitatively different, though nonetheless extreme, pleasures of music. Although they might appear marginal to the creation of ‘emotions’ as a domain of secular scientific psychology, they seem symptomatic of the involvement of aesthetics in formulating new accounts of psyche and sensation.<sup>56</sup> Jackson’s quotation from Dryden’s *Song* points to the ode’s role as a touchstone in such debates.

Coltharp’s reference to the sublime also raises a number of more concrete questions for a history of emotions. Why is Dryden’s reference to the ‘dreadful Hour’ not about dread? (Do we hesitate to deal with religious dread as a ‘real’

Morris, *The Religious Sublime*; Turner, ‘The Libertine Sublime’; Doody, *The Daring Muse*. A similar move to Coltharp’s occurs in Williamson, ‘From Heavenly Harmony to Eloquent Silence’, p. 529. Williamson suggests Dryden’s *Song* should be connected with *dies irae* poetry, designed ‘to excite sensations of sublime terror’. Yet rather than discussing the sublime’s meaning in this context, she contrasts the ‘doctrinally orthodox’ reading of Dryden she thinks this context suggests with her preferred reading, based on an immediate appeal to affect: ‘The overall effect of the concluding lines is terrifying [...] the paradox encapsulated in the last line resonates disturbingly beyond the frame of Christian doctrine and contemporary aesthetics. Affectively, the words have a desolating rather than awe-inspiring finality.’ Williamson, like Coltharp and Hollander in their different ways, uses the poem to support a narrative of secularization and modernization. This relies on the conceit that the poem’s emotional effects offer ultimate criteria in interpretation, and perhaps on a ‘universal subject of sentiment’ to guarantee interpretations. To refute such arguments, it would suffice to cite the evidence that I have never felt terrified or desolated but moved and exhilarated by Dryden’s last couplet.

<sup>55</sup> Compare Monk’s foundational study, *The Sublime* (1935), pp. 113–14.

<sup>56</sup> If emotions between the 1800s and 1850s become strongly tied to terms like “psychology”, “law”, “observation”, “evolution”, “organism”, “brain”, “nerves”, “expression”, “behaviour” and “viscera” (Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, p. 5), then we might add an overlapping list of terms which underscores their imbrication with aesthetics, like ‘taste’, ‘sensation’, ‘association’, ‘nerves’, ‘passivity’, ‘distance’, ‘observation’, ‘expression’, ‘enthusiasm’, ‘transport’.

passion?) Why does the apparently transparent emotional force of Handel's musical setting — composed almost fifty years after the ode — provide the authoritative gloss on the Chorus's appeal to the passions? (Do we still believe in the immediate and timeless emotional power of music, even while demanding that emotion be historicized and problematized?) Most importantly, what is the 'dislocating wonder' which is said to mark the sublime? Is it a passion or not? What does it dislocate us *from*?

To focus on the last of these questions, perhaps the sublime in Dryden's ode can better be said to dislocate us *towards* something, just as Longinus's sublime makes us love 'whatever is great and more divine than ourselves', pointing us towards the non-material, more-than-worldly purpose of our birth.<sup>57</sup> Such a teleology is, after all, what the Apocalypse realizes. And in Dryden's ode apocalypse is associated, not with a simple negative 'dread' in the modern sense, but with a dread of *awe*, linked with humans' elevation as well as annihilation: at the 'last and dreadful hour', 'The Dead shall live' as well as 'the Living die'; and our 'crumbling Pageant' will give way to a new heaven and a new earth (59–63).<sup>58</sup> The *Grand CHORUS*, with its driving rhythms and climactic final triplet of rhymes, might then be said to evoke a fear mingled with elation — what Dryden's friend and admirer John Dennis would call the 'delightful Horrour' and 'terrible Joy' of the sublime.<sup>59</sup>

The TRUMPET shall be heard on high,  
The Dead shall live, the Living die,  
And MUSICK shall untune the Sky. (61–63)

It is no surprise that this awesome, dreadful, and overwhelming theme is repeatedly rehearsed by English Pindarics.<sup>60</sup>

Yet this still somewhat begs the question of whether and how the bookends of Dryden's *Song*, and their 'sublimity', relate to the passions. 'Dread' may be an

<sup>57</sup> Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 35. 2–3.

<sup>58</sup> Compare the connotations of awe and reverence in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. 'dreadful'. Revelation 21. 2.

<sup>59</sup> Dennis used these phrases just one year after the *Song*'s publication in one of the earliest accounts of the Alps as sublime; see John Dennis, 'Letter Describing his Crossing the Alps' (1688), in *The Critical Works of John Dennis*, ed. by Hooker, II, 380.

<sup>60</sup> See e.g. Abraham Cowley, *The Resurrection* (1656); Joseph Mitchell, *An Ode to Music* (1721); Christopher Smart, *Carmen cl. Alexandri Pope [...] Ode for Musick on Saint Cecilia's Day* (1746); Mary Heron, 'Ode to Music', in *Odes, &c. on Various Occasions* (1792), and Hammond and Hopkins's notes on the *Song*.



'emotion word', but is it a 'passion word' in this context? Even if it is, no such words appear in the first stanza, and the *CHORUS* does not concentrate on 'dread' in the way that previous stanzas thematize melancholy, love, or choler. The *Song* seems intractable to any simple contextualization in a history of emotions.

A thread of sublimity, then, runs through Dryden's *Song*, marking the height of music's power in the cosmos, as in the microcosms of man and his passions. Yet the passions' place in Dryden's Pindaric sublime seems precarious, teetering between extreme and exceeded passion. It is no accident that music, although intimately connected with the passions, is the site of this ambivalence; as in Brady's ode, music's ability to raise passion — and thence arouse a sublime of *excessive* conflicting passions — is met by a propensity to quell passion — and thence stimulate an *austere* sublime of absent passion.<sup>61</sup>

This tension between raising and quelling passions travels through the eighteenth-century music Pindaric, as three brief examples serve to show. In William Congreve's irregular *Hymn to Harmony* (1701), 'the wretched Race of Men' is 'torn' 'by conflicting Passions' which make vain the 'Aid' offered by 'Reason'.<sup>62</sup> Only music can 'bind' the passions (verse IV, l. 11):

[...] tumultuous Passions cease;  
And all is husht, and all is Peace.  
The weary World with welcome Ease is blest,  
By Musick lull'd to pleasing Rest. (V, ll. 11–14)

The 'Harmony of Peace' embodied by music in this stanza means a literal stilling of passions, whose essence thus seems to be turbulent movement (verse VI, l. 10). Nonetheless, Congreve's evocations of *pleasure* in rest suggest either some kind of separate, non-passionate affective sphere — like the stable pleasures of Epicurean thought — or that 'tumultuous Passions' are only a subclass of passions *per se*.<sup>63</sup> Verse eight further contradicts the association of music with the 'Harmony of Peace': Cecilia appears 'To ease the World of Care', and yet she does not achieve this through gentle, beautiful or serene, music (verse VIII, l. 5). Composure and lulling now appear as pagan indolence, as 'The soft enervate Lyre is drown'd | In the deep Organ's more majestick Sound' (verse VIII,

<sup>61</sup> Compare Anne Janowitz's account of a tension between sublimes of austerity and excess or luxury in 'The Artifactual Sublime'.

<sup>62</sup> William Congreve, *A Hymn to Harmony*, pp. 3–4, verse IV, ll. 4–7.

<sup>63</sup> On Epicureanism, see, *Atoms, Pneuma and Tranquillity*, ed. by Osler.



ll. 10–11). The strife of conflicting passions is now countered by the awful, transformative energy of Cecilia's 'holy Rapture' as 'In peals the swelling Notes ascend the Skies' (verse VIII, ll. 4, 12).

In Christopher Smart's loosely Pindaric ode to St Cecilia (1746) — which, like a number of others, explicitly calls music 'sublime' — the 'obedient ductile passions ebb and flow'.<sup>64</sup> Passions are like tides following the moving moon of music. But the heights of music's powers as an astonishing 'celestial art' are seen not only in movement, but also when 'rolling floods in sweet suspense | Are held, and listen into sense' (verse III, ll. 1, 6). Like Congreve's ode, Smart's implies that the suspending of passionate movement by music makes space for sense or reason. Here, music's role is not confined to clearing the decks for reason; in Smart's poem, music can carry sense in itself: in the organ music of Dryden's contemporary and collaborator, Purcell,

[...] vigorous notes with meaning teem,  
With fire, with force explain the theme,  
And sing the subject into life. (verse VIII, ll. 10–12)

While passion is not excluded from this vivifying effect, the ode's vision of Purcell as an artist of sublime fire and force rests on the fact that his music exceeds the usual 'strife' between 'sense and musick' (verse VIII, l. 9), a strife based on the opposition between reason and passion, and music's typical alignment with the latter. Only in this way can music achieve the sublime effect of bringing the subject 'into life' — as if it were one of Longinus's or Dryden's 'Images', "When the Imagination is so warm'd and affected, that you seem to behold yourself the very Things you are describing, and so display them to the life".<sup>65</sup>

Finally, Mary Heron's Pindaric *Ode to Music* (1790) depicts music's 'pow'r sublime' in a way still further removed from older notions of passion.<sup>66</sup> The speaker pictures herself wandering in a silent abbey which 'Inspires the musing mind' but apparently suspends affective faculties (verse I. 3, l. 29). If she suddenly hears the organ or choir,

Wak'd from the temporary dream,  
Inspir'd by some pathetic theme,  
What sudden raptures are imprest,

<sup>64</sup> Christopher Smart, *Carmen cl. Alexandri Pope [...] Ode for Musick on Saint Cecilia's Day*, p. 26, verse I, l. 12; p. 32, verse VI, l. 4.

<sup>65</sup> Longinus, *On the Sublime*, trans. by Smith, 15. 1.

<sup>66</sup> Mary Heron, 'Ode to Music', p. 40, verse III. 3, l. 2.

Upon the heaving, swelling breast,  
Which each intruding care controul,  
In extasy absorb the soul,  
Where undefin'd sensations rise,  
And soar on rapid pinions to her native skies. (verse I. 3, ll. 34–41)

This is a difficult moment to interpret, not least because the Pindaric grandeur and scope of the sentence is matched by Pindaric 'broken sense' on the level of ordinary semantics. The reference of various pronouns becomes tenuous in the poem, and these lines leave unclear whether the *dreaming* or *awakened* breast is inspired by 'some pathetic theme'. What is clear is that the sleep of the breast during mental reflection is not replaced by specific responses to an object of weal or woe (as with textbook early modern passions), nor by specific affective timbres like love, hate, jealousy, or pity. Instead, the breast is struck or imprinted by *sudden raptures* (like the lightning-bolt of the sublime), the soul is absorbed in ecstasy, and sensations rapidly ascend, implying an inflation and ennobling of the subject as she recognizes those unreachable lofty skies to which her sense impressions curiously rise as her own 'native' realm. As Heron herself makes clear, this sublime music concocts 'sensations' — or elsewhere 'Emotions' (verse II. 3, l. 39) — as 'undefin'd' as they are extreme.

The music Pindarics examined here, stretching from 1687 to 1790, all testify to ferment around changing understandings of affective life. I have suggested that questions in what we now term aesthetics, especially concerning the mixed feeling of 'terrible joy' (John Dennis again) in the sublime, may have helped create this category.<sup>67</sup> But it would be as misleading to set Dryden and his successors in a simple progressive narrative of this creation as it would be to place the discourses they work with and the experiences they evoke under the single heading of 'emotions'. To counteract any impression of an excessively developmental narrative stringing together my illustrations, I want to conclude

<sup>67</sup> To do more than gesture towards the contribution of aesthetics to the rise of emotions is beyond the scope of this chapter, concerned as it is primarily with a discourse (the sublime) which ultimately, I suspect, also strains the category of emotions. For example, Thomas Brown, the 'inventor of the emotions' for Dixon (p. 109), argued for the use of the term partly because it could, on his definition, include beauty and sublimity, which others had classed as intellectual powers. These 'emotions' were passive and immediate, like astonishment and fear, rather than active like intellection. Thomas Brown, *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, p. 102. Yet the identification of emotions with non-cognitive passivity is undermined when Brown insists that beauty and sublimity do not inhere in objects, but are necessarily *diffused* over them by the mind even as they are perceived as pleasing (pp. 351, 379).

by returning to Dryden's heterogeneous milieu, to take a more direct look at the idiosyncratic writing of his younger contemporary, John Dennis, one of the earliest British theorists to concentrate on the sublime.

Dennis developed his own internal division within the passions in order to account for the sublime, using a vocabulary of 'enthusiasm' derived from seventeenth-century dissenting theology, but by no means loyal to its accounts of affective religious experience.<sup>68</sup> In two central critical tracts on poetry, published in 1701 and 1704, Dennis argued that '*Passion is the chief thing in Poetry*'.<sup>69</sup> Prose could be poetry if it were passionate enough, and verse could not be poetry without passion. In fact verse is rather demeaned as merely language full of 'music' and 'harmony' — things for which Dennis has little time.<sup>70</sup> Passion means movement and discord, while music is for Dennis largely synonymous with classical formal qualities of stasis and harmony. Dennis eagerly followed Longinus in promoting the fervour and force of the sublime in poetry, but faced an apparent contradiction in also following the Longinian argument that 'in some of Branches of the greater poetry', 'As in the [Pindaric] Ode [...] it is impossible for a Poet every where to excite in a very great degree, that which we vulgarly call Passion'.<sup>71</sup>

Therefore, he reasons, there 'must be two sorts of Passion. *First*, That which we call Vulgar Passion, and *Secondly*, Enthusiasm'.<sup>72</sup> For Dennis, 'the sublime [...] is never without Enthusiastick Passion. For it 'is nothing else but [...] Great thoughts moving the Soul from it's [*sic*] Ordinary Situation by the Enthusiasm which naturally attends them'.<sup>73</sup> Sometimes, enthusiastic passion seems to represent a different intensity or object for passions like joy, grief, and horror; sometimes, it is so utterly unlike them that it seems not to be a passion at all, but rather a state of communion with God and prelapsarian 'harmony' between man's warring faculties.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>68</sup> For studies of enthusiasm discussing Dennis, see Mee, *Romanticism, Enthusiasm, and Regulation*; Morillo, *Uneasy Feelings*; Hawes, *Mania and Literary Style*.

<sup>69</sup> John Dennis, *The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry*, p. 23; John Dennis, *The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry*.

<sup>70</sup> John Dennis, *The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry*, pp. 23–25.

<sup>71</sup> John Dennis, *The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry*, p. 15.

<sup>72</sup> John Dennis, *The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry*, p. 15.

<sup>73</sup> John Dennis, *The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry*, p. 78.

<sup>74</sup> John Dennis, *The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry*, pp. 172–73.

Identifying the sublime with enthusiastic passion does not remove the tension between troping the sublime as elevating passion (discord), and seeing its end in elevated peace (harmony). In theorizing this tension through the musical metaphors of discord and harmony, Dennis brushes up against the double associations of music with conflicting, passionate movement, and harmonious, peaceful order. ‘Tis a little odd to consider,’ he concedes,

that Passion which disturbs the Soul, should occasion it to produce Harmony, which seems to employ the Order and Composure of [the Soul]. [...] But as Passion, which is the Disorder of the Soul; produces Harmony which is Agreement; so Harmony which is Concord Augments and propagates Passion which is Discord.<sup>75</sup>

Dennis’s worrying at the oddness of the sublime, harmony, and passion is inconclusive, but not unproductive. His arguments with himself prefigure both the conflicting interpretations of Warton and Jackson with which this essay began, and the unsettled reactions of contemporary critics to the sublime and to music in Dryden’s *Song for St Cecilia’s Day*. Examining the emergence of an early modern musical sublime in Dryden’s ode shows the deep and generative roots of ambivalence towards the passions in discourses surrounding both music and the sublime. Sublimes of excessive and austere passion continue to rub shoulders with one another in eighteenth-century Pindarics, reflecting and stimulating thought about the passions and their others (affections, sentiments, emotions, and so on). This marks a significant chapter in the history of emotions and — as is suggested by the conflicting and unsettled responses to Dryden’s music odes from eighteenth century as well as much more recent critics — this is a chapter which may not quite yet be finished.

<sup>75</sup> John Dennis, *The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry*, pp. 99–100.

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# EMBODIED EMOTION, CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR, AND THE AESTHETICS OF READING OLD ENGLISH POETRY

Antonina Harbus

Literary texts fundamentally rely on the representation and creation of affective experience. As Wordsworth famously asserted, ‘all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity.’<sup>1</sup> This complex observation on the centrality of emotion to poetry — and the interplay of affective and cognitive functions in poetic engagement — can apply to other forms of literature, in terms of both creation and reception. Indeed, the potential for literature to provoke an emotional response in the reader is such a widely accepted premise with so many facets that it is not immediately obvious how an analysis of such a universal phenomenon might be approached for the purpose of constructing this part of a history of emotions. A further complication exists in the acknowledged emotional power and resonance of specifically ‘literary’ (and ‘poetic’) uses of language, and the corollary question of the extent to which the emotional force of a literary text relies on language, and what is more emphatically determined by other intertwined narrative, generic, and contextual aspects. Scholars of figurative language have so successfully challenged the idea of abstractly or absolutely literary language,<sup>2</sup> and have shown so convincingly that metaphor in

<sup>1</sup> Preface 1800 version (with 1802 variants) to the *Lyrical Ballads*, 2nd edn, ed. by Brett and Jones, p. 251.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew Goatly argues that the distinction ‘is often a matter of degree’, the difference relying on the ‘gap between a speaker’s thought and the proposition expressed’ (Goatly, *The*

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particular acts as a powerful vector of emotion, that it is becoming increasingly necessary to consider the affective power of literature as a deeply interdisciplinary conundrum.

That interdisciplinarity has become even broader in recent years as literary scholars have come into closer dialogue with philosophical, psychological and even scientific studies of emotion. For instance, cognitive scientists have begun to analyse with their own concepts and methods the complex but uncontested capacity of literary texts to represent, simulate and cause emotions. Keith Oatley, one of the foremost scholars in this field, argues that in audiences of Shakespeare's plays, emotion is instantiated: 'the words and emotions become the mind of the reader'.<sup>3</sup> More broadly, Oatley asserts as a fundamental truth the inter-relationship of emotion and literature.<sup>4</sup> Oatley's and others' scientific study of emotion has produced orthodoxies that literary scholars can only profit by apprehending: most importantly the close interdependence of all cognitive functioning and emotion; and the biological priority of all affective experience (that is, emotions are experienced in the body before they are acknowledged).

The apprehension of these ideas by literary scholars has permitted a fuller consideration of the literary experience and has ushered in dynamic, fundamentally cognitive lines of inquiry into literary affect. Like the more linguistically-focused field, Cognitive Poetics, Cognitive Literary Studies (more recently known as Cognitive Cultural Studies), focuses on the mental processes at work during meaning-making, including the role of emotion in all aspects of the literary encounter. These and other cognitive approaches deploy cognitive science in order to explore the relationship between mind and meaning from the perspective that the mind and human emotion are the result of the close and dynamic interplay of culture and biology.<sup>5</sup> Literary scholars, like their

*Language of Metaphors*, p. 23). Glucksberg has shown that literal understanding is as context-dependent and as complex as figurative understanding (Glucksberg, *Understanding Figurative Language*, p. 11). Leezenberg argues for the similar processing of literal and figurative language (Leezenberg, *Contexts of Metaphor*, p. 2).

<sup>3</sup> Oatley, 'Simulation of Substance and Shadow', p. 30.

<sup>4</sup> Oatley, *Emotions: A Brief History*, esp. pp. 6 and 13.

<sup>5</sup> For a useful overview of this field, see: Richardson, 'Studies in Literature and Cognition'. A lengthy annotated bibliography by Alan Richardson and Mary Crane appears at <<https://www2.bc.edu/~richarad/lcb/home.html#bib>> [accessed 10 September 2014]. See also Turner, *Reading Minds*; and *Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences*, ed. by Herman; and issues of journals devoted to the subject: *Poetics Today*, 23.1 (2002), and *The European Journal of English Studies*, 9.2 (2005).

scientific counterparts, are thereby finding new ways of considering the two related dimensions of literature and emotion, both of which are essentially cognitive and can be analysed via specifically cognitive approaches: how emotion is represented in literature, and how literary texts can trigger emotional reactions in readers. In turn, literary studies have much to offer the sciences in relation to the study of emotion. As Patrick Colm Hogan points out, 'literature provides a vast and largely unexplored body of data for emotion research [by psychologists and other cognitive scientists].'<sup>6</sup>

A productive dimension arises from these two intersections when we consider texts created in temporally or geographically remote societies, such as Anglo-Saxon England. From a history of emotions perspective, consideration of the affective potential of such texts, written down over one thousand years ago in a language that is the antecedent of our own, allows us to consider the role of culture in the experience of emotions. In turn, we can pursue how that experience and its literary representation might change over time, especially given differing deployments of language, including metaphorical constructions. This deep historical perspective on the interplay of culture and biology can only advance cognitive studies of culture and literature. Instances from Old English poetry can allow us to ask whether the experience being represented in these medieval texts is the same as similarly named emotions experienced in later periods; and more broadly, to what degree emotions are intelligible cross-culturally. But before turning to these medieval texts, disciplinary perspectives on the emotions need to be explored in order to clarify what precisely is under discussion, and how the parameters are drawn in different fields.

The burgeoning interest in the history of emotions, of which the present volume and its associated research centre play a part, arose in cultural history.<sup>7</sup> While this field brings scholars from several fields together, most of them are from disciplinary backgrounds in the humanities, and treat emotion from an historical perspective that draws very little on cognitive science. Similarly, the interest paid to the subject of emotions by cognitive science is restricted by a lack of attention to the diachronic aspect of the affective life, and a delayed and still only minor interest in affective responses to the arts.<sup>8</sup> Given the distinctly separate nature of these lines of research, a more open consideration of the

<sup>6</sup> Hogan, *What Literature Teaches Us About Emotion*, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> For example, see: Kaster, *Emotion, Restraint and Community in Ancient Rome*; and Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*.

<sup>8</sup> Oatley, *Emotions: A Brief History*; and Robinson, *Deeper than Reason*. For the comparative linguistic point of view, see Wierzbicka, *Emotions Across Language and Cultures*.

evidence available in the documents of earlier cultures provides a particularly fruitful potential for more active interdisciplinary inquiry in a history of the emotions in any period.

Emotions are the subject of a great deal of interest in the many disciplines captured by the phrase cognitive science — in philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, cognitive neuroscience — and beyond.<sup>9</sup> In cognitive science, an emotion is commonly defined as ‘a psychological state or process that functions in the management of goals, a state ‘seen to serve important intracognitive and interpersonal functions’.<sup>10</sup> The concept of ‘management’ in these statements captures the foundational role of emotions in determining the entire quality of lived experience. Many cognitive psychologists, like Keith Oatley, favour this ‘appraisal’ theory to account for the source of emotions. This essentially functionalist theory holds that emotions are caused not by events, but by ‘appraisal of events in relation to goals and plans, an idea that has found its way into cognitive studies of literature.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, in neuroscience emotions are seen as ‘brain states and bodily responses’<sup>12</sup> that act as ‘managers of mental life, prompting heuristics that relate the flow of daily events to goals and social concerns’.<sup>13</sup>

These conceptions of emotions as managers or regulators whose remit extends beyond the life of mere feelings are especially interesting to the literary or cultural historian, as they underscore the interpenetration of the emotional life with cognitive functions, consciousness and an enduring sense of the self. Research into the emotions from several fields has shown us that though we might recognize apparently separate emotions, such as happiness or anger, the emotional web is tangled and interconnected with other aspects of being, sensing and interacting. For example, major streams within psychology include the study of the way in which emotions are at the foundation of human motivational systems;<sup>14</sup> the distinction between emotions and feelings;<sup>15</sup> and between

<sup>9</sup> The situation has changed since Joseph LeDoux’s observation that most cognitive scientists avoid the study of emotions (LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain*, pp. 33–35).

<sup>10</sup> Oatley, ‘Emotions’, p. 273.

<sup>11</sup> Pandit, ‘Emotion, Perception and Anagnorisis in *The Comedy of Errors*, p. 95. For a challenge to the appraisal view, see Hogan, ‘On Being Moved’.

<sup>12</sup> LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain*, p. 302.

<sup>13</sup> Oatley, ‘Emotions’, p. 275.

<sup>14</sup> Tompkins, *Exploring Affect*.

<sup>15</sup> Prinz, ‘Are Emotions Feelings?’ For a diachronic approach to this question, see Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*.

an emotional reaction and an empathetic response. Pragmatically, many scholars in psychology recognize seven basic emotions: fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy, shame and guilt,<sup>16</sup> though the list and the number of items on it changes depending on who is consulted, and many scholars distinguish primary from secondary or 'social' emotions.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, cross-cultural studies have shown how difficult the terminology around the emotions is in relation to semantic range and translation across cultures.<sup>18</sup>

As suggested above, many of the emerging orthodoxies from these disciplinary studies of emotion are useful to scholars of literature and history. For instance, neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has shown convincingly that cognitive functioning and emotions are fully inter-reliant, and that emotions register in the body before they do in the mind. In a series of books that have had wide public as well as scientific appeal,<sup>19</sup> he has demonstrated that the emotional life is thoroughly embedded in and interacts with cognitive functioning and embodied experience. He thereby confirms what William James postulated in 1884 (that emotions are responses to particular perceptions of changes in the body).<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, once it is granted that emotions are determined biologically, the implication follows that the evolved human brain behaves consistently and even automatically when it comes to emotions, notwithstanding some cultural variations: 'the considerable amount of individual variation and the fact that culture plays a role in shaping some inducers do not deny the fundamental stereotypicity, automaticity, and regulatory purpose of the emotions' as

<sup>16</sup> Kringelbach, 'Emotions, Feelings, and Hedonics in the Human Brain', p. 41.

<sup>17</sup> Antonio Damasio includes on this list: embarrassment, jealousy, guilt and shame, and lists six primary emotions, with surprise in the place of guilt and shame in the list above. See Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens*, p. 51. He also posits the idea of 'background emotions' such as 'well-being or malaise, calm or tension' (p. 52).

<sup>18</sup> The literature is huge, and dominated by studies of particular groups of words and specific cultural contrasts. For the cognitive semantics view, see *Happiness: Cognition, Experience, Language*, ed. by Tissari, Pessi and Salmela; and Kövecses, 'Metaphor and Thought'. For an Old English example, see Geeraerts and Gevaert, 'Hearts and (Angry) Minds in Old English'. For a broader overview of key concepts and readings in Cultural Studies, see: *Emotions: A Cultural Studies Reader*, ed. by Harding and Pribram.

<sup>19</sup> Damasio, *Descartes' Error*; and Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza*. Damasio's most recent book advances from an evolutionary perspective even more evidence for a biological basis of human consciousness (Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind*). As with his other studies, he places memory at the centre of consciousness and the self.

<sup>20</sup> Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens*, pp. 287–88.

bodily responses.<sup>21</sup> This orthodoxy sensibly acknowledges, albeit in a perhaps minimalist way, the constitutive function of cultural context, but lays greatest emphasis on biological consistency. Consequently, many neuroscientists are currently investigating the brain functioning of emotion, and increasingly stress, as Damasio does, the role of memory in the process.<sup>22</sup> In particular, the reliance of consciousness on working memory implicates the role of emotions: 'feelings result when working memory is occupied with the fact that one's brain and body are in a state of emotional arousal.'<sup>23</sup>

There are other useful insights for literary scholars from other disciplines, that support the mutual impact of culture and cognition. For instance, sociologists have long argued for the way in which societies condition the way in which emotions are processed,<sup>24</sup> and have settled on the culturally-specific experience of emotions, and therefore 'how mistaken it would be to assume that emotions are unproblematically translatable from one culture or historical period to another'.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, cultural anthropologists insist upon the constitutive role of social context in the very experience of emotions, and have increasingly emphasized the discursive resources of a community as a factor: 'the most productive analytical approach to the cross-cultural study of emotion is to examine discourses on emotion and emotional discourses as social practices within diverse ethnographic contexts.'<sup>26</sup>

Despite this interest in culture and emotion, scholars in the social sciences rarely consider literary texts as sources of information on the emotional life, even when considering emotions as 'psychosocial' phenomena in social life and popular culture,<sup>27</sup> though there are some notable exceptions. Keith Oatley and his colleagues, for instance, briefly discuss the ubiquitous textual focus on the emotions: 'written narrative literature, from ancient times to the present, concentrates on our emotional lives [...] Publicly available stories give mem-

<sup>21</sup> Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens*, p. 51.

<sup>22</sup> 'Emotion has important effects on mental functions that are indisputably cognitive, such as memory, attention, and perception'. See Lane and others, 'The Study of Emotion from the Perspective of Cognitive Neuroscience', p. 4.

<sup>23</sup> LeDoux and Rogan, 'Emotion and the Animal Brain', p. 270.

<sup>24</sup> Wouteres, 'The Civilizing of Emotions'.

<sup>25</sup> LeVine, 'Afterword', p. 398.

<sup>26</sup> Abu-Lughod and Lutz, 'Introduction: Emotion, Discourse, and the Politics of Everyday Life', p. 1.

<sup>27</sup> See, for example, *Emotion: New Psychosocial Perspectives*, ed. by Sclater and others, 'Part II: Emotions in the Public Sphere'.



bers of society common exemplars of action of emotion and of responsibility.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, moral philosopher Martha Nussbaum approaches literature as a site in which philosophical and religious views on emotions are represented, in her model in which, following Aristotelian and Stoic theories, there is an ethical dimension to appraisal.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, there is a lack of cross-disciplinary inquiry from the other direction too: scholars working explicitly on emotional histories often entirely ignore the biology and psychology of emotions, to focus exclusively instead on philosophical or theological ideas.<sup>30</sup>

Scholars working in the hard sciences are even less likely to be interested in textual representations of and triggers for emotions, though again there are exceptions, notably Damasio, who discusses art in all its forms as the highest achievement of human consciousness, which, in evolutionary terms 'became a privileged means to transact factual and emotional information deemed to be important for individual and society'.<sup>31</sup> He goes on to say that the arts 'became a means to induce nourishing emotions and feelings' and thereby they prevailed in evolution because they had survival value and contributed to the notion of wellbeing.<sup>32</sup> But Damasio is an unusual neuroscientist, known for his intense interest in humanist scholarship and the arts, who shows that while field-specific limits are of course understandable, especially given the scope of the topics — from mind to brain, to self, to emotions, to their artistic expression — that is no reason to perpetuate absolute boundaries.

Approaches to emotion and literature from outside cognitive science that are nevertheless avowedly cognitive are seeking to broach this divide between cognition and culture from the other direction. They consider how cognitive functioning shapes culture, and also how cognition is culturally determined, an influence that Damasio acknowledges ('learning and culture alter the expression of emotions and give emotions new meanings').<sup>33</sup> Further, these humani-

<sup>28</sup> Oatley, Keltner and Jenkins, *Understanding Emotions*, p. 401. See also Oatley, 'A Taxonomy of the Emotions of Literary Response'.

<sup>29</sup> Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, esp. pp. 457–613. Nussbaum's work, though influential, has been the subject of serious criticism. See, for example, Hale, 'Aesthetics and the New Ethics'.

<sup>30</sup> For example, MacMullen, *Feelings in History, Ancient and Modern*; and Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*.

<sup>31</sup> Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind*, p. 295.

<sup>32</sup> Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind*, p. 296.

<sup>33</sup> Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens*, p. 51.

ties scholars consider how cognition and emotion are deeply interrelated, and how literary texts can model that interaction, and indeed embody cognitive structures.<sup>34</sup> More broadly, there is now some consideration of the emotional pull of the literary text, of how 'fiction gives people the chance to practice their emotional connections with other people'.<sup>35</sup> So, scholars working at the interdisciplinary nexus of science, social science, and the arts are coming to appreciate the rich potential of considering the complex inter-reliance of culture, cognition, and emotion.

Within this burgeoning cross-section, there is quite a bit of interest in whether we engage with representations of emotions in the same way as we do with real-life emotional encounters. In a specifically cognitive approach, Patrick Colm Hogan argues against the appraisal theory, in his discussion of emotions experienced in fictional encounters.<sup>36</sup> Emotional reactions to fiction, Hogan argues, use the same sort of neurologically created 'concrete images' and 'emotional memories' that determine real-life emotional responses, so create genuine reactions to triggers whose fictionality is incidental, and can extend beyond their original cultural context.<sup>37</sup> In his wide-ranging studies of emotion and fiction, Hogan examines several Shakespearean plays, including *The Tempest* as a text that still invites empathy, and *Measure for Measure*, one that can still appeal to and interact with a 'disgust-based morality'.<sup>38</sup> There are implications for genre and story shape too, in that, according to Hogan, human emotional systems determine narrative structures.<sup>39</sup> He recruits ideas from neurobiology to argue this symbiotic relationship. In this schema, imagination, when engaged in reading or viewing a text, creates a distance between the 'emotional object' represented in that text and 'the egocentric space of direct action'<sup>40</sup> — the range of proximity that triggers a direct response. In

<sup>34</sup> Pandit and Hogan, 'Introduction: Morsels and Modules'; and Tribble, *Cognition in the Globe*.

<sup>35</sup> Vermeule, *Why Do We Care About Literary Characters?*, p. 165. Vermeule's argument bears some similarity to that of Zunshine, *Why We Read Fiction*, p. 164: 'Fiction helps us to pattern in newly nuanced ways our emotions and perceptions', though the latter's main focus is Theory of Mind rather than the emotions.

<sup>36</sup> Hogan, 'On Being Moved'.

<sup>37</sup> Hogan, 'On Being Moved', p. 246.

<sup>38</sup> Hogan, *What Literature Teaches Us*, pp. 262–69 and 244.

<sup>39</sup> Hogan, *Affective Narratology*, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup> Hogan, 'On Being Moved', p. 248.

other words, the reading brain responds to perceived spatial distance, senses a buffer zone, that allows us to experience an emotion, but less directly than in real life, and with some degree of cultural variation. More broadly, Hogan has demonstrated, in his broad-ranging consideration of texts, from the writings of Sappho, Shakespeare, and beyond to Japanese poetry, that 'literature may play a role in fostering openness to empathetic response'.<sup>41</sup> Gregory Currie, on the other hand, presents a different solution to the problem of how emotions are engaged via fiction, but who likewise accounts for the apparent distance between emotional trigger and reaction. He suggests that a virtual reader is created in the mind of the reader, a 'reader of fact', who reacts to the characters and events of the narrative, whose perspective we use as a guide for emotional interaction.<sup>42</sup>

Other scholars who study how emotion can be a product of fictionality focus on popular culture, especially film. Noël Carroll, for instance, explores the 'affective address of popular fiction',<sup>43</sup> and Amy Coplan examines the distinctive capacity of film to trigger genuine emotional reactions.<sup>44</sup> Both scholars emphasize the powerful emotional triggers of audiovisual cues, especially facial expressions, and come up with different explanations for the viewers emotional response. Carroll denies that consumers of fiction simulate the emotional experience of characters as some scholars argue, but rather, says they 'mobilize an affective stance' that is distinctly produced in response to a fiction whose content we imagine rather than believe.<sup>45</sup> Coplan prefers the theory of 'emotional contagion', whereby an automatic affective response is produced when we observe the experience of emotion in others, a phenomenon requiring the sensory input of a visual experience as occurs when viewing a film; literary fictions, on the other hand, can produce reactions that are more cognitive, but less affective because they produce experiences more removed from real-world sensations.<sup>46</sup>

Coplan, like other scholars working in this area, distinguishes emotional contagion from empathy, 'a complex and unique imaginative process involving both cognition and affect',<sup>47</sup> which is why literary narratives can produce

<sup>41</sup> Hogan, *What Literature Teaches Us*, pp. 74–75.

<sup>42</sup> Currie, 'The Paradox of Caring', p. 71.

<sup>43</sup> Carroll, 'On the Ties that Bind', p. 89.

<sup>44</sup> Coplan, 'Catching Characters' Emotions'.

<sup>45</sup> Carroll, 'On the Ties that Bind', p. 91.

<sup>46</sup> Coplan, 'Catching Characters' Emotions', p. 35.

<sup>47</sup> Coplan, 'Catching Characters' Emotions', p. 31.

empathy.<sup>48</sup> Empathy, or ‘a vicarious, spontaneous sharing of affect’, can be created through character identification and emotional simulation, primarily via the activation of mirror neurons,<sup>49</sup> which function pragmatically to assist in the understanding of the actions and emotions of others. Mirror neurons allow us to experience the emotional meaning of our interpersonal encounters — and perhaps also experience empathy — by producing ‘reflexive processing of the sensory aspects linked to how they appear in the facial expressions or acts of others,’<sup>50</sup> even when those encounters are with fictional scenarios created during the process of reading. Clearly, imagination can produce images in the brain of facial expressions that in turn trigger the same sort of emotive mirroring response, which is why we can feel moved by situations communicated in fictional texts, such as those discussed below. Fritz Breithaupt, in his fuller treatment of this area, covers four main models of empathy, including one from narratology, concluding that ‘narrative fiction can only exist because it invites, triggers, channels, controls, and manages empathy’.<sup>51</sup> Other theories of affective response to literary fictions often rely on one of Breithaupt’s models, Simulation Theory. For instance, Meskin and Weinberg cite the orthodoxy that ‘engaging with fiction is a matter of “off-line simulation”’, before offering their own modification that relies on the idea that fictions trigger the creation of possible worlds in the mind of the recipient.<sup>52</sup>

Going beyond that idea of mental representation to a more nuanced consideration of the role of emotion in the aesthetics of reading is Peter Stockwell’s theory of ‘texture’: ‘the experienced quality of textuality’.<sup>53</sup> Stockwell, working within Cognitive Poetics, develops a highly technical analysis of linguistic cues that invite the build-up of emotional response to a text, but more immediately relevant here is his central contention that readers of literary texts can have a cognitive affective response to that text that is susceptible to systematic scrutiny. This theory is particularly useful in that it seeks to account for the mechanisms of literary reading: how certain ideas and knowledge from a reader’s

<sup>48</sup> For a good overview on philosophical perspectives on readers’ empathetic engagement with fictional narratives and characters, see Coplan, ‘Empathetic Engagement with Narrative Fictions’.

<sup>49</sup> Keen, ‘A Theory of Narrative Empathy’, p. 208.

<sup>50</sup> Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, *Mirrors in the Brain*, trans. by Anderson, p. 190.

<sup>51</sup> Breithaupt, ‘How is it Possible to Have Empathy?’, p. 274.

<sup>52</sup> Meskin and Weinberg, ‘Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture’.

<sup>53</sup> Stockwell, *Texture*, p. 1.

whole store of information are selectively recalled and deployed in response to textual cues in a particular act of reading; and how texts foreground and group certain ideas, inviting certain associations and cumulative responses in the mind of the reader in the creation of an emotional response to it. Specifically, Stockwell has developed a stylistic approach that accounts for the literary creation of ambiguity, tone and the affective reading experience. He looks at how the reading mind is primed below the level of consciousness to create certain connections in the text at hand and to derive a particular sort of reading experience from that text.<sup>54</sup> Stockwell's method has broader value beyond cognitive linguistics, particularly his idea of 'the texture of edges', or 'the flow of experience across a transitional moment'.<sup>55</sup> By this remark he means that the human mind is primed to notice changes and to perceive edges, and movement across boundaries, both physically and metaphorically. When texts represent changes in emotional states, the joining edge is particularly noticeable, and can be a powerful emotional trigger itself.

Taking an even closer look at the language of emotion, Zoltán Kövecses argues for the bodily basis of metaphors that express emotions (and hence a degree of universality), and the shaping power of cultural context on both the feeling and expression of those emotions (and therefore their variability).<sup>56</sup> Kövecses shows the degree to which culture and biology are integrated: how embodied experience give rise to conceptual metaphors, that in turn are subject to cultural impact. One of his conclusions, that 'figurative language, including metaphor and metonymy, contributes a great deal to the conceptualization of emotion concepts', through the expression of culturally-specific image schemas.<sup>57</sup> His example, 'Zulus become wet with anger, but Americans do not' shows how the physical experience of an emotion is in part determined by prevailing, and pragmatically-accessed, metaphoric expressions. Temporally remote cultures can also be compared in this way, in considering the precise mutual impact of culture and cognition — and the limitations of an exclusively biological view of the emotional life.

With these ideas in mind, it would be useful to consider how a modern reader can have an emotional reaction to a medieval or premodern text, in combination with an intellectual and aesthetic experience produced by that liter-

<sup>54</sup> Stockwell, *Texture*, p. 11.

<sup>55</sup> Stockwell, *Texture*, p. 107.

<sup>56</sup> Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*.

<sup>57</sup> Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, p. 188.

ary encounter. The Anglo-Saxon literary corpus, and in particular its fictional representations of emotional experience, are readable to us, but only via the process of linguistic and cultural relocation that operates through translation into Present-Day English. Nevertheless, a core degree of intelligibility remains, because we share the human experience of an embodied mind and, apparently, a hard-wired predisposition for narrative. Evolutionary and relative cultural proximity means that the similarity of our emotional experiences with other humans from remote societies makes cross-cultural intelligibility possible. For instance, our use of conceptual metaphor to communicate abstract ideas ('burning with anger', 'sick with grief') is a key point of contact with our medieval predecessors, whose literary representations of embodied emotions we are able to recognize and appreciate.

The literature of Anglo-Saxon England has been analysed with respect to emotions, but not from a particularly cognitive perspective. Simon Nicholson, for instance, has studied abstract Old English nouns connoting moods, to conclude that there is evidence in the corpus of both 'psychological and somatic expressions of emotional distress', thereby disputing the idea that such a distinction is relatively recent.<sup>58</sup> Other studies have been similarly mainly lexical.<sup>59</sup> But the archaeology of emotions in Anglo-Saxon England, and the capacity of its literature to produce an emotional engagement, even an empathetic response, is as yet little explored. More broadly, the history of emotions can be advanced by a consideration of the emotional content and expression of Old English verse. To indicate how we might start to conceive of such a project, I will briefly suggest below how these ideas, particularly the shared cognitive basis of meaning and feeling, might be approached in relation to medieval literary texts. I take as my examples extracts from the enigmatic *Wulf and Eadwacer* and the heroic *Beowulf*.

The short poem *Wulf and Eadwacer* is an allusive complex of emotional expressions:

<sup>58</sup> Nicholson, 'The Expression of Emotional Distress in Old English Prose and Verse', p. 337.

<sup>59</sup> Gorsuch, 'Emotional Expression in a Manuscript of Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica*'; Polomé, 'Some Comments on the Vocabulary of Emotion in Germanic'; Fabiszak, 'A Semantic Analysis of Emotion Terms in Old English'; Ogura, 'Verbs of Emotion with Reflexive Constructions'; Diller, 'The Growth of the English Emotion Lexicon'; Ogura, 'Words of EMOTION in Old and Middle English'; Ogura, 'Words of Emotion in Old and Middle English Translations of Boethius's *De Consolatione Philosophiae*'; Ogura, 'Old and Middle English Verbs of Emotion'; and Sauer, 'Ælfric and Emotion'.

Leodum is minum      swylce him mon lac gife;  
     willað hy hine aþecgan,      gif he on þreat cymeð.  
 Ungelic is us.  
 Wulf is on iege,      ic on oþerre.  
 Fæst is þæt eglond,      fenne biworpen.      5  
     Sindon wæleowe      was þær on ipe;  
     willað hy hine aþecgan,      gif he on þreat cymeð.  
 Ungelic is us.  
     Wulfes ic mines widlastum      wenum dogode;  
 þonne hit wæs renig weder      ond ic reotugu sæt,      10  
     þonne mec se beaducafa      bogum bilegde,  
     wæs me wyn to þon,      wæs me hwæpre eac lað.  
 Wulf, min wulf,      wena me þine  
     seoce gedýdon,      þine seldeymas,  
 murnende mod,      nales meteliste.      15  
     Gehyrest þu, Eadwacer?      Uncerne earne hwelp  
     bireð wulf to wuda.  
     þæt mon eape toslited      þætte næfre gesomnad wæs,  
     uncer giedd geador.<sup>60</sup>

It is as if someone gave my people a gift; they plan to kill him if he comes into their troop. It is different for us. Wulf is on an island, I on another. That island is fast bound with fens. There are murderous men on the island; they plan to kill him if he comes into their troop. It is different for us. I endured with hope Wulf's long journey. When it was rainy weather and I sat lamenting, then the battle-bold one embraced me with his arms. There was joy for me in that, yet there was also loathing. Wulf, my Wulf, hopes for you have made me sick, your rare visits, my mourning mind, not at all lack of food. Do you hear Eadwacer? A wolf bears our wretched cub to the woods. One may easily separate that which was never united, our tale together.

Modern readers have found this narrative, and the relationships it suggests, enigmatic, but the expression of emotions is not difficult to grasp, especially in the context of other Old English elegiac narratives lamenting separation from the group,<sup>61</sup> though here, separation from an individual, presumably a lover,

<sup>60</sup> 'Wulf and Eadwacer', in *The Exeter Book*, ed. by Krapp and Dobbie. All translations are my own.

<sup>61</sup> The narrator of *The Wife's Lament* grieves for her lover and their usual social context, and the speaker of *The Seafarer* mourns his alienation at sea. In *The Wanderer*, the ritual gift-giving ceremony in the hall is recalled, along with the speaker's affection for his lord. The remembered self is 'sociocentric' in that social norms and responsibilities guide behaviour,



is articulated in lines 3–4. The conceptual metaphor of the self as an island is used here to express the sadness of isolation and loss. The emotional trajectory moves then to the registration of fear and anxiety, then to joy and disgust at the memory of (presumably) an act of love that was later regretted in shame, then on to sadness, fear and anxiety again, amplified by the potential connotations of the guilt attendant on the loss of a child, ‘uncerne earne hwelp’ (16b) ‘our wretched cub’. The second half of the poem in particular is a self-aware expression of a complex emotional state, the conflicted nature of which is registered physically. Embodied emotion, or emotions as perceptions of changes in the body, is expressed in the line about sickness, and conflicted bitter-sweet emotions in the line about joy and loathing (13). Regret mixed with resignation is expressed in the final paradoxical statement about separation in togetherness. Most interestingly, though, is the degree of self-awareness of the quality and impact of the emotions being experienced.

This text is unambiguously a lament in which human emotional pain of a recognizable nature is encapsulated in language. The complex, experiential nature of the emotions represented seems familiar, and highly cross-culturally intelligible. The recognized emotions allow us to create and to fill out the text world here, and to notice particularly the emotional shifts from anxiety, joy to sorrow, to longing, to resignation, and also the manner in which emotional states are embedded within other states (for instance, joy within sorrow, resignation within regret and the reverse). Neurologically, the overriding emotion of grief, and the conflicted sense of joy and grief in memory, dominates consciousness in this representation, thereby managing the mental life of the speaker and controlling the flow of daily events towards the goal of indulged memory of a loved one — the communicative rationale of the text. Its social functions, besides the aesthetic expression of the lament, might include the reinforcement of the social status quo, through depiction of the consequences of transgression. In this manner, the text has the potential to trigger the emotion of fear, via the arousal of compassion for the distraught speaker and her expression of loss and sadness.

though this is contrasted with the present circumstances of the solitary and self-oriented narrator. See Higgins, ‘The “Self-Digest”’. The view of the self shaped by emotional experience here is independent according to the formulation of Markus and Kitayama: the emotions, especially grief, are ego-focused, and other selves are perceived to be outside the bounds of the self rather than connected to it. The poems frequently depict this personal isolation by means of the metaphor of physical isolation (Markus and Kitayama, ‘Culture and the Self’).



The shape and force of the emotional trajectory of this text, and its emotional impact, seem very familiar, and draw the modern-day reader towards, not away from, the Anglo-Saxon one. Partly, that conformity stems from the causes of the emotions depicted here. It is worth noting that all seven of the basic emotions are recognizable in this poem — fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy, shame and guilt — with sadness playing the keynote in a textual evocation of the complex intertwining of emotional states. It is not therefore surprising to come away from the poem feeling that the full gamut of experience has been run, and to have noticed the shifts and boundary-crossings that the interpreter has cognitively incurred in making sense of it. If we consider an emotion as an ephemeral psychological state that both drives motivation and manages immediate goals, then it is useful to see how the representation of the affective life here shows the particular organization of the inner life around emotions in general and sadness in particular. The articulation of this experience in poetic form can in turn be viewed as the entrenchment of this phenomenon rather than an alleviation of it, and indeed, a vehicle by which this emotional perspective can be spread.

The poem enacts the now common idea that ‘emotions can distort practical reasoning’, particularly during ‘experiential imagining’, from the inside.<sup>62</sup> Of course, the reader or hearer of the text is invited to sympathize with the speaker via the simulation of the emotions being expressed. This activity occurs through the interpretive act of experiential imagining necessary in the act of textual sense-making, so to a limited degree the audience experiences the emotions too. But, given the distance created via the fictionalizing process, the audience remains in control of practical reasoning, and is metacognitively aware of its distorting effect on the speaker, something that is indeed highlighted by the allusive, enigmatic narrative arc of this lament. Because the modern reader is left wondering who has done what to whom, the emotional texture dominates, not the precise details of the situation. Within that ambiguity, though, are sufficiently recognizable human emotional high-water marks to signal personal agony: the emotional acuteness of the mother-child separation and the longing for an absent lover depicted in this poem particularly captures the dramatic apex of its emotional landscape, and the impersonal constructions encode the universal quality of the tragedy recounted.

One might ask, given the emphasis on grief and longing in this text, what this text tells us about the Anglo-Saxon apprehension of psychological pain. It

<sup>62</sup> Goldie, ‘Imagination and the Distorting Power of Emotion’, pp. 127–28.

also raises the question of how that apprehension is similar to or distinct from our own. Our understanding and empathy with the emotional complexity of the subjective experience represented in this text are predicated on comparable human psychological functioning shared by the creator and receiver of this text. Moreover, the apparent cross-cultural intelligibility of the text and its emotional texture points to consistency rather than variation in human apprehension of and cause for emotional pain, as well as the deep entrenchment of the reliance on poetry to represent and to engage with the emotional life. Indeed, the intensely affective quality of this poem is integral to its narrative ambiguity and capacity to evoke an emotional response in its audience. This affective power derives in part from the investment required on the part of the audience, and on the capacity of poetry for emotional co-experience. More specifically, it draws on the acknowledged role of emotions as managers of the inner life and controllers of cognitive functioning, and on the capacity of poetry to behave as emotion realized in aesthetic form.

For sense to be made of this text, its audience has to embrace these concepts, and thereby to valorize the emotional quality of lived experience, particularly highly-charged in this fictional representation. The patterns of emotional behaviour depicted in the text are mimicked by the reader in the act of interpretation, and so experienced in some atavistic manner in this mobilization of an affective stance towards the text that is cognitive as well as emotional. Of such experience, empathy is born. That readers today can feel such empathy, and live through the emotions depicted in *Wulf and Eadwacer*, tells against a model of the emotions that relies heavily on their cultural construction: the expression of strong emotion is too explicit for a viable reading exclusively through modern cultural constructions. No doubt historical and social forces have some impact on emotional experience, but the cross-cultural intelligibility of the emotional power of poetry argues for a limit on that shaping influence. Moreover, the emotional logic and contoured affective landscape of this poem shows the durable aesthetic reliance on the individual inner life, and the dominant continuities in the specifics of embodied human emotional experience over the millennia.

Similarly, the empathetic engagement of the audience is invited in other medieval texts. To take just one further Old English example, we can consider the long epic poem *Beowulf* to be an intuitively as well as demonstrably emotional text.<sup>63</sup> There are many instances of emotional concentration in this long

<sup>63</sup> See the statistical psychologically-based charting of emotional activity represented in the poem: Whissell, 'The Flow of Emotion through Beowulf'.

text, but to take just one line of inquiry, it is evident that, notwithstanding the negative depiction of the monsters, there are moments where the audience is invited to sympathize with them and thereby to develop an affective stance that complicates the narrative alignment of the reader's support for and focus on the hero. For example, Grendel's mother is initially and fundamentally motivated by grief. Her maternal anguish at the sight of her dead son's arm provides a brief humanizing quality to her and a pathetic aspect to her behaviour. Indeed, when the audience is first introduced to her, it is to see her grief-driven desire for vengeance: 'Grendles modor, | ides aglæcwif yrmpe gemunde'<sup>64</sup> (1258b–59) 'Grendel's mother, a female monster, mourned her misery'. Then, 'heo under heolfre genam | cupe folme; cearu wæs geniwod geworden in wicun' (1302b–04a) 'she took the known hand covered with blood; care was renewed, had come to pass in the dwellings'.<sup>65</sup> The limb was referred to earlier as 'blodge beadufolme' (990a) 'bloody battlehand' (which caused the blood of others to flow), but now her emotional reaction is embedded in the 'known hand' (known through 'blood' kinship: the conceptual metaphor of 'blood' is polyvalent here). The *Apo Koinou* line can refer backwards as well as forwards: the renewal of care can refer both to her renewed grief and to the fresh misery she inflicts on those nearby when she attacks. Like Grendel, his mother is humanized to a sufficient degree for her behaviour to be seen as calculated and evil rather than merely instinctive and bestial. Grief here is the trigger for motivational systems — it is managing behaviour, activating memory, and prompting revenge — and seems to determine rather than to disable practical reasoning, and to singularize the agent's goals.

This text's audience must engage with this emotional territory in order to make sense of the narrative, and thereby invest the monsters with human emotional characteristics in order to conceptualize motivated behaviour.<sup>66</sup> This conceptual activity is reinforced by the text's invitation to see the loss as psychologically distressing on both sides: 'ne wæs þæt gewrixle til, | þæt hie on ba healfa bicgan scoldon | freonda feorum' (1304b–06b) 'that was not a good bargain, where those on both sides had to pay with the lives of dear ones'. The

<sup>64</sup> *Klaeber's Beowulf*, ed. by Fulk, Bjork and Niles.

<sup>65</sup> An argument for the hand's being Æschere's, not Grendel's, has been made: See *Klaeber's Beowulf*, ed. by Fulk, Bjork and Niles, p. 198.

<sup>66</sup> In a similar way, Grendel's motivation for atrocity in the first place was presented as unendurable torment at being excluded from the revelry in the hall: he 'earfoðlice | þrage geþolode' (lines 86b–7a) 'endured that time of torture'. Later, too, the dragon responds to the theft of a goblet enraged ('abealch', line 2280b) at his loss.

immediately following lines take the focalization to Hrothgar, upset at the loss of his chief thane (1307–09), thereby foregrounding the human emotional implications of the monster's rage. This human reaction is as automatic, singular and stereotypical as the monster's, arising from self-preservation and social bonding. Yet, the reader's affective response goes beyond simple emotional contagion, because the monster's attack was presented as emotionally motivated. So, while the audience is undoubtedly cheering for the humans, prior engagement with the emotional reaction of a mother grieving for her dead son invites a cognitive, affective readerly response to the recounted battle that is explicitly presented as being between emotionally-charged adversaries.

Similarly, when the loyal Wiglaf addresses his companions, who abandoned their leader Beowulf at the crucial moment, he enacts a familiar emotional trajectory and invites a sympathetic response from the audience. He combines sorrow for his dead lord and smug scorn for his cowardly comrades: 'Wiglaf maðelode, Weohstanes sunu; | sec sarigferð seah on unleofe' (2862b–63) 'Wiglaf spoke, son of Weohstan, sick, sad at heart, looked at the unloved ones'. Like the speaker of *Wulf and Eadwacer*, here grief is likened to physical sickness, an embodied experience that is familiar to medieval and modern readers. Clearly, the narrative context and recognizable social schemas have an impact on the experience and complexity of emotions by the reader or hearer of the text, of which the cumulative construction of a mood of retrospection and even doom in the poem is a product. The representation of emotional human behaviour, as well as human cognitive activity, models and triggers similar activities in the mind of the audience — a form of emotional contagion that invites empathy.

These texts, like other medieval poems, portray recognizable human emotions, and in turn invite emotional reactions from readers today. We can distinguish the intense and conflicted emotional texture of *Wulf and Eadwacer* and the mixture of grief and vengeance of *Beowulf* precisely because we are familiar with the way in which emotions function in the management of goals and as a stimulus to action. These texts can arouse intense, involved readings from a modern audience because they model emotional reactions and narratively produce emotional experiences and genuine sensations, notwithstanding their acknowledged remoteness and even their fictionality. This readerly implication, or emotional investment, arises from rich, textured features within discourse that can be analysed in the context of ideas about emotion that are still emerging from the cognitive sciences.

As these examples show, a consideration of the emotional basis of the mental processes activated during textual interpretation provides an explanation for cross-cultural intelligibility, as well as the affective capacity of a fictional

narrative. Cognitive processes grounded in the emotional life determine both individual experience and also literary structure and response. The broad continuities in human emotional experience over time ensure the similarity of the emotional quality of textual creation and reception. Notwithstanding this consistency over time and across locations, emotions are subject at least in part to cultural impact, so can be studied in the context of cultural history: what is true for early medieval texts such as those discussed above would apply to some extent, but with significant variations, to later medieval and early modern texts.

The writings of Chaucer and Shakespeare represent and have the potential to trigger emotional reactions that are similar to those discussed in relation to *Wulf and Eadwacer*, but which are mediated by context-sensitive features that are surely deserving of comparative analysis. Indeed, the intrinsic textual capacity both to represent the flux of emotional states and also to trigger an emotional reaction in the reader provides a rich resource for a wide range of studies of the emotional life, investigations that can only be enhanced and deepened by considering a broad historical sweep back to the earliest English writings. As such, scholars of earlier cultures such as the medieval and early modern can and should contribute to a fuller diachronic examination of the affective potential of literary texts, as well as the capacity of these texts to represent human emotional experience that is both embodied (and therefore biologically consistent) and also subject to the localized shaping power of a specific cultural context.

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## GUINEVERE AS 'SOCIAL PERSON': EMOTION AND COMMUNITY IN CHRÉTIEN DE TROYES

Andrew Lynch

**G**uinevere is a major figure in Arthurian literature, especially in its romances, due to her prominence as queen in Arthur's court, her passionate relation to the primary hero Lancelot, and her close involvement in the sad end of the story. Yet while one can call Guinevere a striking 'character' in medieval writers as diverse as Marie de France, Chrétien de Troyes, the authors of the Lancelot-Grail cycle, and Thomas Malory, it must also be acknowledged that 'she' is really several separate fictional entities, united by a similar name but based on differing incidents, occurring in differing genres or forms, and produced by differing ideological needs of meaning. Despite some major overlapping characteristics — beauty, regality, passion, vulnerability — the composite 'Guinevere' of medieval tradition is a convenient figure of speech matching no individual textual instance, not an autonomous being who moves from text to text with a central core that receives only local variations, or who grows quasi-organically within a continuous narrative culture. Nevertheless, experienced Arthurian readers think they know what 'Guinevere' is like, so even within individual texts it is hard not to treat the familiar name as an already known, a key to interpretation, as if somehow anterior to the narrative utterances and the reading practices which make 'her' meaning *in situ*. In any single instance, the meaning of Guinevere, as with other characters with a long literary history, is formed by a reader's negotiation between the complex actualities of a text and the power of tradition.

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The tendency to reify Guinevere as an autonomous being has arguably been increased by recognition of her place as a problematic female element in the masculinist Arthurian literary tradition. The reader encounters her in a highly gendered context; like Chaucer's Criseyde, she has already been 'rolled [...] on many a tonge' before the story begins.<sup>1</sup> From her early 'historical' appearance in Geoffrey of Monmouth, Guinevere perfectly fits Thelma Fenster's observation that 'female Arthurian characters seem to arrive in each new work with a full set of already-givens that carry the freight of the problem that is woman'.<sup>2</sup> Addressing his dedicatee, man to man, Geoffrey quickly passes over Guenhumara's 'wicked' second marriage,<sup>3</sup> and moves on to the war between Arthur and Mordred which her wifely treachery has helped to bring about. Arthur has married Guenhumara for her Roman and Trojan/British connections and her beauty;<sup>4</sup> Mordred takes possession of her along with the crown;<sup>5</sup> her final despairing retreat to a nunnery in Caerleon is more a narrative disposal of her than a matter of interest in its own right: she will be a widow living chastely away from the seats of power.<sup>6</sup> Politically evaluated by men both within the story and beyond it, her career seems to have meaning only within the requirements of elite male groups.

Against such a background, it is natural that creative and critical interest should have arisen in Guinevere as an 'individual', a personality with legitimate interests and feelings of her own, who counts for something in the story, and is more than an objectified problem within it. Finding the hidden Guinevere would then seem to entail liberating her from the often misogynist and always male-centred discourses in which she is found. As one modern writer has put it: 'I wanted her to grow beyond the legend, to become real.'<sup>7</sup> This approach also has its problems, partly because the textual space into which a Guinevere is liberated can only be another construction, not a latent 'reality', but also because an important determinant of Guinevere's being in the Arthurian tradition is her openness to hostile male judgements, firstly as the adulterous consort of Mordred in the chronicle tradition, or as the adulterous lover of Lancelot (mainly) in romances.

<sup>1</sup> *The Riverside Chaucer*, ed. by Benson, *Troilus and Criseyde*, V. 1061.

<sup>2</sup> *Arthurian Women*, ed. by Fenster, p. xx.

<sup>3</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, X, ed. and trans. by Faletra, p. 196.

<sup>4</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, IX, ed. and trans. by Faletra, p. 170.

<sup>5</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, X, ed. and trans. by Faletra, p. 196.

<sup>6</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, XI, ed. and trans. by Faletra, p. 198.

<sup>7</sup> Newman, 'Foreword, "Seeking Guinevere"', p. xiii.

Guinevere's resulting vulnerability has inspired many liberations and defences of her, both literal and figurative, within and beyond the narrative fictions. Modern critical defences mainly reject readings which treat Guinevere as a known quantity on the basis of misogynist attitudes and discriminatory practices. Yet there are also problems with readings which seek to take her beyond the gendered social roles assigned her in medieval narratives. Just as misogyny restricts discretion in reading character because it judges one woman by assumptions about women in general, insistence on a specially liberated, alternative, or transgressive feminine agency in a female character may restrict attention to the specificity of her participation in a particular text. As Geraldine Heng noted, the ancillary nature of women in chivalric literature requires that readers must attend to 'a submerged second narrative' in the text to establish women's significance. Yet in attending to what Heng calls the 'direct and indirect manifestations which together inscribe a range of play' through which the feminine might be recovered,<sup>8</sup> the social construction of the feminine within overt masculinist discourse still remains a major factor. The gendered social horizons of a text do not define the complete emotional potential of the woman of chivalric literature, but they are intrinsic to one sense of her 'reality', in that they reveal practical and ideological factors which shaped the lives of actual women in similar circumstances, and which have left their traces in contemporary literature. These are

the stereotypes and expectations about proper emotional expression and behaviour that would have circumscribed how individual women processed their feelings and allow us to imagine how medieval women might 'navigate' the complicated web of social norms and cultural values that define and give meaning to emotions.<sup>9</sup>

The unequal historical access of the sexes to power, opportunity and self-expression made evident in literary texts means that modern readers cannot release a sub-textual 'real' woman, as a notional free entity, from a textual 'role' dictated by gendered limitations. Literary being, like actual being, is imaginatively constituted and enacted within these limits, amongst others. In a study of literary character ranging from Chaucer to Spenser, Elizabeth Fowler calls this process 'the personification of social bonds'.<sup>10</sup> Within the process, Guinevere's

<sup>8</sup> Heng, 'Enchanted Ground: The Feminine Subtext in Malory', pp. 97, 108.

<sup>9</sup> Perfetti, 'Introduction', p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Fowler, *Literary Character*, p. 95. See also Nair, "O brotel wele of mannes joie unstable!" for a discussion of the concept of social character, specifically in relation to gender and the medieval romance genre.

existence as 'the queen' or 'the wife of King Arthur' is sadly more 'real' than her imagined existence as a woman freed from those definitions and what they entail in medieval culture. Accordingly, I shall argue, her emotional life is more, not less, readable through its depiction within a literature, such as Chrétien de Troyes's romances, that respects the real power of social bonds, even though what can be read is not the whole story.

Johanna Bourke has written that 'emotions are an expression of social power relations. Emotions link the individual with the social in dynamic ways. They are always about social enaction.'<sup>11</sup> Using Fowler's terms, we can also understand a figure like Chrétien's Guinevere as a 'social person'. 'Social persons are models of the person, familiar concepts of social being that attain currency through common use.'<sup>12</sup> They 'depend not only upon their contexts of topoi and institutions, but also upon their positions in networks of social relationships'.<sup>13</sup> The varied signifying systems and registers of discourse within which and by which a literary character is constructed form part of the operations of these social networks. I am interested in observing the emotional life of Chrétien's Guinevere in relation to his depiction of her social interactions, rather than seeking it in a narrative subtext where an imagined autonomous feminine agency operates independently of or in resistance to social norms. In particular I shall argue that Chrétien's Guinevere, as articulated across three narratives — *Erec et Enide*, *Cligès*, and *Le Chevalier de la Charrete* (*Lancelot*) — is neither simply a creature of masculinist culture nor simply defined by subversive or alternative individual agency. Rather, in my view Guinevere is represented as a skilled operator within the emotional demands of various male-oriented collectivities, but when these collectivities are themselves shown to be problematical and open to critique, the queen's definition as a 'social person' changes its nature and value in relation to the changing evaluation of its social contexts. In this way, without ceasing to be 'the queen' or 'the wife of King Arthur', or breaking the bounds of her masculinist world, Chrétien's Guinevere is given new opportunities of emotional articulation.

Guinevere's initial status in Chrétien's *Erec* is uncertain, in that unlike Erec or Enide, for example, she seems to need no introduction and no back-story; she just appears as 'the queen' (*Erec*, 77),<sup>14</sup> as if already known. In this, she is treated

<sup>11</sup> Bourke, 'Fear and Anxiety', p. 113.

<sup>12</sup> Fowler, *Literary Character*, p. 2. See also, p. 5: 'the intrinsic capacity of social persons simultaneously to refer to individual bodies and to personify social relations.'

<sup>13</sup> Fowler, *Literary Character*, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> This and subsequent references are to line numbers in Chrétien de Troyes, *Erec et Enide*, ed. and trans. by Carroll.

like King Arthur himself, already a famous figure. And yet, Chrétien's treatment of her character here could not have been predicted from the treacherous and timid, even 'degraded', Guanhumara in Geoffrey of Monmouth and Wace,<sup>15</sup> nor from the predatory and vindictive queen in Marie de France's *Lanval* who seems alienated from the knightly group and suspected of promiscuity: the barons readily believe Lanval, not her, about which of the two proposed love.<sup>16</sup> In direct contrast, Chrétien's Guinevere occupies a position loyal to the king, yet in her broader relation to the court, and especially to the knights, she establishes an identity beyond the relation to Arthur, even though she is always understood as the king's wife and the queen, and her position remains clearly ancillary to the king's in power. In the standard terms of character 'agency', one might see some potential individuation signalled for the queen at the start of *Erec* when she rides in company with Erec, participates in the start of his first adventure, persuades Arthur to alter his original plans, and receives homage from Erec's first conquest, Yder, whom she releases directly into Arthur's service. Yet from that point, as the story deals more with the relation between Erec and Enide, Chrétien's narrative tends to maintain the 'Trojan' ceremonial separation of the sexes found in Geoffrey and Wace,<sup>17</sup> with the queen cast mainly as sponsor and investor of Enide and patron of the marriage, ending in a consort role — 'and the queen' — in the later coronation scenes, while Erec sits next to Arthur on a throne that was originally a wedding present to her. In the later parts of the story, Guinevere is assimilated into spectacles promulgating the idea that the best interests of all — men and women, lord and vassals, parents and children — can be accommodated in the ideal court.

In a context which privileges an ideal of the court collective so strongly, the queen cannot experience the emotional adventures that characterize Enide in the relatively private problems of her marriage, nor operate loyally as Enide does through an emotional instinct that often means crossing her husband's will. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to read Guinevere's narrative trajec-

<sup>15</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, X–XI, ed. and trans. by Faletra, pp. 196–98; Wace, *Roman de Brut*, trans. by Weiss, lines 13010–13222; p. 331, n. 1.

<sup>16</sup> See Marie de France, *Lais*, ed. by Ewert, p. 68, line 413, and Marie de France, *Lais*, trans. by Burgess and Busby, p. 78. Arthur's barons say that Lanval has been 'retté a mut grant tort', very 'wrongly accused' of asking the queen for her love.

<sup>17</sup> See Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, IX, ed. and trans. by Faletra, p. 176: 'they still maintained the Trojan custom of celebrating feast days separately, the men with the men and the women with the women.' For the occasional separation of Arthur's and Guinevere's courts in *Erec*, see Maddox, *The Romances of Chrétien de Troyes*, pp. 31–33.



tory in *Erec* as simply a story of failed autonomy, a would-be independent identity subordinated to masculinist romance convention. The notion of character 'agency' can privilege a summary of the *récit* too much over thematic and discursive emphases. In summaries of action, one tends to forget events like the long description of the dress Guinevere gives to Enide, in a scene extensively prepared for by Erec's refusal of other clothing for his bride. The queen's sponsorship of Enide with her own clothing, 'as though she were another self', is especially significant.<sup>18</sup> Through her concern for Erec's reputation, Enide will become this male-centred poem's moral centre, upholding its balance between the fulfilment of love in marriage and of prowess in vassalage. She will eventually function as a second Guinevere in consoling the defeated Mabonagrain's lover and bringing her also into the 'Joy of the Court' that Erec's victory has achieved. That climactic episode provides the poem's major statement of the sorrows of existence in isolation and the necessity for happiness of emotional integration into society at large. So, as both Erec's early patron and Enide's sponsor, Guinevere grows in significance through the narrative of their later successes. She, more than Arthur, has been their link to the court, as expressed in the poem's core emotional idiom. Her secondary position, named after the king and his entourage, in the context of the initial hunt — 'Aprés aus monte la reïne' ('The queen mounted up after them') (77) — is reversed in the display of 'joy' when Enide first comes to court:

La reïne Ganievre i cort  
et si vint meïsmes li rois.

Queen Guinevere ran there,  
and the king himself came. (1512–13)

and

La reïne grant joie an mainne;  
de joie est tote la corz plainne  
ancontre son avenement.

The queen was overjoyed at this;  
the whole court was full of joy  
in preparation for his arrival. (1523–25)

<sup>18</sup> Le Goff, 'Vestimentary and Alimentary Codes in *Erec et Enide*', p. 137.

While Arthur first greets the couple, it is Guinevere that Erec first addresses: 'Je vos amain, | dame, ma pucele et m'amie' ("My lady, | I bring you my maiden and my lady") (1542–43), before Enide is taken straight to the queen's apartment to receive the amazing mantle. The queen takes the lead, whenever required, in what seems to be a practised royal double-act, as part of a long negotiation to keep Erec, a premier knight and a future king, within the Arthurian orbit. The process will culminate when Erec decides to hold his inherited lands under Arthur's lordship — 'un molt grant savoir' ('an act of great wisdom') (6498), according to Chrétien, and to be crowned by Arthur as a 'gift' and an 'honour' (6510).<sup>19</sup> Retrospectively, Guinevere and Arthur are seen to have modelled from the outset the co-operative strategy of a noble husband and wife that Erec and Enide only achieve after many adventures.<sup>20</sup> The young couple have to come through trials of separation and solitude towards the complete fullness of their final coronation at Nantes, while Arthur and Guinevere seem already to have reached this end zone.

In such a context, the sense of 'the queen's' identity in *Erec*, including her emotional identity, is not built up through individuation, let alone transgression, but through repeated recognition that she fulfils the requirements of her place, and that the court as a whole, male and female, approves of her behaviour and judgement. She, like Arthur, is a primary focus for and example of the communal orientation that makes for a joyful court, the story's climactic theme, the assembly to which Chrétien says his heart draws him ('li cuers me tire') (6596). Like Arthur, who receives the consent of all present, 'a une voix' (1785), before he gives Enide the kiss of the White Stag, Guinevere features commonly in constructions which signal full participation and concurrence: 'And the queen likewise' (272); 'there was not a one who did not agree with her' (340); "I am quite certain | that you are absolutely right" (1154–55); "That may well be", said one and all' (16); "we did well yesterday to take your advice" (1224). She in turn approves of the right others, especially Erec and Enide. Guinevere is mainly present in group scenes, with her moments of relative retirement with Enide used as preludes to further public display. In such a story of ceremonial and mass pageant, a sense of singularity and individualized agency would arguably make her actions, as queen, less effective. In particular, as represented in this highly politicized narrative, her emotional life as queen only exists at any

<sup>19</sup> For expectations of such a decision as beneficial to both parties, see Pascua, 'Peace among Equals', p. 201.

<sup>20</sup> See Burgess, *Chrétien de Troyes: Erec et Enide*, pp. 47–80.

important level within corporate situations, where a communal realm of feeling operates, centred on the elite group, and lesser emotions are expected to give way. There is a politics of emotion at work here, as in Guinevere's careful leadership of court 'joy' over Erec's bride, or Chrétien's treatment of the sorrow at Enide's departure from her family:

au departir plore la mere,  
 plore la pucele et li pere.  
 Tex est amors, tex est nature,  
 tex est pitiez de norreture:  
 [...]  
 mes bien savoient ne por quant  
 que lor fille an tel leu aloit  
 don granz enors lor avandroit.

at parting the mother wept,  
 and the maiden wept, as did the father.  
 Such is love, such is nature,  
 such is the tenderness for one's offspring.  
 [...]  
 and yet they knew full well  
 that their daughter was going to such a place  
 where there would be great honor for them (1449–58)

The sorrow due to nature is indulged, but still clearly bounded by the new royal context which will transform the lives of these provincials. Similarly, when King Lac dies, '[...] this weighed upon Erec much more | than he showed people outwardly | but grieving is uncourtly on the part of a king, | and it does not befit a king to show grief' (6478–81). Erec is a true son, but he is required to take on a new responsibility for his emotions as a monarch, just as he has had to adjust emotionally to being both a knight and a married man. The narrative does not assume, as a modern reader might, that the gap between natural or private emotions, like those of a son at the death of a father, and behaviour appropriate to the holder of a public role, means simply the difference between underlying reality and outward pretence. Rather Erec's form of sorrow as a king, what might be called his 'social emotion', has its own legitimate claims and prompts to action, and, in this romance at least, these will take precedence.

Chrétien's *Cligès* also strongly features Guinevere as patron of youth. As in *Erec*, her sponsoring of a young couple begins with encouragement of a foreign knight, the Greek Alexander, before his love interest emerges. Much as before, she strengthens the young hero's place at court, receives his first prisoners, and

further his marriage through the gift of a rich garment. It is as if the selfish and predatory behaviour of Arthur's queen in Marie's *Lanval*, where the worthy hero receives no gift from royalty, but only from a lover, was being specifically redressed in Guinevere's brokering of Soredamors's love-gift of an embroidered shirt to Alexander. Similarly, the steward Count Angrès's revolt, causing Arthur and his army to hurry back from the Continent, is a rerun of Mordred's treachery in Geoffrey of Monmouth and Wace, but in this case Guinevere accompanies Arthur abroad and returns with him as if specifically to reverse the previous stories of her disloyalty (*Cligès*, 436–37; 98).<sup>21</sup> Their gendered sharing of court roles is maintained: Alexander travels as Arthur's only companion, Soredamors with Guinevere and the maidens, all in one vessel (441–46; 98). Guinevere will eventually foster the love that springs up on the ship, in line with her wish to encourage the 'new knights' (1202–05; 109). Alexander's surrender of prisoners to her further binds her into the chivalric group, for 'everyone' (1358; 111) approves of it, fearing that Arthur would have them executed as traitors, as he eventually insists on doing. A rehabilitation at court like that Guinevere achieves for Yder in *Erec* is therefore not possible in this case, so the issue of the prisoners creates a temporary difference between Arthur and herself. She has to submit to his authority — there is 'no way out of it' (1432; 112) — but the episode does not weaken her relation with the knightly group, nor with Arthur, as they fulfil traditional gender roles of kingly justice and queenly pity. When 'the good, loyal knights' later condemn the traitors with Arthur as a group, after they have agreed with Guinevere before to spare them, it can be seen that they are inconsistent, but the main point is the common ability of king and queen to encourage collective agreements, reading the mood of a situation and working as if in tandem to further a good outcome. Their projects are shown to merge. During the queen's interview with Arthur about the prisoners, Alexander and Soredamors are thrown together again and Soredamors sees that he is wearing the shirt she embroidered, Guinevere's gift; then after the executions Arthur rewards Alexander with followers and lands, and once more 'tuit li baron de la cort' ('all the nobles') approve (1470; 112).

As a whole, the episode shows both political and chivalric concerns to be satisfied by different means shared between king and queen. Guinevere's actions mark out a court identity and mode of operation for herself, suiting the

<sup>21</sup> References to the text of *Cligès* are to line numbers in Chrétien de Troyes, *Cligès*, ed. by Foerster, followed by page numbers in Chrétien de Troyes, *Arthurian Romances*, trans. by Owen. For the relation of this episode and others to Wace, see Maddox, *The Romances of Chrétien de Troyes*, pp. 9–10.

queenly role of intercessor, but they fit well with a system of reward and punishment, based on the regime's need to attract and maintain military support. The Greek knights will replace the traitors they have helped to kill and capture. Guinevere's preoccupation with love and marriage is also prudent politics. Alexander dies, but the allegiance of Cligès, the offspring of Guinevere's two protégés, is in large part her own work. That Cligès is also Gawain's nephew and Arthur's great-nephew indicates how closely love and dynastic strategy are linked in the milieu she occupies as queen. Overall, the chief significance of Guinevere's actions in *Erec* and *Cligès* seems neither subversive nor relegated to a separate sphere; rather, she speaks for its core 'value system' of honourable love.<sup>22</sup> Beyond that, her actions also seem to relate back directly to the Arthurian agenda in Geoffrey of Monmouth and Wace, — 'invit[ing] all the bravest men [...] to join his household.'<sup>23</sup> Chrétien's obsession with large round numbers, including the number of knights present at Arthur's court, can be seen as an index of this royal need for military support, and anxiety about loss of it: we are told in *Erec* that when the hero finally returns to Arthur after his adventures, the king is personally weak (he has just been bled) and 'greatly distressed | that he did not have more people at his court,' 'only | 500 barons of his household' (*Erec* 6370–78; 85).

Guinevere's adventures in *Lancelot* or *Le Chevalier de la charrete* also stem from her double-act with Arthur, but under different circumstances, since from the start of this text collective identities are shown as under threat, and there is no positive sense of court cohesion. A single intruder — Meleagant — taunts the king with the prisoners he holds, and demands to fight in single combat for possession of them and the queen. The court is 'tote estormie' ('in turmoil') (81),<sup>24</sup> united only in alarm; no one moves to help Arthur. In these circumstances, Guinevere shares the king's predicament and acts with him. It is she who at Arthur's request persuades Kay to remain when he threatens to leave court, and she makes on behalf of both of them the rash promise that puts her under Kay's protection: "et ge et il l'otroierons" (159; 187).<sup>25</sup> She and Arthur

<sup>22</sup> Uitti, with Freeman, *Chrétien de Troyes Revisited*, p. 56.

<sup>23</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, IX, ed. and trans. by Faletra, p. 171; Wace, *Roman de Brut*, trans. by Weiss, lines 9741–46.

<sup>24</sup> References to this text are to line numbers in Chrétien de Troyes, *Lancelot, or The Knight of the Cart*, ed. and trans. by Kibler.

<sup>25</sup> It is therefore not simply the case that Arthur 'rashly gives [...] his queen away,' as claimed in Uitti, *Chrétien de Troyes Revisited*, p. 31, and pp. 64–66.

are linked on this occasion by their inability to control a collective situation presented as outrageous. They share a royal vulnerability to the power of enemies (Meleagant), the wilfulness or ineffectiveness of vassals (Kay who says too much, Gawain who speaks too late), and the dangers of obligation (the promise to Kay). The *Charrete* narrative sends Guinevere from her home court for the first time in Chrétien — her previous excursions have been in Arthur's company — and precipitates her into new situations and opportunities. Nevertheless, she is not liberated from her social identity, still identified as 'queen' (*reïne*), 'lady' (*dame*) or 'the wife of King Arthur' (*la fame le roi Artu*); the name 'Ganievre' is used only twice. She is glimpsed only once in Meleagant's control on the road, and even then is accompanied by her maidens. Otherwise, she is under King Bademagu's close protection in Gorre, and Bademagu, 'striving [...] to do her honour and service', recreates for her there a royal status: "No one but herself has overseen | Her confinement, and she arranged it so" (3568–69; 4063–64).

In this situation, the obvious new emotional opportunity for Guinevere is separation from Arthur and love with Lancelot, which finds its deep expression in Gorre. Like the queen's own initial status in *Erec*, this love receives no backstory, but is taken as existing from before the narrative begins, even though there is nothing about it in Chrétien's previous romances. Karl Uitti puts eloquently the mainstream view that love makes Guinevere a character divided between public duty and private emotion:

She [Guinevere] is [...] torn between her 'external' duty to the masculine world — the City of Men — represented by her husband, his court, and the 'historical' matter of Britain, and the private, 'internalized' feminine world of her feelings and individuality.<sup>26</sup>

Nevertheless, although Lancelot's actions in this romance are solely motivated by Guinevere, they suit the continuing interests of both king and queen. He is not a force that divides the royal couple. Even if it is Lancelot that Guinevere secretly addresses as she reluctantly rides off with Kay (209) — 'amis' ('friend') not 'rois' ('king')<sup>27</sup> — that does not mean that she implies Lancelot would have acted against Arthur's wishes, or interfered with the promise to Kay. She may well mean that, if Lancelot had known, he, not Kay, would have taken up Meleagant's challenge and escorted her. What would have happened, in effect,

<sup>26</sup> Uitti, *Chrétien de Troyes Revisited*, p. 74.

<sup>27</sup> Manuscripts of the text differ in this reading. See Chrétien de Troyes, *Lancelot, or The Knight of the Cart*, ed. and trans. by Kibler, p. 298, n. 209.

is what is agreed to after the first combat in Gorre, that is, a fight between Lancelot and Meleagant to decide the fate of the prisoners and whether Guinevere stays with Arthur or goes, except that the peace agreement in Gorre stipulates that the fight must take place at Arthur's court (and therefore under his supervision) rather than in the 'woods' beyond it, as originally proposed. The story requires Lancelot to begin his adventures outside the norms of a quest granted by Arthur, and for love alone, but, under Guinevere's control, he serves the common interests she shares with Arthur. As well as releasing the captives, redressing the story's original problem and creating 'joy', he returns the queen and the adventure to Arthur's jurisdiction.

Chrétien seems fascinated by taking to its extreme the idea that a noble male lover will do all that the beloved wants. When that lover is also the best of all knights, the narrative results are intensely ironic, for at his most elevated in prowess Lancelot is also most subjected in love service, by normal standards a ridiculous figure unable to act 'for himself', and yet his unique capacity for subjection to *one* is what shows him to surpass all others, as the ground of his knightly agency and his deepest emotional identity. Lancelot's utter devotion to Guinevere's will, coupled with his unsurpassable prowess, also offers her unique power and choice, far beyond the ancillary or co-operative role she has had as Arthur's queen. Yet Guinevere treats this power with caution, showing a broad concern for her responsibilities to Arthur and his court. Rather than using her complete emotional hold over Lancelot to solve the problem of Meleagant by force, she uses it to make peace. She immediately grants Bademagu's request that Lancelot spare Meleagant — the obligation to King Bademagu is repeatedly insisted on (4013–65) — then stays with some of her retinue in Gorre to wait for Gawain, while ostentatiously refusing to speak to Lancelot. She twice stops the result of a fight that would have proven Lancelot the winner, leaving Meleagant's claim to possess her and (absurdly) to have been winning the fight still unsilenced, so postponing its resolution until Arthur is in charge. These actions serve as a narrative demonstration by Chrétien of how a queen can employ the love of a great vassal for benign political ends. It is not such a great step, perhaps, from Guinevere's cultivating love between others — Erec and Enide, Alexander and Soredamors — for military and political purposes to using her own lover-knight in this way. In that respect, it can be argued that not much changes in *Lancelot*, despite an influential view that it is a poetic fragment, an adventure set apart.<sup>28</sup> Chrétien's earlier romances show a young noble

<sup>28</sup> See for example, Uitti, *Chrétien de Troyes Revisited*, p. 11, and Frappier, *Chrétien de Troyes*, p. 133.



pair receiving the patronage of Arthur's court, strengthening it by their actions, and upholding its authority. In *Lancelot*, now that the court collective seems enfeebled, no longer able to empower the Arthurian agenda and to mediate 'joy', the emotional energy needed to sustain the regime is found in the love of a knight for the queen herself. So the narrative necessity for the effective combination of love and prowess remains as before, questioning how strict a division really exists between private feminized emotion and public masculine politics.

Nevertheless, comparison between the situation in *Lancelot* and those in the previous romances reveals one major difference. The queen's patronage of Erec and Cligès has never involved the social rejection of others as Lancelot is repeatedly rejected by her in this romance. Rather, Guinevere has tried to bring everyone, including former opponents like Yder and even the traitors in *Cligès*, back into the court collective. Now she singles Lancelot out for shameful usage in several episodes, driving him into isolation. Her first dismissive treatment of Lancelot in Gorre (3937–46), amazing Bademagu and Kay, stands out all the more sharply after the conventional scene, pushed to comic extremes, in which Lancelot is able to dominate the combat with Meleagant only after observing his beloved observing him (3669–3727). Such behaviour may look like a classic idea of 'feminine' caprice. Even a defender of Guinevere, Jean Frappier, speaks of the 'jeu cruel de grande coquette' in which she 'exerce [...] son empire sur le plus vaillant des chevaliers', but excuses her because she is a suffering lover herself: 'N'est-elle pas aussi l'amante?'<sup>29</sup> Yet this cruelty to Lancelot would be the only area of capricious emotional behaviour in Chrétien's Guinevere, and oddly limited to her treatment of one knight. It would be better understood as a course of action that consistently signals the queen's special attitude to Lancelot as a lover, and in which her 'inner' emotional life of feeling is not truly divorced from an 'outer' social and political role of action, but closely, if sometimes obscurely, connected to it.

In any reading, Guinevere's treatment of Lancelot should be understood within a social context which is very different from what has prevailed before in Chrétien. None of the collective social entities encountered in this romance is invested with the true courtly and chivalric qualities they had in *Erec* and the earlier sections of *Cligès*. Instead, they are fickle bodies whose failures of action and judgement set off by contrast the seriousness and efficacy of Lancelot and the queen. These groups include, amongst others: Arthur's cowed court at the story's beginning; the maidens who mock Lancelot for riding in the cart, but

<sup>29</sup> Frappier, *Chrétien de Troyes*, p. 139.

greet Gawain joyfully (395–498); the foolish company in the meadow, dancing, dicing and playing board games (1634–72), who first revile Lancelot, then accept him when he is countenanced by their lord: ‘A hundred curses on anyone | Who stops his play on his account. | Let’s return to our games!’ (1825–27); the people of Logres who fight to host Lancelot, then are appalled to hear about his ride in the cart, then delighted again when he accepts the combat (2437–2676); the natives of Gorre who mistakenly try to please King Bademagu by capturing Lancelot because he has released Meleagant’s prisoners (4107–56); finally, the tournament crowd at Noauz, bewildered by Lancelot’s deliberate changes of form at Guinevere’s wish, who end up ‘ashamed and mortified’ for having abused him for cowardice (5621–6040). These are idle, infantilized and confused crowds rather than honourable assemblies, and they change their opinion according to rumours, fashion, signs of noble favour, or the latest tournament results. In a significant alteration from the narrative privilege of collectivity in *Erec* and *Cligès*, group behaviour in the *Charrete* is dysfunctional and unruly in every social unit: children will not be ruled by parents; vassals violate their lord’s wishes; shallowly-judging knightly groups deal only in scandal and surface appearance; neither Arthur nor Bademagu exercises proper control over court trouble-makers. In a related thematic series of episodes, Chrétien repeatedly contrasts a few insightful individuals (usually old) with others (usually hot-headed young men) who judge only by surface appearances and their own will, and who are then forced by events to change their minds or suffer humiliation.

By contrast with the crowds, Guinevere’s conduct towards Lancelot can be read as a extreme statement rejecting an evaluation of him based on the chances of military success, and rejecting an attachment that must be nurtured by public signs of favour such as she has to show to the temperamental Kay and to Gawain. She refuses to let Lancelot’s rescue of her from Meleagant be treated as an obligation to the winner, or a *de facto* placement within his protection. Guinevere is not to be possessed through competitive prowess, as Meleagant has hoped, according to the custom of the region, which Lancelot has already opposed in a previous episode, typically involving a father-son dispute. (1506–1811). At the tournament of Noauz (‘worst’), Guinevere mockingly questions the traditional attachment of female esteem to male military success by making Lancelot deliberately lose as well as win. As Matilda Bruckner points out, her actions are ‘a way to preserve her love as a gift’, and to allow Lancelot ‘the maximum display of his love.’<sup>30</sup> The queen apparently rejects the

<sup>30</sup> Bruckner, ‘Le Chevalier de la Charrette’, pp. 145–48.

three-day tournament scenario that connects love and prowess in Geoffrey of Monmouth and Wace, where ladies 'grant their love' to proven warriors, as if under obligation.<sup>31</sup> Lancelot's eventual prowess at Noauz comically disrupts this arrangement also, because after the tournament no woman wants to marry anyone but him. Employing but inverting such conventions, Guinevere distinguishes her lover from all others by consistently evaluating him on the ability to suffer shame, defeat and symbolic death. Her apparently inconsistent emotional behaviour actually consistently follows the narrative emphasis that the difference between Lancelot and other knights is love more than prowess. It is only 'por les genz ('for those present') (4166) that Guinevere claims to value Lancelot as a vassal, for what he has done 'on my account' (4169), and it is Bademagu, not Lancelot, who blames the queen for ingratitude (3892–99). Lancelot never claims to deserve, let alone command her. She, though politically attuned to everyone else, continually rejects obligation to him as one who has 'served' her; rather, the condition of her love, as shown in its consummation at Gorre, is her assurance of his respect for her will, which gives its exercise a unique freedom:

'Se vostre congiez le m'otroie,  
tote m'est delivre la voie' [...].  
'Certes,' fet ele, 'jel voel bien;  
mes voloires pas ne vos detient.'

'If you grant me your permission  
The way will soon be free [...]'  
'Of course I want you with me,' she replied.  
'My wishes will never restrain you.' (4611–17)

The emotional contrast between the story's opening promise extorted by Kay and the consent freely given here to Lancelot — the verb 'otroier' ('grant', 'allow') recurs — could not be greater; it makes Meleagant's accusation that the queen has slept with Kay all the more ironic.<sup>32</sup> Guinevere's exercise of her will as lover may appear capricious, but it steadily highlights her emotional difference from the failing societies we see depicted in *Lancelot*. Here Chrétien shows the lovers alone able to achieve the joyful accord based on deep emotion

<sup>31</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, IX, ed. and trans. by Faletra, p. 176.

<sup>32</sup> See also Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, p. 189: 'Both he [Lancelot] and Guinevere agree: no one has rights over Guinevere.'

— ‘une joie et une merveille’ (4077) — which in his previous romances was shared by the broader courtly collective.

This change of heart about courts was not to be a feature of one romance alone. An analogous situation occurs in *Yvain*, though Guinevere is largely ‘absent’ from that text through her involvement in the simultaneous plot of *Lancelot*. Chrétien’s story treats the love relationship between Yvain and Laudine as a deep concern in contrast with the protagonist’s shallow chivalric fellowship with Gawain on the tournament circuit. Yvain must abandon courtly society to recover his best self. In the more religious context of *Perceval*, where Guinevere does not feature at all, the hero also decisively leaves court at a crucial point in the narrative to seek out alone the Grail lance and spear, his apparently destined significant others.<sup>33</sup> Beyond the *Lancelot*, Chrétien continues through other means to valorize the deep emotional connection of individuals over the widely inclusive emotional collectives he had previously endorsed but now rejects as inferior loci of feeling.

Accordingly, whatever else she is, the Guinevere of *Lancelot* should not be read as a typically ‘disruptive [female] force’ in the courtly realm of medieval romance;<sup>34</sup> the idea of the court is already ruptured in this case. Chrétien weakens faith in the judgement of the chivalric collective and in the public means by which its judgements are formed, and so makes a much lesser consideration of its agreement and approval. In tandem with that, Guinevere’s emotional identity becomes more apparent in distinction from the groups in which she figured so prominently in *Erec* and *Cligès*. That does not make her a subversive or adversarial character in the Arthurian world: her regnal skills and loyalty are shown to remain undiminished; as a good queen, she never loses countenance in public; even at the overwhelming news of Lancelot’s death, she can speak suitable words ‘por les genz’; Lancelot is placed fully at the service of Arthur’s regime. Yet the singularity of love — signalled as before in Chrétien by many asides, interior monologues, psychomachias, equivocations and secret ironies — cannot this time eventually receive collective affirmation and acculturation through the patronage of a discriminating court elite, the role Guinevere herself has performed for Erec and Enide, Alexander and Soredamors. Only intermittently and unpredictably can a third party, like the maiden in the window at Gorre, be a mediator (3633–3703). Love restricts recognition to an elite of

<sup>33</sup> Chrétien de Troyes, *Le Conte du Graal* (*Perceval*), ed. by Lecoy, line 4703; Chrétien de Troyes, *Arthurian Romances*, trans. by Kibler, p. 439.

<sup>34</sup> Krueger, ‘Questions of Gender in Old French Courtly Romance’, p. 138.

two, who employ public signs in a way that can at best be meaningful only to themselves, because the signs bear an inverse, poetic relation to their meaning in the shallow systems that everyone else treats as rational.<sup>35</sup> Love is therefore by no means a free emotional state that permits a private Guinevere to emerge and operate independently of her normal role. The confusion of significance, even sometimes for Lancelot, in her attempt to give a personal emotional meaning to public codes reveals how much she remains 'the queen', a political and gendered identity. But through love and through a narrative shift in attitude towards the institutions and shared discourses that constitute her as a 'social person' in this romance, the queen's emotional life is separated from its former community.

<sup>35</sup> See Bruckner, 'Chrétien de Troyes', p. 86: 'an epistemological problem that pervades Chrétien's romances: how to interpret signs correctly when their meaning shifts as our point of view changes [...] the narrator focalizes what we see through the characters' eyes, limits what we can know, and complicates with conflicting perspectives any effort to totalize knowledge.'

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# POSITIVE EMOTION IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY: THE EMOTIONAL WORLD OF GOSWIN OF BOSSUT

Jennifer Carpenter\*

As long as we judge loss, limits, and extinction to be evils, we will never, at least in the stories we tell ourselves, be without joy.

(Potkay, *The Story of Joy*, p. 236)

This study considers the distinctive emotional world evoked by Goswin of Bossut, cantor of the Cistercian monastery of Villers, in three saints' lives he composed in the 1230s. In these works, which describe for a mainly local audience the lives of three contemporary local Cistercian heroes, Goswin of Bossut presents a coherent and striking 'emotional community', whose members share a consistent understanding of how and why and where emotion should be felt and expressed.<sup>1</sup> Key to that understanding is the central place Goswin gives in his works to what may be described as positive emotion — joy, jubilation, gladness, rejoicing, love, happiness, consolation, and also,

\* My thanks to Prof. Barbara Brookes, University of Otago, New Zealand for providing inspiration for this study.

<sup>1</sup> The concept of 'emotional community' is drawn from the work of Barbara H. Rosenwein. See especially, Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*; Rosenwein, 'Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions'; Rosenwein, 'Emotion Words'. I am also indebted to Reddy's 'Against Constructionism'.

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importantly, grace, whose reception Goswin frequently portrays as emotional experience.<sup>2</sup> Expressions of positive emotion are also positioned as key forces in constituting and defending the social groups Goswin values, often in remarkably concrete ways. In particular, the texts reinforce the value of communities linked by close, equal spiritual friendships between men and women, lay and religious, a theme that pervades each of Goswin's three hagiographical works. At the same time, Goswin's evocation of positive emotion serves as a rhetorical strategy to reinforce membership in the various communities of readers to whom the lives he authored were directed; the texts thus serve as guides to what emotional life and what community life should be like.

Goswin of Bossut was a monk and cantor of Villers, a large Cistercian community in the Duchy of Brabant founded in 1146–47;<sup>3</sup> he was active as a writer in the 1230s, and is known to be the author of the Lives of Arnulf of Villers, a laybrother of Villers, Ida of Nivelles, a nun of the Cistercian community of La Ramée, and Abundus of Huy, a monk of Villers, and also two liturgical offices for local saints.<sup>4</sup> Goswin of Bossut's saints' lives fit within a larger, but still quite

<sup>2</sup> The emphasis on positive emotion is in contrast to the emphasis found in communities such as the Paxtun women of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in which sorrow, sadness, and grief are generally expressed, with little interest in the expression of joy. See Grima, *The Performance of Emotion*.

<sup>3</sup> On Villers, see Brouette, 'Abbaye de Villers à Tilly'. For the thirteenth-century abbots of Villers, see Cawley, 'Four Abbots of the Golden Age of Villers'.

<sup>4</sup> On Goswin of Bossut, see *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, pp. 6–8; Newman, 'Goswin of Villers and the Visionary Network'; and Roisin, *L'hagiographie cistercienne*, pp. 35–38 and 56–59. The identification of Goswin as the author of all three of the *vitae* on stylistic grounds (only a manuscript of the *Vita Arnulfi* names him as author, and gives his office as 'cantor') was first made by Roisin in the passages cited above. Cawley has confirmed this conclusion with his own (computer-aided) work on the texts (*Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, p. 7). Nothing is known of Goswin outside of the texts he composed; however, his ease in supplying his texts with references from the Bible and the liturgy along with his assured handling of theological nuance, may indicate an education in the Schools, as well as within the Cistercian order. For the texts of the three saints' Lives, see *De B. Arnulfo monacho ordinis Cisterc. villarii in Brabantia*, in *Acta sanctorum*, Iun. v, 606–31, hereafter cited as *Vita Arnulfi*; Frenken, 'De Vita van Abundus van Hoei', hereafter *Vita Abundi*. A Latin text of the Life of Ida of Nivelles, taken from Henriquez, *Quinque prudentes Virgines*, is available in *Lives of Ida of Nivelles, Lutgard and Alice the Leper*, ed. and trans. by Cawley, hereafter cited as *Vita Idae*. An annotated English translation of these three *vitae* has been published: *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, pp. 209–46 (*Vita Abundi*), pp. 125–98 (*Vita Arnulfi*), and pp. 29–100 (*Vita Idae*); page references to this English translation (ET) will be given after references to the Latin text. The translations below are my own. The two liturgical offices composed by Goswin are for Arnulf of Villers and Marie d'Oignies (de Loos, 'Saints in Brabant', pp. 25–28 and 37).

local, corpus of about twenty-four hagiographical texts written in the southern Low Countries in the thirteenth century, many of them from within a Cistercian context.<sup>5</sup> This corpus is especially notable for the large number of female saints included — they make up more than half of the total. The texts are also notable for the important role mystical experience plays in the lives of the subjects; as a group, they make up the earliest corpus of mystical hagiography. Finally, the texts as a group are remarkable for frequently portraying close and essentially untroubled relationships within a network of like-minded ‘religious’ men and women — monks, nuns, priests, laywomen, laymen, recluses, and beguines.<sup>6</sup>

Goswin of Bossut’s three hagiographical texts emerge from an even more deeply local environment within the southern Low Countries, that of Goswin’s own community of Villers and its environs, an environment that Goswin shared with the subjects of his *vitae*, all close chronological contemporaries of his, and with the witnesses on whose testimony he relied. Goswin wrote his Life of Arnulf of Villers, a laybrother who was an older contemporary of Goswin’s at Villers, not long after Arnulf’s death in 1228.<sup>7</sup> Goswin’s sources for the Life of Arnulf were primarily the testimonies of his fellow monks and laybrothers of Villers, as well as of male and female friends of Arnulf outside the monastery. The Life of Ida of Nivelles, a nun from La Ramée, a Cistercian foundation about twenty km from Villers, was composed soon after Ida’s death in 1231 at the request of the abbot of Villers.<sup>8</sup> Goswin had not known Ida himself, but tells his readers he wrote the Life of Ida from accounts provided by ‘trustworthy peo-

<sup>5</sup> See *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, pp. xlviii–xlix. For the Cistercian Lives, see Roisin, *L’hagiographie cistercienne*. For an overview of holy women of the southern Low Countries (and their *vitae*), see Simons, ‘Holy Women of the Low Countries’, and also Simons, *Cities of Ladies*.

<sup>6</sup> For discussions of this phenomenon, see McGuire, ‘The Cistercians and Friendship’, and Newman, ‘Goswin of Villers and the Visionary Network’, pp. xxxiv–xxxvi. For related discussions of the politics of the relationships between holy women and their male collaborators and hagiographers, see among others, McGuire, ‘Holy Women and Monks in the Thirteenth Century’, and Coakley, *Women, Men, and Spiritual Power*.

<sup>7</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 7, para. 68, p. 579; ET, p. 197. On Arnulf of Villers, see McGuire, ‘Self-Denial and Self-Assertion in Arnulf of Villers’, and *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, pp. 12–18. For an examination of the position of the lay brothers within the Cistercian order which includes a discussion of Arnulf, see Noell, ‘Expectation and Unrest among Cistercian Lay Brothers in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries’.

<sup>8</sup> On Ida of Nivelles, see Cawley, ‘Ida of Nivelles, Cistercian Nun’; Boudreau, “‘With Desire Have I Desired’”; *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, pp. 8–12; and Carpenter, ‘The Communities of a Thirteenth-Century Holy Woman, Ida of Nivelles’. For the abbot’s request, see *Vita Idae*, prol., para. 2; ET, p. 30; for the date of death, *Vita Idae*, ch. 34; para. 4; ET, p. 95.

ple' from both within and without La Ramée.<sup>9</sup> Goswin began work on the Life of Abundus on his own initiative, seeking only confirmation of his plan from his abbot; this work seems to be unfinished, and what we have may date to the 1230s, a period perhaps well before Abundus died.<sup>10</sup> Goswin claims Abundus of Huy as a close friend of his, who consented, somewhat reluctantly, to Goswin's request that he share with Goswin the 'good things the Lord had done for him and was still doing', so that Abundus and Goswin are both themselves key sources for this Life.<sup>11</sup> As texts that focus on the inner experience, including the emotional experience, of their subjects, the *vitae* may often represent Goswin's reconstructed and reworked versions of his informants' oral or written accounts (possibly prompted by Goswin's questioning) of the remembered, narrated emotions of the subject of the *vita*, or of those who interacted with Ida, Arnulf, or Abundus. The consistent understanding of the emotions which emerges from this process across the three *vitae* owes much to Goswin, but is not individual to him; the emotional community the texts bear witness to was one in which his subjects, informants and his intended audience participated.

The first feature of the emotional community evoked by Goswin is that a 'tranquil' emotional life is explicitly admired. For Goswin, tranquillity means the absence of such emotions as anger, irritation, and indignation, and their bodily expressions. For example, Goswin praises Ida of Nivelles for her 'tranquil mind', and relates that she 'loved outward bodily calm' because it helped her maintain her inner emotional peace.<sup>12</sup> Goswin also recounts with approval the recollection of the recluse, Mary, with whom Ida had lived before becoming a Cistercian, that 'never once in their four years together did she see [Ida] moved by anger or indignation'.<sup>13</sup> Abundus, too, is praised for his restrained emotional life, his 'mildness of character and natural gravity of manner'.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, Goswin reports that no-one had ever seen Arnulf 'angry or

<sup>9</sup> *Vita Idae*, prol., para. 3; ET, p. 30.

<sup>10</sup> A letter mentioning Abundus written in 1260 is evidence that he was alive at that date (Appendix IV to *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, p. 255).

<sup>11</sup> *Vita Abundi*, prol., p. 11; ET, p. 209. On Abundus of Huy, see *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, pp. 18–20, and pp. 255–58.

<sup>12</sup> *Vita Idae*, ch. 1, para. 5; ET, p. 33, and ch. 2, para. 4; ET, p. 35.

<sup>13</sup> *Vita Idae*, ch. 1, para. 4; ET, p. 32. In the same paragraph, we also learn that Ida kept peace with the seven women with whom she lived as a girl, and was 'gracious and sweet' to them all.

<sup>14</sup> *Vita Abundi*, ch. 2, p. 13; ET, p. 211. Abundus retained his 'gravity of manner' on his entry into the novitiate (*Vita Abundi*, ch. 5, p. 16; ET, p. 215).

upset'.<sup>15</sup> This is in contrast, Goswin tells us, to the many people who are seen today losing their patience at the slightest provocation.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, Abundus's father, one of the few characters Goswin presents in a negative light, is 'very angry' when he finds that young Abundus is keen to extend his education beyond what was sufficient for helping with his father's business affairs.<sup>17</sup>

However, emotional restraint is only required when earthly passions such as anger are concerned. In Goswin's emotional world, the positive emotions of joy, rejoicing, jubilation, happiness, gladness, love, and also consolation — 'gaudium', 'hilaritas', 'jubiliatio', 'felicitas', 'beatitudo', 'laetatio', 'caritas', 'amor', 'consolatio' — are the most highly valued emotions, and the ones most commonly described and expressed. Their expression in the *vitae* is anything but restrained. Key to this emotional world is the joy, love, rejoicing and consolation of heaven, and we are reminded of the importance of the Christian reformulation of emotion as the central goal of life in the experience of the blissful emotion that is heaven. This repositioning in Late Antiquity of positive emotion as the key human goal after the Stoic project to eliminate human emotion is rightly seen as a watershed in the history of emotions.<sup>18</sup>

In Goswin's texts, mystical experience is most often a foretaste of the emotion of heaven, and joyful, nonconceptual, sensual emotion is the predominant way in which God is directly experienced. The distinctive emotional world evoked by Goswin thus draws from the twelfth-century Cistercian and Victorine exploration of the loving, jubilant nature of mystical experience, or of the (often inseparable) joy of heaven.<sup>19</sup> It is not surprising that two writers, Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St Thierry, who are crucial to the development of detailed accounts of the joyful union of the soul with God, are also two of the few post-patristic writers whose works are directly quoted by Goswin.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 1, para. 7, p. 567; ET, p. 157.

<sup>16</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 1, para. 7, p. 567; ET, p. 157.

<sup>17</sup> *Vita Abundi*, ch. 2, p. 14; ET, p. 212.

<sup>18</sup> Casagrande and Vecchio, 'Les théories des passions', p. 109.

<sup>19</sup> For this development, see McGinn, *The Growth of Mysticism*. For the importance of Cistercian mysticism in the history of emotions, see Casagrande and Vecchio, 'Les théories des passions', p. 115.

<sup>20</sup> Goswin quotes from William of St Thierry's early treatise, *De natura et dignitate amoris*, PL 184, col. 379c (trans. by Davis, *On the Nature and Dignity of Love*) in *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 2, para. 11, p. 560; ET, p. 133. The passage from Bernard of Clairvaux (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 2, para. 11, p. 560; ET, p. 133) is from the *Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles*, Sermon 79 (PL 183, col. 1163a). As would be expected, Bernard's *Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles* are

Bernard's bridal mysticism, his theme of the 'jubilation of the heart' and the rich sensual vocabulary of the Song of Songs are fundamental to the emotional world depicted in the work of Goswin.<sup>21</sup> This context is confirmed by Goswin's testimony that the very Bernardine topics of 'the canticle of love' and 'the jubilation of the heart' were the subjects of eloquent sermons heard by the brothers of Villers, including Arnulf the laybrother, during chapter gatherings.<sup>22</sup> The vocabulary and themes of mysticism gave new shape and new importance to the understanding and management of emotion that Goswin consciously strove to represent.<sup>23</sup>

In Goswin's hagiographical texts, progress in the spiritual life is often depicted as the experience of a sequence of emotional events, ending in the consolation of heavenly joy. The *vitae* of Arnulf, Ida and Abundus share this emotional sequence, which forms the basis for a number of the anecdotes in the *vitae*. The sequence begins with the disequilibrium created by a negative, that is, unwanted, emotional experience. Ida is, for example, 'disturbed in her heart' about the possibly tainted money from her father she has given to her monastery, or she feels 'sadness in her heart' because of her unfulfilled longing for the eucharist.<sup>24</sup> Ida also helps a nun who is 'weighed down with a grave uneasiness of mind', and another who is 'worn out' with a great 'heaviness' caused by a spirit of blasphemy.<sup>25</sup> In further examples from the Lives of Abundus and Arnulf, a novice experiences 'the bitter sadness of temptations', a lay brother is similarly 'troubled by the inner torments of temptation', while a monk suffers as a result of a debilitating ailment.<sup>26</sup>

included in a 1636 listing of the books held in the library of Villers. The booklist also records a number of the works of Richard of St Victor, though none of William of St Thierry. For the booklist, see *Bibliotheca belgica manuscripta*, ed. by Sanderus, I, 268 (Bernard) and I, 171 (William).

<sup>21</sup> See Supper, 'Spiritual Joy in the Works of Saint Bernard'.

<sup>22</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 3, para. 22, p. 570; ET, p. 167. Other 'heavenly' topics included 'the vision of the Blessed Trinity', 'the glory of the saints' and 'the cherubim and seraphim'.

<sup>23</sup> Goswin's Prologue to the Life of Ida makes it clear that he counted the depiction of Ida's emotional life as one of the main challenges he faced in writing her Life: her life offered 'much material which is difficult to describe, namely, her emotional states [affectiones], her luminous contemplations and her graces of every kind' (para. 2; ET, p. 29).

<sup>24</sup> *Vita Idae*, ch. 4, para. 1; ET, p. 37; ch. 20, paras 1–2; ET, pp. 60–62.

<sup>25</sup> 'Gravi quadam incommoditate mentis gravebatur' (*Vita Idae*, ch. 4, para. 1; ET, p. 38) and *Vita Idae*, ch. 7, para. 1; ET, p. 41.

<sup>26</sup> *Vita Abundi*, ch. 18, p. 30; ET, pp. 240–41; ch. 19, pp. 30–31; ET, pp. 241–43, and *Vita*



The next stage in the sequence is typically the intervention of the Divine in the form of grace. While Christ appears several times as Ida's interlocutor in her *vita*, and Mary is a particularly frequent visitor to Abundus in his, and both play a smaller role in the Life of Arnulf, it is grace which is a 'character' of crucial importance in each of the *vitae*; it is in the form of grace, as an active force which brings change, that divine interaction with humanity most frequently occurs. Grace is personified by Goswin as a 'mother'; she 'smiles' on those on earth and acts as their 'helper'.<sup>27</sup> Even more striking is the nature of grace's interaction with the people in the saints' Lives — grace is consistently presented as a positive, bodily experience which is fundamentally sensory and emotional in nature.<sup>28</sup> Though grace is often sought by its recipient, it almost always comes 'suddenly', without warning, and its advent is usually unmistakable because of its bodily rather than intellectual expression. For example, when Goswin relates Abundus's response to his direct question as to whether he is always certain of the veracity of his mystical experience, the answer includes an explanation of the sensory nature of the experience: 'Just as a drop of water poured into a large amount of wine is immediately and completely absorbed by the wine, so his faculties of sense [sensualitas] [...] would be absorbed by an overwhelming abundance of grace.'<sup>29</sup>

For Goswin, grace is fundamentally hydraulic, and is described over and over again with watery images: sometimes as a sprinkling, or rain, but more often as a pouring, flowing, welling, flooding, rushing force — a stream, a river or a flowing spring.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, when Arnulf relates a message for a woman who

*Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 4, paras 28–29, p. 571; ET, pp. 171–72.

<sup>27</sup> Grace is personified as 'mater' in *Vita Arnulfi*, pref., para. 2, p. 558; ET, p. 126, and in *Vita Abundi*, prol., p. 12; ET, p. 209. Grace also smiles ('gratia Dei arriserit') in *Vita Arnulfi*, pref. para. 1, p. 558; ET, p. 125, and acts as a helper ('adjutrice Domini gratia') in *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 5, para. 38, p. 565; ET, p. 150. These personifications of grace have been noted by *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, p. 37, note 24.

<sup>28</sup> The bodily materiality of 'knowing' (cognoscere) is clear from a vision Ida has of God dripping white liquid (which had emanated from his own mouth) into her mouth, so she could 'taste' the honeycomb sweetness of his divinity in her heart; the liquid lit her heart with 'divine sweetness and knowing' (*Vita Idae*, ch. 22, para. 1; ET, p. 65). The liquid is not named as grace; it is likened to manna.

<sup>29</sup> *Vita Abundi*, ch. 9, p. 20; ET, p. 223.

<sup>30</sup> Taking just one passage from the Life of Ida, we find that 'the soil of her heart' is not yet watered by a 'shower of tears'; the death of a friend suddenly opens the 'floodgates' of Ida's eyes, from which flows a flood of tears, which stream from 'the wellspring of heavenly grace' (*Vita Idae*, ch. 1, paras 6–7; ET, pp. 32–33).

will receive a future visitation of grace, adding the caveat ‘unless the aqueduct through which the stream of grace should flow into her heart is blocked by the obstacle of some negligence of hers’, one is put in mind of the feats of water engineering for which the Cistercians were famous.<sup>31</sup>

The force of the ‘hydraulic’ power of grace has many bodily effects which express emotion. It can push ‘an overflow’ of tears from the eyes, as in the ‘deluge of tears’ that a monk experienced when grace brought about a ‘breach of the floodgates’ within his head.<sup>32</sup> Likewise, following the insistent prayers of the young Abundus:

The Lord began to pour into the mouth of his heart, so to speak, which was gaping wide open, the honeyed mouthfuls of his grace, filling him with so much fragrance of interior sweetness, that he was sometimes compelled to pour out sweet tears from his eyes.<sup>33</sup>

Grace may also erupt from the body as laughter.<sup>34</sup> As in the experience of Abundus related above, grace is also frequently tasted as divine sweetness; grace nourishes the soul with ‘food’ that may make earthly food unpalatable.<sup>35</sup> And,

<sup>31</sup> ‘Nisi obstaculo negligentiae suae obstructus fuerit aquaeductus, per quem rivulus gratiae debet influere in cor eius’ (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 5, para. 5, p. 575; ET, p. 183).

<sup>32</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 4, para. 29, p. 571; ET, p. 171.

<sup>33</sup> ‘[Dominus] ori cordis eius ut ita dicam ad summa hianti, mellitas gratiae suae buccellas coepit infundere, tanta intimae suavitatis fragrantia illum imbuens, ut interdum cogeretur dulces ab oculis lacrimas effundere’ (*Vita Abundi*, ch. 3, p. 14; ET, p. 213). On another occasion, Abundus receives such a flood of grace, that he cannot refrain from crying for many days after his experience (*Vita Abundi*, ch. 6, p. 17; ET, p. 218).

<sup>34</sup> This is the experience of a devout woman of whose transport to heaven Arnulf is given knowledge (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 6, para. 48, p. 575; ET, p. 185), but it is also, and especially, Arnulf’s own experience. Arnulf was in fact troubled by uncontrollable, compulsive laughter, a condition which he did not have when he entered the monastery, but which developed over time, and which was sometimes accompanied by a compulsive head nodding or foot tapping (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 3, paras 22–23, p. 570; ET, pp. 166–68). Goswin provides a mystical explanation for this laughter, but also describes the onset and bodily expression of the condition in some detail, and makes it clear that the laughter was embarrassing and distressing for Arnulf, because it could occur at inappropriate times, such as in chapter. Modern understandings of episodes of uncontrollable laughter (or crying), known as ‘Pseudobulbar affect’, relate it to neurological disease or injury. See Dark, McGrath and Ron, ‘Pathological Laughing and Crying’, where it is noted that episodes of uncontrollable laughing or crying are usually triggered by an appropriate stimulus, as was the case with Arnulf, but it is the magnitude of the response which is abnormal (p. 473).

<sup>35</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 1, para. 9, p. 567; ET, p. 159, and *Vita Abundi*, ch. 6, pp. 17–18;

following the imagery of the Song of Songs, the inflow of grace may bring about heavenly inebriation.<sup>36</sup>

Grace, like emotion, often works in the viscera of its recipient.<sup>37</sup> It jolts, melts and liquefies the viscera (again the imagery is from the Song of Songs), like wax before a fire; the liquefying is usually tied to spiritual inebriation.<sup>38</sup> Inner liquefying and inebriation often lead to an experience of 'transportation'. Following Abundus's yearning for the experience of heaven, for example, he was 'inebriated, as if with spiced wine, with such a great and sudden pouring in of overwhelming grace, that he crossed over entirely to another state of mind'.<sup>39</sup> The experience of the transported person may be left unspecified, or may be described in detail, but is assumed to involve transportation to heaven, 'the paradise of delights', 'the workshop of joy', where the glory of God is experienced.<sup>40</sup> In Adam Potkay's terms, joy is thus experienced as 'an escape from the limiting self [...] [and as] an intense experience of the self in relation to the unlimited'.<sup>41</sup> The emotional trajectory is completed in the experience of overwhelming joy and consolation, with the effect that the initial negative emotion is transformed into ecstatic joy. Goswin's prose must rise to its most dramatic when describing these heavenly joys, as in this example from the Life of Abundus: 'Nothing

ET, pp. 218–19. See also Abundus's exhortation to his natal sister, to 'open her mouth [os] to the Holy Spirit' and so be illuminated within by his grace, and Arnulf's experience of opening 'his heart's mouth wide open' for a mouthful of heavenly grace (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 2, para. 16, p. 569; ET, p. 164). See also Scholl, 'The Sweetness of the Lord'.

<sup>36</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk. 2, ch. 7, para. 61, p. 578; ET, p. 194; *Vita Abundi*, ch. 6, p. 17; ET, p. 217.

<sup>37</sup> Spiritual emotion is to be experienced viscerally. Arnulf longs to 'inviscerate' love 'throughout the innermost parts of his heart' (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 2, para. 12, p. 560; ET, p. 133), while Ida wants to 'inviscerate [the visionary Christ child] wholly throughout the innermost parts of her soul' (*Vita Idae*, ch. 21, para. 1; ET, p. 63).

<sup>38</sup> Intense grief also 'shakes' Ida's viscera violently, causing her to vomit blood (*Vita Idae*, ch. 9, para. 1; ET, p. 44; cf. ch. 6, para. 1; ET, p. 39, ch. 11, para. 1; ET, p. 47, and ch. 13, para. 2; ET, p. 50).

<sup>39</sup> 'Tanta tamque repentina gratiae supervientis infusione tamquam vino condito inebriatus est, ut totus transiret in mentis alienationem' (*Vita Abundi*, ch. 6, p. 17; ET, p. 217). See also, *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 1, para. 9, p. 567; ET, pp. 158–59.

<sup>40</sup> For the workshop image, see *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 3, para. 20, p. 570; ET, p. 166. The experience of heaven is overwhelmingly one of joy, but it also described as a place of rest and light. See for example, *Vita Abundi*, ch. 6, p. 16; ET, p. 217, cf. *Vita Idae*, ch. 22, para. 2; ET, pp. 65–66.

<sup>41</sup> Potkay, *The Story of Joy*, p. 48.

could be imagined that was more joyful than this vision, nothing more desirable than this blessedness, nothing more delightful than this glory!’<sup>42</sup>

The rigorous daily regime of flagellation and other bodily mortifications which mark the devotional life of Arnulf (but not that of Abundus or Ida) might not at first glance seem compatible with positive emotion: these practices include striking himself with a cane, rolling in nettles, wearing sackcloth, winding cords and chains around his body, and wearing a (soon oozing) coat of mail, not to mention a home-made shirt of hedgehog skins which pierced his body.<sup>43</sup> And yet even here, Goswin consistently presents Arnulf’s acceptance of physical pain and bodily corruption as a welcome, joyful experience of love. In a series of reversals, Goswin describes Arnulf as saddened when he finds that the monastic life is less physically taxing than he had imagined,<sup>44</sup> but soon his own pain-inflicting inventions (in this case a cord wound tightly around his waist) bring him happiness: ‘O truly happy child, so recently born, for whom his Mother Grace is so solicitous that she feeds him not only with tears of sweetness, but also gives him wine with myrrh to drink.’<sup>45</sup> Arnulf’s physical pain, Goswin tells us, teaches him the ‘the art of arts, the art of loving’, so that he understands that love is ‘rash, fierce, passionate and impetuous’, and that love triumphs over propriety and reasonableness.<sup>46</sup> When Goswin ponders the motivation for Arnulf’s bloody mortification, its origin in love (here again a forceful liquid) is the one he emphasizes: ‘Was it not from the obstinacy of fervent love, which boiled over from the depths of your heart, through the wounds of your flesh?’<sup>47</sup>

<sup>42</sup> ‘Nihil hac visione jocundius, nihil hac beatitudine amabilius, nihil hac gloria delectabilius possit excogitari’ (*Vita Abundi*, ch. 6, p. 17; ET, p. 218). Caroline Walker Bynum has noted the increasing perception among thirteenth-century spiritual writers that the capacity and longing for joy was insatiable: ‘However much the theologians of the thirteenth century might define blessedness as the stilling of desire, spiritual writers came increasingly to treat love as a longing that cannot be satiated or filled, magnifying itself forever as each increase of joy further stimulates need’ (*The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity*, p. 329).

<sup>43</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, chs 1–5, pp. 559–66; ET, pp. 129–51.

<sup>44</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 1, para. 8, p. 560; ET, p. 131.

<sup>45</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 1, para. 10, p. 560; ET, p. 132.

<sup>46</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 2, para. 11, p. 560; ET, p. 133. The first quotation is from William of St Thierry; the second is from Bernard of Clairvaux (see above, note 20). This view is not only a strain for those of the twenty-first century; Goswin tells us of a fellow monk who is upset to tears when he discovers Arnulf’s bloody beating of himself (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 13, p. 561; ET, p. 134).

<sup>47</sup> ‘Nisi ex praesumptione ferventis amoris, qui de infimis cordis tui per vulnera carnis

Goswin gradually makes it clear that Arnulf expressed his love in the form of vicarious suffering for those in his local community, and here is another form of emotional community: ‘Whipping himself fiercely, he recalled by name some of his brothers, now some of his friends, now religious women, beloved by him in Christ, to whom he implored either that grace and remission of their sins be given by the Lord, or relief from their tribulations.’<sup>48</sup> And here, too, against all odds Goswin emphasizes positive emotion: as a result of his afflictions of the body, ‘he passed his days and nights with bodily distress, but with all goodwill and joyousness (*benevolentia et hilaritate*) of heart’.<sup>49</sup>

A further feature of the emotional community evoked by Goswin is that Jesus and Mary, and occasionally other saints, are part of the interpersonal community with whom close affective ties are shared. Here again love, delight and joy are the emotional focus as Mary, for example, joins the monks in the choir at Villers ‘showing her delight to the singers and smiling sweetly’, she exchanges kisses with Abundus, demonstrating to him ‘how indissoluble is the bond of holy charity by which my heart is glued to your heart’, fans the hot monks of Villers with her sleeves during the harvest, and gives the baby Jesus to Ida to hold.<sup>50</sup> Mary also has an active engagement in Abundus’s interpersonal relationships — encouraging Abundus to ask for her help for his dying nephew, for example, and also directing how and when to speak to a novice who was on the brink of leaving the monastery.<sup>51</sup> It is not surprising that Goswin describes Arnulf as meditating at length on the joys of the Virgin: this is a veritable feast of positive earthly and heavenly emotion, and while Mary does direct Arnulf not to neglect meditation on her heavenly joys, her experience of great joy while still in the world provided a important model for Goswin’s saintly local heroes.<sup>52</sup>

ebulliebat?’ (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 2, para. 16, p. 561; ET, p. 136).

<sup>48</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 5, para. 34, p. 565; ET, p. 148.

<sup>49</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 5, para. 37, p. 565; ET, p. 149. Arnulf’s self-inflicted pain is extreme, but not isolated, nor is its interpretation: Ida of Nivelles (along with a number of thirteenth-century holy women from the Low Countries) also voluntarily took on bodily suffering, mostly in the form of sickness, as a form of spiritual charity for others.

<sup>50</sup> *Vita Abundi*, ch. 8, p. 19; ET, p. 222 (smiling and singing); *Vita Abundi*, ch. 10, p. 21; ET, p. 225 (kissing), the text I quote is: ‘quam indissolubili sanctae caritatis glutino cor meum conglutinatum sit tuo cordi’; *Vita Abundi*, ch. 14, pp. 25–26; ET, p. 234 (fanning); *Vita Idae*, ch. 23, para. 3; ET, p. 68 (sharing playtime with the infant Christ). Christ in the form of a boy also exchanges kisses with Ida (*Vita Idae*, ch. 21, para. 1; ET, p. 64).

<sup>51</sup> *Vita Abundi*, ch. 16, pp. 28–29; ET, pp. 236–39, and ch. 18, p. 30; ET, pp. 240–41.

<sup>52</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 2, paras 14–16, pp. 568–69; ET, pp. 162–64.

One of the most memorable characteristics of the emotional world of Goswin's texts is the confidence with which Arnulf, Abundus and Ida create and strengthen relationships by bringing ecstatic experience to others.<sup>53</sup> The experience may be visionary in nature, but almost always includes, and sometimes is solely, the experience of sweetness and joy. One person may pray for another to receive this experience, sometimes on a day designated in advance, while in other instances, two people will share the same mystical experience. In one story, from the Life of Arnulf, a landlady in Paris who has heard of Arnulf, summons a student who hails from Brabant, and sends him to Arnulf, to ask him 'to implore that an abundant gift of heavenly grace be imparted to her by the Lord'.<sup>54</sup> Arnulf is delighted with the request and asks their go-between to tell the lady 'she will attain such a heavenly flood of grace from the Lord as she will not have her whole life'.<sup>55</sup> And sure enough, on the appointed day:

Suddenly and without warning the spirit of the Lord, a mighty and strong spirit, rushed upon her, and its powerful force jolted all her viscera, and just as wax melts in the face of fire, so was her soul totally liquefied and poured into the embraces of her Beloved, so that she was fed inwardly on the honeyed taste of a divine sweetness, but she was also amazed that she had been so to speak transported as if into a paradise of delights.<sup>56</sup>

In another story from the Life of Abundus, a Cistercian monk, who had asked Arnulf to 'send him God', is on horseback when the flood of grace he requested arrives, and falls back behind his companion to savour the 'sweet pittance' which gladdens his soul.<sup>57</sup> Arnulf also shares in an emotionally intense Good Friday vision experienced by a 'devout woman' who was linked to Arnulf 'with

<sup>53</sup> These instances of 'intentional partnership in the mystical life', are discussed by *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, pp. 20–22; the phrase 'Send me God', which Goswin notes was used to ask for a specific mystical experience from those known to enjoy them, suggested to Cawley the title of his translations of Goswin's *vitae*.

<sup>54</sup> 'Mandans ei [Arnulfo] quatenus copiosum gratiae coelestis munus sibi a Domino impertiri flagitaret' (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 5, para. 45, p. 575; ET, p. 183).

<sup>55</sup> 'Tantam coelitus a Domino consequetur gratiae affluentiam quantam in omni vita sua non habitura est' (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 5, para. 45, p. 575; ET, p. 183).

<sup>56</sup> 'Subito et inopinante irrui in eam Spiritus Domini (Spiritus vehemens et fortis), cuius potenti virtute concussa sunt omnia viscera eius; et sicut fluit cera a facie ignis, sic tota liquefacta est anima illius, et transfusa in amplexus Dilecti sui; ita ut cum interius mellifluo divinae dulcedinis sapore pascetur, sed quodammodo quasi in quemdam paradisum deliciarum translata fuisse miraretur' (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 5, para. 46, p. 575; ET, p. 183).

<sup>57</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 4, para. 29, p. 572; ET, pp. 171–72.

such an indissoluble bond of holy love that the pair of them had just one heart and one soul'.<sup>58</sup> It is also as a result of Abundus's prayers that Baldwin, a novice who is suffering temptation, is granted a vision of Mary, which brings him such great comfort that he thereafter experiences greater gladness in adversity, and is at times 'drenched in tears because of his devotion'.<sup>59</sup> In one of the numerous episodes of this kind from the *Life of Ida*, Ida has a vision of a pillar of fire descending on the head of a priest 'who loves Ida, and is loved by him' while he is elevating the host during mass. At that precise moment the priest's viscera grow warm, and he experiences a great inner spiritual sweetness, which he attributes to Ida's merit.<sup>60</sup> In another story, Ida is the beneficiary of the prayers of a Cistercian abbot while he is celebrating mass in Liège, and as a result is visited by the Virgin Mary, who brings her the Christ child to play with; the heavenly sweetness Ida tasted during the vision stayed with her for two months.<sup>61</sup> In these stories we see a community constituted most concretely by the flow of positive, ecstatic emotion, as the explicit bestowal of powerful positive emotion by one person on another creates and develops spiritual community.

Goswin's three hagiographical texts are powerful witnesses to a community committed to the possibility of forming an emotionally open 'communitas' whose only criterion for membership is religious devotion, and dedication to fellow members.<sup>62</sup> The texts frequently feature lay and religious men and women in close and highly valued spiritual friendships, the most intense of which are cemented with flows of mystical emotion. Goswin's *vitae* also include

<sup>58</sup> *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 6, paras 47–48, p. 575; ET, pp. 184–86. See also the grace sent to a young woman who had sought the help of Arnulf, on her reception of the eucharist at Candlemas (bk 2, ch. 6, paras 52–53, p. 576; ET, pp. 188–89).

<sup>59</sup> *Vita Abundi*, ch. 19, pp. 30–31; ET, pp. 241–43. See also Abundus's transfer of grace to an ailing nephew, at the moment at which Abundus received the eucharist (*Vita Abundi*, ch. 16, pp. 28–29; ET, pp. 236–39).

<sup>60</sup> *Vita Idae*, ch. 27, para. 2; ET, pp. 75–76.

<sup>61</sup> *Vita Idae*, ch. 23, para. 3; ET, p. 68. See also, *Vita Idae*, ch. 24, para. 1–3; ET, pp. 68–70; ch. 25, para. 1–2; ET, pp. 70–72; ch. 26, para. 1; ET, pp. 72–74. In a well-known account of 'ecstatic partnership', Beatrice of Nazareth asks Ida of Nivelles to help her obtain an 'experience of sweetness'; the vision she was granted was accompanied by great joy and copious tears (*The Life of Beatrice of Nazareth*, I, 10–11, 51–19, trans. by De Ganck, pp. 61–75 (English and Latin); these chapters are also translated in *Send Me God*, trans. by Cawley, pp. 110–16).

<sup>62</sup> One can also be 'excluded' from the community of affection: the *Life of Ida* gives a vivid account of a woman's decision not to accept Ida's attempt to win her salvation; Ida could never thereafter recover the 'tender affection' and great compassion she had had for the woman (*Vita Idae*, ch. 9, para. 5; ET, p. 45).



a significant number of narratives that serve to raise and then dismiss or defuse potential threats to the existence of these ideal communities, including the threat posed by emotional insincerity and sexual temptation.

Emotional insincerity poses an obvious threat to a community constituted by emotion, and indeed, Goswin describes in some detail Ida's accurate discernment of the insincere affection shown by a certain priest. Here the problem is not that the priest sought to form an emotional bond with Ida, but that he was insincere about his feelings. Goswin makes particular mention of the divide between the priest's bodily expression of emotion, as he was 'demonstrating to [Ida] with his gracious and joyful face his close, loving friendship' and his true feeling: suddenly it was revealed to Ida that 'that love which the priest demonstrated for the outward eye to see was an empty pretence'.<sup>63</sup>

Sexual temptation is also a potential threat to cross-sex emotional relationships, but here again Goswin's stories are optimistic. Goswin recounts, for example, the assistance Abundus offers to a devout ('religiosus') man who cared for a girl dedicated to the religious life 'with wholesome simplicity and in the charity of Christ', but in time his 'spiritual love' ('amor spiritualis') for her turned into a potentially dangerous carnal love, and he began to be troubled by carnal thoughts which were rising up in his heart. Abundus showed compassion for the man, and with the help of his prayers, the temptation disappeared.<sup>64</sup>

Similarly optimistic is the story in the *Life of Abundus* about John of Nivelles, a well-known clerical supporter of the religious women of the Low Countries, who appears after his death to Abundus to affirm this vocation, notwithstanding the challenges of the role: 'When, while I was still dwelling in the mortal flesh, I was God's helper, and on account of the holy friendship which I had with religious women, it was necessary for me to often keep company with them, so that I might console the fainthearted and take on the duty of hearing their confession, I turned the pleasure of the tickling flesh, which arose from the unclean matters brought up in confession, into the stuff of virtue.'<sup>65</sup> Though he

<sup>63</sup> 'Cum gratiosa quadam vultus hilaritate magnum familiaritatis amorem ei demonstrans'; 'amorem illum quem sacerdos foris ad oculum demonstrabat simulatorium esse et inanem' (*Vita Idae*, ch. 6, para. 2; ET, p. 40).

<sup>64</sup> *Vita Abundi*, ch. 17, p. 29; ET, pp. 239–40.

<sup>65</sup> 'Cum adhuc in carne mortali degens Dei adiutor essem et propter sanctam familiaritatem, quam ad religiosas mulieres habebam, me inter ipsas frequenter versari oporteret, ut consolarer pusillanimes et recipiendis earum confessionibus operam dare, voluptatem carnis titillantem, quae ex peccatorum immunditiis in confessione propalatis oriebatur, in materiam virtutis convertentem' (*Vita Abundi*, ch. 15, p. 27; ET, pp. 235–36).



stood 'in the conflagration of the flesh', John was 'never consumed' by the fire, and was rewarded in the afterlife for both his charity and his chastity.<sup>66</sup> In all of these examples, open spiritual friendship triumphs, despite the difficulties faced.

Goswin's three texts not only describe an emotional world; they also of course, as normative texts, aim to create certain attitudes towards emotions, and encourage certain emotional experience. The opening of the *Life of Ida* goes further to position itself as a text created for the interpersonal community of 'those who loved Ida more especially than the rest and whom Ida especially loved' — the text thus helps mark out the very local sub-community of people who identify themselves by emotion; their love of Ida and her love for them.<sup>67</sup> The *Life of Abundus* opens by explicitly seeking an emotional experience in the wider community of Cistercian readers Goswin addresses the work to, hoping that 'in the present life they may be bedewed with abundant tricklings of heavenly grace' — for Goswin, none other than an emotional experience. Goswin further wishes that his readers might be joined in the emotion that is heaven: that they may in the life to come be 'made blissful in the fullness of everlasting salvation'.<sup>68</sup>

We come finally to consideration of the function of the emotional world evoked in Goswin's saints' lives. The emotional community described by Goswin may certainly have served in some sense as an 'emotional refuge' — a social space outside the emotional mainstream — for its members. Indeed, William M. Reddy, to whom we owe the concept of the 'emotional refuge', has suggested this may have been the case for the beguine communities of the thirteenth century, who were both sources of and participants in the emotional community Goswin bears witness to.<sup>69</sup> Ida, born in Nivelles, Arnulf, born in Brussels, and Abundus, born in Huy, are all 'refugees' from middle-class families resident in thriving commercial towns;<sup>70</sup> their emotional world offered freedom from the presumably much less lyrical emotional world of the precociously urbanized and commercialized southern Low Countries.<sup>71</sup> For it was

<sup>66</sup> *Vita Abundi*, ch. 15, p. 27; ET, p. 236.

<sup>67</sup> *Vita Idae*, prol., para. 3; ET, p. 30.

<sup>68</sup> *Vita Abundi*, prol., p. 11; ET, p. 209.

<sup>69</sup> Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*, p. 154.

<sup>70</sup> *Vita Idae*, ch. 1, para. 1; ET, p. 30; *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 1, p. 559; ET, p. 129; *Vita Abundi*, ch. 1, p. 13; ET, p. 210.

<sup>71</sup> A general treatment of the urban and economic society of the French-speaking Low Countries is Despy, 'Naissance de villes et de bourgades'. Bas Van Bavel offers an important

not the world of the knightly aristocrat which is presented as the greatest threat to the religious life in the pages of Goswin; indeed, Goswin praises Arnulf for being a 'knight of Christ', and notes the knightly status of Arnulf's clients with approval, while Ida envisages heaven as a mountaintop castle.<sup>72</sup> The alternative worldview which is rejected in the *vitae* is that of the urban, commercial bourgeoisie, who do not see the value of spiritual life. Abundus's angry father, a businessman who did not, at least at first, encourage the religious vocation of Abundus or his sister, Mary, is a case in point.<sup>73</sup> The danger of the commercial mindset is manifested most insistently in Goswin's descriptions of the perils of benefiting from money obtained illicitly from interest-bearing loans, whether the benefit was in accruing or possessing such ill-gotten gains oneself, or merely in being raised in a family reliant on such funds.<sup>74</sup>

To conclude, we have in the hagiographical work of Goswin the evocation of a quite distinctive emotional community, a community inspired by the possibilities for emotional expression opened up by the discourses of mysticism, linked by a shared understanding of the value of joyful and loving emotion, and optimistic about the possibilities of human joy on earth. In this world, the experience of positive emotion, and the transformation and transfer of emotion, often through the agency of an 'emotion-like' grace, act to sustain monastic vocations, bring relief from spiritual aridity, doubt and temptation, intensify rich spiritual friendships, and, importantly, confirm the saintliness of

synthesis of scholarship on the medieval economy of the Low Countries in *Manors and Markets*.

<sup>72</sup> For Arnulf as a knight of Christ, see *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 3, paras 19 and 20, p. 562; ET, p. 137 and p. 138; the *Vita Abundi* also speaks of 'spiritual knighthood' with approval (ch. 19, p. 30; ET, p. 241). In addition, Arnulf 'becomes' a knight himself when he puts on a coat of mail to mortify his body (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 1, ch. 5, para. 37, p. 565; ET, pp. 148–49). Goswin never disparages knightly values (nor knightly riches) in recording with approval the knightly status of Arnulf's 'clients' (*Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 5, para. 54, p. 576; ET, p. 189; *Vita Arnulfi*, bk 2, ch. 1, para. 2, p. 566; ET, p. 154). The commercial or middle-class backgrounds of lay friends or clients are not mentioned. For Ida's hilltop castle, see *Vita Idae*, ch. 18, para. 2; ET, p. 57.

<sup>73</sup> Abundus's father's rejection of a clerical education is discussed above. When Abundus tells his father of his plan to have a betrothed sister enter a monastic life, his father is 'struck by grief within his heart' and speaks 'harshly'. Abundus's father, however, comes to conform to Abundus's emotional world — on the next day, he suppresses his feeling of sadness, and transforms it into a more 'suitable' one: Goswin tells us he is 'softened by a feeling of devotion' and gives his daughter's vocation his blessing (*Vita Abundi*, ch. 12, p. 24; ET, p. 231).

<sup>74</sup> See *Vita Arnulfi*, bk. 2, ch. 6, para. 56, p. 577; ET, p. 191; *Vita Idae*, ch. 4, para. 1; ET, p. 37, and ch. 14, para. 1; ET, p. 51.

local 'heroes', such as Ida of Nivelles, Arnulf of Villers, and Abundus of Huy. The emotional community which emerges from the pages of Goswin's three hagiographical texts formed a kind of emotional sanctuary, in which unusually close and open relationships between nuns, monks, clerics, laymen and women, beguines, and recluses, expressed through distinctive attitudes towards and experiences of emotion, could be sustained and nurtured.

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# DECODING THE EMOTIONS IN APHRA BEHN'S AND ANNA MARIA FALCONBRIDGE'S TRAVEL NARRATIVES

Margarete Rubik\*

‘Stories in every culture both depict and inspire emotion.’<sup>1</sup> Indeed, it is ‘a deeply rooted idea in contemporary Western culture that there is some peculiarly intimate relationship between the arts and the emotions.’<sup>2</sup> This paper will investigate the emotions encoded in and aroused by two women-authored travel narratives, namely Aphra Behn’s *Oroonoko* (1688), a fictional story about an African prince enslaved in Surinam, and Anna Maria Falconbridge’s travel report of her *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone* (1794). However, as I have argued elsewhere,<sup>3</sup> Behn’s novella may also be read as a travel narrative and, like Falconbridge’s travel report a hundred years later, centrally addresses the narrator’s reaction to cross-cultural encounters. Travelogues have long been interesting to scholars for the culture-specific mentalities about self and other they convey, but they also offer insights into the emotional responses such mind-sets may obscure or seek to conceal.

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<sup>1</sup> Hogan, *The Mind and Its Stories*, p. 1. There are a bewildering number of different theories trying to differentiate terms like feeling, emotion, and affect. This paper will not pursue this question and will use the terms as synonyms.

<sup>2</sup> Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason*, p. 101.

<sup>3</sup> Rubik, ‘Teaching Oroonoko in the Travel Narrative Course’.

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Emotions are not the opposites of reason but involve a cognitive and evaluative appraisal — and vice versa: ‘thought [...] can play a role in generating emotional states.’<sup>4</sup> Emotions are also goal-oriented, in the sense that, according to Oatley, they are not elicited by events themselves, but by the evaluation of events relevant to a person’s goals.<sup>5</sup> Thus emotions must, in turn, allow inferences as to the overt and covert objectives the traveller pursues. The appropriative rhetoric of imperial travellers and their construction of racialized identities have long been in the focus of scholarly interest. This essay wants to centre on their affective response to the contact zone — a space wrought with complex emotions which, as Pratt has outlined, may be highlighted in the self-dramatizing ‘sentimentalized’ style of travel writing foregrounding an experiencing I or obscured in ‘scientific’ travel writing by an ‘objectivist rhetoric’ which ‘minimize[s] the human presence’.<sup>6</sup>

Any verbal representation of emotions will, of course, because of the ‘ineffability of bodily experience’, come up against the problem of having to write about ‘phenomena that, at least in part, are in their very character not representational’.<sup>7</sup> There are, however, a number of well-known devices which are generally employed in literature for the purpose: emotions may be simply narrated or stated, with no attempt to detail their physiological or expressive profile. On a more subtle level, emotions can be dramatized and shown in action. The reader draws inferences as to the feelings of characters from their behaviour or body language. In particular the involuntary somatic symptoms are generally regarded as more authentic and true indicators of affects, since they are less under conscious control.<sup>8</sup>

Frequently, writers also resort to a range of poetic devices such as ‘metaphor, simile and trope in order to invoke the sensual realm of corporeal feeling, passion and desire’<sup>9</sup> they wish to convey. Images may be employed to illustrate

<sup>4</sup> Carroll, ‘Art, Narrative and Emotion’. Cf. also Hogan, *Cognitive Science, Literature and the Arts*, p. 181: ‘It is well-established that when we concretely imagine an object, our brains behave in much the same way they do when we actually perceive the object [...]’.

<sup>5</sup> Oatley, *Best Laid Schemes*, p. 98.

<sup>6</sup> Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, pp. 4, 65, 58. Pratt speaks of these two complementary and often overlapping styles as ‘paired bourgeois forms of authority’ whose authors share crucial characteristics (pp. 4, 77): ‘European expansionism is as sanitized and mystified in the literature of sentiment as in the informational/scientific mode’ (p. 77).

<sup>7</sup> Blackman and Cromby, ‘Editorial: Affect and Feeling’, p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> Korte, ‘Theatralität der Emotion’, pp. 144, 147.

<sup>9</sup> Blackman and Cromby, ‘Editorial: Affect and Feeling’, p. 18. For typical metaphors

the feelings of the fictional personae described in a text, but they may also allow a privileged glimpse of the affective response of the narrative voice to the world presented (a narrative voice which, in the case of travelogues, is generally identified with that of the author), because metaphors give clues as to how members of a culture understand a particular experience and conceptualize one mental domain in terms of the other. Without explicitly employing an affective register such metaphorical blends can elicit related emotional resonances in the reader.

New experiences in intercultural contact are processed by travel writers in terms of previous experience and general world knowledge, by means of so-called schemas or mental frames. Schemas, according to Rumelhart, are the 'fundamental elements upon which all information processing depends', the cognitive 'data structure[s] for representing the generic concepts stored in memory'.<sup>10</sup> Any new experience will be fitted into the familiar patterns of world-knowledge, though schemas are, of course, dynamic and can be refreshed. However, as Lakoff reminds us,<sup>11</sup> the logic of framing can impose an interpretative spin on the agenda. The schemas and images by which the unfamiliar is categorized are always emotionally charged, inscribed with implicit ethical norms, expectations and commitments colouring the reader's response. Such is the power of schemas that readers cannot distinguish between what is actually said in a text and what their knowledge of the typical ingredients of a particular schema or script has added; indeed, we can recall details of a script that were not mentioned in the story.<sup>12</sup> Such constructive processes must also be operative on the emotional level. Readers must find it equally difficult to distinguish between emotions explicitly described in a text and the feelings they themselves have supplemented in response to its rhetoric. Thus, if travel writers portray cultural contact by means of well-known schemas, they wittingly or unwittingly also call up a range of emotions inherent in these mental frames.

Besides images, of course, affects and emotions can also be aroused in the addressee by other rhetorical figures and, in particular, by violations of Grice's cooperative principle of communication.<sup>13</sup> Paul Grice was a linguist whose theories had a profound influence on the study of pragmatics, but are, I believe,

conveying particular emotions in Western culture, cf. Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*.

<sup>10</sup> Rumelhart, 'Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition', pp. 33, 34.

<sup>11</sup> Lakoff, 'Simple Framing'.

<sup>12</sup> Bortolussi and Dixon, *Psychonarratology*, p. 153 and Ashcroft, *Fundamentals of Cognition*, p. 208.

<sup>13</sup> Grice, 'Logic and Conversation'.

also extremely relevant for the study of the emotions, since they define features of discourse which permit us to make inferences about hidden sentiments not explicitly articulated in a text. Grice argued that a listener may conventionally trust a speaker to observe four maxims to facilitate understanding, namely the maxim of quality (i.e., that what she says is true), the maxim of quantity (i.e., that she gives as much information as necessary, no more and no less), the maxim of relation (i.e., that the information she gives is relevant to the topic), and the maxim of manner (i.e., that she is clear and avoids obscurity and ambiguity). Any flouting of this cooperative principle creates an implicature and requires an interpretation on the part of the listener to account for it. Implicature, hence, denotes a meaning which is implied or suggested by an utterance 'but is neither explicitly expressed nor logically entailed by the statement itself'.<sup>14</sup> The question whether Grice's principles can also be applied to literature is a matter of debate, since literature, by its very nature, defamiliarizes ordinary language. It would be difficult, Cook asserts, in a fictional text, 'which has no apparent practical and social function', to decide on the appropriate length, relevance and permissible ambiguity of statements, let alone their truth value; and Widdowson warns that in literature 'the co-operative principle is in abeyance'.<sup>15</sup> Even Widdowson, however, concedes that the text must be 'consistent and coherent on its own terms and in its own terms'.<sup>16</sup> Tropes like hyperbole, understatement or ambiguity in an otherwise straightforward text, or what is absent and not said, I would argue, in literary as well as non-literary contexts can therefore create implicatures, i.e., they permit us to conjecture hidden meanings or unacknowledged emotions suggested by an utterance but not explicitly verbalized.

Affective reader-responses may of course be overtly invoked by an author to create the desired emotional reaction. Since people belonging to one culture

<sup>14</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. 'implicature'.

<sup>15</sup> Cook, *Language and Discourse*, pp. 41–42. Widdowson, 'Critical Practices'. Like Cook, Widdowson argues that 'it makes no sense to ask whether the events are being presented as true, or according to normal expectations of economy or clarity of expression, or as relevant to what has been previously said or to the immediate context' (p. 164). This, however, does not rule out that there are what Bortolussi and Dixon call 'narratorial implicatures' (p. 73) if texts blatantly offend against the stylistic norm they themselves have established, or against genre conventions. When conversational conventions are not in place in a literary text, 'readers are invited to make inferences about the narrator's knowledge and beliefs that would render the narrative cooperative' (p. 73).

<sup>16</sup> Widdowson, 'Critical Practices', p. 164.

share basic cultural norms, in the sense of 'an ethos, a moral and emotive repertoire, a cognitive stock', writers are generally 'able fairly reliably to induce the emotions they set out to evoke' as they know what is 'normatively correct in a culture'.<sup>17</sup> Metaphoric blends, schemas, and implicatures, however, also grant insight into hidden feelings which the narrative voice might have completely naturalized or might have wished to suppress. What Althusser calls the 'problematic' and Marcheray the 'unconscious' of a text<sup>18</sup> (i.e., the ideological assumptions which inform it, but which do no surface in a straightforward way), must necessarily also apply to its emotional agenda. As for its affective subtext, just as for its ideology, we must distinguish between what the text is ostensibly saying, and what it is showing in an indirect, and often contradictory, way.

In what follows, I will analyse the emotions presented in the travel narratives of Behn and Falconbridge and also try to access the 'emotional unconscious' in order to analyse what these travel narratives say about empathy across cultural boundaries.

### *Oroonoko*

*Oroonoko* was published in 1688 and is the first English literary text about the transatlantic slave trade. However, for all its criticism of European duplicity and cruelty, it is not an abolitionist text but only criticizes the enslavement of a noble African prince, who is betrayed by the captain of a slave ship and transported to the British colony of Surinam, where he is reunited with his beloved, who has also been sold into slavery. Although he is originally given privileges by the plantation owner and befriended by the female narrator, when he heads a slave rebellion he is captured, tortured, and executed. There are several references in the narrative that link the female narrator who is writing *Oroonoko*'s biography with Aphra Behn herself, who may have visited Surinam in her youth: the narrator refers to herself as the writer of a comedy celebrating the character of Colonel Martin<sup>19</sup> (i.e., Behn's own *The Younger Brother: Or the Amorous Jilt*), and she also mentions the gift of a brilliant wreath of feathers to the King's Theatre for a performance of Dryden's *Indian Queen*,<sup>20</sup> which Behn herself indeed may have donated to the theatre.

<sup>17</sup> Caroll, 'Art, Narrative and Emotion', pp. 205–06.

<sup>18</sup> Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*; Marcheray, *A Theory of Literary Production*.

<sup>19</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 132.

<sup>20</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 76.

In *Oroonoko*, the emotions of the protagonist are mainly narrated, and even then their range is mostly restricted to love, with the attendant feelings of joy and despair, and to pride and righteous anger — that is, to the emotions appropriate to a heroic character of the Restoration period. Despicable emotions or weakness had no place in such a figure; in the novella, fear, envy, or cowardice are only attributed to his white opponents.

The repertoire of body language is limited to sighing, weeping, and the parley of eyes to indicate the lovers' attachment. Wandless has censured their 'stylized agonies' and 'conventional languishing'.<sup>21</sup> Oroonoko's portrayal, however, is not meant as a psychological portrait, but instead follows the conventions of heroic drama. Korte speaks of the theatricality of the emotional display in eighteenth-century fiction.<sup>22</sup> Behn's seventeenth-century narrative, however, was no less influenced by the conventions of theatre — it is only that the acting styles in the two periods were entirely different. In Restoration drama emotions were conveyed by conventionalized gestures; a more natural acting style was only introduced by David Garrick in the second half of the eighteenth century.

We should also remember that seventeenth-century European court culture required of the individual not authenticity but adequate role-play. Emotional display could be potentially dangerous and courtiers needed to control rather than indulge in outward signs of their inward feelings, though they had to be adept in interpreting those of the monarch or of their rivals.<sup>23</sup> Oroonoko, too, has to hide his passion from the jealous old king, but cannot keep up the violent disjunction between an inexpressive face and a passionate heart and betrays his feelings to the eyes of the lookers-on.<sup>24</sup> His friend Aboan is more successful in this respect: his false protestations of love to the old Onahal are indistinguishable from the real thing. The most consummate dissemblers, however, are the Europeans feigning esteem and love for Oroonoko (renamed Caesar), only to betray him in the end. Thus the unscrupulous Deputy-Governor Byam, who used to be 'one that pretended the most friendship to Caesar, was now the only violent man against him',<sup>25</sup> and even the more civilized Trefry, who 'showed him

<sup>21</sup> Wandless, 'Narrative Pain and the Moral Sense', p. 58.

<sup>22</sup> Korte, 'Theatralität der Emotion', p. 143.

<sup>23</sup> Meise, 'Gefühl und Repräsentation in höfischen Selbstinszenierungen des 17. Jahrhunderts', p. 119; Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft*, p. 160.

<sup>24</sup> Compare with Kunin, 'Facial Composure and Management in Behn's Novels', p. 88.

<sup>25</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 128.

all the civilities due to so great a man,'<sup>26</sup> fails to keep his promise of effecting his release. Such feigned emotions must destabilize belief that body language can be read as a reliable sign of authentic affect. Such hypocrisy links the white colonizers to Satan, whom Milton portrayed as a master of dissimulation<sup>27</sup> — a link which is further strengthened by the images used in Behn's text, as will be shown below.

There is only one scene in *Oroonoko* where the hero's distress is graphically illustrated: after he has killed his pregnant wife to save her from the mob, he 'tore, he raved, he roared', he 'water[ed] her face with showers of tears [...] he had not power to stir'.<sup>28</sup> For a modern reader brought up on different rules of decorum and emotional display, he may seem to be 'unmanned' by grief,<sup>29</sup> but love and the joys and sorrows attendant upon it were part of the repertoire of a heroic character. It was not uncommon in the tragedy of the time to see men weep. A breach of decorum in the face of his own death, on the other hand, was inappropriate for a hero. We should not, therefore, wonder at the lack of bodily signs of pain in Oroonoko's death scene nor at the fact that Behn's novella, modelled on heroic drama, refuses to give us insight into the hero's interior life at this point. Oroonoko remains imperturbable even under torture. Yet his complete control over his body language does not weaken or block the reader's empathy. Indeed, the text's silence on the effects of torture invites the reader's own imaginative engagement with the scene. Readers will inevitably wince at the description of the ordeal, even when genre conventions forbid the exposure of the hero's pain. Daniela Bohde has argued that Titian's picture of the Flaying of Marsyas (c. 1575), which refuses to depict the pain of the victim, is particularly disturbing because it challenges the viewers to imagine the attendant agony themselves, which 'increase[s] the emotional effect of the painting'; the alleged painlessness 'disturbs and provokes contradiction'.<sup>30</sup>

So far, only the display of emotions on the part of the fictional characters has been analysed. However, the narrator, often identified with Behn herself, also reveals emotions: some she openly avows, such as admiration for the African prince and pity for his fate, others are only implied and some inadvertently

<sup>26</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 106.

<sup>27</sup> For the facial management of Milton's Satan see Kunin, 'Facial Composure and Management in Behn's Novels', p. 79.

<sup>28</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 136

<sup>29</sup> Wandless, 'Narrative Pain and the Moral Sense', p. 60.

<sup>30</sup> Bohde, 'Skin and the Search for the Interior', pp. 45, 46.

seem to grant insight into her contradictory feelings towards colonialism, slavery and the eponymous hero himself.

Thus the schemas of friendship and brotherhood which the text uses to define the relation of the colonizers to both the Indians and Oroonoko carry a number of unacknowledged emotional overtones of nurture and affection and involve culture-specific scripts of behaviour. While the narrator is obviously aware of the duplicity of the slave trader and the Deputy Governor, who hoodwink the noble African by a show of friendship, she herself uses such metaphors quite unselfconsciously to explain relations which, in fact, are characterized by expediency and dependence:

the natives of the place [i.e. Surinam] [...] we live with in perfect amity, without daring to command them: but on the contrary, caress them with all the brotherly and friendly affection in the world [because they are] on all occasions, very useful to us. [...] nor dare we do other their number so far surpassing ours.<sup>31</sup>

This masks the exploitative reality of colonial relations by an illusion of family affection and mutual obligations, with all the attendant onus of the 'unnatural' act of breaking the familial bond by a rebellion. Or is it simply that we do not understand Restoration culture and the connotations of terms like 'friend' or 'brother', which the female narrator has no qualms about combining with threats of imprisonment, should Oroonoko fail to comply?<sup>32</sup> Although 'in complaisance to [the narrator], in whom he had entire confidence',<sup>33</sup> the prince vowed that he would 'act nothing upon the white people',<sup>34</sup> she 'neither thought it convenient to trust him much out of our view, nor did the country, who feared him'.<sup>35</sup> By entertaining him with various excursions and activities, she can keep an eye on him and act as a spy. Though irony is frequently used in the text in descriptions of white treachery and hypocrisy, there is no sense of irony at this point, nor any sign of awareness of the narrator's duplicity. Later, during the slave rebellion, the narrator fears that her black friend 'would

<sup>31</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, pp. 75, 78.

<sup>32</sup> She threatens that his impatience might 'compel us to treat him so as I should be very loth to behold: that is, it might occasion his confinement' (Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 114).

<sup>33</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 115.

<sup>34</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 114.

<sup>35</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 115.



come down and cut all our throats'<sup>36</sup> and flees downstream, failing to act in his defence when Oroonoko is captured, tortured and executed.

Trefry, whom we are supposed to take for an honest man, supposedly 'began to conceive so vast an esteem for him [i.e. Oroonoko], that he ever after loved him as his dearest brother';<sup>37</sup> yet despite the emotional commitment implied in the image does not feel obliged to take an active role in defending him against the mob. The high cultural (and emotional) capital of the family metaphor employed obscures the sordid facts and the complicity of the narrator and her friends with the system of slavery. Not only the language of the hypocrites, but occasionally also the narrator's, is corrupted, with the terms bearing no relation to actual conduct or attitude.

Another emotionally charged image used in the text is that of paradise, which invokes a complex biblical schema of the garden of Eden, but also of original sin and the Fall of Man. Though Campbell has argued that the explorers of the New World had to convey radical novelty without recourse to popular legend, because one does not 'mine Paradise or organize commerce with the locus amoenus',<sup>38</sup> the schema of paradise was, in fact, frequently employed in early modern travel texts. The American Indians, Behn's narrator says, 'presented to me an absolute idea of the first state of innocence, before man knew how to sin'.<sup>39</sup> The schema suggests a world of Edenic innocence and naivety which is opposed to white sophistication, but which also has more sinister overtones. While the family metaphors discussed above tend to gloss over colonial exploitation, the invocation of the Biblical narrative of our first parents Adam and Eve, in contrast, foregrounds the iniquity of the colonizers, as it inevitably raises the question concerning the agent who introduced evil into this Paradise — a role quite obviously assigned to the lying, corrupt, and blood-thirsty Europeans. The contradictory feelings aroused by Behn's imagery radically destabilize the reader's emotional response to cross-cultural contact.

The narrator's unease at the role of the Europeans is also given away by a number of violations of the Gricean maxims. The narrator's long digression about Oroonoko's heroic exploits in the South American jungle seeks to dispel the nasty aftertaste of her own duplicitous dealings by giving an impression not of enslavement but of adventure, which would have rendered rebel-

<sup>36</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 115.

<sup>37</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 106.

<sup>38</sup> Campbell, *The Witness and the Other World*, p. 224.

<sup>39</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 77.

lion unnecessary. A similar need of detailed self-justification is obvious after her flight from the site of the slave rebellion and her failure to intervene on Oroonoko's behalf: she excuses her behaviour by womanly fear and ignorance of the projected execution. A little earlier she claimed that she would have had 'authority and interest enough'<sup>40</sup> to prevent any outrage against her hero — though, as it turns out, her mother and sister present on the site of execution were not 'suffered to save him'.<sup>41</sup> Contradictory feelings vie with one another in this passage: shame at having deserted the prince and pride in her own social importance, offset by the bitter insight that women's supposed influence in patriarchal society is in fact illusory.

Indeed, throughout the narrative the female narrator's voice resonates with conflicting emotions, not only of shame and pride, but also of admiration and fear of the royal slave, of gratification at British colonial expansion and disdain for its agents, of identification with her native culture on the one hand and cross-cultural respect on the other. Such respect and interest is evinced not only in her eulogy of the African hero (no matter how Europeanized his features are), but also in a remarkable digression about a visit to an Indian village, in which she enters into close contact with the indigenous people and reverses the Eurocentric perspective, looking at the English travellers through their eyes. In such rare moments, Behn seems able to 'somehow negate or at least severely bracket the values, assumptions and ideology of her own culture' and to break the Manichean binary of either 'responding to the Other in terms of identity' and hence judging it by one's own cultural values, or assuming the other to be 'irremediably different'<sup>42</sup> and thus undeserving of cognitive or emotional attempts at understanding.

### *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*

There are few fictional or factual texts in the long eighteenth century detailing a woman's confrontation with foreign cultures and ethnicities in a colonial setting. Anna Maria Falconbridge's travels took her to West Africa, where also the first part of *Oroonoko* is set (although its narrator meets the African prince only when he has been enslaved in Surinam). Like Behn's narrator, Falconbridge got into close contact with both the indigenous population of the places she visited

<sup>40</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 132.

<sup>41</sup> Aphra Behn, *Oroonoko*, ed. by Todd, p. 106.

<sup>42</sup> JanMohamed, 'The Economy of Manichean Allegory', p. 65.

and people from other ethnicities who had been shipped to the area: the narrator of *Oroonoko* befriends the African royal couple enslaved in Surinam and visits a village of the South-American Caribs in the jungle; Falconbridge had contact to the local African rulers and their court as well as to the new inhabitants of Sierra Leone, consisting of freed black British slaves, black American loyalists who had fought alongside the British troops in the War of Independence, and loyalist African-American slaves who had originally settled in Nova Scotia. Both Behn's narrator and Falconbridge assumed an ultimately ambiguous position towards these foreign ethnicities and a critical stance towards the British authorities in charge of the colony or new settlement.

*Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, a travelogue of two journeys undertaken in 1791 and 1792, consists of a series of letters to a friend, which, as the author herself confessed in the Preface,<sup>43</sup> were designed for publication from the very beginning. The final impetus for printing them in 1794 may have been the issuing of a *Report* on the part of the Sierra Leone Company, 'in which her late husband's "habits of intoxication, idleness and irregularity" were held responsible for the infant colony's "first difficulties" and "commercial disappointments"', the repatriated Nova Scotian African Americans were accused of ungratefulness and Falconbridge's second husband was blamed for the blacks' unruliness and hostility.<sup>44</sup> The seemingly private epistolary form thus has an explicit political agenda of criticizing the mismanagement and corruption of the Sierra Leone Company in turn, and transports a conscious public image of herself. In her descriptions Falconbridge concentrates on the incompetence of the administration, their reneging on promises made to the black settlers and on the ungenerous treatment she herself had received at the hands of the supposed philanthropists running the Company.

Apart from this unmistakable anger which informs the narrative, the range of emotions described in Falconbridge's narrative is fairly limited. In Behn's Restoration text, genre convention decreed a reserve in the emotional display a hero was permitted. In Falconbridge's travel report, it is not a fictionalized African prince with his imaginary feelings who is in focus, but the author herself, and in spite of the epistolary mode she chose, she is rather reserved and selective in the information she gives about herself. Her composure is occasionally quite remarkable, as, for instance, in her calm reaction to a madman crying

<sup>43</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 47.

<sup>44</sup> Coleman, 'Introduction', p. 5.

murder on board of the ship.<sup>45</sup> A writer like Ann Radcliffe might have made much of the deranged passenger's Gothic vision of his murderous wife, bloody dagger in hand, but Falconbridge passes over the incident nonchalantly, trying to exhibit the stout-heartedness becoming a female traveller to Africa.

Not only does she take pride in her physical robustness and nerve in undertaking such 'an unusual enterprise for an English woman',<sup>46</sup> but she also exhibits a generous dose of humour and self-irony. She ridicules the satisfaction she feels at the sight of some decently dressed African women, before she finds out that all of them are white men's mistresses. She heaps fun at the faux pas of the African royal couple, who fail to come up to the Western codes of dress and conduct, yet at the same time laughs about her own 'fancied importance'<sup>47</sup> for priding herself on the place of honour she is given at their court.

However, the self-image she composes in her travel report veers between pluckiness and trepidation, a display of self-irony and a conscious show of sensibility. Like Behn, Falconbridge is impressed by the exotic landscape, which, in accordance with the tastes of the time, she renders in terms of the sublime and picturesque: 'stupendous heights, richly wooded and beautifully ornamented', affording 'delightful prospects' and 'new scenery almost every moment'.<sup>48</sup> While Behn, however, presents Surinam as a paradise, Falconbridge sees Africa as a wilderness, 'inhospitable',<sup>49</sup> peopled by 'barbarous'<sup>50</sup> tribes — terms mirroring her basic fear and repugnance. Indeed, in her contact with the indigenous Africans, the emotion we hear about most frequently is fear. As in Behn's narrative, there is a lurking suspicion of the Africans despite their seeming friendliness, although she asserts later that she had 'less to fear from [the natives] than our own people'.<sup>51</sup> But while Behn's narrator says little about any anxiety she might have felt in the jungle of Surinam, except, of course, when she uses her feminine timidity to excuse her failure to save Oroonoko, Falconbridge frequently reports that she was 'alarmed'<sup>52</sup> at the sound of African drums, afraid of

<sup>45</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 49.

<sup>46</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 48.

<sup>47</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 63.

<sup>48</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 51.

<sup>49</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 46.

<sup>50</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 77.

<sup>51</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 71.

<sup>52</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 116.

King Jemmy's savage nature, 'distressed' at king Naimanba's terminal illness.<sup>53</sup> In her description of the encounter with a hostile indigenous tribe, she leaves it to the reader to 'imagine what horrors' their 'threats' of violence occasioned her,<sup>54</sup> thereby inviting an empathetic emotional engagement. Once, she is physically incapacitated by overpowering emotions, when she dreads some perfidiousness on the part of the native King Jemmy and his followers, mistrusting their smiles: 'My heart quivered with fear lest they might be forming some treacherous contrivance' and 'a shower of tears burst from my eyes and I swooned into hysterics'.<sup>55</sup>

Like *Oroonoko*, Falconbridge's narrative misapplies the schema of friendship to intercultural relations based on expediency, implicitly calling up the affective response inherent in this mental frame. Her fear of the Africans makes it quite clear that she regards them as (potential) enemies, not friends. She is keenly aware of the absurdity of her husband speaking to the African monarch of his 'good friend', King George.<sup>56</sup> Yet she gets carried away by the emotionally loaded schema all the same, so that the failure of Africans to treat the whites with the disinterestedness and mutual trust that might be expected of a friend serves to confirm her notion of their basic ungratefulness and treachery. Thus she criticizes the fact that the natives always want gifts and that 'words are not sufficient enough to convey thankful acknowledgement in [Africa]' — as if the two ethnicities were truly on terms of friendship.

She also seems to approve when her husband exhorts the black settlers 'that they might merit by their industry and good behaviour the notice taken of them' so as to 'deserve further favours from their friends in England'.<sup>57</sup> Such expectation of gratitude for alleged good graces obscures the fact that Britain was beholden to the black loyalists who had fought on the British side in the American War of Independence and that the supposed friends in England (namely the Sierra Leone Company) denied them the promised support in their new homeland, as her travelogue emphasizes again and again. That Falconbridge expects black people to prize the condescension of the whites

<sup>53</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 120.

<sup>54</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 65.

<sup>55</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 67.

<sup>56</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 60.

<sup>57</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 70.

is also shown by her anger at an African woman who tears off the European clothes she has deigned to put on her.<sup>58</sup>

As is frequently the case when it comes to the cross-cultural interpretation of emotions, she draws inferences as to the King's lack of parental feelings from the absence of tears at parting from his son,<sup>59</sup> remaining oblivious that the reproach of callousness is bound to fall back on her own lack of feeling at the death of her husband. The African monarch later regains her good opinion when he weeps at the sight of his son's portrait. Some of her interpretations of emotional display in a foreign culture are plainly absurd. Thus she claims that she 'never saw more signs of content and satisfaction'<sup>60</sup> on the part of Africans than those exhibited during the middle passage.

An interesting stylistic feature of Falconbridge's travelogue is the frequent use of a language of sensibility which forms a curious contrast to the show of courage and wry humour she also displays. Sensibility in the sense of 'an exquisite fineness of feeling'<sup>61</sup> was a desirable character trait at her time and was considered a physical as well as moral attribute.<sup>62</sup> The insistent emphasis on the trials her delicacy had to undergo in Africa creates a Gricean implicature suggesting an effort to assert her femininity, in spite of the robustness she stresses on other occasions. Thus Falconbridge delicacy is offended, for instance, by the sailors' language and the African women's nakedness. Yet this 'refined sense of what is becoming, modest and proper', she lays claim to occasionally seems more like 'fastidiousness' and 'squeamishness',<sup>63</sup> her reactions indicating aesthetic rather than moral shock. Thus the somatic reaction she acknowledges when unexpectedly glancing into a slave-yard is a 'blush' of 'offended modesty' and compunction 'for not hurrying my eyes from such disgusting scenes'.<sup>64</sup> Terms like 'offended modesty' and 'disgusting' suggest that she is dismayed at the unpleasantness and indecency of the sight rather than being moved by a

<sup>58</sup> She calls the woman 'impetuous, litigious, and implacable' (Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 69).

<sup>59</sup> 'He seemed unconcerned at parting with his son' (Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 82).

<sup>60</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 134.

<sup>61</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*.

<sup>62</sup> Bending, *The Representation of Bodily Pain*, p. 181.

<sup>63</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*, which lists these various definitions as accepted meanings of the term.

<sup>64</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 58.

'delicate regard for the feelings of the victims'<sup>65</sup> — especially since the only consequence she seems to draw from the experience is to avoid 'the prospect from this side of the house'<sup>66</sup> (not the house itself).

Although her first husband was an avid abolitionist, whom she accompanied on his mission, her own attitude to slavery is equivocal, like that of Behn's narrator, who accepts the system and merely deplores the enslavement of black aristocrats like Oroonoko. Falconbridge comments bitterly on the black settlers' hardships which were aggravated or indeed caused by the Sierra Leone Company, and shows herself outraged at the 'barbarous customs' in Africa which make it possible for a 'poor victim' to be enslaved by a hostile black tribe.<sup>67</sup> Yet the 'disgusting' vision of the slave yard does not prevent her from making a heavy-handed point about the greater civility of the white slave traders on Bance Island as compared to the Company Directors.

Sensibility in the eighteenth century of course did not necessarily imply a readiness to feel compassion for suffering. Contemporaries like Hannah More, however, criticized the disjunction of emotionalism from philanthropic action and angrily dismissed a sensibility that only expressed itself in 'Loquacious Feeling'<sup>68</sup>. In Falconbridge's travel report compassion works across racial borders only very selectively, and rarely appertains to the native Africans, though she does feel sorry for the ill treatment of the freedmen settled in Sierra Leone. She can, up to a point, relate to these ex-slaves who have adapted to white civilization; the indigenous population, however, is other for her. For them, she evinces little sense of shared humanity across the colour bar, and hence she has 'little incentive to adopt the viewpoint of that alterity' or to enter into their feelings; unlike Behn, she does not reflect 'on the efficacy of European values, assumptions and habits in contrast to those of native cultures.'<sup>69</sup> Compassion is a 'complex emotional attitude', and implies a willingness to put oneself in another person's place; it is blocked when the other is not taken as fully human and there is no 'sense of shared humanity'.<sup>70</sup> Behn may be entangled with British colonialism, but her emotions of curiosity, admiration, and compassion

<sup>65</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. 'delicacy'.

<sup>66</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 58.

<sup>67</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 72.

<sup>68</sup> More, 'Sensibility: A Poetical Epistle to the Hon. Mrs Boscarwen'. However, Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, p. 85, points out that 'sentimentality consolidated itself quite suddenly in the 1780s and 1790s as a powerful mode for representing colonial relations and the imperial frontier'.

<sup>69</sup> JanMohamed, 'The Economy of Manichean Allegory', p. 65.

<sup>70</sup> Bloom, 'Compassion', pp. 509, 511.



are also directed outward towards the fortunes of the colonized. If anything, Falconbridge feels pity rather than compassion, which involves 'a kind of condescension'<sup>71</sup> and a consciousness of being fundamentally different from the other person. Emotionally, she remains basically self-centred, and her narrative does not forge solidarity and bridge cultural difference. The description of the irresponsible administration of Sierra Leone ultimately serves primarily as a proof of the veracity of her own tale of woe.

In view of her ambivalent attitude towards slavery it is interesting that she frequently uses images of violence and enslavement to define her own pitiful condition and her relation to both her first husband and the Sierra Leone Company. Such images are intended to arouse moral outrage, invite the reader to see Falconbridge as the chief sufferer of the tale and threaten to upstage the wrongs done to the black settlers in Sierra Leone her critical report set out to castigate. The appeal for sympathy is also enforced by the hyperbolic adjectives drawing attention to her 'hardships unprecedented' and 'matchless suffering'.<sup>72</sup>

Already in the preface she promises to 'kiss the rod' if she has done 'violence to veracity'<sup>73</sup> in her report about the misgovernment of Sierra Leone. She claims to have been 'shabbily treated' by the hypocrites running the company, who deprive her of 'the poor pittance [she is] entitled to',<sup>74</sup> thereby casting herself in the role of an afflicted widow robbed by misers, a possible intertextual reference to Exodus 22. 22–24, where God promises to avenge the cries of widows and orphans.<sup>75</sup> Earlier, her first husband is said to have treated her like a prisoner or slave, keeping her 'pent up in a floating cage without room' where life is a 'torment'.<sup>76</sup> While the slave traders kindly extend an invitation to the couple to take a bed on shore in their comfortable houses, which Falconbridge herself would have gratefully accepted, her husband boorishly refuses their hospitality because of what seem to her stubborn abolitionist prejudices. Such scenes imply that her husband is wanting both in manners and genuine concern

<sup>71</sup> Bloom, 'Compassion', p. 512; Hogan, *The Mind and Its Stories*, p. 144.

<sup>72</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, pp. 81, 155.

<sup>73</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, pp. 47, 48.

<sup>74</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, pp. 153, 152.

<sup>75</sup> 'Ye shall not afflict any widow, or fatherless child. If thou afflict them in any wise, and they cry at all unto me, I will surely hear their cry; And my wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword; and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless.' Exodus 22. 22–24.

<sup>76</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, pp. 54, 53.

and compassion for his wife, who must stay in a disgusting 'hog-trough'<sup>77</sup> of a berth, a 'floating prison'.<sup>78</sup> A trough from which the captive Africans feed, notably, is also mentioned in the vision of the slave yard. She is at pains to include several examples of Mr Falconbridge's inconsiderate behaviour, possibly to account for her remarkable breach of emotional decorum when she expresses not grief, but relief, at the death of her husband, and a lingering resentment which not even death can dispel.

While her emotional exhaustion when so many colonists die from tropical fever may be understandable, a confession of relief at the death of one's husband is unconventional, to say the least, especially if we consider that Falconbridge designed the travelogue for publication from the beginning. She is, of course, aware that readers arrive at an interpretation of a person by evaluating her emotional responses<sup>79</sup> and from them may draw unwelcome inferences as to her goals and beliefs, but she turns the table on her critics by accusing them of narrow-mindedness, professing to prefer candour to hypocrisy — a vice which she persistently and at great length ascribes to the Sierra Leone Company. The disjunction between body language and true emotions is used to illustrate their Pharisaism: Mr Clarkson's 'cheek was furrowed with tears'<sup>80</sup> when she tells him of her suffering, nonetheless this 'unmanly, unprincipled and diabolical'<sup>81</sup> functionary has no qualms about withholding the money she considers her due. Even a sentimental reference to her unloved first husband, who supposedly received his deathblow when he was dismissed by these heartless people,<sup>82</sup> comes in handy at this point. The seeming philanthropy of the company members is interpreted as a craving for power and 'bigot[ry] for the abolition',<sup>83</sup> a phrase which discredits anti-slavery agitation by linking it to (religious) intolerance, an accusation frequently levelled at Evangelicals. She even accuses Wilberforce and his supporters of being 'impelled by too keen

<sup>77</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 53.

<sup>78</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 58.

<sup>79</sup> Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason*, p. 116.

<sup>80</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 117.

<sup>81</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 123. In contrast, Fyfe, *History of Sierra Leone*, p. 33, describes Clarkson as a 'deeply emotional man' who was 'easily stirred' by injustice and suffering.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, pp. 109 ff.

<sup>83</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 134.

notions of humanity, and too zealous a desire of doing good,'<sup>84</sup> a paradoxical argument linking fervent humanitarianism with excess and disproportionality, and implying that good deeds, too, must be undertaken with moderation. Such passages, as Coleman points out, 'reflect the waning popularity of abolitionism as it became more closely associated with radicalism.'<sup>85</sup>

In Falconbridge's own travelogue, however, the disproportion in the space apportioned to various descriptions creates implicatures allowing inferences as to her hidden feelings. While she passes gingerly over the vision of the slave yard, she spends a whole page outlining the amenities on board a slave ship, which, as Coleman quips, is made to look like a 'luxury liner'.<sup>86</sup> The hyperbolic style (slaves treated with 'the utmost kindness and care', enjoying 'abundance of room', and 'excellent' provisions such as freshly prepared 'mutton, fowl and fresh meat' in 'superabundance'),<sup>87</sup> hints at deep seated unease and embarrassment — which is only natural, given her first husband's activities in favour of the abolitionist cause. Her excess of emotions for three white sailors accused of having stolen a duck is also telling: while the slave yard merely occasions a blush, she waxes indignant about their trial by 'a *Jury of twelve blacks*'<sup>88</sup> as 'one of the most atrocious infringements on the liberty of British subjects'.<sup>89</sup> The incident comes in handy to make a further case against a functionary of the Sierra Leone Company, who allowed the white men to be tried not by their peers, but by freedmen, and 'dreadfully mortified' one of them by having him 'whipped by a black man'.<sup>90</sup> Yet her outrage about the treatment of these suspected white thieves seems excessive when compared to the passionlessness with which she reacts to the suffering of slaves. The implicature generated suggests not only that she took every opportunity to discredit the company, but also that she may have shared the sailors' sense of mortification at black men claiming equality by sitting in judgement over them.

Falconbridge's *Two Voyages* may be less complex and polysemous than Behn's *Oroonoko*, but it also veers between emotional extremes: self-pity and self-irony, anger at the treatment of the black freedmen but resentment when they trans-

<sup>84</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 134.

<sup>85</sup> Coleman, 'Introduction', p. 22.

<sup>86</sup> Coleman, 'Introduction', p. 24.

<sup>87</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 134.

<sup>88</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 130.

<sup>89</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 129.

<sup>90</sup> Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone*, ed. by Coleman, p. 130.

gress the place allocated to them by the system, contempt for the native king and gratification at his attention, rhetorical support for her husband's mission and patently colonialist attitudes. In order to portray the feelings generated by intercultural contact, both texts explicitly state and dramatize certain emotions in action. Behn's narrator expresses her admiration for the protagonist, her curiosity about the Caribs, her horror at the white men's treachery and cruelty, her delight in the tropical fauna and flora of Surinam. In contrast, Falconbridge stresses her anxiety and apprehension of the Africans, her pity for the freedmen, her anger and contempt for the functionaries of the Sierra Leone Company, her female sensibility.

The metaphors used in the two texts, however, also give away concealed affective responses and put an interpretative spin on scenes indicative of emotions not explicitly addressed. The narrator of *Oroonoko* frames Surinam as a tropical Eden, implicitly blaming her white compatriots for bringing sin and corruption into this paradise. Falconbridge exhibits few misgivings about slavery, but uses the affective appeal of the schema of enslavement to arouse pity for her own suffering and maltreatment. Both texts misapply the highly emotional schema of friendship to interracial relations, offending against the Gricean maxim of quality (truth) by glossing over political, social and economic inequalities which ought to render expectations of true mutuality absurd. Hidden emotions can also be gleaned from other implicatures, such as verbosity or a quick passing over scenes, which may imply that the speaker feels embarrassed, wants to vindicate herself, or is emotionally involved in ways she does not want to acknowledge openly. A consideration of schemas, mental frames and Gricean implicatures can thus help to gain a more complete understanding of the ambivalent emotions of the two female speakers involved in colonial contact.

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## Part III

### Social History and Material Culture



## FEAR, GENDER, AND VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN IRELAND

Dianne Hall\*

During 1689 George Walker stood up at the pulpit of the Cathedral in Londonderry and preached a series of fiery sermons to his fellow Protestants suffering through a long siege. To Walker the Catholic enemy were a ‘cruel and wastful People that spared no Means that Force or Fraud could invent to vex [the Protestants]’.<sup>1</sup> In his sermons he used narratives of past violence perpetrated by Irish Catholics against innocent godly Protestant settlers to evoke emotional responses from his audience that would sustain them through the trauma of the lengthy siege and inspire them in the battles that would end it. In his use of examples from this stock of historical narratives, Walker worked to build the bonds of his besieged community by emphasizing the threats facing them. In one sermon he moved quickly from the courage displayed by the besieged in Biblical sieges through the ‘Cruelties too tedious to mention’ of the Elizabethan Irish wars to the ‘inhumane torments’ of the Catholics during the 1641 rebellion.<sup>2</sup> Many of these threats were highly gendered with the most common being threats of sexual violence against women and associated threats to their menfolk’s masculinity for failing to protect them. In his sermons Walker’s accumulation of narratives recalling

\* Research was funded by the Australian Research Council. Thanks to Elizabeth Malcolm.

<sup>1</sup> George Walker, *The Substance of a Sermon Being an Incouragement for Protestants*, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> George Walker, *The Substance of a Sermon Being an Incouragement for Protestants*, p. 8.

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past threatening events, and the implicit and explicit emotional responses of those who heard and retold them, worked to build communally understood emotional scripts based on an interplay of memory and emotion that bound communities together.<sup>3</sup>

Historians have long recognized that Protestant communities in early modern Ireland were bound together by a sense of brooding threat from their numerous Catholic neighbours and fear of the Irish Catholics gaining the upper hand or joining forces with the European Catholic enemies of the English Crown. An integrated fear of both the Irish and of popery was commonly expressed in literature and commentary in both Ireland and English Protestant and official circles.<sup>4</sup> There remain aspects of this shared sense of threat that have not been subject to in depth scholarly attention. In analysing what can be termed the emotional range or scripts of fear, threats that sparked and fanned emotion were integral to their modes of expression and valency. A sense of threat was a cornerstone of a range of emotional responses, which might include anger, and calls for courage and vengeance as well as fear. Gender also acted powerfully on the ways that these emotions could be legitimately expressed and acted upon. Threats of sexual violence against women or emasculation of men were the most explicit gendered triggers of fear. However the emotional script itself could be gendered: women and lower class men were described as being afraid of Catholic violence, while armed Protestant men did not express emotion in this way. Protestant writers used signs that Catholic men were afraid, as signs that Catholic men were deficient, implicitly gendering these emotional scripts as feminine and weak. The first part of this essay analyses gendered narratives of threat in seventeenth-century Protestant communities in Ireland. The second section will investigate how 'fear' words were gendered in narratives of the troubled seventeenth century.

In using emotions as a tool to analyse historical communities the explicit language of emotion in testimonies, propaganda and official reports needs careful analysis.<sup>5</sup> Use of words for emotions always needs textual contextualization and consideration of the societal uses of those texts. Rosenwein has outlined

<sup>3</sup> Rosenwein, 'Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions', p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Noonan, "'The Cruell Pressure of an Enraged, Barbarous People'", and Lake, 'Anti-Popery'.

<sup>5</sup> Rosenwein has explored the idea of 'emotional communities' in many of her works. See Plamper, 'The History of Emotions'; Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions in History'; Rosenwein, 'Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions', and Rosenwein, 'Thinking Historically about Medieval Emotions'.

the importance of identifying the emotions that were fundamental to communities, arguing that this is best done through interrogation of a wide range of emotions.<sup>6</sup> I suggest that there is also value in analysing communities through the prism of a single emotional range at particular historical moments.<sup>7</sup>

While there are many potentially profitable avenues for exploring fear in this period, including fear of damnation and fear of loss of honour or social standing, I will focus on the context of threats of physical violence against Protestant communities by Catholics in the long seventeenth century in Ireland from 1580s to 1690. This focus will largely exclude violence between members of the same household or family because intimate violence has a separate through related set of complex emotive scripts.<sup>8</sup> In this essay I will also limit the analysis to Protestant emotional responses to Catholic violence. There is no doubt that Irish Catholics suffered terribly from reprisals and attacks by Protestant settlers and armies during these dark years.<sup>9</sup> However the rhetorical power embedded within an emotional vocabulary based on threat of Catholics hardened divisive attitudes of the Protestant communities towards Irish Catholics in the seventeenth century, meaning that these narratives of fear resonated for many years and were instrumental in the formation of a distinctive Protestant Irish political, social and legal identity.<sup>10</sup>

## I

By the 1680s Protestant settlers, originally from England and low-land Scotland, had been established in colonies ('plantations') throughout Ireland but particularly in the southern parts of Munster and the northern counties of Ulster.<sup>11</sup> From the time they arrived they joined a ruling Protestant elite in enjoying privileges over the Catholic population of mainly Gaelic Irish. While this divide was neither complete nor impermeable, it did lead to both real

<sup>6</sup> Rosenwein, 'Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions', p. 15.

<sup>7</sup> White provides a model for analysis of one range of emotions. See White, 'The Politics of Anger'.

<sup>8</sup> This is a rich seam of historical research and analysis in its own right. See Walker, *Crime, Gender and Social Order*.

<sup>9</sup> The sufferings of Catholics are certainly less well documented. See Nicholls, 'The Other Massacre'.

<sup>10</sup> Barnard, 'The Protestant Interest 1641–1660', and Gibney, 'Protestant Interests?'

<sup>11</sup> For a summary of events see Canny, *Making Ireland British*, and MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*.

and perceived inequalities.<sup>12</sup> The resulting tensions between and among these groups, combined with attempts by the English crown to strengthen its control over politically recalcitrant areas of Ireland, meant that there were periodic outbreaks of extreme violence. Two outbreaks that were important in providing an emotional vocabulary of threat and fear that resonated throughout the rest of the century were the violence by Irish Catholics that ended the Munster plantation schemes in the 1590s and the rebellion occurring throughout Ireland in 1641.<sup>13</sup> Narratives of Irish Catholic violence against Protestant settlers from these two periods entered the later communal world-view of Protestants. These narratives were in turn shaped by knowledge of the 'barbarous nature' of the Catholic Irish gleaned from a long tradition of English and settler writings on Ireland and the Irish. While almost all of this writing was ultimately indebted to the twelfth-century writings on Ireland by Gerald of Wales, the continuing refashioning of these views within the context of Protestant anti-papery and the Tudor military reconquest of Ireland kept the ideas of violent and irrational Irishness current.<sup>14</sup> These constantly refreshed ideologies carried rich veins of gendered anti-Irishness.

In the reports, narratives and propaganda generated by these two events there was a thread of gendered violence that has only begun to be explored by historians, most recently about the 1641 rebellion.<sup>15</sup> There were however also similarities between the end of the Munster plantation in the 1590s during what has become known as the Nine Years War, and the 1641 rebellion at the beginning of the Civil wars. In both cases Protestant settlers recorded profound shock that their erstwhile Catholic neighbours could destroy so quickly and completely their settlements and the social bonds that they thought had been secured. One commentator recorded in 1598 that 'thinking they [the settlers]

<sup>12</sup> The 'plantations' were never as complete as was hoped. In almost all areas, even in areas under firm English control, the majority of tenants were almost certainly native Irish. See Canny, *Making Ireland British*, pp. 78–79 ff.

<sup>13</sup> McGurk, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland*, and Barnard, 'Crises of Identity among Irish Protestants', p. 50.

<sup>14</sup> There is a growing literature on the medieval genealogy of the concept of the Barbarity of the Irish; for summaries, see Carroll, 'Barbarous Slaves and Civil Cannibals'; and Leerssen, 'Wildness, Wilderness and Ireland'; and Leerssen, *Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael*.

<sup>15</sup> The importance of analysis of the testimony of women during the 1641 rebellion and its aftermath has begun to be explored in the past few years. See Hall and Malcolm, "'The Rebels Turkish Tyranny'"; McAreavey, "Paper Bullets"; McAreavey, 'Re(-)membering Women'; and Coolahan, *Women, Writing, and Language in Early Modern Ireland*, pp. 140–79.

lived in all security, they never sought to prevent the mischief that might [rise] and there on the sudden, rose, among them'.<sup>16</sup> Fynes Moryson in his record of the reactions of Protestant settlers of the 1590s wrote:

Againe theire Irish Tennants ether rann away, or turning Rebells spoyled them, and the Irish in theire houses were ready to betray them and upon theire dores to the Rebells. So as some of those undertakers were in the first tumult killed, some taken prisoners were Cruelly handled, and had theire wives and daughters shamefully abused.<sup>17</sup>

The 'shameful' abuse of the wives and daughters of the settlers was an integral and shocking part of the violent dismantling of settlers households. A ringing condemnation of the rebellion addressed to the Queen in 1598, possibly written by the crown administrator, colonist, and poet Edmund Spenser, began with a long catalogue of gendered and sexualized violence suffered by the settlers of Munster:

None that lighted into their hands escaped their beastly luste. If they were under fortie; verie Children of a dozen or therten yeares of age (a thinge as true as hard to be believed) could not be privledge from there villainy [...]

There should you have scene the widowe lamentinge over the dead bodie of her husband: the Child bewaylinge the death of his father: the mother runinge into the thickest of the swordes to save her sonne, miserable rentinge and tearing herselfe for the abusing of her daughter before her face.<sup>18</sup>

In other reports the necessity for wives and children to leave quickly for the shelter of English-held towns was cited as evidence of the gravity and unpredictability of the situation; so Arthur Hyde reported that his castle in Limerick had been attacked and he had been forced to send his wife and children to Cork.<sup>19</sup> Where women were not able to leave and so were stranded to face assaults on fortified houses and castles, their sufferings were emphasized in the official reports, as when Sir Thomas Moore's castle was surprised and the women of the house were either abducted or barely escaped.<sup>20</sup> Spenser in his

<sup>16</sup> *Calendar of State Papers relating to Ireland* (hereafter *Cal. S. P. Ire.*), 1598–99, p. 324.

<sup>17</sup> Moryson, 'The Irish Sections of Fynes Moryson's Unpublished "Itinerary"', p. 48.

<sup>18</sup> Maley, 'The Supplication of the Blood of the English', pp. 17–18. For the authorship of this text see Morgan, 'Spenser's Supplication: The Proof'.

<sup>19</sup> *Cal. S.P. Ire.*, 1598–99, p. 302.

<sup>20</sup> 'Captain Thomas Reade to Sir Robert Cecil', *Cal. S.P. Ire.*, 1598–99, p. 353.



*A View of the Present State of Ireland* (1598) wrote generally about the threat of Irish fighting men — gallowglasses:

those (gallowglass) bee the most barbarous and loathly conditions of any people (I thinke) under heaven for, from the time that they enter into that course, they doe use all the beastly behaviour that may bee; they oppress all men, they spoile aswell the subject, as the enemy; they steale, they are cruell and bloodie, full of revenge and delighting in deadly execution, licentious, swearers and blasphemers, common ravishers of woemen and murtheres of children.<sup>21</sup>

*A View of the Present State of Ireland* circulated widely in manuscript and was eventually edited and published in 1633. His views on the threat of unchecked Irish barbarity for Protestant settler communities were influential and were part of the stock of narratives that provided shocked survivors of the 1641 rebellion with narratives through which they could understand the threat that faced them.<sup>22</sup>

The 1641 rebellion began on 24 October when a group of Irish Catholic nobles captured English strongholds in Ulster at the same time as a planned capture of the seat of English power in Ireland — Dublin castle — was uncovered. The leaders seem to have quickly lost control as Catholics began attacking Protestant settlers aiming primarily to dispossess them of their property. In the process the attacks frequently turned violent and many Protestant women, men, and children were killed in often horrific ways or died from exposure after being turned out of their houses without clothes, money or food.<sup>23</sup> Reports of the events were quickly communicated to a horrified public in London while the Dublin government began an ambitious process of collecting witness statements from Protestants who had lost property or suffered violence.<sup>24</sup> These ‘Depositions’ were the raw materials used in the writing of an avalanche of pamphlets heaping horrific detail upon detail of murder, cruelty, and treachery all aimed at provoking the English to agree to send troops, money, and reinforcements to Ireland to fight the rebels.<sup>25</sup> The torrent of propaganda was

<sup>21</sup> Spenser, *A View of the State of Ireland*, p. 74. See for further interpretation of Spenser in Ireland, Brady, ‘Spenser’s Irish Crisis’.

<sup>22</sup> Maley, ‘How Milton and his Contemporaries Read Spenser’s View’, p. 193.

<sup>23</sup> See Canny, ‘What Really Happened in Ireland in 1641?’.

<sup>24</sup> Dublin, Trinity College, MS 809–841 now fully digitalized: <<http://1641.tcd.ie/index.php>> [accessed 10 September 2014]. All references to the depositions will be by MS and folio number, these can be used to search the digital database.

<sup>25</sup> Barnard, “‘Parlour Entertainment in an Evening’?”, and Shagan, ‘Constructing Discord’.

successful and the resulting wars lasted for over ten years and culminated in the brutal Cromwellian campaigns of the 1650s. The pamphlets were in turn referred to in annual sermons preached throughout Protestant Ireland and often in England to celebrate the delivery of Protestant Ireland from the threat of Catholic massacre.<sup>26</sup>

The witness statements in the Depositions include both eye-witness accounts as well as a significant seam of rumour and hearsay pointing to a groundswell of rising fear and sense of threat in settler communities in late 1641. As the refugees struggled to safety through one of the coldest winters in memory they told and retold narratives of disaster, survival, and escape. These narratives were in turn understood through the available emotional vocabulary provided by Protestant anti-Catholic and anti-Irish writings. The repetition of narratives by refugees from the violence in 1641 is one measure of the types of violence that provoked widespread fear among settler communities. The violence that was most threatening to settler communities was indiscriminate massacres, and then targeted and gendered violence against pregnant women and ministers of religion. Stories of pregnant women delivered of their babies at the point of death were repeated far from their geographical origin as refugees fled.<sup>27</sup> These combined with reports of genital mutilation of Protestant ministers were the most widely-repeated narratives of gendered violence in the Depositions. While rape was not commonly reported by witnesses, the writers of the pamphlets included stories of widespread sexual violence and so promoted threatening images of Irish barbarity and defective masculinity.<sup>28</sup> What this meant was that narratives of indiscriminate sexualized violence were common and were inextricably mixed with reports of massacres. One example from the vast corpus of propaganda pamphlets describes a meeting between a group of refugee settler women and Irish commander Rory McGuire:

The pore women begged with two Ladies of good worth for mercie with bended knees their hands up and their teares trickling downe their pale cheekes. But this hell-hound would not relent, but first bidding this souldier satisfie their lust upon them, their husband looking on, put them all to the sword onely reserving the two Ladies for further villany.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Barnard, 'The Uses of 23 October 1641'.

<sup>27</sup> McAreavey, 'Re(-)membering Women', pp. 72–92.

<sup>28</sup> Hall and Malcolm, "'The Rebels Turkish Tyranny'", pp. 73–74.

<sup>29</sup> *More Happy Newes from Ireland [...]*.

Narratives of massacre and sexual violence created an atmosphere of threat that was so widely known that it could be referred to in short hand. This atmosphere of threat was kept alive by reprinting of the most popular of the atrocity compilations, John Temple's *The Irish Rebellion*.<sup>30</sup> During the New Model Army military campaigns in Ireland, these threats were used in the justification given by Oliver Cromwell for his massacre of the inhabitants of Drogheda in 1649: 'I am persuaded that this is the righteous judgment of God upon those barbarous wretches, who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood.'<sup>31</sup>

The years after the decade of war in the mid-century were ones of fragile peace in Ireland and the shattered economic and social fabric was starting to repair when tensions rose again. In the late 1680s fears grew that James II was promoting Catholics and thus threatening Protestant interests and hegemony. This provoked the serious political crisis in England that ended with the 'Glorious Revolution'. In Ireland the growing evidence for Catholic toleration and subsequent rise in status of Irish Catholics reactivated the dark seam of threat and fear based on the memory of 1641, filtered through the lurid details of the hearsay reports and Pamphlet literature.

They say, they have still in their memories the cruelities they suffered in the late rebellion from the natives, when they lived with all the loving friendliness together and how say they can we help being frightened when we see the sons of these very men, who were most active in the rebellion now in command and they proceed to reckon them up.<sup>32</sup>

So when the Protestant Apprentice Boys closed the gates of Derry in 1689 against the onslaught of the Irish Jacobite army they were doing so in clear knowledge of what was at stake.<sup>33</sup>

Walker's exhortations in his sermons in besieged Derry wove a powerful narrative of threat of attack against Protestant settlers besieged within the walls. He called on his audiences as men whose masculinity was bound up in their ability to protect their households from the ravages of Irish Catholic attack:

What a dismal sight it would be to see our offsprings dragged from the dear embraces of their affrighted parents and cloistered up with polluted Priests to the

<sup>30</sup> John Temple, *The Irish Rebellion*; Gillespie, 'Temple's Fate'.

<sup>31</sup> Cited in Ó Siochrú, 'Propaganda, Rumour and Myth', p. 272.

<sup>32</sup> Henry Earl of Clarendon, *The State Letters*, I, 303.

<sup>33</sup> On the influence of memories of 1641 on actions in 1680s see Barnard, 'Crises of Identity among Irish Protestants'.

end they may imbibe Popish principles? Would you not be struck with horror to see your wives and daughters suffer all the abuse that the unbridled lust of French and Irish Dragoons can invent. Your houses plundered, slaughter and fire raging in our streets and every thing looking with a horrid aspect of blood and destruction. I dare say we would all rather die on the spot than survive such barbarous and bloody scenes.<sup>34</sup>

Such threats of gendered violence played a crucial part in Protestant perception of Irish barbarism and were the bedrock for their fears of attack and loss of property and life.

## II

Threats of social upheaval, massacre and violence provoked various emotional responses within the Protestant populations that were grounded in individual and communal memory of past threats as well as societal expectations and norms of behaviour. The emotions described included courage, anger, revenge but primarily fear. The use of words for fear in the different texts of the period was not purely descriptive but served to underline distinct agendas. There are also many instances in the surviving texts where the words for fear are not used, yet actions are narrated that fit within a script of fear.<sup>35</sup> So that when people are described as running away or leaving in the face of threat, they were interpreted as experiencing fear.

When faced with armed insurgency from Irish rebels, Protestant settlers sought military, financial and material aid from the English governments and officials who had engineered and supported the plantations schemes. The narratives of threat faced by the settlers were carefully articulated in their pleas for aid in order to provoke the greatest possible sympathy and assistance. In interrogating the vocabulary of emotion used it is clear that the emotion of fear was used selectively and emphasized gendered norms. When reporting the swiftness and unexpectedness of the Munster rebellion in 1598, Francis Barkley of Askeaton in Co. Limerick for example emphasized the fear of the neighbouring settlers in his report to the Lords Justice in Dublin:

not so few as 500 men, women and children who brought nothing with them for the most part but such things as the extremity of their fear would give them leave

<sup>34</sup> George Walker, *The Substance of a Sermon Being an Incouragement for Protestants*.

<sup>35</sup> For the concept of emotional scripts see Rosenwein, 'Thinking Historically about Medieval Emotions', p. 834.

to lay their hands on, a spectacle, I protest unto your Lordships of the greatest pity and commiseration that ever my eye beheld.<sup>36</sup>

As the first reports of unrest reached Sir William St Leger, the President of Munster, in November 1641, he reported the generalized fear of his Protestant tenants:

but I must tell you that if I should stir from hence or make any show of danger, there would be but a few tenants left in Bruheny or in Downerayle for you cannot imagine in what a fright the people are in.<sup>37</sup>

While when Thomas Ash went to Derry in April 1689, he wrote in his diary that

we had been alarmed by reports that the Roman Catholics intended to rise in arms against us, and to act over the tragedy of one thousand six hundred and forty-one, but to confirm our fears we were informed a letter had come to Mount-Alexander [...] warning him [...] of general insurrection.<sup>38</sup>

In all these accounts, the vocabulary of fear emphasizes the gravity of the threats facing settlers and was applied to groups of unnamed men and women, mostly tenants and social inferiors to the writers.

Fear as an emotional response specifically expressed by men in the face of physical threats was not generally used positively. A prominent Protestant settler was specific in his mocking criticism of men who fled in the face of fear during the Munster rebellion:

I do not observe that in general the people here are more terrified than they have cause to be, though in some particular persons the apprehension of danger works more strongly. Captain Hargill is gone to Cork to dwell, which gave occasion to a friend of ours wittily to say 'a captain, a castle and a coward, ingrafted on the stock of one crabtree'.<sup>39</sup>

As the reports of the 1641 rebellion grew more alarming St Leger was willing to admit that his tenants in general might be fearful, but he held a poor view of Protestant men who acted upon fears of the Irish.

<sup>36</sup> Captain Francis Barkley to Lords Justice Loftus and Gardener. *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1598–99*, p. 347.

<sup>37</sup> Sir William St Leger [Lord President of Munster] to Sir Philip Percivall, *Report of the Manuscripts of the Earl of Egmont*, I, 142–43.

<sup>38</sup> *Two Diaries of Derry in 1689*, ed. by Witherow, p. 61.

<sup>39</sup> Thomas Bettesworth to Sir Philip Percivall, *Report of the Manuscripts of the Earl of Egmont*, I, 147.

I do find that all at Dublin, or the most part of them, are frighted out of their wits, for if it were not so, it were impossible that they could think that Dublin could be taken by a company of naked rogues. You are as safe as if you were in London, if you be but men and stand to your tackling.<sup>40</sup>

St Leger outlined two opposite gendered scripts of emotional responses to threat. Being 'frighted out of their wits' was one reaction that he dismissed as unworthy of the threat from 'naked rogues'. The response to threat that he thought was appropriate for Protestant male settlers was neither talk about fear, nor to act upon fear by leaving, but to face the enemy and fight.

Contrasting reactions between flight while succumbing to fear and standing to fight was a commonplace in sermons and polemics seeking military intervention. So during the 1590 Munster rebellion advocates of harsher treatment of the native Irish compared the fear shown by the colonists who had trusted their Irish neighbours with the courage of those who had not and had taken up arms against them. Fynes Moryson complained of the cowardice of the settlers who still wanted to claim their lands after they had abandoned them:

a great part rann out of the kingdome, and yet shamed not to clayme and proffesse in the ende of the Rebellion these lands, the defence whereof they had so basely forsaken.<sup>41</sup>

Barnaby Rich in his 1610 polemic about plantation schemes in Ireland was typically forthright in his advocacy of harsher responses to the Irish, arguing that men who were afraid were those who gave concessions:

doubtes are styrrd uppe, sometymes, by ygnorant men that are afraide of ther owne shadowes, but most especyally, by thos that are more leanyng to ther Iryshe frendes, then eyther to the prynces honore or profyt.<sup>42</sup>

Rich explicitly defined fear as a feminine and unmanly emotion when, citing Roman history, he wrote in the same tract about the adverse effect of allowing soldiers and settlers to bring their wives as 'in the tyme of warre, they do hyndre the servyce by ther tymeryte & feare'.

<sup>40</sup> St Leger to Percivall, 8 November 1641, *Report of the Manuscripts of the Earl of Egmont*, 1, 144–45.

<sup>41</sup> Moryson, 'The Irish Sections of Fynes Moryson's Unpublished "Itinerary"', p. 48.

<sup>42</sup> Hinton, 'Rych's Anothomy of Ireland with an Account of the Author', pp. 89, 90; and see Highley, *Shakespeare, Spenser and the Crisis in Ireland*.

When it came to open warfare between the settlers and the Catholic Irish, the emotional divide between male combatants seemed obvious to the Protestant observers. At the same time as the Irish enemies might be acknowledged as strong, they were also scorned using the vocabulary of fear and were often depicted as foolhardy and barely rational in their strength and cunning. Spenser in *A View of the State of Ireland* (1598) is typical:

[the Irish] are very aliunt, and haride, for the most part great indururs of colde, labour, hunger and all hardnesse, very active and strong of hand, very swift of foot, very vigilant and circumspect in their enterprises, very present in perils, very great scorner of death.<sup>43</sup>

In reports of battles there are many descriptions of Irish Catholic fighting men showing their fear and cowardice through unmanly actions. In propaganda written during the 1641 rebellion the Irish were described as habitually running away. So Tristram Whitcombe wrote in 1642 that Irish soldiers had been outmaneuvered so that they ‘could hardly betake themselves to their heels, as they usually doe and have formerly done’.<sup>44</sup> A few years later a report to Cromwell after the siege of Wexford in 1649 described the stark emotional divide between enemy and friend in gendered terms: ‘for nothing is more obvious to sense than this, that a lyon like heart is inspired into our men, whilst all that is man-like is taken away from our enemy.’<sup>45</sup> Manly Protestant virtue did not include the emotion of fear.

The witness statements of Protestant survivors of the 1641 rebellion recorded testimony about violence, threat and fear from a wider range of people than official or semi-official commentators. These witnesses also often shaped their memories of violence using a vocabulary of gendered responses to fear. One relatively coherent group of statements recorded reactions to supernatural and ghostly events occurring in the aftermath of massacres of Protestant civilians by Catholics. As survivors made the painful journey to safety through the terrible winter of 1641/42, they found some comfort in the reports of ghosts and apparitions that were seen at the sites of notorious massacres of settlers. During her time as a prisoner of rebel forces, Joane Constable heard her Irish

<sup>43</sup> Spenser, *A View of the State of Ireland*, p. 47.

<sup>44</sup> Tristram Whitcombe, *The Truest Intelligence from the Province of Munster in the Kingdome of Ireland*. See also Hall and Malcolm, “The Rebels Turkish Tyranny”, p. 69.

<sup>45</sup> ‘Typescript copy of documents relating to Cromwell in Drogheda and Wexford in 1649, with a commentary on the documents’, National Library of Ireland, MS 9696, fol. 22.



captors describe the fear that was generated by reports that the site of the massacre on the Portadown bridge was marked by blood that would not wash away, while the water around the Bridge was filled with the 'fearful scratch and cry' of the drowned.

And that their cryes were & skritchings did soe terrify the irish thereabouts That none durst not stay nor live longer there, but fledd & removed further into the Cuntrie<sup>46</sup>

Other witnesses gave slightly differing versions of the ghostly apparitions but they were agreed that the Irish, particularly the rebel men who had participated in or ordered the massacre, were regularly seeing apparitions of victims and interpreting them as fearful. Richard Newberrie met up with his two Irish Catholic servants who had turned to the rebel side. They told him that their commanders at Portadown were so terrified of the apparitions they saw on the bridge that they repented of their actions.<sup>47</sup> One of the most respected Protestant witnesses, Dr Robert Maxwell, a prosperous and learned Anglican clergyman, had spent a considerable amount of time imprisoned by the rebels:

he [Maxwell] saith that divers of the rebells assured him, that they themselves did dwell neere to the said River, and being dayly affrighted with those apparitions, but especially with their horrible scritchings were in conclusion forced to remove further into the Country.<sup>48</sup>

While Anthony Stephens in Abbey Boyle, Co. Rocommon had heard:

That in the places where such drownings & cruelties have bin comitted There have bin often heard often the cryes of Revenge Reveng & other gastley strang & formidable expressions by spiritts which hath much as he is perswaded affrighted the hearers yet little amated or struck remorse into the harts or Consciences of the offenders.<sup>49</sup>

The witnesses interpreted the apparitions that they themselves had witnessed or that they had heard about using a gendered emotional script. The Catholic Irish men were afraid of the righteous anger of those that they had killed and

<sup>46</sup> Deposition of Joane Constable, 6 June 1643, Trinity College Dublin MS 836, fol. 89<sup>v</sup>. All transcripts of 1641 depositions have been checked against 1641 Depositions Online and may be found using manuscript references <[www.tcd1641.ie](http://www.tcd1641.ie)> [accessed 10 September 2014].

<sup>47</sup> Deposition of Richard Newberrie, 27 June 1642, TCD MS 836, fol. 61<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>48</sup> Deposition of Robert Maxwell, 22 August 1642 TCD MS 809, fol. 10<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>49</sup> Deposition of Anthony Stephens, 25 June 1646, TCD MS 830, fol. 44.



they acted upon this fear by fleeing. While the expression of fear was itself unmanly, so too was the killing of unarmed women and children. The emotion underlined the cowardly actions. Anthony Stephens also used the Irish rebels' response to their fear as proof that these Irish Catholics were morally inferior as the fear that they felt did not produce the emotion he deemed appropriate — that is remorse.

When Protestant settlers described the actions of Irish women during the rebellion, the vocabulary of fear shifted to implicit denials of the femininity of the women. Descriptions of Irish women perpetrating violent acts against Protestants emphasized their fearlessness in the face of violence and linked this with their inherently unwomanly nature:

whores & lewd women did much vawnt & glory in such their cruelties wherein they had noe little assistance by their children that if as farr as their powres extended, assisted if not exceeded, them in ther cruelties merciles & bloudie acts.<sup>50</sup>

These women 'did much vawnt and glory', and in doing so exceeded their menfolk in cruelty. Some witnesses reported that the women rebels were worse than the men 'Irish rebellious women were farr worse & more feirse & bloudy then the men Rebels: & carried their skeins'.<sup>51</sup> While 'the Vicountesse Ivaghe was soe cruell against the English & Scottish that she was very angrie with the souldjers because they did not putt them all to death'.<sup>52</sup> Fearlessness, like this, is masculinizing in women, because it was considered normative in men, while fearfulness was gendered feminine, and so emasculating to the men who expressed it.

### *Conclusion*

In seventeenth-century Protestant communities in Ireland, fear of Catholic violence was embedded in historicized narratives of threats against women and the vulnerable. Commentators and those holding government office used the fear reported as experienced by women and mixed groups of non-combatants to underline the gravity of threats experienced by settler communities in pleas for material, military, and financial aid. The vocabulary of emotion was further feminized when men who acted fearfully — particularly by running away

<sup>50</sup> Deposition of Alice Gregg, 21 July 1643, TCD MS 836, fol. 95.

<sup>51</sup> Deposition of William Jamesone, 8 July 1642, TCD MS 833, fol. 161<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>52</sup> Deposition of Elizabeth Crooker, 15 March 1643, TCD MS 837, fol. 4<sup>r</sup>.

— were described as being less than fully functioning men. This emasculating effect was aimed at both Protestant men who fled or did not fight in the face of threat and Irish Catholic enemies who were routinely described as unmanly because they did not stand and fight pitched battles when expected or who fled in the face of supernatural apparitions. The same vocabulary and meaning of fear also meant that while women were expected to be fearful when faced with violence or the threat of violence, when they did not they were described as lacking in essential civilizing femininity. This particularly applied to Irish rebel women when they were engaged in either encouraging Irish men in violence or in perpetrating violence themselves.

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## FEAR OF CRIME IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LONDON

Robert Shoemaker

Early modern Europe has been described as having experienced a ‘climate of fear’, with widespread anxieties about the threats posed by the devil, witchcraft, plague, arson, and sedition.<sup>1</sup> Although little studied, the possibility of becoming a victim of violent crime, whether murder, robbery, or burglary, also prompted many fears. Also little studied, except in the context of witchcraft, is the impact of print in shaping and spreading those fears, by the rapid and widespread dissemination of texts.<sup>2</sup> This chapter combines these two topics to examine how printed reports of crime shaped fears of crime in eighteenth-century London. While this was a time when some early modern threats, such as witchcraft and plague, were receding, worries about other dangers, including crime, were on the increase. In London, these fears coalesced with more general public unease about rapid urban growth and social instability, and they were magnified by the increased power of print following the

<sup>1</sup> Naphy and Roberts, eds, *Fear in Early Modern Society*, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> The pioneering work on the impact of print is Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*. While many aspects of this argument have been undermined or qualified by subsequent scholarship, the fundamental point about the impact of the sheer number and speed of the dispersal of printed texts has not. See Johns, ‘How to Acknowledge a Revolution’, p. 120; Febvre and Martin, *The Coming of the Book*, pp. 248–332. For the role of print in shaping the image of witches, see, for example, Zika, *The Appearance of Witchcraft*.

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expiration of press licensing in 1695. With an increasingly literate population, increased purchasing power, and a growing thirst for news, the market for print in one of Europe's largest cities, and therefore the potential impact of print, increased dramatically in the eighteenth century. This was particularly true for crime reporting. Images of criminality were disseminated in unprecedented numbers as crime became one of the most common topics in eighteenth-century printed literature, most notably in new genres explicitly devoted to the subject (trial accounts in the *Old Bailey Proceedings* and criminal biographies in the *Ordinary's Accounts*), but also in newspapers, polemical pamphlets, novels, plays, ballads, and satirical prints. This significant increase in representations of crime had the potential to change the way Londoners thought about crime, particularly their perceptions of the threats it posed to their personal wellbeing.

Although Londoners continued to learn about crime from oral sources, such as reports from friends and neighbours, increasingly their information came from print. While that literature disseminated a variety of images about crime, by no means all negative, the sum total of such repeated discussion, particularly of the violent attacks which received the most attention, served to heighten awareness of danger.<sup>3</sup> In publications such as newspapers and the *Old Bailey Proceedings* authors and publishers did not hesitate to heighten fears by devoting extra attention to the most violent and threatening crimes. This was also true of polemical pamphlets which sought to make the case for new punishments or policing reforms. Fear sold publications, and it was a useful weapon in eliciting support for proposed changes which were intended to make London's streets safer.

But print was not all-determining in shaping attitudes towards crime. As recent work on reading practices has demonstrated, readers' interpretations of what they read were shaped by a complex range of social and cultural influences, and the conclusions they drew could be at odds with the author's intentions.<sup>4</sup> We can investigate these responses in some detail owing to the growing habit of diary keeping and letter writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which provides us with valuable evidence not only of what Londoners read, but also of how they thought about crime, expressed their fears, and acted on them. In addition to the printed literature of crime, therefore, this chapter is based on an extensive trawl through twenty-six particularly rich diaries and collections

<sup>3</sup> Shoemaker, 'Print Culture'.

<sup>4</sup> Jackson, 'Approaches to the History of Readers and Reading'; Colclough, *Consuming Texts*, pp. 64–87.

of correspondence kept by eighteenth-century Londoners.<sup>5</sup> In analysing these sources, our investigation of the authors' complex responses to crime will shed light more generally on how Londoners expressed and coped with their emotions, and about the role of print in shaping those emotions.

We can also consider whether, as several historians have argued, London at this time of rapid change witnessed any significant change in the role of emotions in cultural and social life. We know from previous work on the history of emotions not only that the languages of emotional expression, and their regulation, vary over time and space, but also that simple narratives of increasing emotional restraint, such as Norbert Elias's 'civilising process', are oversimplified. Emotions, such as anger, are typically expressed within the constraints determined by 'emotional regimes' or 'emotional communities', and so controlled they had a considerable public impact.<sup>6</sup> But as the contexts of emotional expression change, as they did in the rapidly growing metropolis of London, there was the substantial possibility that the languages and consequences of emotions would change too. In the case of crime, this would have significant implications for attitudes towards punishment.

For historians of eighteenth-century emotions, personal diaries are a rich, if by no means unproblematic, source, which is largely unavailable to scholars of medieval and renaissance Europe. English diary keeping dates from the late sixteenth century, when diaries were first kept by Calvinist Protestants as a form of spiritual self-examination and aid to meditation and prayer. Following exhortations from preachers and the publication of guides, diary keeping became widespread, particularly from the late seventeenth century.<sup>7</sup> As reflected in the use of the term journal, or 'diurnal', these diaries often included some reports of public events. By the eighteenth century, as the spiritual focus waned, diarists devoted much more space to worldly issues, including household practices and crime.<sup>8</sup> But the legacy of the origins of this genre remained — diaries contin-

<sup>5</sup> This research is part of an ongoing project examining the experience of crime and the role of printed literature in constructing knowledge about crime in eighteenth-century London, the results of which will be published separately.

<sup>6</sup> Rosenwein, ed., *Anger's Past*; Rosenwein, 'Thinking Historically about Medieval Emotions', pp. 829–30. For 'emotional regimes', see Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*. For 'emotional communities', see Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions', para. 35 ff.; Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*.

<sup>7</sup> Cambers, 'Reading, the Godly, and Self-Writing', pp. 798–99; Mascuch, *Origins of the Individualist Self*, pp. 71–77; Sherman, 'Diary and Autobiography', pp. 649–51.

<sup>8</sup> Clarke, 'Diaries', p. 610. For household practices, see Harvey, *The Little Republic*, passim.



ued to contain a significant amount of self-reflection, and they continued to be written with a wider audience in mind, even when written in code.<sup>9</sup> Even though diary keeping was always a minority pursuit and diarists were therefore atypical, the fact remains that they wrote using conventional languages and for an intended audience. Thus, diaries provide an invaluable source for understanding contemporary emotional communities. That said, it must be acknowledged that the diaries which form the core source for this study do not constitute a representative sample of eighteenth-century Londoners. Unsurprisingly, they were written primarily by male elite Londoners (though they include two women, Gertrude Savile, sister of an MP, and Elizabeth Fothergill, a seventeen-year-old Quaker who visited the metropolis for six months in 1769–70, just before her marriage). Although many of our diarists were men of independent means or were well-connected officials or professionals, some were in business. Unfortunately, no useful working-class diaries have been found for this period.

Where did these diarists get their information about crime? In addition to their personal experiences, they received oral reports from friends, neighbours and acquaintances. But the diary evidence indicates that printed literature was their most important source. One of the most remarkable findings from a careful analysis of these sources is the discovery that these Londoners had very few personal experiences of crime. If we include crimes committed against members of their households and their acquaintances, they experienced a crime on average only once every three years, and few of these involved any violence (most were forms of simple larceny).<sup>10</sup> Nonetheless, their diaries indicate that

<sup>9</sup> Cambers, 'Reading, the Godly, and Self-Writing', pp. 804–11; Mascuch, *Origins of the Individualist Self*, pp. 87, 94; Dawson, 'Histories and texts'.

<sup>10</sup> Calculated from a cumulative two hundred and sixteen years of diary evidence and correspondence from twelve diarists/correspondents whose writings were sufficiently comprehensive that we can with some confidence conclude that if the author or any of his family and friends were victims of crime, they would have reported it. These include: John Evelyn (1660–1706): *The Diary of John Evelyn*, ed. by de Beer; Samuel Pepys (1660–69): *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, ed. by Latham and Matthews; Norris Purslow (1688–1728): London, Wellcome Library, MS 4021; Peter Briggens (1706–12): London, London Metropolitan Archives, ACC 1017/2; Dudley Ryder (1715–16): *The Diary of Dudley Ryder*, ed. and trans. by Matthews; William Byrd (1717–19): *William Byrd: The London Diary*, ed. by Wright and Tinling; John Dawson (1722–46): London, Hackney Archives, D/F/DAW/3/1; Gertrude Savile (1721–57): *The Diaries of Gertrude Savile*, ed. by Savile; Stephen Montague (1733–64): London, Guildhall Library, MS 205/1–9; Horace Walpole (1746–96): *Horace Walpole's Correspondence*, ed. by Lewis; Samuel Curwen (1775–84): *The Journal of Samuel Curwen*, ed. by Oliver; and James Jenkins (1780–1800): London, Friends House Library, cupboard 5.

they *thought* they personally knew a lot about crime, and the source of their information was printed literature. How was crime portrayed in that literature?

While, as previously suggested, crime was represented from a variety of different perspectives, not all of which were negative, there is no question but that, for a variety of reasons, authors and publishers frequently sought to highlight the most violent and fear-inducing aspects of crime. Such reports appear to have increased sales, and as noted earlier they were also used to recruit support for proposals to reform policing or punishment. The anonymous pamphlet *Hanging, not Punishment Enough, for Murtherers, High-Way Men, and House-Breakers* (1701), published during the perceived crime wave which followed the demobilization of soldiers at the end of the Nine Years War, offered its proposals for more brutal forms of execution, such as breaking on the wheel, 'to the consideration of the two Houses of Parliament'. Justifying the need for such punishments, readers were told that highwaymen 'have ruined several, and have brought fear on almost all. They have wounded and maimed divers, have left many bound and naked in cold weather, to the hazard, and often to the loss of their lives'. Turning to housebreakers, the author commented that 'the dread [...] is greater than can be well expressed [...] they terrifie innocent people to that high degree [...] that they would scarce be more afraid of a foreign invasion'. The proposals contained in this pamphlet were the most 'probable way to secure us from our fears'.<sup>11</sup>

Similarly, Henry Fielding's *Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers* (1751), written during a similar crime wave which followed demobilization in 1748 and dedicated to the Lord Chancellor, contained 'some proposals for remedying this growing evil'. This treatise started by arguing that the current level of crime in the metropolis was tantamount to a foreign invasion:

if I am to be assaulted and pillaged, and plundered; if I can neither sleep in my own house, nor walk the streets, nor travel in safety; is not my condition almost equally bad whether a licenced or unlicenced rogue, or dragoon or robber, be the person who plunders me?

He claimed, as

an unquestionable fact, that there are at this time a great gang of rogues, whose number falls little short of a hundred, who are incorporated in one body, have officers and a treasury; and have reduced theft and robbery into a regular system.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Hanging, not Punishment Enough*, pp. 3, 6.

<sup>12</sup> Henry Fielding, *An Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers*, pp. 2–3.

Coming from one of the most active magistrates in the metropolis, who should have known about such things, this was indeed a terrifying report.

These polemical works, of course, were not the most widely read texts about crime; Londoners spent far more time reading newspapers, trial accounts, and fictional representations. Many of these publications also presented crime as threatening: the *Old Bailey Proceedings* devoted disproportionate space to trials for murder and violent robbery, and to victim testimonies (rather than those of defendants), which for legal reasons (to conform to the legal definition of robbery) often went out of their way to report that the attackers had put their victims in fear.<sup>13</sup> Even more than the *Proceedings*, newspapers overwhelmingly reported crime from the point of view of the victim. While in a recent article Peter King has characterized crime reporting in the London papers as 'multi-vocal, sporadic, brief, and sometimes chaotic', he notes that the frequent reports of unsolved crimes, with the culprits still on the loose (comprising about a quarter of all crime and justice reports), had the potential to frighten readers.<sup>14</sup> Like the *Proceedings*, the papers concentrated their reporting on the most violent and threatening crimes, and their language describing the culprits as 'ruffians', 'villains', and members of 'gangs' further underlined the threat that they posed. Not surprisingly, King suggests that the newspapers contributed to 'the rapid increase in anxiety about crime which is clearly visible' in the decade after another demobilization, in 1783.<sup>15</sup>

Overall, the major threat to Londoners in these publications appeared to be of violent robbery and burglary, rather than murder, though authors did not hesitate to claim that the former often led to the latter. There was, therefore, plenty of material in this literature to frighten readers. And frightened some were. Fears that the authors might become victims of crime are expressed in the majority of detailed diaries examined, often despite the fact that the writers themselves and their acquaintances had no or very limited personal experiences of crime.

For example, when Dudley Ryder, future Chief Justice, was a law student in 1716, he recorded worries on at least three occasions about possible break-ins to his house when he was sleeping. In September of the previous year his family home had been broken into when he was not there and 'some of our pewter

<sup>13</sup> Shoemaker, 'The Old Bailey Proceedings', pp. 567–71.

<sup>14</sup> King, 'Newspaper Reporting and Attitudes to Crime and Justice', pp. 76, 91–93.

<sup>15</sup> Shoemaker, 'Print Culture', pp. 5–6; King, 'Newspaper Reporting and Attitudes to Crime and Justice', p. 83.

and other things below stairs of no great value' were taken, but his fears were of something much worse. On 18 October he dreamt that someone had come into his room to rob him: 'I lay extremely still, pretty much frightened. He still kept feeling for my breeches.'<sup>16</sup> Sylas Neville, an unmarried gentleman, worried about travelling at night on the roads surrounding the metropolis. On 16 May 1784 he took tea at a village in Hertfordshire and then returned to London. He recorded in his diary that it was 'dusk when I entered the town in my return and quite dark before I got to Highgate. What danger of being robbed! Thank God, I escaped.'<sup>17</sup>

While these and many other fears expressed in diaries were derived from a variety of sources, it is clear that increasingly diarists' fears were informed by what they had read. While in 1715–16 Ryder obtained most of his news from gossip and his habit of frequenting taverns and coffee houses, in 1767–88 Neville frequently read the newspapers. Similarly, but a few decades earlier, Gertrude Savile, a gentlewoman spinster who recorded several worries about being robbed on London streets, got her knowledge about crime from reading the newspapers and the *Old Bailey Proceedings*, as when she recorded on 27 August 1728, 'read the news and sent it to brother; abundance of street robbers again.'<sup>18</sup> When, travelling from Scotland in 1762, James Boswell approached London in a coach, he grew scared: 'During our last two stages this night, when we travelled in the dark, I was a good deal afraid of robbers. A great many horrid ideas filled my mind.'<sup>19</sup> Where did he get those 'horrid ideas' from? On more than one occasion he reports that in his 'younger days' he had read 'The Lives of the Convicts, and other such books', which filled him with 'ideas of London roguery and wickedness.'<sup>20</sup> During seventeen-year-old Elizabeth Fothergill's six-month visit to London in 1769–70, she found her coach stopped one evening in a dark crowded street where a group of hackney coachmen were quarrelling. She wrote in her diary: 'their profuse swearing, the darkness of the night and being in a strange street put my mind into much agitation and all the frightful tales I had heard of London from my youth upwards

<sup>16</sup> *The Diary of Dudley Ryder*, ed. and trans. by Matthews, pp. 95, 349.

<sup>17</sup> *The Diary of Sylas Neville*, ed. by Cozens-Hardy, p. 319.

<sup>18</sup> *The Diaries of Gertrude Savile*, ed. by Savile, p. 133.

<sup>19</sup> *Boswell's London Journal*, ed. by Pottle, p. 43.

<sup>20</sup> *Boswell's London Journal*, ed. by Pottle, p. 290. It is not clear which of the several compilations of criminal biographies and trials available at that time Boswell had read; perhaps it was the *Lives of the Most Remarkable Criminals*.

came into my head.'<sup>21</sup> Since Fothergill grew up in Cheshire, these 'tales' must have come from what she or her family had read. Although primarily published in London, the printed literature of crime was disseminated throughout the country, and the images of crime the British frequently encountered in their reading constituted a cultural resource which was drawn upon whenever they found themselves in potentially dangerous situations in the metropolis.

Yet the printed literature of crime was not mono-thematic. Crime was such a widespread theme in the publications of the day that it was inevitably represented in diverse ways. Some genres sought to instruct or entertain readers rather than frighten them. Readers of the *Ordinary's Accounts*, the biographies of the convicts hanged at Tyburn which were compiled by the chaplain of Newgate prison, encountered accounts of convicts' lives which were in some respects sympathetic to the accused. In their *Accounts*, the Ordinary sought to explain how the condemned had fallen into a life of crime, and gave them the chance (within limits) to tell their own stories in order to demonstrate their progress towards repentance. Other biographies presented the point of view of the accused even more clearly, since the authors were dependent on them for their source material, and the accused sought to present themselves in a positive, or at least self-promoting, light. Some highway robbers such as James MacLaine, for example, styled themselves as 'gentlemen highwaymen', justifying their crimes as necessary so that they could maintain their genteel status. They claimed they treated their victims in a chivalrous and polite manner, rendering their crimes less threatening.<sup>22</sup> Even more entertaining were works of fiction, notably the *Beggar's Opera* (1728), the most frequently performed play in the eighteenth century. Of the twenty-four diarists and correspondents examined who wrote when the play was being performed, seven reported having watched it and two more having read it. There are frequent passing references to characters and passages from the play in their writings, as well as reports that they had sung or played some of the songs with their friends. It is difficult to determine what these observers thought of the depiction of Macheath and his fellow highway robbers and pickpockets in the piece, but they certainly did not find them threatening. Savile, who went to see the play on the first night in January 1728, wrote that 'the top charicters [*sic*] were highwaymen and common whores and

<sup>21</sup> Diary of Betty (Elizabeth) Fothergill of Warrington: London, Friends House Library, MS Box 4 (8) (transcript), p. 68.

<sup>22</sup> Shoemaker, 'Print Culture', pp. 13–16; Shoemaker, 'The Street Robber and the Gentleman Highwayman', pp. 393–98.

very exactly drawn and yet manag'd to be inofensive and very witty'; overall, she found it 'wonderfully entertaining and instructive, tho' the subject was so low'.<sup>23</sup> It would be wrong to conclude that Londoners were fully convinced by the myth of the gentleman highwayman; Horace Walpole, who was robbed and slightly injured by Maclaine in 1749, commented that Maclaine's 'profession is no joke'.<sup>24</sup> Nonetheless some victims, including Walpole, were sufficiently taken in that they declined to prosecute their robbers.<sup>25</sup>

It is clear from the diaries that Londoners read all these printed accounts, whether they depicted robbery as violent and threatening or as polite and entertaining, with a degree of scepticism. Following the appraisal theory of emotions, we should recognize that emotional responses to the threats posed by crime were shaped by individual expectations, interpretations, and judgments.<sup>26</sup> Londoners did not believe everything that they read, and this is one reason why they were not debilitated by such fears as were induced. Driven by personal goals, diary writers often ignored their fears and went out after dark anyway. They took coaches along the dark roads which surrounded the metropolis and they walked London's supposedly dangerous streets at night. It is true that they took precautions, often hiding their valuables, travelling armed, or seeking travelling companions, but they nonetheless went out. When staying outside the metropolis in Westbourne, Gertrude Savile records having walked in the fields 'tho with fear, as there is great danger in these fields'.<sup>27</sup> Some went further and appear to have entirely dismissed their fears. Despite the fact he was robbed by highwaymen in April 1761, Talbot Williamson continued to travel the roads in and out of London, even at night, without expressing any fears.<sup>28</sup> Others deliberately put themselves at risk as a way of demonstrating their own lack of fear (which of course highlights the significance of those fears). The American Samuel Curwen seems to have enjoyed walking through the most notoriously criminal parts of London. On 18 August 1783, at the height of the crime wave which followed the end of the American War, he records that he walked with a friend without incident 'through Blackboy Alley,

<sup>23</sup> *The Diaries of Gertrude Savile*, ed. by Savile, p. 100.

<sup>24</sup> *Horace Walpole's Correspondence*, ed. by Lewis, xx, 188.

<sup>25</sup> Shoemaker, 'The Street Robber and the Gentleman Highwayman', p. 398.

<sup>26</sup> Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions', p. 8; Arne Öhman, 'Making Sense of Emotion', pp. 42–43.

<sup>27</sup> *The Diaries of Gertrude Savile*, ed. by Savile, pp. 227–28.

<sup>28</sup> *The Williamson Letters, 1748–65*, ed. by Manning, pp. 76 ff.

Chick Lane, Cow Cross, Hockley in the Hole, Mutton Lane, Great Saffron Hill, and Field Lane. Within each is the habitation of the most abandoned, profligate, lewd, dirty of the human species'.<sup>29</sup> Some Englishmen also adopted this approach: Neville recorded in his diary that he went incognito 'to a bear baiting at Islington and had the honour of mixing with highwaymen, footpads and thieves of all denominations', with no ill effects.<sup>30</sup>

As with the case of the plague in seventeenth-century Italy,<sup>31</sup> Londoners made deliberate efforts to control their fears. Not only did our diarists often act in spite of their fears, but they also distanced themselves from them, dissecting them and celebrating their ability not to be ruled by them. Addressing their assumed readers, they were keen to demonstrate that they were in control. In part, this may reflect the spiritual origins of diary keeping, in which self-examination was expected (many of these diarists were Protestant dissenters), but these reflections were not expressed in spiritual language. Instead, reflecting the growing individuality and subject-centredness of eighteenth-century diaries,<sup>32</sup> diarists turned their fears into a source of self-promotion and amusement. John Byrom, an expert in shorthand who was robbed while travelling in a coach from London to Cambridge in 1728, subsequently published a poetic account of the experience, celebrating his and the coachman's resistance (which had, in fact, not happened), by using his shorthand writing hand to fight off the robbers (thereby demonstrating its powers).<sup>33</sup> In his diary, Gervase Leveland, the son of a woollen draper, recorded an account of a trip to Twickenham in a coach in which a fellow passenger expressed 'fears of travelling for fear of losing his family watch'. Following a discussion of whether it was better to shoot highwaymen or attempt to capture them alive, Leveland and his friend entertained themselves by fuelling the passenger's fears by telling him that 'this is a very dangerous road, and [...] robberies are committed at noon day', prompting the victim of this cruel joke to regret that he had not brought any pistols. Later, recounting this story at dinner, 'very merry we were at the expense of the young fellow who had just left us'.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>29</sup> *The Journal of Samuel Curwen*, ed. by Oliver, p. 941.

<sup>30</sup> *The Diary of Syllas Neville*, ed. by Cozens-Hardy, p. 299.

<sup>31</sup> Gentilcore, 'The Fear of Disease and the Disease of Fear'.

<sup>32</sup> Mascuch, *Origins of the Individualist Self*, pp. 88, 96.

<sup>33</sup> *The Private Journal and Literary Remains of John Byrom*, ed. by Parkinson, I, pt 1, 288; John Byrom, *A Full and True Account*, p. 7.

<sup>34</sup> Diary of Gervase Leveland, London, British Library, MS Add. 19,140, fols 18–20.



Horace Walpole, whose letters are full of accounts of London crimes and the dangers of travelling between the city and his residence at Strawberry Hill, often joked about theft, even though, unlike most diarists, he had extensive experience as a victim, having suffered three robberies and at least four other crimes. In December 1753, during the post-war crime wave which, two years earlier, had prompted a speech by the King asking Parliament to do something about crime as well as the publication of Fielding's *Enquiry*, Walpole made light of the theft of some fish from his pond, which turned out to be caused by herons. 'I like [these herons] better than thieves', he wrote, 'as I believe the gang will be more easily destroyed, though not mentioned in the King's speech or Fielding's treatises'.<sup>35</sup> Walpole regularly made fun of his contemporaries' fears. In a letter to Edward Jermin, who was about to visit him at Strawberry Hill in 1784, he told him not to return home at night in a coach,

for there is a body of two hundred footpads between this place and Isleworth, three regiments of housebreakers at Brentford, between three and four thousand highwaymen encamped at Turnham Green, and a whole army of nabobs at Knightsbridge who plunder and murder without any treachery.

Instead, he suggested returning to London by hot air balloon.<sup>36</sup>

Others took their fears more seriously, and worried about their worries — they expressed concerns that worrying about crime was a mental defect, and sought to overcome their fears. Following a night spent worrying that his sword, which he had left downstairs in the parlour, might get stolen, Dudley Ryder told himself not to worry: 'I am concerned about this solicitous temper of mine. I am afraid it should grow upon me with age, and if it should riches and wealth will always be a burden to me for fear of losing them.'<sup>37</sup> Later he developed a more prosaic (and less self-incriminating) explanation for his restless nights. Following the night when he thought a thief had come into his room and tried to steal his breeches, he wrote 'That was the strangest dream or rather vision I ever had. I attribute it to my eating pretty heartily last night of a turkey and drinking'.<sup>38</sup> Whatever their cause, diarists thought that overcoming fears would build character. On Boswell's trip to London when 'a great many horrid ideas filled [his] mind' as he crossed the dark fields approaching

<sup>35</sup> *Horace Walpole's Correspondence*, ed. by Lewis, xxxv, 159.

<sup>36</sup> *Horace Walpole's Correspondence*, ed. by Lewis, XLII, 109.

<sup>37</sup> *The Diary of Dudley Ryder*, ed. and trans. by Matthews, p. 132.

<sup>38</sup> *The Diary of Dudley Ryder*, ed. and trans. by Matthews, p. 349.



the metropolis, he reported that nonetheless 'I affected resolution'. Thirteen years later, on a similar trip, he adopted a more cowardly approach when he interrupted his journey and spent the night at Barnet in order to 'shun the disagreeable feeling of fear'.<sup>39</sup> It was not only men who attempted to contain their fears in order to maintain self-control: after that frightening evening stuck in a traffic jam on a dark street, Elizabeth Fothergill drew the conclusion that 'the timid and fearful undergo a deal of causeless distress which the firm and resolute' do not experience.<sup>40</sup> Fear had to be rejected, and firmness and resolution embraced. A similar increased desire for self-control of the emotions has been detected in responses to verbal abuse in this period.<sup>41</sup>

Another way of coping with fear was to confront the criminal and reassert control over him, and this may be one reason why the fashion developed in the second half of the eighteenth century of visiting condemned criminals in their cells in Newgate prison. After the trial and death sentence of James MacLaine, reportedly 3000 people went to visit him in prison before he was executed. Many were gentlewomen, who shed tears and gave him gifts. It is difficult to determine the motivations behind such behaviour, which Walpole condemned as a 'ridiculous rage'; some visitors were clearly motivated by the opportunity to demonstrate their capacity for sentiment. Others, however, may have wished to expiate their own fears of highway robbery by confronting the robber when he was no longer able to inflict any harm; several male visitors accused MacLaine of having robbed them before he was caught.<sup>42</sup>

Arguably such visits became possible owing to the growing social and cultural distance between respectable Londoners and criminals which Andrea McKenzie has argued emerged after 1750.<sup>43</sup> With the decline in the 'everyman' belief that all men are sinners and, via the slippery slope, potential criminals, diarists began to self-consciously position themselves as living in a different world. While this did not necessarily render criminals any less threatening, it allowed potential victims to develop a degree of personal detachment from

<sup>39</sup> *Boswell's London Journal*, ed. by Pottle, p. 43; *Boswell: The Ominous Years 1774–1776*, ed. by Ryskamp and Pottle, p. 86.

<sup>40</sup> Diary of Betty (Elizabeth) Fothergill of Warrington: London, Friends House Library, MS Box 4 (8), fol. 68.

<sup>41</sup> Marshall, 'Verbal Abuse in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century England', p. 241.

<sup>42</sup> *Horace Walpole's Correspondence*, ed. by Lewis, xx, 199; *Newgate's Lamentation or the Lady's Last Farewell of Maclean; A Genuine Account of the Life and Actions of James Maclean, Highwayman*, pp. 22–24.

<sup>43</sup> McKenzie, *Tyburn's Martyrs*, pp. 87–92.

them. This removed the threat of moral contagion that one might acquire from visiting prisoners, allowing one to use the occasion to demonstrate one's own cultural superiority — and ability to face down danger. The same argument applies to the behaviour of those, like Boswell, who not only visited prisons but also regularly attended executions at Tyburn. As V. A. C. Gatrell has shown, Boswell's purpose in witnessing such horrific events was less to express sympathy for the condemned than it was to give himself an opportunity to examine his own responses to the hangings, and demonstrate his ability to overcome his emotions.<sup>44</sup>

This growing distance from the criminal, together with the wide range of Londoners' emotional responses to the printed literature of crime, arguably contributed to the climate in which it became possible to rethink the purposes of punishment in the late eighteenth century. Having been entertained and instructed as well as frightened by print, our diarists appraised the situation and responded with humour and self-examination to control their fears. Under this new emotional regime, the idea took hold that some convicts could be reformed in prison rather than physically terrorized through hanging and corporal punishment. If the criminal was not to be feared, it was possible to take the risk of attempting to reform at least the less egregious offenders, and allow them to return to society. Prompted by new concerns for the common humanity of the criminal, many victims even refused to prosecute offenders whose convictions might lead to their executions. As Henry Dagge observed, 'few men in the present civilized state have that violent resentment against many offences which the Law has exprest'. At the same time, reformers came to the conclusion that attempting to induce fear in potential offenders was not an effective method of preventing crime, 'for men [...] are to be led more by reason than by terror'. Punishments which used terror to frighten potential criminals into abiding the law through the principle of deterrence were thus no longer justified.<sup>45</sup> Fear hardened the mind of the criminal just as it disrupted the minds of potential victims. Respectable Londoners' attempts to control their fears of crime thus contributed to the loss of faith in punishments which relied on the fear of physical punishment. It should be emphasized that this new attitude did not derive from greater elite knowledge of criminal lives and the causes of

<sup>44</sup> Gatrell, *The Hanging Tree*, pp. 251, 284–92.

<sup>45</sup> [Dagge], *Considerations on Criminal Law*, pp. 242, 184. For other contemporary critiques of punishments that depended on fear, see McGowen, 'The Body and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England', p. 670.

crimes. In fact, this change was accompanied by greater ignorance of the criminal; the key change was in elite attitudes towards their *own* fears. Nonetheless, and in contrast to the Foucauldian interpretation of the emergence of modern disciplinary prison regimes as an expression of a new bourgeois technology of power, this suggests that a key driver of reform was a new elite mind set: the development by the middle and upper classes of a more humanitarian, if distant, emotional attitude towards criminals.<sup>46</sup>

The widespread dissemination of representations of crime in print in the eighteenth century changed the way people thought about crime, but not in ways we might have expected. Many printed reports did their best to make crime appear frightening, but because print was not Londoners' only source of information, because representations of crime were so varied and were read sceptically, and because respectable Londoners were concerned to control the emotions generated by what they read, print largely failed to create a culture of fear about crime. Instead, Londoners subjected their fears to self-examination and control, and in the process changed their attitudes towards the use of fear as a penal strategy. In the context of the growing socio-cultural distance between victims and criminals, the criminal became someone to be reformed, neither to be feared, nor deterred by fear.

<sup>46</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, trans. by Sheridan.

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# REALITY AND RITUAL IN THE MEDIEVAL KING'S EMOTIONS OF *IRA* AND *CLEMENTIA*

Penelope Nash

**I**n early 996 King Otto III made his first descent from Germany through the Brenner Pass into Italy where he nominated and installed his cousin as pope. On 21 May the new Pope Gregory V in his turn crowned Otto as emperor in St Peter's at Rome. Four days after his coronation Otto and Gregory jointly chaired a synod, which was also a judicial court, to compel Crescentius, Prefect of Rome, and the Romans who rallied around him to give an account of their doings.<sup>1</sup> Gerd Althoff summarizes the subsequent events succinctly. Otto and his court were well aware of Crescentius's attempts to dominate the popes. For his defiance, Otto sentenced him to exile but then pardoned him at Gregory's intercession. The clemency towards Crescentius was to put him in debt to Otto and the pope, with the hope of obligating him to good behaviour.<sup>2</sup> Although Crescentius was dispossessed of his title of *patricius*, Otto granted him permission to live in retirement at Rome. Here appeared 'an amicable resolution of a conflict mediated through the pope, and a ruler's clemency brought into play in place of justice'.<sup>3</sup> Otto returned to Germany, having, as he thought, satisfactorily resolved the dispute by publicly performing the royal rituals of negotiation and peacemaking. He had followed the accepted methods of harnessing his

<sup>1</sup> *The Letters of Gerbert*, ed. and trans. by Lattin, p. 88, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, pp. 61–62.

<sup>3</sup> Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, p. 80.

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own and his subjects' emotions in a period when state mechanisms were more fragile and less well delineated.

In the early northern winter of 997 Otto III, emperor of the Romans, again ventured into Italy with his army. Otto celebrated Christmas in Pavia, held courts of justice there and in Cremona, and issued charters in favour of Italians. By the middle of February Otto was on his way to Rome on a revenge expedition to punish the same prefect Crescentius for driving Pope Gregory V out of Rome and appointing the upstart antipope Johannes Philagathos in opposition to Otto's choice of pope. In August Otto had been expecting Philagathos's imminent surrender but, before the emperor's arrival at Rome, the prefect embedded himself in the Castel Sant'Angelo and the antipope fled from Rome to a garrisoned tower; both locations proved ultimately pregnable to Otto's army.<sup>4</sup>

On their capture both men endured brutal treatment. Johannes's eyes, nose, and tongue were removed. He was brought back to Rome where a synod formally deposed the antipope. In accordance with the rituals of defrocking, the papal robes were stripped from his body, thereby legitimizing his deposing, and Johannes was led through the streets in public disgrace, sitting back-to-front on a donkey and holding its tail as reins. Crescentius suffered no gentler fate. He was beheaded on the battlements of Castel Sant'Angelo, his body was thrown off, then his remains were hung upside down on the Monte Mario along with twelve of his associates. Other supporters were exiled from the city.<sup>5</sup> Otto, when he supported these actions, was around eighteen years of age. The emperor's original negotiations and display of *clementia* had not succeeded: this time he expressed his *ira*, real and orchestrated, as his other instrument of power.<sup>6</sup>

This essay examines the reaction to Otto's actions by a number of his contemporaries. In the late tenth century norms of behaviour were expected to be followed, even though what these should be on all occasions were not always explicitly spelled out. Otto's friends and foes attempted to understand his actions. Their responses displayed a range of reactions and emotions: active

<sup>4</sup> *The Letters of Gerbert*, ed. and trans. by Lattin, pp. 288–89 and p. 289, n. 1; Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, pp. 72–73.

<sup>5</sup> Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV. 30, ed. by Trillmich, p. 146; Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, p. 79; Ferdinand Gregorovius, *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, trans. by Hamilton, pp. 431–32; Müller-Mertens, 'The Ottonians as Kings and Emperors', p. 258; Shepard, 'Byzantine's Overlapping Circles', p. 49.

<sup>6</sup> For *ira* versus *malevolentia*, especially in the Angevin kingdom at a slightly later period, see Jolliffe, *Angevin Kingship*, pp. 87–109, esp. pp. 96–99.

support, tacit complicity, bewilderment, dismay, and strong disapproval. Two explanations for the wide difference in understanding of the participants and onlookers are explored. On the one hand Otto was acting in accordance with expected norms so that his actions clearly indicated his intentions — those in agreement with him understood this. On the other hand Otto's actions no longer conformed to the expected norms because they had changed. Consequently his subjects did not understand as he wished and did not agree with his actions. To re-establish his imperial credibility and to repair the misunderstanding and resistance from his subjects Otto had to alter his imperial behaviour and be seen to be making amends. The events provide the basis for examination of how the two emotions of *ira* and *clementia* were expressed and controlled in the late tenth century during a formative period in the development of northern Europe.

Contemporary works show images of two out of three of the chief protagonists. An ivory relief made in the late tenth century probably shows Philagathos as the donor.<sup>7</sup> Christ stands in the middle flanked by Otto III's parents, Otto II and Theophanu. Otto II stands on the right of Christ, the more important side, and his wife on Christ's left. Though Christ is the tallest and the most significant figure, Otto and Theophanu match each other in size, indicating equal importance. Underneath is a small crouching figure, identified with Johannes Philagathos before he lost favour with the royal family. Johannes is thought to have presented this ivory carving to Otto in earlier and happier times, possibly on the occasion of the couple's wedding but, since the ivory contains the title *Imperator Romanorum*, it was more likely created in or subsequent to 982 after the Italian chancellery had bestowed the title on Otto.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, Philagathos had continued in such favour with the royal household that Theophanu gave him the high office of chancellor of Italy in 990.<sup>9</sup> Such a very stylized depiction reveals the importance of the representation of rulership. A second depiction, of Otto III as an infant, imitates form and material in a similar fashion to the image containing Philagathos. Again Otto II and Theophanu participate, but this time both kneel in submission to Christ.<sup>10</sup> Theophanu holds out their small

<sup>7</sup> Ottonian Ivory Relief, *Christ blessing Otto II and Theophanu*. c. 973–83, Paris: Musée de Cluny. See in Gussone, 'Trauung und Krönung', p. 169. For Philagathos as the donor see Kalavrezou-Maxeiner, 'Eudokia Makrembolitissa and the Romanos Ivory', p. 316.

<sup>8</sup> Nash, 'Demonstrations of *Imperium*', pp. 164–65.

<sup>9</sup> *Queenship and Sanctity*, ed. and trans. by Gilsdorf, p. 13.

<sup>10</sup> Ottonian Ivory Relief, *Otto II, Theophanu, and the Future Otto III at the feet of Christ*,

infant son as an offering. The two kneeling rulers are also of comparative height as in the first ivory relief, although Theophanu is perhaps fractionally taller. Possibly her greater height indicates her greater importance. The significance of space, proportion, and involvement in ivory reliefs during this period was not lost on the intended viewers: they were cajoled by an emotional representation to recognize the ruling and spiritual legitimacy of the people depicted through these objects of material culture.<sup>11</sup>

A third contemporary image shows a very stylized Otto III, the ruler who came down to Italy to punish two men, portrayed in the *Gospels of Otto III*.<sup>12</sup> The very formal depiction includes all the trappings of office — crown, sceptre, and orb — the sceptre as an insignia of judgement and correction.<sup>13</sup> He is extravagantly robed, enthroned between two spiritual and two temporal lords. The image is almost identical to another similarly stylized one of his own father because the representation of rulership was more important than an exact portrait of the ruler.

Otto's punishment of Crescentius and Johannes was not necessarily as anger-driven and as capricious as it might appear at first, but followed other motifs prominent in the Middle Ages which were based on historical precedents: mutilation and humiliation were inflicted in especially gruesome ways. Geneviève Bührer-Thierry highlights the new punishment issued in the first century at the beginning of persecution of the Christians: 'a new sort of judicial penalty appeared in the Roman world: mutilation, of different kinds, which could be substituted for or added to capital punishment.'<sup>14</sup> Blinding was not mentioned in the Roman codes though apparently widely practised against Christians, while the barbarian law codes endorsed blinding as a punishment for sacrilegious acts. In the sixth century cases of blinding were rare in the West and always considered a misuse of power by a bad king, Chilperic King of Neustria being one such. In the seventh century, this concept began to change. Now if the king himself were attacked it was his mercy which caused him to order blinding instead of death. Only the king could commute death, and blind-

*Mary and St Maurice*, c. 980, Milan: Museo del Castello Sforzesco. See in Erkens, 'Die Frau als Herrscherin in ottonisch-frühstaufer Zeit', p. 255.

<sup>11</sup> For an introduction to the emotional response to material culture see Kieschnick, 'Material Culture', pp. 223–37.

<sup>12</sup> Reichenau. Gospel Book of Otto III, the Emperor Enthroned; c. 998. Staatsbibliothek, Munich, col. 4453, fol. 24. See Bullough, 'After Charlemagne', p. 305.

<sup>13</sup> Leyser, *Rule and Conflict in an Early Medieval Society*, p. 35.

<sup>14</sup> Bührer-Thierry, "'Just Anger" or "Vengeful Anger"?', p. 76.

ing became no longer a result of his wrath but had been transformed into an effect of his piety. For example, in the late eighth century in separate instances, the annals report the clemency of Charlemagne and Pippin the Hunchback, who commuted the death sentences of conspirators. About Charlemagne the annals state: 'honore simul ac luminibus privarentur' ('at the same time conferring honour and having been deprived of light'). Despite their 'clemency' Charlemagne and Pippin condemned the accused to exile and blinding.<sup>15</sup> The attacker now became deprived since he was no longer able to envisage the king in all his radiance and majesty. As the first millennium approached, new crimes attracted penalties: 'apostasy, tyranny, high treason, lèse-majesté [crime against the state or king]' all became reasons that 'might lead to a death sentence'.<sup>16</sup>

The donkey, as a metaphor for foolish or bad behaviour, appeared in many medieval stories which expounded upon the good behaviour expected and the bad to be avoided.<sup>17</sup> If the lion represented the king, the donkey as the defeated one or social inferior, gained by contrast.<sup>18</sup> There is no doubt that Otto III's lesson in making Philagathos ride backwards on a donkey would have been understood in intent by all who viewed it as a stern instruction not to seek to overturn the will of the rightful ruler. Humiliation of a subject by the stripping of clothes also became associated with royal anger. In the late sixth century, Queen Fredegund learned that her daughter had been robbed and dishonoured under the escort of the former mayor of the palace.

When she [Fredegund] heard this, she flew into a rage, made him take off his own clothes in the church, and ordered him, without clothes [...] to depart from her sight. Even the cooks and bakers, or other persons, whom she heard had returned from this journey, she had lashed, stripped, and mutilated.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Annales laureshamenses* (*Annals of Lorsch*), s.a. 786, ed. by Pertz, *MGH SS* 1, p. 32; *Chronicon Moissiacense* (*Chronicle of Moissac*), s.a. 786, ed. by Pertz, *MGH SS* 1, p. 298; Einhard, *Annales Fuldenses*, s.a. 792, ed. by Pertz, *MGH SRG* 7.

<sup>16</sup> Bühner-Thierry, "Just Anger" or "Vengeful Anger"?, pp. 76–80, 88.

<sup>17</sup> For a history of ignoble donkey rides see Mellinkoff, 'Riding Backwards'.

<sup>18</sup> For example, the portrayal with lions of Hercules and Lysimachus in the myths of Samson and David in the Bible represented the power of kings. The Carthaginian, Hanno, in bringing the lion he had subdued into a public place, showed Hanno's intention to subvert the state. Bonfil, *History and Folklore in a Medieval Jewish Chronicle*, pp. 61–62.

<sup>19</sup> 'Haec illa audiens furore commota, iussit eum in ipsa aeclesia spoliare, nudatumque vestimentis ac balteo [...] discedere a sua iubet praesentia. Cocos quoque sive pistores, vel quoscumque de hoc itinere regressus esse cognovit, caesos spoliatosque ac demanicos reliquit', Gregory of Tours, *Decem libri historiarum*, VII. 15, ed. by Krusch and Levison, *MGH SRM* 1. 1,

Yet the idea that kings were supposed to control their own anger had been promulgated as long ago as the Ancient Grecian Epicurean and Stoic schools, which had condemned all the passions; the first believed that a man could attain pleasure by limiting his desires and the second that virtue alone was sufficient for happiness. In the later classical Roman period Seneca wrote that anger caused wrong and irreversible judgements. During Rome's transformation into an empire, historians defined the tyrant as 'the ruler who allowed himself to be governed by his impulses and who [...] overturned justice through totally arbitrary and enormously cruel sentences'.<sup>20</sup> The same condemnation of tyrants was adopted in the Germanic lands where the people, converted to Christianity by association with the Romans, considered themselves the empire's inheritors.

Under what Christian model of the late tenth century did Otto treat the two men in ways we think so cruel?<sup>21</sup> Models of good kingship existed and medieval rulers studied them. Written between 630 and 700, Pseudo-Cyprian's work, *On the Twelve Abuses of the World*, remained widely read. His ninth abuse concerned the *rex iniquus* ('the unjust king'). The king had to fulfil certain requirements grouped under the heading of justice. At the same time, he was 'summoned to self-discipline', including 'to put aside anger'.<sup>22</sup> Despite the various injunctions to restrain anger, it was undoubtedly understood that rulership had to be respected and feared in order to be effective. Consequently rulership also required *terror*, that is, compulsion and fear, in order to enforce orders and instructions. Such *terror* would have found adequate expression above all in justifiable royal anger. The rulers of late Antiquity and the earliest Middle Ages openly and aggressively displayed anger when they decided to go to war. Before such a decision envoys with special qualities might be sent to defuse the situation. In the sixth century, the emperor Justin II expounded on just such qualities to the embassy from the Avars: envoys 'should be men who understand exactly when they should speak humbly and when proudly, and who look out for that which will still our anger'.<sup>23</sup> Accordingly even in an adversarial situation the

pp. 336–37, trans. by Althoff, '*Ira Regis*', p. 63.

<sup>20</sup> Bühner-Thierry, "Just Anger" or "Vengeful Anger"?, pp. 75–76.

<sup>21</sup> Both Geneviève Bühner-Thierry's and Gerd Althoff's fine treatments of the history of anger and its complementary virtue 'clemency' form a strong basis for the arguments developed in this paper: Bühner-Thierry, "Just Anger" or "Vengeful Anger"?, pp. 75–91; Althoff, '*Ira Regis*', pp. 59–74.

<sup>22</sup> Althoff, '*Ira Regis*', pp. 60–61.

<sup>23</sup> 'quique ordine possint scire locis humiles quibus et quibus ora superbi expedient, nostramque petant quod mitiget iram', Corippus, *In laudem Justini minoris*, lines 310–13, ed.

emperor was attuned to symbolic gestures and open to negotiation. The early Carolingians showed an especially new mildness, at least as an ideal. In the mid-eighth century the 'merciful King Pippin, moved by compassion, granted him [Aistulf, king of the Lombards] life and kingdom'.<sup>24</sup> Gerd Althoff argues that the principal and contemporary sources for the history of Charlemagne in the late eighth and early ninth centuries demonstrate that the early Carolingian period marked a break in the depiction of royal anger.<sup>25</sup> Alcuin, a scholar and teacher there, wrote:

Anger is one of the eight principal vices. If it is not controlled by reason, it is turned into raging fury, such that a man has no power over his own soul and does unseemly things. For this vice so occupies the heart that it banishes from it every precaution in acting and in seeking right judgement.<sup>26</sup>

In praise of Charlemagne's rulership virtues, the *Royal Annals* and Einhard's *Life of Charlemagne* term him as 'most gentle', 'mildest', and most 'merciful'. Similarly the biographer of Charlemagne's son, Louis the Pious, describes him as 'mildest' and 'most gentle'.<sup>27</sup> In a further development the late ninth-century Hincmar of Rheims in his treatise *On the Governance of the Palace* stressed, among other things, the king's responsibility as corrector of his subjects, yet needing to amend his own morals before he could discipline others.<sup>28</sup>

by Partsch, *MGH AA* 3. 2, p. 145. See also Althoff, '*Ira Regis*', pp. 61–62, and his translation of the passage by Corippus on p. 62.

<sup>24</sup> *Chronicarum quae dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici continuationes*, c. 37, *MGH SRM* 2, pp. 183–84 as cited and translated in Althoff, '*Ira Regis*', p. 64 and p. 64, n. 20. Pippin, king of the Franks, had defeated Aistulf, king of the Lombards, who had dared to take over the papal lands at Ravenna and attempted to hold out against Pippin at Pavia. The rift was healed more quickly by Aistulf's promise of gifts to Pippin and the pope. The 'merciful' Pippin appears in the *Chronicle* rather than in the historical facts. For background to the conflict see also Bachrach, *Charlemagne's Early Campaigns*, pp. 311–14; Partner, *The Lands of St Peter*, p. 20.

<sup>25</sup> Partner, *The Lands of St Peter*, p. 64.

<sup>26</sup> 'Ira una est de octo vitiis principalibus, quae si ratione non regitur, in furorem vertitur: ita ut homo sui animi impotens erit, faciens quae non convenit. Haec enim si cordi insidit, omnem eximit ab eo providentiam facti, nec iudicium rectae directionis inquirere', Alcuin, *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis*, 31, *PL* 101, col. 634; trans. in Bühner-Thierry, "Just Anger" or "Vengeful Anger"?, p. 75. For a performative dimension in Charlemagne's demonstration of anger see Simpson, *Troubling Arthurian Histories*, p. 112.

<sup>27</sup> Althoff, '*Ira Regis*', pp. 64–65 and p. 65, n. 21.

<sup>28</sup> Hincmar of Reims, *On the Governance of the Palace*, ed. by Herlihy, pp. 208–09 and 212. For anger as a weight upon the soul and mind see also Barton, "Zealous Anger", p. 156.



The Christian rulership ethic that developed under the Carolingians remained binding for the emperors and kings of the following centuries. Otto III was the fourth in what has come to be called the Ottonian era, starting with Henry I, elected king in 909, and proceeding through the respective sons, Otto I (also known as Otto the Great), Otto II, and Otto III (with the line ending with cousin Henry II in 1024). Ottonian kingship developed from the background of Carolingian kingship which was based on itinerant kings supported by both the court palace and the web of counts and dukes throughout the kingdom through which the king exerted his authority (the royal *bannum*).<sup>29</sup> Ottonian kings did not rule from a geographical capital city or town, although certain towns such as Aachen had particular significance; the three Ottos were all crowned at Aachen.<sup>30</sup> The court owed its existence and authority to the presence of the king; he ruled by travelling around the kingdom, and his queen, as evidenced by her frequent mentions in the official diplomata, often but not always travelled with him. The king punctuated his travels with formal ceremonies which exhibited his earthly power and sacral nature to his subjects.

Copied in England in the first half of the eleventh century and probably of German origin, the poem *De Heinrico* dramatically illustrates the rituals of kings in interaction with their magnates. The poem details the interactions of a certain King Otto and a certain Duke Henry (not specifically identified) in a probable rite of forgiveness and reconciliation. The emphasis in the poem remains on the two main parties who interact ceremonially with formal gestures and speak ritualized words. The messenger asks why the good Caesar Otto still sits since Henry has arrived. Otto gets up, proceeds towards his honoured visitor Henry and welcomes him. After such a fair response by Otto the two men join hands and seek God's blessing, but before leading Henry into the council Otto embraces him. Otto gives everything to Henry except the regalia, the symbol of kingship. Otto takes Henry's advice about his own actions. Finally, Henry is confirmed as right-minded and right-actioned.<sup>31</sup> *De Heinrico*

<sup>29</sup> Olson, *The Early Middle Ages*, pp. 94, 109, 170, 210; Niermeyer and Van De Kieft, *Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus*, s.v. 'bannus'. See also Wickham, *The Inheritance of Rome*, p. 518.

<sup>30</sup> Nelson, 'Aachen as a Place of Power', pp. 225–31.

<sup>31</sup> *De Heinrico*, ed. by Strecker, *MGH SRG* 40, no. 19, pp. 57–60. For a variation on the Latin/German and an English translation and commentary see *The Cambridge Songs*, ed. and trans. by Ziolkowski, pp. 82–84 and 228–34. For further discussion of the poem see Gibbs and Johnson, *Medieval German Literature*, p. 53; Jeep, ed., *Medieval Germany: An Encyclopedia*, pp. 258–59.

is an important reminder that the combination of private negotiations and public ceremonies saved face for the parties and encouraged a public, unified resolution.<sup>32</sup> These formalized actions allowed the grievances and passions of the parties to be recognized and right order to be restored, without loss of face to either individual.

Important too were the ritualized displays of emotion through which the king exhibited his pleasure, sorrow or anger, all oriented to the audience. Although the early medieval rulers governed according to generally recognized formulae, the individual personality of each ruler still marked each reign idiosyncratically. On the one hand, Ottonian and early Salian rulership was distinguished by its collective sacrality.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, in apparent contradiction, individual rulers were guided by those around them. These overlapping communities consisted of the royal household, the groups of learned clerics and advisers which gathered round the ruler, and the ruler's magnates, whether holding a formal office such as duke or count or not, and families.<sup>34</sup> Both formulaic and individualistic methods of rulership were ritualized in actions, rulings and recordings in diplomata, chronicles, annals, histories and other written works, in decorated gospel books and on ivories, seals, and coins.

Otto III in deciding his actions in response to the rebellion in northern Italy had two important tenth-century models of behaviour from within his family which he could emulate. The first model was based on that of his grandfather, Emperor Otto I; the second on that of three women acting in concert. These were his grandmother (dowager Empress Adelheid, second wife of Otto I), his mother (dowager Empress Theophanu, wife of Otto II), and his aunt (Abbess Mathilda of Quedlinburg). In examining Otto I's behaviour as a model, it is appropriate to look initially at Widukind, a monk of Corvey, the leading authority on kingship and Saxon history in the tenth century, who finished his *Res gestae Saxonicae* (*Deeds of the Saxons*) in 967/8, probably adding the final chapters about Otto I's death in 973.<sup>35</sup> Widukind saw at least part

<sup>32</sup> For a selected list of articles about friendship and ritual in Ottonian times see the following: Althoff, *Family, Friends and Followers*, pp. 137–52; Warner, 'Thietmar of Merseburg on Rituals of Kingship', especially pp. 74–75; Leyser, 'Ottonian Government'; Leyser, 'Ritual, Ceremony, and Gesture', especially pp. 192–202; Reuter, '*Regemque, Quem in Francia Pene Perdidit, in Patria Magnifice Recepit*'.

<sup>33</sup> Leyser, *Rule and Conflict in an Early Medieval Society*, pp. 74–107.

<sup>34</sup> Hamilton, 'Review: Early Medieval Rulers', p. 260; Nelson, 'Rulers and Government', p. 103.

<sup>35</sup> Widukind of Corvey, *Res Gestae Saxonicae*, ed. by Bauer and Rau, pp. 12–183. For comment on the final chapters see Bagge, *Kings, Politics*, p. 25.



of his mission as the promotion of a standard of rulership based on two particular tenth-century kings; his *Res Gestae Saxonicae* was a polemic to justify the Saxon rulership of Henry I and Otto I. Widukind's exposition of the ideal standard of Saxon ruler remains a legitimate model for an examination of the principles of rulership in late tenth-century Germany. Indeed Sverre Bagge persuasively argues that the multifaceted list of qualities that Widukind allocates to Otto I — *pietas* (which should be equated with *clementia*, used in its classical sense of gentleness or loyalty to friends and relatives), generosity (expressed through phrases such as 'dandi largus' and 'amicis nichil negans'), and *fidelitas* (expressed by Otto's refusal to believe anything unfavourable about friends but, if necessary, to defend and forgive them) — appropriately address Otto's highly personal manner of rulership. At the same time Otto is both *constantissimus* and also has the attributes of a watchful leader of men.<sup>36</sup>

Otto's kingship, being only the second in what was to become the Ottonian dynasty, began circumspectly. His father had been nominated by Conrad I and acclaimed as sole king by the people, but Henry I had proceeded cautiously in the early years with the leading men of the realm. So too Otto, still in a precarious position in his initial years with the tensions arising because of the abandonment of the division of the kingdom among all the sons, needed to take account of the *dignitas* of all those involved: he could not use his kingly powers of punishment unfettered. Nevertheless he could practise *clementia*, which retained historical clout as a Christian as well as an imperial virtue from the early sixth century when Ennodius had flattered Theodoric, king of the Goths in addressing him in old Roman terms as 'clementissime domine' ('most merciful lord'), 'inclyte domine' ('renowned lord'), and 'princeps venerabilis' ('venerable prince').<sup>37</sup> Otto paraded *clementia* when necessary because the sensitivity of both his kin and his other magnates to their rights of relationship and friendship under Henry I had continued into Otto's reign.<sup>38</sup> Consequently Otto var-

<sup>36</sup> Bagge, *Kings, Politics*, pp. 55–58. For use of *clementia* in the tenth century see Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, p. 75; Warner, 'Ideals and Action', p. 15 and Althoff, 'Königsherrschaft Und Konfliktbewältigung', pp. 272–76.

<sup>37</sup> Ennodius, *Panegyricus dictus clementissimo regi Theoderico*, VII, I, III, and I, ed. by Vogel, *MGH AA 7*, pp. 206, 203, 256, and 203; Haase, 'Ennodius' Panegyric to Theoderic the Great', VII. 29, p. 24; I. 2, p. 17; III. 14, p. 20; I. 1, p. 17.

<sup>38</sup> Althoff, 'Königsherrschaft Und Konfliktbewältigung', p. 290. For a much more pragmatic view of Otto's actions, that Otto needed to conciliate a number of his kin throughout his reign, see Leyser, *Rule and Conflict in an Early Medieval Society*, pp. 9–47.

ied his much flaunted *clementia* to meet the exigencies created by angry and powerful opponents.<sup>39</sup>

Otto I's court, though based on that of the Carolingians, was indeed less savage. Otto forgave both Liudolf, his son from his first marriage, and Conrad the Red, after their long and dangerous uprising in 953–54.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless Otto's kingship remained reliant on physical prowess, specifically victory on the battlefield. The Ottonian bishops were expected to fight and Bishop Thietmar endorsed their armed conduct in collaboration with the other leading men.<sup>41</sup> Karl Leyser summarizes Liudprand of Cremona's unashamedly partisan view of Otto: 'the northern and western parts of the world [...] were ruled by his power, pacified by his wisdom, gladdened by his faith and frightened by the severity of his just judgment',<sup>42</sup> while a contemporary other than Liutprand noted 'the clemency that always lay near to him'.<sup>43</sup> In contrast others applauded the royal terror which had given peace to the church. In practice Otto showed his ire readily. Leyser summarizes the Saxon Analyst of the twelfth century who reported on the flurry of activity in the north when, in 952, as news of Otto's 'return from Italy spread [...], everyone settled with his adversary as quickly as possible by agreement out of court so that he should find nothing to judge on his return'.<sup>44</sup> In these ways Otto consolidated his rule, by using a fine balance of terror and mercy which his men acknowledged and to which they responded.

Consequently Otto III had a royal model in his grandfather, Otto the Great, as one who both granted mercy and generated fear. Alternatively, the female members of his family provided another model which employed negotiation rather than anger and punishment to transfer the kingdom to the next generation in a time of great angst. On 7 December 983 Emperor Otto II died unexpectedly. At Otto's death his infant son the future Otto III, no more than three years old, inherited the kingdom. The transition of the kingdom did not proceed smoothly initially. On the one hand little Otto's mother, Empress Theophanu, his grandmother, Empress Adelheid, and his aunt, abbess Mathilda

<sup>39</sup> Leyser, *Rule and Conflict in an Early Medieval Society*, p. 36; Wormald, 'Review: Rule and Conflict'.

<sup>40</sup> Leyser, *Rule and Conflict in an Early Medieval Society*, pp. 85–86.

<sup>41</sup> Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, II. 27, ed. by Warner, p. 112.

<sup>42</sup> Leyser, *Rule and Conflict in an Early Medieval Society*, p. 35; Liudprand of Cremona, *Antapodosis*, IV. 15, ed. by Bauer and Rau, p. 418.

<sup>43</sup> Althoff, 'Ira Regis', p. 64.

<sup>44</sup> Leyser, *Rule and Conflict in an Early Medieval Society*, p. 35.

of Quedlinburg formed a coalition of *dominae imperiales*.<sup>45</sup> On the other his uncle, Henry the Wrangler, and collaborators formed an alliance of leading men.<sup>46</sup> The tussle for the kingdom was played out in a series of staged moves where the main actors performed their parts. This was so successful that during the seven months of indecision, no fighting took place between the parties until the resolution. However, a significant public 'dance of the emotions' had to be enacted first.

Those on the side of the three *dominae imperiales* were Archbishop Adalbero of Rheims and Archbishop Willigis of Mainz. Gerbert of Aurillac, in the name of Adalbero, urged Willigis to stand firm (although there did not seem to be any doubt of his loyalty). 'Will he [Henry], who has attempted to kill two Ottos, be willing that a third should survive?'<sup>47</sup> Gerbert seems never to have wavered in his loyalty for Theophanu as regent and indeed ruler: 'It is proper that the lamb be entrusted to his mother [Theophanu], not to the wolf [Henry].'<sup>48</sup> In various letters, Gerbert wrote many words of support to and about Theophanu.<sup>49</sup> Thietmar, also at pains to name many of the allies, stressed the wide variety of their backgrounds and locations.<sup>50</sup> Consequently Thietmar, as a probable witness to all the events, provided detailed testimony of the strong

<sup>45</sup> Gerbert uses 'domina' to discuss a colloquium of noble women. *Die Briefsammlung Gerberts von Reims*, ed. by Weigle, no. 62, p. 93 and no. 66, p. 97 and *The Letters of Gerbert*, ed. and trans. by Lattin, no. 69, p. 110 and no. 72, p. 112; Keller, *Die Ottonen*, III, 66. The word *dominae* was applied to royal women in the tenth century having developed out of Carolingian models. The translation 'ladies' does not convey the sense of lordliness in their authority, Nelson, 'Rulers and Government', p. 99.

<sup>46</sup> Those on Henry the Wrangler's side included the Bishop of Utrecht (who released Henry from prison when he heard of the death of Otto II) and Archbishop Warin of Cologne (who handed over the newly consecrated Otto III into Henry's care). Others were Egbert, Archbishop of Trier, and other Lotharingian bishops (including Bishop Poppo), and Count Ekbert. Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, III. 4, ed. by Warner, p. 129 and n. 10; 3. 25, p. 148; 4. 1, p. 149; 4. 3, p. 151.

<sup>47</sup> 'Qui duos Ottones conatus est occidere, tercium volet superesse?': *Die Briefsammlung Gerberts von Reims*, ed. by Weigle, no. 27, p. 50; *The Letters of Gerbert*, ed. and trans. by Lattin, no. 35, p. 72.

<sup>48</sup> 'Agnum matri, non lupo committi oportuit': *Die Briefsammlung Gerberts von Reims*, ed. by Weigle, no. 34, p. 62; *The Letters of Gerbert*, ed. and trans. by Lattin, no. 42, p. 83.

<sup>49</sup> *The Letters of Gerbert*, ed. and trans. by Lattin, nos 24, 34, 38, 41, 43, 51, 57; pp. 62, 71, 75–76, 82, 84, 92, 97.

<sup>50</sup> Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV. 2, ed. by Warner, p. 150 and n. 6.

backing that a large number of the bishops and other leading men provided in support of the women.<sup>51</sup>

The *Annals of Quedlinburg* record that Henry had a legitimate claim to the throne through his kinship with the family of the emperor; he took custody of the king by right of kinship.<sup>52</sup> Henry tried to entice King Lothair of Lotharingia and his brother Karl to his side by planning a meeting at Breisach on the banks of the Rhine on 1 February 984. Lothair and Karl, however, changed to the women's side. In Saxony, and even in his home state of Bavaria, hardly any of the nobility eventually supported Henry.<sup>53</sup> Ultimately, the majority of the magnates were not on his side. The Saxons came to believe that Henry wanted to seize the throne for himself, since he had a history of violating the rules of clemency. In 982 he had not granted his favour to Count Dietrich, count palatine of Saxony, and to Count Sigbert of Liesgau when they requested it by a formal act of submission — they had approached him with bare feet. He had arrogantly usurped the Easter rites at Quedlinburg in 984, being honoured there with *laudes*, thus declaring his wish to be king.<sup>54</sup> He had flouted both rules and ritual and everyone knew it.

When support started to swing behind the women, many of the opposing bishops changed sides; some clerics, after initially wavering, became firm supporters. Although a female regent was not unknown it was unusual — three women together as regent remained unprecedented. Nevertheless the magnates of the kingdom supported the three women and Henry the Wrangler was required to exhibit penitence. Despite Henry's behaviour, the three *dominae imperiales* forgave and accepted Henry, using a series of public rituals of rulership which witnessed to his submission and consequently authenticated his forgiveness.<sup>55</sup> To effect the reconciliation a number of formal gatherings acknowledged each of the main players' emotions and allowed their recognition and amelioration. The *Annals of Quedlinburg* and Thietmar note approvingly time and again the involvement of the women in both the negotiations

<sup>51</sup> Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV. 16, ed. by Warner, p. 162.

<sup>52</sup> *Die Annales Quedlinburgenses*, s.a. 984, ed. by Giese, *MGH SRG* 72, pp. 470–71 (hereafter referred to as *AQ*).

<sup>53</sup> Keller, *Die Ottonen*, III, 67.

<sup>54</sup> Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV. 1–2, ed. by Trillmich, pp. 114–16 and ed. by Warner, p. 149, n. 3; *AQ*, s.a. 984, p. 471; Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, p. 134; Leyser, *Rule and Conflict in an Early Medieval Society*, p. 90.

<sup>55</sup> Warner, 'Ideals and Action', pp. 16–17.

and the resolution. The *Annals* record that the leading men sent trustworthy messengers to Italy to ask Empress Adelheid to intervene and that she and Theophanu with Abbess Mathilda gathered at Rohr. There in June 984 the chroniclers reported that Henry returned little Otto and performed a prostration before the king and the three women.<sup>56</sup> When the king and regents met Henry again at Bürstadt in October 984 the outcome was not so successful.<sup>57</sup> They met again at Frankfurt in 985.<sup>58</sup> Finally in a ceremony imitating the ritual followed by Otto I at his crowning in 936, where four leading men served him and their camaraderie was stressed, Henry was subject to Otto III and the three women in a great Easter ritual together with the leading men at Quedlinburg in April 986.<sup>59</sup> Unlike Henry's rejection of the submission of the counts to him, the women had accepted his ritual of submission to them. The passions were acknowledged and subdued, according to these recognizable rites of passage.

The *Annals of Quedlinburg* carefully record the ceremonies of correction and forgiveness. At the Frankfurt meeting Henry's submission and humble mien and the three women's mercifulness and forgiveness of him followed the traditional Ottonian method of public negotiation and surrender.<sup>60</sup> Henry had eventually accepted and carried out the private and public requirements for forgiveness (unlike Crescentius) and was given back Bavaria. After having aggressively opposed Otto II and the underage Otto III during his life, he apparently ended his days peacefully in 995.<sup>61</sup> The faithful magnates were also rewarded.<sup>62</sup> Thus the chroniclers actively witnessed the success of the strategies

<sup>56</sup> *AQ*, s.a. 984, pp. 472–73; Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV. 8; *Die Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter Otto III.*, ed. by Uhlirz (after Böhmer), no. 956q2.

<sup>57</sup> Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV. 8; *Die Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter Otto III.*, ed. by Uhlirz (after Böhmer), no. 958b.

<sup>58</sup> *AQ*, s.a. 985, p. 474; Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV. 8, ed. by Trillmich, p. 122.

<sup>59</sup> Widukind of Corvey, *Res Gestae Saxonicae*, II. 2, ed. by Bauer and Rau; Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV. 9, ed. by Trillmich, pp. 122–24; *Die Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter Otto III.*, ed. by Uhlirz (after Böhmer), no. 980b; Wolf, 'Das Itinerar Der Prinzessin', s.a. 986, p. 14; Warner, 'Thietmar of Merseburg on Rituals of Kingship', p. 68.

<sup>60</sup> *AQ*, s.a. 985, pp. 474–75. See also Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, ed. by Warner, p. 155, n. 26, and Warner, 'Ideals and Action', pp. 16–17.

<sup>61</sup> *AQ*, s.a. 995, p. 488; Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV. 20, ed. by Trillmich, pp. 134–36.

<sup>62</sup> Bernward was rewarded with the bishopric of Hildesheim and tutorship of Otto III, Hoiko with the education of Otto III, and Ekkhard with the title of margrave of Meißen. Giseler, despite his initial support of Henry the Wrangler, was confirmed in his rights and

of the women, Theophanu, Adelheid, and Mathilda, who gained the regency, unprecedented as that was, without bloodshed. By a mixture of excellent negotiating skills and ritual performance, they had demonstrated their suitability for rule.

Although he was a mere three years of age at the start of the wrangle over the succession, Otto III would have been conversant with the family history. However, his actions from an early age showed that he was not inclined to negotiate; he had sent his mother from the court to her sorrow when he reached his majority having been, as Thietmar reports, 'misled by the advice of reckless young men'.<sup>63</sup> In considering Crescentius and Philagathos, Otto III determined that his endorsement of the actions against his two enemies should be public and aggressive. In this decision he followed the example of his father, Otto the Great, and not that of his mother, grandmother, and aunt.

What then do we make of the grandson of Otto the Great, who punished Crescentius and Johannes so brutally? In punishing them in such a way did Otto III show a true kingly anger or did he show an unjust anger? In support of the former view, after his second defiance, Crescentius's reputed prostration in front of the emperor as a gesture of submission would normally require the emperor to show mercy.<sup>64</sup> But if Crescentius's prostration were impromptu and Otto had already once shown *clementia* to Crescentius then an opportunity for reconciliation no longer existed.<sup>65</sup> Crescentius had transgressed the rules.

Should somebody continue in a conflict after he had made a formal submission and thus had won mild treatment, his punishment had a parallel to those ordered by canon law for heretics and apostates. They too can be forgiven one time; the death penalty is mandatory for backsliding.<sup>66</sup>

Otto's just ire and its expression through rightful punishment was the only route open to him. Otto followed precedents whose public manifestation would have impressed themselves upon all who saw the actions. Crescentius had defied Otto once and Otto had forgiven him. For a second transgression it was not possible to forgive Crescentius again under the rules of the times.

possessions as archbishop of Magdeburg. Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, ed. by Warner, p. 150, n. 6; Keller, *Die Ottonen*, III, 10.

<sup>63</sup> Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon*, IV, 15, ed. by Trillmich, p. 130.

<sup>64</sup> Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, p. 33.

<sup>65</sup> Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, pp. 73–81 and p. 134.

<sup>66</sup> Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, p. 80.

He deserved death in a very public way. However, Otto showed *clementia* to Johannes by commuting his death sentence to blinding. As emperor, Otto acted in the only way possible.

An alternative view is that Otto showed unjust anger. A number of indicators support this view. Several but not all authoritative contemporaries, though deploring the actions of Crescentius and Johannes, criticized Otto's actions as too harsh.<sup>67</sup> The author of the *Annals of Quedlinburg*, though otherwise pouring scorn on the antipope, was unhappy with Johannes's mutilation, although defending the emperor's part in it.<sup>68</sup> The *Life* of the hermit, Nilus, tells how Nilus begged both the emperor and pope to release the mutilated Johannes into his care. Otto stipulated that he would agree only if Nilus and Johannes stayed in a monastery in Rome rather than at Nilus's monastery in the south of Italy. Otto appointed an eloquent bishop to argue his case with Nilus, who avoided the flow of words by falling asleep but not before issuing a warning to both the emperor and pope: 'If you do not forgive him whom God has delivered up into your hands, neither will the heavenly father forgive you your sins.'<sup>69</sup> If the protocols had been broken, then too Otto can be blamed. For example, David Warner argues that Crescentius's prostration had been agreed with Otto beforehand and, if Otto transgressed that agreement, then indeed Otto must be blamed.<sup>70</sup> One further action by Otto is perhaps significant. In 999, one year after his punishment of the two men, Otto went on a penitential pilgrimage, at the instigation of the hermit Romuald, reputedly for his sins against Crescentius and Johannes.<sup>71</sup> Consequently his penitential pilgrimage, although also used to further political connections, showed his understanding of his wrong and repentance of his actions.

Barbara Rosenwein has posed the problem in examining any emotion: 'Some scholars view emotions as innate whereas others consider them to be "social constructions".'<sup>72</sup> The examination of Otto III's actions and the reactions by his audience sharply highlight these two views. The period in which Otto acted was governed to an extraordinary extent by symbolic actions or

<sup>67</sup> Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, p. 79.

<sup>68</sup> *AQ*, s.a. 998, p. 498.

<sup>69</sup> *Vita s. Nili abbatis Cryptae Ferratae*, s.a. 999, ed. by Pertz, *MGH SS* 4, p. 617. See also Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, pp. 73–74.

<sup>70</sup> Warner, 'Ideals and Action', p. 17.

<sup>71</sup> Althoff, *Otto III*, trans. by Jestice, p. 93.

<sup>72</sup> Rosenwein, Introduction to *Anger's Past*, p. 2.



'social constructions'. Otto's very elaborate performance before his exaction of punishment illustrates Clifford Geertz's statement: 'emotions too, are cultural artifacts'.<sup>73</sup> Although his 'willed anger', sanctioned by God, was a model well understood in the late tenth century, the debate about whether Otto applied the model correctly or not shows that his contemporary audience was no longer sure that the execution accurately matched the justification. At least some of them believed he acted out of ill-will and was exacting vengeance.<sup>74</sup>

The time that Otto took to reach Rome on his two descents into Italy shows his progress through the kingdom as a ritual, deliberately performed. Consequently when he effected his punishment, based on historical norms, the audience would know that, firstly, the king's 'mercy' and, secondly, his 'righteous anger' was deliberate, cool and implacable. If his audience no longer read the signals as he wished, then there had occurred a shift in his subjects' acceptance of the nexus between the king's anger and his punishment. Norbert Elias perceived the later period of the Renaissance as engendering a great civilizing influence, forming a society which controlled emotions including anger.<sup>75</sup> Similarly the epoch around the first millennium in northern Europe could be considered as a period when the people were re-examining the relationship between *ira* and *clementia*. Since records from this time are fewer and scattered and incidents which might indicate such changes are not always fully described, such shifts are more difficult to detect and consequently less easily determined.<sup>76</sup> Consequently Elias's analysis cannot be applied so readily to the earlier period. In considering this important series of incidents, we should not be misled by Otto's leisurely well-planned journey through northern Italy to think his was a slow response to the defiance which had been shown him or to mistake his imperial *iter* for merely a construction for an audience. Yes, his slow process through Italy was a display of his power in the currency of the times — but his anger was also white hot.

<sup>73</sup> Geertz, 'The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind', p. 81, as analysed in Rosenwein, 'Controlling Paradigms', p. 236.

<sup>74</sup> Rosenwein, 'Controlling Paradigms', p. 234; Throop, 'Introduction', pp. 1–2.

<sup>75</sup> Elias and Jephcott, *The Civilizing Process*, as analysed in Rosenwein, 'Controlling Paradigms', pp. 237–40.

<sup>76</sup> See Althoff's assessment of blinding as a legitimate tool of kings in the ninth century on the Continent versus the shift in opinion noted by Hyams in his analysis of the English King Henry III by the thirteenth century: Althoff, '*Ira Regis*', pp. 90–91; Hyams, 'What Did Henry III of England Think', pp. 123–24.

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## AFFECTIVE BEQUESTS: CREATING EMOTION IN YORK WILLS, 1400–1600

Lisa Liddy

The study of the history of emotions, though still in its infancy, has already contributed much to our understanding of the feelings and motivations of the people of the past. The work of Professor Barbara Rosenwein, in particular, has provided insights, and instruction, in how such an investigation into the history of emotions might be undertaken.<sup>1</sup> Rosenwein recommends perusing all contemporary texts available to an emotional community — that is, a group, usually social, in which people share values and interests, privileging some emotions and downgrading others, with its own standards for expressing those emotions — and identifying the emotional terms used therein, in order to examine the emotional norms of that community.<sup>2</sup> While sound in theory, such a thorough approach may not always be possible, or even desirable: when investigations into the emotions of a particular group inform only one section or aspect of a wider study; when the investigation itself concentrates on only one particular type of documentary source; or when the focus of the study is not the community itself, but the material culture of that community.

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*; Rosenwein, 'Problems and Methods'; Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions in History'.

<sup>2</sup> Rosenwein, 'Problems and Methods', pp. 12 ff. For the definition of an 'emotional community', see Scot in Exile, 'A Question of Emotion Part 1: Q&A with Professor Barbara Rosenwein' <[www.scotinexile.blogspot.com/2009/05/q-with-professor-barbara-rosenwein.html](http://www.scotinexile.blogspot.com/2009/05/q-with-professor-barbara-rosenwein.html)> [accessed 23 January 2012].

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This essay faces, and aims to tackle, these very issues, and will form part of a forthcoming study on possessions and their ownership in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century York based on the evidence provided by both archaeological and documentary sources, including wills and inventories.<sup>3</sup> The emotional community under consideration is drawn from the inhabitants of the city of York between 1400 and 1600, specifically those who left wills and those who benefited from them. The primary emphasis is not on the people of the city themselves, but rather on their material culture, namely, the objects they owned, used, and lived with on a daily basis. Limitations of time dictate that gathering every type of document known to this emotional community would be impractical. This paper relies on one kind of documentary source, the last will and testament, although the sheer volume of available material means that even that has to be sampled. The focus is on the ways in which the objects described and bequeathed in wills become carriers of emotions and investments in the affective relationships of the testator with his or her family, friends, and neighbours.

Objects bequeathed in wills are often described in great detail, though rarely, if ever, using recognizably 'emotional' terms such as those identified by Rosenwein in her 'emotion word lists'.<sup>4</sup> Examples, taken from a survey of over five hundred wills written in four York parishes between 1400 and 1600, show that York testators used carefully chosen words to describe their personal and domestic possessions selected as bequests — notably objects relating to the testator's own body, such as clothes, jewellery, and personal bedding — in order to enhance culturally the value of the bequest and, consequently, to enhance the affection of its recipient for both the deceased and the object itself. The essay concentrates on two very specific ways in which this could be achieved. The first is through the association of the bequeathed object with an important moment in the testator's life-cycle, such as a wedding, childbirth, or the death of a loved one. The second is by describing either the testator's or recipient's past experience with the bequeathed object, using the shared experiences of the artefact to

<sup>3</sup> Liddy, 'Domestic Objects in York'. The main sources considered will be archaeological finds from York as well as testamentary material including wills and inventories. Since inventories are simply lists and evaluations of objects, wills remain the only documentary source of use for establishing evidence of emotion.

<sup>4</sup> Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, pp. 40, 52–53: these lists are based on the works of Cicero and other classical writers, with English equivalents provided, and include words relating to emotions such as love, hate, sadness, joy, etc. However, Rosenwein notes that there is as yet no consensus among modern scientists and scholars as to what constitutes an emotion, using 'lust' and 'depression' as examples of disputed terms (pp. 53–54).

convey an impression of the special relationship between testator, object, and beneficiary, with the evidence suggesting that the people of York felt affection not only for the family and friends to whom they left such bequests, but also for the possessions themselves. Through such selective description, testators transformed objects into carriers of emotions, as they sought to create or enhance an affective connection between themselves, their intended recipients, and the bequeathed objects that would remain in the minds of the recipients long after the testators' deaths.

There are many ways in which the last will and testament can be read as an emotional document: from the professions of religious devotion that open most wills, to much rarer and more personal declarations of feelings for family and friends, both of which will be briefly discussed. However, the paper will concentrate on the ways in which the objects bequeathed in wills acted as carriers of emotions and investments in affective relationships between the testator and his or her friends and family, serving as a personal reminder of the deceased each time the object was seen or used.

The examples are taken from five hundred and forty wills written in four York parishes between 1400 and 1600. Over three quarters of the wills in the sample were written by the men and women who lived in the prosperous craft-based parishes of St Michael-le-Belfrey and St Helen, Stonegate in the vicinity of the Minster, whose residents included merchants, lawyers, and some of the city's wealthiest craftsmen such as goldsmiths, glaziers, and pewterers. The remaining quarter represents the final requests of the wealthiest residents of the suburban parishes of St Margaret and St Lawrence on either side of Walmgate Bar at the east end of the walled city, notably tanners and members of the textile trades. Almost 90 per cent of these wills were written within a year of probate being granted and 47.7 per cent — almost half — were proved within one month. The last will and testament, therefore, is a document that was composed at a highly emotional moment of the life-cycle — its very end.<sup>5</sup>

The last will and testament is a source that is problematic for historians in general and for the study of emotions in particular. It is a highly formulaic religious and legal document that conformed not only to ecclesiastical and common law, but also to custom. Furthermore, most surviving wills are not origi-

<sup>5</sup> Bowdon, 'Redefining Kinship', p. 409, describes wills as 'performance texts — dialogical scripts and dramas that are read and performed before audiences'. Elisabeth Salter, 'Reworked Material', p. 183, emphasizes the importance of wills' 'instances of reception'. This essay is less interested in the way in which wills were performed and received, and more interested in how and why they were created, and what they contained.

nals, but copies of original probates transcribed into volumes by clerks at the church courts. The potential problems for the historian are numerous and have been discussed elsewhere, but three are especially relevant to the study of emotions and material culture — the problems of law, custom, and voice.<sup>6</sup>

The most noticeable issue to arise from the law governing the last will and testament is that married women could make a testament only with their husbands' permission, resulting in an under-representation of married female testators not only in the sample used here, but throughout England in general. Many other York residents did not leave wills, because they had very little or nothing to bequeath, due to death being sudden and unexpected, or because they were content for their estate to be disposed of according to custom. Additionally, many wills must not survive, particularly those whose executors never submitted them for probate, either due to the cost or because the will was straightforward and easily administered.

Problems relating to local custom are more complicated. Until 1679 the Province of York followed the custom of *legitim*: the child's right to one third of his or her parent's estate.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, upon a man's death, one third of his personal property belonged to his wife, one third belonged to his legitimate children, and the final third was his own, to be disposed of as he willed.<sup>8</sup> When analysing a will, it is usually impossible to tell whether bequests made to a spouse or child come from the testator's own third or from the third to which the recipient is already entitled by custom. Occasionally a testator did specify that a bequest comprised a child's third, but even then it is unclear whether the bequest represented the entire third or only part of it, as bequests made to children *inter vivos* (or 'between the living') could count towards their customary third.

Finally, and most importantly for the study of evidence of emotion in wills, is the problem of voice. Are the sentiments expressed the testator's own? To what extent have the testator's words been summarized or paraphrased by the scribe of the will and/or the clerk compiling the probate register? This problem is further compounded by the issue of language.

Until the sixteenth century the majority of wills in probate registers were recorded in Latin, the language of the Church — a language that most testators, executors, beneficiaries, and witnesses would not have understood. In wills recorded in Latin, use of any emotional language is reserved for the religious

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Arkell, Goose, and Evans, eds, *When Death Do Us Part*.

<sup>7</sup> Helmholz, 'Legitim in English Legal History', p. 667.

<sup>8</sup> Henry Swinburne, *A Briefe Treatise of Testaments and Last Willes*, fol. 111<sup>r-v</sup>.

preamble which opens the will, in which the testator identified himself or herself and commended his or her soul to God using a variation of the standard formulae which therefore reveal very little, or even nothing, about the testator or his or her beliefs and feelings towards religion.<sup>9</sup>

As well as making use of standard formulae, it is likely that the scribes of Latin wills abbreviated, or at least edited, the testators' own words significantly, for it is only when wills start being recorded in English (the earliest example in this sample is from 1460 with the next not occurring for another thirty years) that they occasionally include examples of direct emotional statement made by the testators themselves, expressing friendship, love, and affection for their beneficiaries. Such emotional utterances, which remain rare, are probably the result of the testator retaining greater control over the wording of his or her last will, as the final product dictated to the testator for approval and acceptance was now in a form easily understood by testator and witnesses alike. Although few and far between, such examples can offer a brief glimpse into the real feelings that the testator had, or purported to have, for friends, family members, or other beneficiaries.

Thus in 1563 a merchant appointed as his supervisor an apparently unrelated friend whom he described as his 'welbeloved brother', and in 1536 another testator used the same word to describe his wife Isabel, asking the witnesses of his will 'to bee good to my welbeloved wyf and to my childern'.<sup>10</sup> One testator entrusted custody of his daughter to his 'trustie and speciall freinde', while another bequeathed a harness to his 'loving neighbour' whom he also appointed as joint supervisor of his will.<sup>11</sup> The most overt emotional statement of the entire sample occurs at the very end of the time period considered, when shoemaker John Bentam named his executor: 'Alice Bentam, my lovinge wife of whome I make more accompte of then of all the worlde'.<sup>12</sup>

Affection for family members is also evidenced by the wording of final requests for their wellbeing, all utilizing the adjective 'good', which according

<sup>9</sup> Testamentary preambles: Burgess, 'Late Medieval Wills and Pious Convention'; Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars*, pp. 504–13; Palliser, *The Reformation in York*, p. 19; Palliser, *Tudor York*, pp. 249–52; Spufford, 'Religious Preambles'.

<sup>10</sup> York, Borthwick Institute for Archives (BIA), Prob. Reg. 17, fols 222<sup>v</sup>–223<sup>r</sup>; Prob. Reg. 11, fol. 194<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> York Minster Library (YML), Dean & Chapter Wills, v, fol. 26<sup>v</sup>; BIA, Prob. Reg. 22, fol. 112<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, v, fol. 178<sup>r</sup>.

to the *Middle English Dictionary* could mean ‘excellent’, ‘virtuous’, or ‘kind’.<sup>13</sup> Although not an emotional term in itself, the testator’s use of the descriptive ‘good’ can be taken as evidence of affection both for the people about whom he or she made this judgement as well as for the family with whose care they were entrusted. John Broune gave to each of two friends custody of one of his two daughters, specifying that each man’s wife ‘be a gude moder to hir’ and ‘be gude to hir’ respectively, and Roger Annytson named his wife’s friend as joint executor, provided that ‘she be good and diligent to my wif and helpe to kepe her nowe in her olde age’.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, Martin Richardson asked one Mr Savell, ‘which haythe been my good master’, to be an ‘especiall frende’ to his son William, adding his hope that one Thomas Mayson ‘wilbe likewise frendelie and good to the same William’.<sup>15</sup> John Place showed his affection for his wife (as well as hers for her birth family) by making the following request of his father-in-law: ‘desiringe yowe, good father More, that because my saide wiffe is like to remane nearer unto youe then unto any of my kinred, youe will thearfore conteneue a good father unto her and to aide her withe youre good advice in all her causes’.<sup>16</sup>

Despite the rarity of such direct emotional utterances, not to mention their complete absence in wills written in Latin, evidence of emotion can be found in most testaments, both Latin and English, through an investigation of the bequests made by the testator, of the possessions singled out as appropriate gifts, of the choice of recipient entrusted with their care, and, especially, of the amount of detail with which the testator chose to describe his or her prized possessions. It could be argued that every single gift made in a will — whether of money, objects, or even good wishes — is evidence of some emotion, most often affection, for the person or group to whom it is given. Yet in contrast to bequests of currency, when York testators bequeathed their personal and domestic possessions in their quest for remembrance, they used carefully chosen words to describe those objects, with each additional detail provided culturally enhancing the value of the bequest and, consequently, the value which the deceased placed on his or her relationship with the object’s chosen beneficiary. Descriptives could include details of appearance, material, provenance, economic value, and weight as well as relative terms such as ‘best’ and ‘new’ to

<sup>13</sup> *Middle English Dictionary*: gōd (adj.), nos 1(a), 5(a), 6(a).

<sup>14</sup> BIA, Prob. Reg. 5, fol. 425<sup>r</sup>; Prob. Reg. 9, fol. 347<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> BIA, Prob. Reg. 21, fol. 272<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> BIA, Prob. Reg. 19, fol. 553<sup>v</sup>.

denote the specialness of an object. Often the bequeathed object was provided with a biography, through the testator relating aspects of its history which bound it not only to the testator but also to other particular people, places, times, or events, and the emotions associated with them. In other words, the bequeathed objects themselves became the carriers of the testator's emotions and investments in his or her affective relationships.<sup>17</sup>

Bequests symbolize the importance of the relationship between testator and recipient. In general terms, gifts in wills were given with the expectation that the recipient would reciprocate by remembering and praying for the deceased; thus the bequeathed object became a link, an aide-de-memoire, for the recipient of the testator. Some bequests were actually specified as such: John Morton gave the Countess of Westmorland an English book called Gower 'pro remembrancia' ('as a remembrance'), William Cooke left his friend his jet beads 'in signum memorancie mei' ('as a sign of [his] memory of me'), and John Place granted his brother his best saddle, bridle, trappers, and other horse equipment 'whiche I pray hime weare for my sake'.<sup>18</sup> While to a certain extent all bequests are intended to inspire remembrance of the testator, it does not follow that every object bequeathed is a carrier of emotion. Sometimes an object is described simply in order that it may be identified, to distinguish it from another similar item, or to locate it within the house. This is not to say that bequests lacked personal significance, simply that the text of the will itself does not reveal this information. There are, however, certain types of object bequests in which the possessions themselves are clearly given affective meaning beyond their original economic or use value, acting as carriers of emotion and investments in affective relationships. The most obvious examples include objects belonging to the testator's body, such as clothing, jewellery, weaponry, and personal bedding, objects provided with a history of ownership, and objects described with reference to their past use.

Objects belonging to the testator's own body, such as clothing, jewellery, weaponry, and bedding, usually have a more personal connection to the deceased than other domestic possessions such as silver or kitchenware, as they

<sup>17</sup> Catherine Richardson and Elisabeth Salter both emphasize the importance of description in wills, although not in regard to the study of emotions: Richardson, 'Household Objects and Domestic Ties'; Salter, 'Reworked Material'; Salter, *Cultural Creativity in the Early English Renaissance*, ch. 4. Richardson does, however, write about the connection between description and emotion elsewhere, analysing the language used in two court cases revolving around personal possessions: Richardson, "A Very Fit Hat".

<sup>18</sup> BIA, Prob. Reg. 2, fol. 653v; Prob. Reg. 9, fol. 158r; Prob. Reg. 19, fol. 554r.

are items which belonged to and were used by the testator him or herself, rather than the household as a whole. Bequests of such personal items thus signify a close emotional link between testator, object, and recipient, as each time the new owner wore or used the bequeathed item he or she would presumably be reminded of its former owner.

Clothing the naked is one of the seven corporal works of mercy, a spiritual requirement for the soul, and several testators did leave gowns — or money to buy gowns — to a specified number of poor people attending their funeral.<sup>19</sup> However, clothing was also a mark of social and economic status and so bequests of clothing had to be appropriate to the status of the beneficiary.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the testator's own clothes were usually bequeathed not to the poor but to members of the same social and economic circle, and especially to family and members of his or her own household. Moreover, often these items were individually described — some in great detail — emphasizing the object's value, both monetary and cultural, and consequently also emphasizing the value placed on the recipient by the donor.

In this sample of wills, two hundred and eighty-six (53 per cent) testators bequeathed items of their own clothing, sixty (11 per cent) bequeathed pieces of jewellery, and fifty-nine (11 per cent), all male, bequeathed their personal weapons or armour. One of the most valuable items of clothing owned by York's men and women was the girdle. The most precious were made of costly fabrics such as silk or velvet and were decorated with silver and gilt. Consequently these were usually left to the testator's children or other family members, but were occasionally given to friends or household servants. Widow Agnes Orlowe, despite having at least one surviving child, chose to leave two of her girdles — one of red silk decorated with silver and the other of blue silk decorated with silver — to two household servants.<sup>21</sup> Although neither of these was her 'best', which she instructed her executors to sell, such gifts — personally worn by the donor herself and of relatively high economic value — were symbols of the regard and affection which Agnes had for these women of her household.

Some items were afforded much greater description. When Joan Cotyngnam, a carpenter's widow, bequeathed her two tabards in 1459, the amount of detail she included in the description of each illustrates not only the quality and dec-

<sup>19</sup> For gifts of clothes as acts of charity, see Cullum and Goldberg, 'Charitable Provision in Late Medieval York', p. 29; Sweetinburgh, 'Clothing the Naked'.

<sup>20</sup> Sweetinburgh, 'Clothing the Naked', pp. 109, 112, 117.

<sup>21</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, I, fols 321<sup>v</sup>–322<sup>r</sup>.



oration of the garments but also her affection for them, and consequently her affection for the tabards' recipients. If the testator wished only to differentiate one tabard from the other, she could have simply noted that one was green and the other blue. The actual descriptions are far more intricate: she left to Joan Soll 'meum melius colobium de intenso viridi ex parte exteriori, duplicatam cum remisso blodo, circumsutam cum serico' ('my best tabard of dark green on the outside, lined with light blue and sewn round with silk') and to her neighbour Maud Danyell 'meum colobium de intenso blodo, duplicatum cum viridem, circumsutum cum crewles' ('my tabard of dark blue, lined with green and sewn round with woollen embroidery'). In describing the first tabard as her 'best', trimmed with silk instead of wool, she was not only ranking her garments, but also the affection which she felt for the respective recipients.<sup>22</sup> The tabards themselves became symbols of Joan's affection for the two women who will wear them in the future.

As mentioned above, it was not only the testator's own clothing that could act as a personal connection between the giver and recipient, but also other objects belonging to the testator's body, such as jewellery, weapons, and even the bedding on which he or she sleeps. Alison Clark left her nephew, amongst other things, 'þe federbed that I lie upone with þe bolster and all thinges perteynyng to þe same'.<sup>23</sup> By specifying that the bequeathed bed was her own, Alison was not only suggesting that it was the best bed in her home, as befitted the lady of the house, but was also emphasizing its intimate connection with her own person, and in giving it to her nephew, judging him worthy of owning and using that same bed.

The bequeathed objects became carriers of even more powerful emotions when their donors provided details of their past history, either concerning their previous ownership or their past use. Male and female testators alike often bequeathed objects which formerly belonged to a deceased spouse; these were usually given to the couple's children or grandchildren. Such bequests remained common throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and would always have increased the affective value of the object. Hawise Aske left her grandson a primer which had belonged to her late husband, Roger, who was not only the boy's grandfather, but also his namesake.<sup>24</sup> Two widows specified that the items of clothing which they left to their sons had formerly belonged to

<sup>22</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, I, fol. 291<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, II, fol. 82<sup>r-v</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, I, fol. 264<sup>v</sup>.

their late husbands, creating a connection between mother, father, child, and bequeathed garment, while stimulating the child's affection for both of his parents.<sup>25</sup> In one case this connection was tangible: the carpetcloth which Lady Jane Calome, widow of York mayor Richard Calome, left to her son William had her late husband's full name embroidered across it.<sup>26</sup>

In addition to clothing, jewellery was also identified in testaments as belonging to a deceased spouse and was, again, usually bequeathed to the couple's children, and especially to daughters. Several women inherited beads or rings that had belonged to their mothers, either as sole bequests or together with items of clothing.<sup>27</sup> One bequest, however, shows particular attention to detail as Robert Fons left his daughter all of her late mother's beads and girdles, which he then proceeded to itemize: one gold Agnus Dei with St Christopher on it, one pair of coral beads gauded with silver and gilt with knags on them, one pair of amber beads, two demi-girdles and one girdle with silver and gilt rowels.<sup>28</sup>

Not all bequeathed objects that were described in terms of their former ownership belonged to family members. York vintner John Petyclerk bequeathed to John Morton 'a piece of silver after the fashion "de buttercoppes", and gilt at either end', emphasizing the object's decoration and fashionability.<sup>29</sup> Yet just five years later, when John Morton bequeathed the same piece of silver in his own will, he described it as a silver bowl with a cover which he had received as a legacy from John Petyclerk. For Morton, the bowl's style and decoration was not as important as the link it provided to its previous owner.<sup>30</sup>

The emotion invested in the bequeathed object was increased even further when the biography provided for the object involved an event of great emotional significance. Girdles, mentioned above as being one of the most valuable items of clothing, are the only pieces of clothing that three-time widow Ellen Stockdale specified as bequests in her will, leaving one to each of her five daughters and to her step-daughter. Her two unmarried daughters received the 'best' and 'next best', while two other daughters received 'oon gyrdyll with a gold crosse and a smalle harnes gilt' and 'oon gyrdyll sylver harnest' respectively. Yet

<sup>25</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, II, fol. 207<sup>r</sup>; BIA, Prob. Reg. 19, fol. 215<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, v, fol. 104<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, II, fol. 27<sup>r</sup>, 76<sup>v</sup>, 134<sup>v</sup>; v, fol. 118<sup>r</sup>; BIA, Prob. Reg. 5, fol. 425<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, II, fol. 174<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> *Testamenta Eboracensia*, ed. by Raine, I, 15.

<sup>30</sup> BIA, Prob. Reg. 2, fol. 653<sup>v</sup>.

the remaining two girdles were not only described by their appearance but were also provided with additional details of biography, greatly adding to the emotional meaning of the gifts. Ellen left Isabel Dickonson, her step-daughter and daughter of John Stockdale, her late husband, ‘oon gyrdil of blak sylk and gold of thold facion, wich was hir moders’. Thus, Isabel’s inheritance was imbued not only with the affection of her step-mother Ellen who gave it to her and with her own culturally embedded knowledge of its worth, but also with her affection for her deceased mother who used to wear the same girdle herself. The final girdle bequeathed by Ellen was left to her daughter Margery: ‘oon girdill silver harnest and gilt wych was my weddyng girdill with my husband Johnson, read sylk of the baksyde’, thus instilling Margery’s girdle, which she would presumably wear on her own wedding day, with the emotions associated with the marriage of her own father and mother.<sup>31</sup>

As well as wedding girdles, wedding rings were also regularly bequeathed, as were rings of trothplight, all recognizably emotional objects in and of themselves, representing love and commitment. Wedding rings are perhaps the only possessions mentioned in the wills of this sample that can be definitively identified as heirlooms. They were always left to family, and usually to the owner’s own blood-relations. Thus, widow Maud Brown left her wedding ring to her grandmother and John Sawndwith left his wife’s wedding ring to his granddaughter, while Joan Harlam bequeathed her ‘anulum auri cum quo fuerat despousata’ (‘gold ring with which she was married’) to her father, despite the fact that her husband was still alive at the time of her death.<sup>32</sup> Trothplight, or promise, rings found a wider variety of recipients, with Cecily Overdo and William Colyer leaving silver rings of trothplight to a maid-servant and kinswoman respectively, while Lambert Tymonson left to Margaret, wife of Richard Patoner, who was probably his daughter, a small gold ring bearing an inscription on the inside which read ‘nul alter’ (‘no other’).<sup>33</sup>

Childbirth is another emotional life-cycle event referred to in testamentary bequests: two men each left their daughter a coffer that had belonged to her mother, together with, in one case, all the linen or napery which ‘did belonge to hir mother when she laid in childbed’, and in the other, one linen sheet which her mother ‘used to lye upon her in chyld bed’ with four pillowcases

<sup>31</sup> BIA, Prob. Reg. 6, fol. 227<sup>r-v</sup>.

<sup>32</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, II, fol. 1<sup>r</sup>; BIA, Prob. Reg. 15/3, fol. 96<sup>r</sup>; YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, I, fol. 131<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, I, fols 275<sup>r</sup>, 338<sup>r</sup>, 371<sup>r</sup>.

or coddwares belonging to it.<sup>34</sup> These legacies served as a reminder to the girls not only of their fathers who made the bequests and their mothers who used the bequeathed items, but also of the emotions bound up in the experience of childbirth itself — worry, fear, pain, and joy or sorrow — emotions that they too could expect to experience in the future.

Other significant events were also connected to objects by the description afforded them by the testator. Thus one widow left her cousin ‘one frenche tawney gowne and best pettycote, the whiche I do weare on the hollyday’.<sup>35</sup> Not only was the gown described as coming from France, and therefore imported, increasing its value economically and in terms of status and fashion, but the testator associated the whole outfit with holiday-ware as opposed to workday clothes, adding to the specialness of the bequest. Another testator left his sister a new gown bought at ‘Christenmas last’, again associating the outfit with times of festivity and identifying it as suitable for a special occasion.<sup>36</sup>

The event associated with a bequest might be one that was significant only to the testator and recipient, such as when William Selby left his chaplain Thomas ‘unam peciam coopertam argenti quam idem Thomas utitur maxime in potando’ (‘a covered piece of silver which the same Thomas used greatly in drinking’).<sup>37</sup> The object, through its description in the will, would forever be bound up in memories of (hopefully happy) times the two men spent together drinking, prompting the recipient to not only remember the deceased but also suggesting the circumstances in which he wished to be remembered.<sup>38</sup> A similar association is made by the York wait William Hill who left his colleague Robert his loud treble pipe with the black end ‘that the said Robert hath plaide the morne watches withe’, thus conjuring up Robert’s memories of himself and William making their rounds and playing their instruments in the otherwise quiet hours before dawn.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>34</sup> BIA, Prob. Reg. 17, fol. 223<sup>r</sup>; YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, v, fol. 118<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>35</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, v, fol. 128<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> BIA, Prob. Reg. 16, fol. 88<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, i, fol. 228<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> For the importance of bequests relating to shared experiences in general: Salter, ‘Re-worked Material’, p. 187; and on the shared experience of drinking in particular: Sweetinburgh, ‘Remembering the Dead at Dinner Time’.

<sup>39</sup> BIA, Prob. Reg. 15/2, fol. 291<sup>r</sup>. Barroll, *Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England*, vii, 118 n. 54: the 1570 York House Books instruct that ‘the common waits [...] shall use and kepe their Mornynge Watche with there Instrumentes accustomed every day in the weyke

Occasionally a will occurs in the sample in which almost every object bequeathed is a carrier of emotion and investment in an affective relationship.<sup>40</sup> John Chesman wrote his will in January 1509 and died before the end of February. He had just three years earlier been admitted into the freedom of the City of York as a barber and wax-chandler, and was engaged to be married for the first time. In John's will, he bequeathed the majority of his possessions to his fiancée Agnes Murton and to her immediate family, showing through the detail with which he described the objects the affection he felt not only for Agnes herself, whom he described as 'my wiff shuld have beyn and god had wold', but also for her entire family. He left Agnes's father his best doublet, a jacket of camlet (a costly fabric from the Near East), and a jacket banded with blewmeld (a variegated blue cloth), as well as his battle axe and two mail gussets. Agnes's mother received a gown of 'bewticolour' lined with black, six yards of linen, a little sheet with red silk going through it, and two new chairs, while John gave Agnes's brother his scarlet bonnet with a silver and gilt truelove on it, a fine steel bonnet, and a doublet of Cyprus satin. Each bequest was carefully described with details including material, decoration, and trim; the camlet jacket and satin doublet were identified through their description as economically and fashionably valuable imports, the remaining doublet was John's 'best', the chairs were 'new', and the steel bonnet was 'fine' — all adjectives emphasizing the superior quality of the bequests and, consequently, the esteem which John felt for both his possessions and his new affinal family.

To Agnes herself, John made three bequests. With the exception of his final bequest to his fiancée, these were not individually described items belonging to his body, as he made to her family. Rather, he left her two separate assemblages of domestic items, clearly intended to equip the conjugal home of the soon-to-have-been-married couple. The first group of household objects would have furnished the master bedchamber of their home: a featherbed, bolster, two pillows, a pair of sheets, a pair of blankets, two coverlets, with other household linen, namely, eight yards of new linen cloth, a boardcloth, and a towel. The second assemblage was for equipping their kitchen and included tableware for two: two pewter doublers, two dishes, two saucers, a new pewter saltcellar, four latten candlesticks, a latten posnet, two maslin pans, a bigger and a lesser, and a new latten ladle. This bequest would have furnished the new couple's table,

excepte onely sondays in the mornyng and the tyme of the Crystenmas'; Barroll notes that in other cities civic waits were directed to patrol and play from midnight or two am until dawn.

<sup>40</sup> For what follows: YML, Dean & Chapter Wills, II, fols 78<sup>v</sup>–79<sup>r</sup>.

while the three pans and ladle would also have stocked their kitchen. John specified that the saltcellar is new, and that all of the items are made of more durable — and higher status — copper alloys, rather than being cheaper, everyday products made of wood or pottery. However, it is John's final bequest to his fiancée that is invested with the most emotional impact: a piece of cloth which the testator movingly described as 'a gownecloth þat shuld have beyn my weddyng gown'.

Although the bequests to Agnes and her family were described with the most attention to detail, and were consequently invested with the most affection, other bequests also reveal John's affection both for his possessions and for the people to whom he chose to entrust them after his death. While Agnes's family appeared to receive the best of John's clothing, his other outfits were similarly ornate: his aunt was given his 'best gowne exsept on of violeit'; one friend received 'a gowne þat is furrid with whitlame, a fyne worseit dubleit bown with blak velvit, a pare of violet hose', and another 'a gowne furred with cony'. That such bequests were intended to provoke remembrance of the testator is indicated by two other bequests: John left one John Thorp from his birthplace of Durham a silver spoon 'for a tokyng'; and John's curate is the recipient of 'a fyne meslyng basyn with owt ryngis [and] a silver spone with a knope giltid so to remembre me in his beedrole'. John also provided for his servant and two apprentices before leaving 3s. 4d. to his tenant 'for his trew dwellyng with me'.

John Chesman, newly independent and looking forward to the next stage of his life as a married man, added affective value to the bequests of his personal possessions through the detail with which he chose to describe them. Through his choice of recipients for these cherished objects, he was exhibiting the emotional attachment he felt towards his intended wife and her immediate family and, to a lesser extent, to his friends and household. The objects themselves became carriers of his emotion and investments in the affective relationships most important to him.

The examples provided above illustrate some of the ways in which the last will and testament can be read as an emotional document. Even when direct use of recognized emotional words, such as those on Rosenwein's list, is absent, the meanings that testators ascribed to their personal and domestic possessions, and the care with which they described them, can be studied for evidence of testators' emotional attachment both to their belongings and to the people with whom they chose to entrust those possessions.

The last will and testament is a very familiar source: it has been used by historians influenced by a variety of approaches, asking an assortment of questions, but it has not been analysed in this way as a potential source for the study

of emotions.<sup>41</sup> Historians have long been aware of the highly formulaic nature of the will — its standard structure and conventional language — but as the examples here show, the last will and testament can be a highly personalized document.

Although this essay has concentrated only on information provided by the last will and testament and has not, as Rosenwein recommended, gathered all available texts, it has engaged with Rosenwein's suggestions for pursuing a history of emotions. The emotional community identified here — the people of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century York — was a community of the living and the dead, comprising not only those individuals who wrote the wills, but also all those who were the recipients of bequests. Emotional terms have been examined, and words and phrases weighed for relative importance.<sup>42</sup> However, both the source under investigation and the study of material culture more generally require a slightly different approach to emotions history, since a recognizably emotional vocabulary was not used in the description of possessions, and was used only rarely in relation to other people. Yet many wills in both Latin and English contained bequests of intricately described objects, descriptions that reveal far more than would have been necessary if their sole purpose was to locate an object or to distinguish it from a similar item. So why did testators go to the trouble of describing the objects which they bequeathed with such care and in so much detail? They did so because the objects which they singled out had personal significance to them, and through emphasizing the characteristics which contributed to the 'specialness' of the objects, testators were signifying their affection not only for the gifts, but also for the people to whom they gave those intricately described possessions. The objects, then, were reflective, but also constitutive, of an emotional relationship between the deceased and his chosen recipients.

<sup>41</sup> Some approaches towards wills include studies of particular sections of society: Loengard, "Which May Be Said to Be her Own"; Prior, 'Wives and Wills'; comparisons between practices of different localities: Salter, 'Some Differences in Cultural Production of Household Consumption'; studies of kinship or craft networks: Bowdon, 'Redefining Kinship'; and the transmission of objects as part of the ritual of gift-giving: Ashley, 'Material and Symbolic Gift Giving'; Ben-Amos, *The Culture of Giving*; Howell, 'Fixing Movables'.

<sup>42</sup> Rosenwein, 'Problems and Methods', pp. 12–15.



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# ‘MEMENTO MORI’: LOVE/FEAR OF AND FOR THE DEAD — ARCHAEOLOGICAL APPROACHES

Sandra Bowdler and Jane Balme

## *Background: Emotions in Archaeology*

In this essay we investigate the deep history of the emotions that living people have about the dead, calling on archaeological records of the deep past, and ethnographic studies of the more recent present. We also discuss some of the wider implications of this for changing attitudes to human burial in Early Modern Britain. The study of emotion from material remains left by societies without written records is difficult and such emotions are often assumed, with very little research that interrogates interpretations of them. Archaeologists traditionally have considered discussions of emotions inappropriate and/or unscientific, although more recently they have begun to rethink this position, in the wake of other social sciences.

Sarah Tarlow,<sup>1</sup> whose own research focuses on death and burial in Early Modern Britain,<sup>2</sup> has written a useful review of archaeological approaches to the study of emotion and suggests some future directions for the field. She argues that researchers of human emotions in the social sciences tend to fall on a

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<sup>1</sup> Tarlow, ‘Emotion in Archaeology’.

<sup>2</sup> For example, Tarlow, *Ritual, Belief and the Dead*.

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spectrum with, at one end, a biological school which believes that emotions are 'primarily genetic, based on evolutionary adaptation, and functional',<sup>3</sup> and at the other end a social constructivist school that believes that 'human emotions are culturally specific and differently constituted in different cultures through myth, social practice, and language'.<sup>4</sup> In general, it may be said that she believes archaeologists should, without dismissing the biological basis of emotion, fall more towards the latter end of the spectrum. According to Tarlow,<sup>5</sup> 'emotionless archaeologies are limited, partial, and sometimes hardly human at all'. She argues that we should pursue 'a study of the past which acknowledges that psychology, meaning, and emotion are essential to the way societies are structured and enacted',<sup>6</sup> and proposes three basic principles:

1. Emotions should be regarded as cultural as well as biological. They are not universal, and the nature of human emotion cannot be assumed a priori in any context. Therefore emotion needs to be problematized and theorized.
2. Emotion cannot be divorced from cultural meaning and social understandings, which are contextually variable.
3. Social emotional values rather than individual, subjective emotional experience may be of greater interest to archaeologists and will also be more accessible to archaeological study.<sup>7</sup>

In this essay we pursue Tarlow's general agenda in an examination of one category of archaeological study, which we assume may allow us some access to the emotions of people in the deep past, namely the study of how people disposed of their dead. Burials provide biological information not only about the deceased individual (age, sex, occupational evidence, palaeopathology) but also about the cultural practices involved in the act of burial (including interment, cremation, exposure on platforms) and other cultural information obtained from grave goods. Archaeologists have been keen to identify social status from burials, and to infer belief systems concerning an afterworld, but little attention has been paid to the emotions that might be inferred from the treatment of the human dead.

<sup>3</sup> Tarlow, 'Emotion in Archaeology', p. 715.

<sup>4</sup> Tarlow, 'Emotion in Archaeology', p. 716.

<sup>5</sup> Tarlow, 'Emotion in Archaeology', p. 720.

<sup>6</sup> Tarlow, 'Emotion in Archaeology', p. 722.

<sup>7</sup> Tarlow, 'Emotion in Archaeology', p. 728.

Formal disposal of the dead is a uniquely human behaviour and so we begin by discussing whether the practice suggests emotions that are uniquely human. We then investigate the antiquity of human disposal of the dead based on archaeological evidence and consider what early human emotions might be indicated by such treatments. Tarlow's recent review<sup>8</sup> of the new and not very extensive research area of the archaeology of emotion and affect, points out that mortuary archaeologists tend to assume the existence of past emotions without critical assessment, and that emotions surrounding grief are the most common emotions discussed in this context. The emotions surrounding 'grief' may be felt by different cultures, in different times and places, in different ways and may include a variety of elements, for example, anger, sadness and fear for the future. However, we argue below that there are aspects of 'grief' that are uniquely human and that in part our response to death depends on people's beliefs about the 'dead'.

### *Animal and Human Responses to Death*

Humans are not the only animals that apparently have emotional responses to death. One of the most commonly cited examples of animal 'grief' is the interpretation of herd behaviours associated with elephant death. There are many descriptions of these behaviours<sup>9</sup> and they typically include stories about the rest of the herd standing around an ailing or dead animal, sometimes for days. Members of the herd will sometimes try and get the ailing or dead animal to stay on its feet. They also touch the animal with their trunks. Descriptions often refer to such touching as 'caressing', and in so doing anthropomorphize the behaviour of the elephants. The elephants also cover the dead animal with leaves and branches. All of these rituals are interpreted as indicative of elephants 'grieving'.<sup>10</sup>

Because of their similarity to humans, grief is also often ascribed to our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos. Observations of individuals' deaths in captivity record the apparent caring of the rest of the group. For

<sup>8</sup> Tarlow, 'The Archaeology of Emotion and Affect', p. 174.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Douglas-Hamilton and others, 'Behavioural Reactions of Elephants'; Meredith, *Elephant Destiny*; Moss, *Elephant Memories*; O'Connell, *The Elephant's Secret Sense*; Poole, *Coming of Age with Elephants*.

<sup>10</sup> For example, Poole, *Coming of Age with Elephants*, p. 95.

example, Anderson and others<sup>11</sup> description of the days leading up to an older female's death records that the group was very quiet and paid close attention to her. Immediately before she died, she received much grooming and 'caressing' from the others, who appeared to test her for signs of life as she died. They left her soon after, but her adult daughter returned and remained by her mother all night. For several days the other chimpanzees avoided sleeping on the platform where the female had died, and ate less than normal which the authors interpret as evidence for grief and mourning.<sup>12</sup>

It is clear that there are strong bonds between individual chimpanzees and other primates. Goodall<sup>13</sup> describes the psychological stress undergone by an 8½-year-old chimpanzee after the loss of its mother and the contribution this stress made to its death. Grief amongst these primates has been also suggested to be indicated by the fact that mothers may carry around a dead infant for some time before abandoning the corpse. Goodall (as Van Lawick-Goodall)<sup>14</sup> observed mothers carrying the corpses for three or four days, and in a recent paper about chimpanzee observations in Bossou (Guinea), Biro and others<sup>15</sup> recorded that mothers continued to carry the corpses of their offspring for weeks, even months, following death. In that time, the corpses mummified completely, and the mothers exhibited care of the bodies reminiscent of their treatment of live infants, including grooming.<sup>16</sup> Of course this behaviour may be because it takes some time for the mother to recognize that the offspring is no longer emitting signs of life, although the very long times recorded by Biro and others<sup>17</sup> suggest that it may be more than this. But, are these 'grieving' behaviours?

It is easy to anthropomorphize these animals and interpret such behaviours as grief, especially when the animals are our close primate relatives. Undoubtedly elephants, chimpanzees, and other animals do react to death, but it is difficult to know whether the responses they show constitute 'grief' in the way that we humans experience grief. Equating these responses to human grief — a response associated with the end of a relationship, something that cannot be any more — implies a reflective cognition that allows us to imagine and

<sup>11</sup> Anderson, Gillies, and Lock, 'Pan Thanatology', p. R349.

<sup>12</sup> Anderson, Gillies, and Lock, 'Pan Thanatology', p. R349.

<sup>13</sup> Goodall, *The Chimpanzees of Gombe*, p. 103.

<sup>14</sup> Van Lawick-Goodall, 'The Behaviour of Free-Living Chimpanzees'.

<sup>15</sup> Biro and others, 'Chimpanzee Mothers at Bossou'.

<sup>16</sup> Biro and others, 'Chimpanzee Mothers at Bossou'.

<sup>17</sup> Biro and others, 'Chimpanzee Mothers at Bossou'.



plan for a future with the person who is now dead, a behaviour normally only ascribed to humans.<sup>18</sup> Whatever emotions other animals feel when members of their group die, there is no evidence that they feel grief in the sense that humans do. Instead what we may be seeing in elephant ritual, for example, is individual fear, anxiety, or unhappiness associated with changes in the herd.

However these behaviours might be interpreted, in all of the observations of other animals' response to death, the corpses are eventually left. In all modern human societies the relationship continues after death and the disposal of the remains. All living human societies dispose of the dead, whether through direct burial, cremation, or secondary burial (where the body is exposed until the flesh is removed and then the remaining bones cached, cremated, etc.). It could be argued that disposal of the dead is simply humans' response to the health hazards associated with close living conditions. However, the fact that all human societies have rituals associated with burial and post-burial, areas specifically set aside for disposal of the dead, and that grave markers are common, suggest that, unlike other animals, humans continue to have emotional relationships with the dead. When did these uniquely human behaviours arise and what evidence do they provide for early human emotions?

### *The Antiquity of Human Disposal of the Dead*

There are two major problems in identifying the antiquity of deliberate disposal of the dead. First, burials are not easy to recognize in archaeological deposits. Evidence for pits, indicated by differences in the sediments around the skeleton, built structures, grave goods that would not normally be in the location in which the skeletal remains are found, or deliberate rearrangement of the skeletal remains into a position in which they would not have naturally died, all indicate purposeful interment.

Second, dating in archaeology is not as straightforward as many people think. There are many ways that radiometric dates (such as radiocarbon dating) can be compromised, starting with difficulties with the dating chemistry and contamination of the sample to be dated. Only a few materials are suitable for dating and so there are also difficulties in interpreting how the site formed and thus whether a sample suitable for dating is associated with the event or object that the researchers want to date. Most archaeologists rely on a mixture of different dating techniques, some using radiometric techniques and some less objective, comparative techniques.

<sup>18</sup> For example, Barnard and others, 'Differentiation in Cognitive and Emotional Processes'.

Some of the earliest claims for deliberate disposal of the dead are for *Homo antecessor* (sometimes included with *Homo heidelbergensis*) — a Neanderthal forbear. Neanderthals (*Homo sapiens neanderthalis*), are a European variety of premodern human species that appear about 200,000 years ago and disappear about 30,000 years ago with their heyday between about 80,000 to 40,000 years ago. Anatomically modern *Homo sapiens* (*H. sapiens sapiens*) originated in Africa between 195,000 to 130,000 years ago<sup>19</sup> and arrived in Europe a little before 40,000 years ago, by which time they were well established in Africa, Asia, southeast Asia, and Australasia. The claims associated with *H. antecessor* are for deliberate disposal of the dead, but not burials. These claims derive from the interpretation of abundant skeletal remains at the site of Sima de los Huesos (pit of bones) in the Atapuerca Mountains of Spain. The abundance of bones, the uneven representation of anatomical elements represented and the location of the bones within the deposit led Arsuaga and others<sup>20</sup> to suggest that the individuals were deliberately disposed. Others, such as Pettitt<sup>21</sup> and Bermúdez and others<sup>22</sup> concur with the interpretation, with the latter laying particular emphasis on the presence of an aesthetically pleasing, symmetrical hand axe in the deposit that they regard as having ritual significance, although the reason for this interpretation is not given. If this is true, then it represents deliberate disposal of the dead between 500,000 and 400,000 years ago.<sup>23</sup> However, the site is at the bottom of a shaft and it is possible that the area was a natural pit trap into which hominins and other animals fell. Even if the bones at the site do represent deliberate disposal of the hominin dead, the lack of any strong evidence for associated ritual or other symbolic behaviours means that little can be said about emotional associations with the individuals after death and disposal.

It has also been suggested that Neanderthals deliberately cached bones of their dead fellows and that they deliberately buried their dead. Pettitt<sup>24</sup> has reviewed the evidence for Neanderthal caching, arguments for which are largely based on an abundance of bone in a single location and the skewed age profiles of the individuals represented in the deposit, which do not seem to reflect a normal demographic distribution. At one site, Krapina in Croatia, the

<sup>19</sup> Stringer, 'Modern Human Origins'.

<sup>20</sup> Arsuaga and others, 'Sima de los Huesos'.

<sup>21</sup> Pettitt, *The Palaeolithic Origins of Human Burial*, pp. 49–52.

<sup>22</sup> Bermúdez de Castro and others, 'The Atapuerca Sites', p. 37.

<sup>23</sup> Arsuaga and others, 'Sima de los Huesos'.

<sup>24</sup> Pettitt, 'The Neanderthal Dead'.

distribution of cut marks on the bones has led Russell<sup>25</sup> to suggest that the bodies were defleshed before disposal. Without any other clear evidence of human intervention other than what could be the result of meat eating, it is always possible that these accumulations are the result of natural events or the remains of meals; the evidence is inconclusive.

Claims that Neanderthals deliberately buried their dead are also highly controversial, mainly because, although skeletal remains are found in caves, many of these were excavated a long time before modern recording methods, and it is often difficult to verify the pit context claimed. Gargett's<sup>26</sup> reviews of the evidence of all of the strongest claims led him to conclude that there is no evidence for deliberate burial by Neanderthals. Not everyone agrees with Gargett's analyses. Pettitt,<sup>27</sup> for example, refutes Gargett's arguments in some detail.

Also controversial are interpretations of rituals associated with Neanderthal burials. Evidence for the de-fleshing referred to above is not necessarily a ritual behaviour. Other suggested support for ritual interpretations is based on such evidence as missing anatomical parts, for example, a missing skull at the site of Kebara<sup>28</sup> or interpretations of the placement of human remains. One of the best known of these is the so-called 'flower burial' at Shanidar in Iraq dated to 60,000 years ago. Flower pollen in the deposit was said to be associated with skeletal remains, which has led to highly dramatic reconstructions.<sup>29</sup> However, there are other explanations for the presence of this flower pollen, such as wind blowing it in, or its deriving from the decoration of the original local excavators who are described as having had flowers in the spokes of their wheels.<sup>30</sup> There are other examples of detailed reconstructed Neanderthal burial rituals, but they are all based on skeletal remains that may or not have been deliberately buried.

The willingness to assign ritual burial behaviours to Neanderthals may in part derive from an historic view of them as some kind of rugged human, rather than a distinct species. However, in the absence of incontrovertible evidence for ritual associated with skeletal remains, it is possible that Neanderthal 'buri-

<sup>25</sup> Russell, 'Mortuary Practice at the Krapina Neanderthal Site'.

<sup>26</sup> Bouyssonie, Bouyssonie, and Bardon, 'Decouverte d'un squelette humain moustérien'; Gargett, 'Grave Shortcomings', pp. 161–63; Gargett, 'Middle Palaeolithic Burial is Not a Dead Issue'.

<sup>27</sup> Pettitt, *The Palaeolithic Origins of Human Burial*; Pettitt, 'The Neanderthal Dead'.

<sup>28</sup> Bar-Yosef and others, 'The Excavations in Kebara Cave'.

<sup>29</sup> Solecki, *Shanidar*.

<sup>30</sup> Gargett, 'Grave Shortcomings', p. 176.

als' may have been simply disposals to deter predators from the area of occupation or to deal with pollution. There is thus no evidence that the disposal of the Neanderthal dead is associated with any emotions beyond a physical response as seen in other animals.

Even Pettitt<sup>31</sup> agrees with Gargett's observations that none of the claimed Neanderthal burials have clearly identifiable grave goods. Apparent grave goods associated with Neanderthal burials consist of artefacts and bone fragments,<sup>32</sup> items that are present in the site anyway, so that their association with the human bones is likely to be fortuitous. This is in contrast to the goods associated with burials of *Homo sapiens sapiens*, that is, Anatomically Modern Humans. These goods consist of beads and other items of personal adornment.<sup>33</sup> These burials, referred to by Pettitt<sup>34</sup> as 'ritualized burials', date from the Gravettian period (from about 29,000–21,000 years ago) in Europe, and support the argument that the oldest identifiably symbolic burials are associated with Anatomically Modern Humans.

Evidence for Europe in the period of the early spread of *Homo sapiens sapiens* is particularly abundant, reflecting the concentration of research and the excellent preservation conditions in limestone caves. One of the earliest indications of changes in treatment of the dead is the evidence for human relics. In Europe, and particularly France, the most common relics are teeth. For example, at the Grotte des Hyènes at Brassempouy there is human skeletal material dated to 30,000 years ago. The remains are fragmented, and the teeth have modifications in the form of perforations, suggesting that they were worn as ornaments. Henry-Gambier and others<sup>35</sup> argue that these were part of mortuary practices that did not involve burial.

As far as deliberate burials go, the earliest known sites for the disposal of the dead are in Australia, a continent in which only Anatomically Modern Humans have ever lived. At Lake Mungo in western New South Wales, WLH 3 is a full skeleton found in correct anatomical position in a discernible pit over which had been scattered red ochre. WLH 1 is the oldest evidence for cremation in the world. Analysis of the burnt bones of this individual reveal that they were

<sup>31</sup> Pettitt, 'The Neanderthal Dead'.

<sup>32</sup> Riel-Salvatore and Clark, 'Grave Markers', Table 1, pp. 454–55.

<sup>33</sup> Riel-Salvatore and Clark, 'Grave Markers', Tables 1 and 2, for example, pp. 454–57.

<sup>34</sup> Pettitt, 'The Neanderthal Dead', p. 9.

<sup>35</sup> Henry-Gambier, Maureille, and White, 'Vestiges humains des niveaux de l'Aurignacien ancien'.

deliberately smashed after burning,<sup>36</sup> indicating that this is also the earliest evidence of secondary burial. The dates for these have been contentious but recent extensive dating suggests that both are about 40,000 years old.<sup>37</sup>

In Europe the oldest burial dates to 29,000 years ago<sup>38</sup> and was found in Wales. The 'Red Lady' (despite being male) owes its name to the red ochre covering the bones. It was originally excavated in the nineteenth century, but there has been much recent analysis of the site and its recovered remains.<sup>39</sup> Grave goods include ivory 'rods', bracelets, and periwinkle shells stained with ochre. In continental Europe, one of the oldest elaborate burials is the well-known site of Abri Cro-Magnon that contains a 27,680 year old burial of an adult covered in ochre and three hundred marine gastropod shells.<sup>40</sup>

While most of the European ritual burials are of adults, burials of young people indicate that rituals associated with death were not restricted to mature individuals. For example, at the Portuguese site of Lagar Velho, a young boy, about four years old, was buried covered in ochre. The burial dates to about 24,500 years ago and is associated with perforated shells, deer teeth and pendants from different animals.<sup>41</sup> Infants were also buried. At the site of Krems-Wachtberg, Lower Austria, two infant burials, one a double burial and the other a single burial dating to about 27,000 years ago, provide evidence that their bodies were covered with red ochre and decorated with ornaments.<sup>42</sup>

Multiple burials are common<sup>43</sup> and both single and multiple burials are present at the same sites. For example, at the Russian site of Sungir, about 200 km north-east of Moscow, there are three ritual graves dating to about 23,000 years ago. One is a single male burial and the second contains two adolescents (one male and one female).<sup>44</sup> All three individuals are covered in ochre, all were cov-

<sup>36</sup> Bowler and others, 'Pleistocene Human Remains from Australia'; Bowler and others, 'Pleistocene Man in Australia'.

<sup>37</sup> Bowler and others, 'New Ages for Human Occupation'.

<sup>38</sup> Jacobi and Higham, 'The "Red Lady" Ages Gracefully'.

<sup>39</sup> Aldhouse-Green, ed., *Paviland Cave and the 'Red Lady'*; Aldhouse-Green and Pettitt, 'Paviland Cave'.

<sup>40</sup> Henry-Gambier, 'Les Fossiles de Cro-Magnon'.

<sup>41</sup> Duarte and others, 'The Early Upper Palaeolithic Human Skeleton'.

<sup>42</sup> Einwögerer and others, 'Upper Palaeolithic Infant Burials', p. 285.

<sup>43</sup> Formicola, 'From Sunghir Children to the Romito Dwarf'.

<sup>44</sup> Pettitt and Bader, 'Direct AMS Radiocarbon Dates for the Sungir Mid Upper Palaeolithic Burials'.

ered in thousands of mammoth bone beads and other grave goods associated with the burials.

It should be emphasized that not all skeletal remains found in European sites later than 30,000 years ago provide evidence for ritual burial. Some remains were simply disposed of, some buried with no evidence for ritual, some are in caves, and some, like Dolní Věstonice, are in the open.<sup>45</sup> Summarizing the evidence for burials between about 40,000 years ago and 20,000 years ago, simple disposal with no ritual elements continues, human relics are kept, most of the burials are single but some are double and even triple burials, all age groups and both male and females are represented and most burials are in open sites near settlements, but this varies regionally.

Secondary burial seems to be more common in Europe from the Magdalenian period (beginning about 17,000 years ago), mainly in the form of defleshing as indicated by cut marks, although this also sometimes involved elaborate shaping of the bones.<sup>46</sup> From about the same time there is the first evidence for cemeteries, that is, circumscribed areas exclusively devoted to the disposal of the dead. Amongst the earliest is Uyun al-Hammam in Jordan with a cemetery consisting of eleven individuals dating to about 16,500 years ago.<sup>47</sup> Grave goods, associated with the burials at this site include stone tools, a bone spoon, animal parts, and red ochre. In Australia cemeteries occur from about 12,000 years ago.<sup>48</sup>

To sum up the archaeological evidence, modern human forebears may have deliberately disposed of or even buried their dead, but without any evidence of symbolic behaviour associated with this disposal it is difficult to know whether the behaviours indicate some emotional response to the dead or whether it was just 'housekeeping'. Gradually after about 40,000 years ago new and varying practices were used by *Homo sapiens sapiens*. These include modification of bones, keeping of relics, primary and secondary disposal, grave goods, and, later, circumscribed areas for disposal. There are many things that can be and are deduced from these practices, including status of different individuals and groups within societies, the relationships between people and places and information on culturally-determined styles of burial and accompanying artefacts. However, these different treatments of the dead also show emotions that humans

<sup>45</sup> Riel-Salvatore and Clark, 'Grave Markers', Table 2, pp. 456–57.

<sup>46</sup> Bello, Parfitt, and Stringer, 'Earliest Directly-Dated Human Skull Cups'.

<sup>47</sup> Maher and others, 'A Unique Human-Fox Burial'.

<sup>48</sup> Pardoe, 'The Cemetery as Symbol'.

have about the dead themselves — emotions that no other animals have and that appear very late (at least by archaeological standards) in hominin history.

What do these different practices reveal about emotions associated with the dead? The methodological difficulty is how we draw conclusions about emotions that happened so long ago. Our ancestors may well have had emotional responses to death that are quite unlike our own or that may not even exist anymore. What we can say is that the earliest deliberate disposal and ritual suggest that our ancestors for the first time demonstrated a continuing relationship with the person after death. We cannot say whether this is ‘grief’ as we know it in its various guises today, but we can produce a model of what the emotions might have been towards the dead by drawing analogies from modern hunter-gatherer societies.

### *Ancient Burials in Aboriginal Australia*

As pointed out above, Australia appears to have been settled before the arrival of modern humans in Europe, probably between 45,000 and 50,000 years ago. There is no doubt that the first colonists were modern humans, *Homo sapiens sapiens*. One of the reasons for the importance of the Australian evidence is that this continent was not previously occupied by other hominins. The Australian archaeological record consists of unambiguous evidence for the cultural activities of modern humans in a pristine landscape, with no possibility of confusion with other hominins. Furthermore, the archaeological record also demonstrates great cultural unity through time, from over 40,000 until some two hundred years ago, and more recently than that in remote areas. This is not to say that Aboriginal society did not change over time, both in adapting to new and changing environments, and for more purely sociocultural changes; in no way are we suggesting a scenario of ‘living fossils’. Archaeologically, however, there is clear evidence of continuity through time in artefacts, art, and disposal of the dead.

The evidence from the Willandra Lakes area of western NSW described above shows that there was formal disposal of the dead, including inhumation, cremation, and ritual behaviours from almost the earliest times. In the Murray Valley, cemeteries are common from the terminal Pleistocene onwards. For example, at Kow Swamp, some forty interments have been identified, dating to between 14,000 and 9000 years ago<sup>49</sup> and thirty-three individuals were buried

<sup>49</sup> Thorne and Macumber, ‘Discoveries of Late Pleistocene Man’.



at Coobool Creek between *c.* 14,000 and 7000 years ago.<sup>50</sup> Many of these burials were said to contain grave goods.

These are all simple burials, which continue through the Holocene (post-Ice Age) and into the ethnographic present. Compound burials are harder to identify archaeologically. There is, however, one possible example, from King Island in Bass Strait. Archaeological excavations in a cave on the south-west coast of King Island revealed the skeletal remains of a male adult human, dated to *c.* 14,000 years ago. It appeared that after the individual died, his remains were exposed for a time, probably on the floor of the cave, and were then gathered together and buried under a mound. The remains were associated with pieces of red ochre.<sup>51</sup>

### *The Ethnographic Present — Aboriginal Australia*

Because Australia was a continent peopled by hunter-gatherers and exempt from Western influences until the relatively recent past, and shows remarkable cultural continuity through its long history, we think a consideration of recent Aboriginal burial practices may throw light on such practices among small societies not influenced by the world religions of the last two thousand years.

Anthropologist Les Hiatt,<sup>52</sup> musing in 1966 on an archaeological discovery at Port Hacking in Sydney, speculated that traditional Aboriginal burial rites in Australia were of two kinds, simple and compound disposal, and could be equated with two corresponding emotional responses to the dead: fear and love. There were two kinds of simple disposal, immediate interment in some form of grave with no subsequent disturbance, and cremation. Hiatt suggested that simple disposal was commonest in southern Australia. Compound disposal involved several variations. One was removing or drying the flesh and retaining the corpse for long periods before putting it in a final resting-place. In other cases, the corpse was buried, or exposed on a tree-platform until the flesh disappeared, then the bones were recovered, kept for a time, and eventually put in a final resting-place. According to Hiatt, compound disposal was commonest in northern Australia. Simple disposal, Hiatt thinks, was used to deal with the dead as expeditiously as possible, as the survivors *feared* the ghost of the deceased. Compound disposal, on the other hand, was evidence of *love* for the

<sup>50</sup> Brown, *Coobool Creek*.

<sup>51</sup> Sim and Thorne, 'Pleistocene Human Remains from King Island'.

<sup>52</sup> Hiatt, 'Mystery at Port Hacking'.

deceased, a desire to keep them close for as long as possible. Hiatt also notes in passing that love of the dead may be tempered by less amiable feelings, and invokes Freudian ambivalence.

Ethnoarchaeologist Betty Meehan (formerly Hiatt)<sup>53</sup> was impelled by L. Hiatt's arguments to make a more detailed study of disposal of the dead in Aboriginal Australia, and found inevitably that the case was more complex than he had allowed (and, to be fair, our description of his argument is something of a simplification in itself). She has discussed particularly cremation in Aboriginal Australia, including Tasmania.<sup>54</sup> In ethnohistorical sources for Tasmania, cremation was at least on some occasions followed by the collection of the ashes to be worn in a small skin pouch as an amulet. Sometimes ashes of the deceased were smeared across the face as a mourning cosmetic.<sup>55</sup> It is also the case that amongst the Tasmanian Aborigines, people often kept a bone from a deceased close relative to be worn as an amulet. An example may be seen in Thomas Bock's watercolour portrait of Tasmanian Aborigine Maulboyheenner.<sup>56</sup> B. Hiatt also discusses similar examples from the southern Australian mainland. This seems rather to cut across L. Hiatt's model in which expeditious removal means fear and incorporation means love. His model is, however, a starting-point for a consideration of emotional states associated with burials in non-agricultural societies.

In considering both the archaeological and the ethnohistorical evidence, it would seem that the general range of burial types seen in the ethnographic present in Australia has a long antiquity. Can we also infer the emotional response to the dead that accompanied these ancient disposals? Following Hiatt's model, we would be led to conclude that fear was a more prevalent emotion than love in disposing of the dead, as in the past simple interment or cremation seem to have been the main modes. But, as we have seen from the historical Tasmanian evidence, fear was tempered by the desire to hold the deceased close, in the form of ash or bone amulets. Unfortunately we have no archaeological evidence for the antiquity of such practices.

If fear is involved, it seems reasonable to suggest that this is a distinguishing characteristic of humans *vis à vis* other animals. Why were people afraid of

<sup>53</sup> Meehan, 'The Form, Distribution and Antiquity of Australian Aboriginal Mortuary Practices'.

<sup>54</sup> Hiatt, 'Cremation in Aboriginal Australia'.

<sup>55</sup> Hiatt, 'Cremation in Aboriginal Australia'.

<sup>56</sup> Plomley, 'Thomas Bock's Portraits of the Tasmanian Aborigines'.

the remains of dead members of their society? They must impute to the dead some capability for inflicting harm on those remaining alive, some notion of spirit which survives the death of the body. Archaeologists are wont to point to burials as indicating the existence of a belief in an afterlife, with goods placed in a grave for some imagined journey to a final resting place. We may however consider this from a different viewpoint, more connected with emotion than unknowable belief systems. If the dead are attributed with malevolence towards the living, then they need to be placated.

When considering the earliest evidence, the business-like disposal of the Neanderthal dead with no evidence of accompanying ritual, suggests a lack of on-going emotions about the dead. When, however, we come to the earliest burials of *Homo sapiens sapiens*, there is evidence for elaborate rituals, for simple disposals and also more complex disposals. Invoking L. Hiatt's model, we see evidence for *fear*, and we see evidence of *love*. We therefore suggest that one of the things distinguishing modern humans from their forbears, including Neanderthal, is the expression of these recognizable human emotions. It is likely that the dichotomy of fear/love is an oversimplification, and that humans had, and continue to have, ambivalent attitudes towards the dead, expressed in deep affective attitudes. This is evident in other times and places, and is picked up in various ways in other essays in this collection. Here we want to discuss one of the implications of this discussion about feeling towards the dead that is evident in the changing attitudes to disposal of the dead in Early Modern Britain.

### *Fear/Love of the Dead in Early Modern Britain*

The following thoughts arise from the pioneering excavation of the crypt of Christ Church, Spitalfields, east London. Whereas burial crypts in England had previously been cleaned up by professional removalists, the Christ Church crypt was excavated by professional archaeologists in the 1980s, setting new methodological, ethical, and professional standards for such work.<sup>57</sup>

In 1711, in the wake of the Great Fire of 1666, and due to the growth of the population in England, it was felt that London was suffering a deficit of churches. A House of Commons committee was formed to consider the rebuilding of the parish church in Greenwich, and widened its remit as to whether more churches were required in London and environs. An Act was set up with Commissions for Fifty New Churches to be built in 1710–11.

<sup>57</sup> Reeve and Adams, *The Spitalfields Project Volume 1*.

The new Act expressly forbade burial in the vaults of those churches. As the commissioners included architects, such as Christopher Wren, this ban was no doubt based on architectural opinion. The ban was only for churches built after the 1711 Act<sup>58</sup> and Wren wrote at the time he was appointed a commissioner that he 'wished that all burials in churches might be disallowed', because he believed it to be unwholesome and the practice affected the evenness of the pavements and the placement of the pews.<sup>59</sup>

In the event, only twelve new churches actually eventuated; one of them was Christ Church, built under architect Nicholas Hawksmoor.<sup>60</sup> Despite the ban on intramural burial, an endowment of a vault for Edward Peck and his family was made before 1727, and the first burial in the crypt took place a month after the church's consecration in 1729.<sup>61</sup> Such burials continued in considerable numbers until 1867, nearly twenty years after the passage of the Public Health Act of 1848 which was supposed to finally put a stop to such things.<sup>62</sup> The Spitalfields archaeological project recovered nine hundred and eighty-three burials, and estimated that at least one thousand burials had taken place within the walls of the church.<sup>63</sup> While few other eighteenth-century churches have been excavated with such precision, those that have been, combined with the historical record, indicate that Christ Church was not, as far as intramural burial went, unusual in Britain.<sup>64</sup> All of the twelve new churches built under the 1711 Act had extensive vaults used for intramural burials.<sup>65</sup>

Why, on the one hand, was intramural burial banned in at least some of these churches? And, on the other, why was the ban defied or at least ignored? We need to look briefly at its history. Christian burial in churchyards goes back to at least Anglo-Saxon times in Britain,<sup>66</sup> and intramural burial was common

<sup>58</sup> Churches in London and Westminster Act, 10 Anne cap. 11 Section 31 (1711).

<sup>59</sup> Christopher Wren, letter printed in *The European Magazine, and London Review*, 18 (August 1790), pp. 91–93.

<sup>60</sup> Reeve and Adams, *The Spitalfields Project Volume 1*, pp. 3 and 67.

<sup>61</sup> Reeve and Adams, *The Spitalfields Project Volume 1*, p. 13.

<sup>62</sup> Reeve and Adams, *The Spitalfields Project Volume 1*, p. 65.

<sup>63</sup> Reeve and Adams, *The Spitalfields Project Volume 1*, pp. 13 and 67.

<sup>64</sup> Miles and others, *St Marylebone Church and Burial Ground*; Page, 'St Peter's Church Carmarthen Excavation 2000'.

<sup>65</sup> Houlbrooke, *Death, Religion, and the Family*, p. 338.

<sup>66</sup> Houlbrooke, 'Death, Church and Family in England', p. 37; Morgan, 'The Burial Question in Leeds', p. 95.

in the later medieval period.<sup>67</sup> It was considered that the precinct within the church was more holy than the surrounding yard, and there were gradations of holiness within it, with the best spot being beneath the altar.<sup>68</sup> Accordingly, those places were reserved for clergy, but they were also available to individuals of wealth and status, and the church benefitted financially from such arrangements.<sup>69</sup>

The Reformation however substantially changed the orthodox (particularly Anglican) doctrinal view on the treatment of dead bodies. No longer were the dead thought to dwell for a time in Purgatory, nor was there any issue with respect to preserving bodies for the Resurrection. The reformers considered the idea of bodies gaining advantage from burial in hallowed ground, with gradations of sanctity, to be superstitious nonsense.<sup>70</sup> There was also a view held by some at the time that such practices were 'indecent and dangerous', i.e. to health.<sup>71</sup> Tarlow<sup>72</sup> quotes Zacharie Boyd writing in 1629:

Wherefore should I make the glorious House of my God a flesh pot of corruption?  
Fye upon our folie: should it be convenient that my stinking bones cast up anie  
noysome vapours, for to trouble the living at the service of the everliving?

Even before the Reformation, intramural burial was not highly regarded by all: Pope Gregory XI (1370–78) prohibited it as unwholesome.<sup>73</sup> In 1579 and again in 1743 the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland forbade burial within the church, and in Scotland this was widely observed, with the exception of Orkney.<sup>74</sup> In some parts of England, intramural burial continued to flourish through the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, declining in the later seventeenth century.<sup>75</sup> The overcrowding in church burial yards and associated stench and recognition of the spread of disease caused by the dead led to

<sup>67</sup> Gilchrist and Sloane, *Requiem*, p. 57.

<sup>68</sup> Gilchrist and Sloane, *Requiem*, p. 57; Tarlow, *Ritual, Belief and the Dead*, p. 38.

<sup>69</sup> Reeve and Adams, *The Spitalfields Project Volume 1*, pp. 65 and 80.

<sup>70</sup> Houllbrooke, 'Death, Church and Family in England', p. 38; Tarlow, *Ritual, Belief and the Dead*, p. 19.

<sup>71</sup> Thomas Lewis, *Seasonable Considerations*.

<sup>72</sup> Tarlow, *Ritual, Belief and the Dead*, p. 40.

<sup>73</sup> Litten, *The English Way of Death*, p. 199.

<sup>74</sup> Tarlow, *Bereavement and Commemoration*, pp. 89–90; Gittings, *Death, Burial and the Individual*, pp. 140–41.

<sup>75</sup> Gittings, *Death, Burial and the Individual*, pp. 141–43, p. 241.

a series of Acts that established public cemeteries from the mid-nineteenth century, forcing burials away from churches. The 1850 Metropolitan Interments Act made all interments in churches and within the metropolis illegal except in special cases under licence.<sup>76</sup>

Until the late seventeenth century, however, in London and elsewhere intramural burial continued in the face of official doctrinal disapproval, and doubts about its seemliness and hygiene. Archaeologists can discern no difference in burial practices in churches before and after the Reformation.<sup>77</sup> There is no doubt that one of the inducements for some at least of the clergy to continue to allow it was financial; Reeve and Adams<sup>78</sup> calculate that the '1000 or so burials in the vaults at Christ Church must alone have raised in excess of £2500' (today about 150,000AUD).<sup>79</sup> For the individuals desirous of such a burial for themselves or family members, it continued to be a matter of status.

Given the level of condemnation however, there must have been stronger reasons for continuing the practice. Here we may admit the possibility of emotional factors, and again we see both love and fear playing a part. With respect to love, it is clear that a level of superstition, or at least folk belief, continued to play a part in the views of the common folk, including those of quite high status (who could afford to pay for it) and the 'middling sort' who mostly comprised the individuals buried at Spitalfields.<sup>80</sup> Despite the views of the Anglican reformers, people still tended to a belief in a certain amount of bodily life after death; it was considered appropriate to make the corpse comfortable, and indeed cosy.<sup>81</sup> Burial within the almost literal bosom of the church expressed the love and concern of the living for the dead.

With respect to fear, while there was a certain amount of concern for the possibility of revenants, these were regarded as not all that malign. Obviously one did not want to encounter a ghost as it would be unsettling at least, but this was not something generating large amounts of fear.<sup>82</sup> What people between about 1700 and 1832 *were* desperately afraid of was the despoliation of their

<sup>76</sup> The Metropolitan Interments Act, 1850.

<sup>77</sup> Tarlow, *Ritual, Belief and the Dead*, p. 40.

<sup>78</sup> Reeve and Adams, *The Spitalfields Project Volume 1*, p. 67.

<sup>79</sup> See also Gittings, *Death, Burial and the Individual*, p. 143.

<sup>80</sup> Mollison and Cox, *The Spitalfields Project Volume 2*.

<sup>81</sup> Tarlow, *Ritual, Belief and the Dead*, p. 173; Reeve and Adams, *The Spitalfields Project Volume 1*, p. 65.

<sup>82</sup> Tarlow, *Ritual, Belief and the Dead*, pp. 179–80.

graves by bodysnatchers.<sup>83</sup> During this period, the only lawful source of bodies for anatomical study by the medical profession was corpses resulting from capital punishment. Given the active nature of medical research and training at this time, a black market in 'fresh' bodies developed, with people making a living from disturbing new graves and selling their contents directly or indirectly to surgeons who obviously were turning a blind eye to their sources. People were terrified that their bodies would endure such a fate, not only because of the disturbance itself, which was bad enough, but that they would then be exposed in public anatomical exhibitions, leading to indecency and violation in the public eye.<sup>84</sup> It is little wonder that strategies were developed to hinder the 'resurrection men', and one of the most favoured was burial within the walls of the church.<sup>85</sup>

There may be different aspects of love and fear operating here. Obviously burials in Aboriginal Australia differ hugely from those of Early Modern Britain in terms of belief systems, burial customs, and associated symbolism and ritual. There are however similar emotions at work. The attention to the 'comfort' of the dead person can be considered an act of expression of love. The location of burial inside the church may on the other hand be an indicator of fear: not so much fear *of* the dead, but fear *for* the dead. As indicated, revenants may have been considered 'real', but people were not particularly afraid of them. More serious was the fear of corpse desecration. People cared about post-death desecration because they had a post-death relationship with the deceased and, despite the body's having no life, it remained representative of the person. This was not limited to Early Modern England; many colonized people feared, and many still do fear, the desecration of their mortal remains by their colonial oppressors in the name of science. One of Australia's most famous women, the Tasmanian Aborigine Truganini, often expressed in her later years fear of being 'cut up' after her death.<sup>86</sup> And she was.

<sup>83</sup> Richardson, 'Why Was Death So Big in Victorian Britain?', pp. 107–08. See also Richardson, *Death, Dissection and the Destitute*.

<sup>84</sup> Tarlow, *Ritual, Belief and the Dead*, p. 95.

<sup>85</sup> Mytum, 'The Social History of the European Cemetery', p. 804.

<sup>86</sup> Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines*, p. 269.



## Conclusion

It is difficult to identify emotions from objects alone, particularly for deep time when the emotions felt may have been very different from those of today or in the written past. Ritual burials are uniquely human and apparently appear first with our own species *Homo sapiens sapiens*. While burials provide few clues about the emotions associated with 'grief', they do indicate a continuing relationship with the deceased person. The mode of burial, its condition and ritual evidence can provide information about the way in which the body remains part of that relationship and sometimes still has active properties of the deceased. Attitudes to burial across time and space demonstrate the individual's or community's love of the deceased. On the other hand, fear of or for the deceased are equally common emotions indicated throughout deep time and requiring protection from or of the body. Archaeology has a role to play in demonstrating those emotions, not perhaps in the kind of detail available from written records, but in terms of demonstrating human emotions across the boundaries of time and space.

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